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Abstract
This thesis is an examination of the role, experiences and contribution of the 
volunteers who fought in the British Battalion of the 15 International Brigade, in Spain’s 
civil war of 1936-1939.
The study analyses the composition of the British contingent, particularly their social, 
economic and political background, but also other aspects, such as their age and 
geographical origin. It examines the motivations of the volunteers, using the wealth of 
memoir and interview material, to explain why almost two and a half thousand men and 
women left Britain to fight ‘in a far away country.’
The volunteers’ experiences within Spain are traced, from the ‘first few’ who fought 
with the multifarious militia units in the defence of Madrid in the autumn and winter of 
1936, to the creation and development of the International Brigades, into which these 
volunteers and the later arrivals were integrated in early 1937. The role of the volunteers 
in the battles around Madrid of 1936-1937, and the battles of Aragon in 1937-38, is 
examined in particular detail. The narrative strand of the thesis concludes with an 
examination of the brutal experiences of the British captured and imprisoned by the 
Rebels during the war.
Finally, the thesis discusses some of the more contentious issues surrounding the role 
of the volunteers in the British Battalion in Spain. The organisation of the brigades and
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the role of the Comintern, and the maintenance of discipline, desertions, and the 
execution of volunteers are all examined closely. The study concludes that discipline was 
indeed tough in the International Brigades, particularly as all the members of the battalion 
were, after all, volunteers. However, it is argued that, in the main, this discipline was 
driven by military, rather than political necessity, and recent studies have over-played the 
extent of ‘Stalinist’ control within the battalion.
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Introduction
In November 1996, four hundred men and women, a small number of them from 
Britain and all in their eighties and nineties, gathered in a ceremony near the Spanish 
capital of Madrid to pay homage to their friends and comrades who had died fighting in 
the Spanish Civil War of 1936-1939. These were the surviving members of the 
International Brigades, the volunteers from around the world that had rushed to the 
country between 1936 and 1938, to fight for the Spanish Republic against its enemies 
from both inside, and outside, Spain. For many of these volunteers, this was their first 
visit to Spain since the civil war, for they had refused to set foot in Spain whilst the 
regime of General Franco, which so many of their comrades had died to prevent, still 
existed. However, following the death of Franco in 1975, a new democratic government 
had replaced the old regime, and as a gesture of gratitude to the international volunteers 
who had come to Spain to fight the military uprising of 1936, sixty years after the 
outbreak of the war, the Spanish Government offered citizenship to the surviving 
members of the Brigades.1 So what did these volunteers do that was so significant such 
that, sixty years later, the few hundred still alive would be offered the citizenship of 
Spain? Who were they? Where did they come from? Why did they go to Spain? And how 
much did they actually help the Spanish Republic? These are some of the questions that 
this study will attempt to answer. However, an explanation of the events within Spain 
preceding the outbreak of civil war is necessary for, whilst it is undeniable that the war
1 However, the offer was of somewhat limited value, for it required the renouncing of one’s own nationality 
as a condition of acceptance of Spanish nationality.
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developed an international dimension, it is inside Spain itself that the causes of the war 
are to be found.
The military coup launched by a group of army officers against the Spanish 
Government on the 17 July 1936, was the culmination of a struggle for supremacy 
between two political blocs within Spain, united by little except mutual incomprehension 
and enmity. That the Spanish Government should be confronted by an armed insurrection 
came as no surprise to many observers; in the five years that the beleaguered Republican 
Government had existed it had faced mortal threats from both left and right. A military 
rising led by General Sanjurjo in August 1932, and a proletarian revolution in the 
Asturias and Catalonia in October 1934 may have been crushed, but the political and 
social forces that had been behind them most certainly were not. Indeed, the history of 
the Spanish Second Republic had been one of ever-increasing political polarisation.
Spain’s Second Republic, la nina bonita, had been proclaimed following the 
municipal elections on 12 April 1931 that had been taken to be a plebiscite on the 
monarchy, and had recorded an overwhelmingly hostile vote against it. The King, 
Alfonso XIII, realising that he had lost not just the support of the populace but, crucially, 
the support of the military, fled Spain. For many Spaniards the birth o f the Republic was 
celebrated by exuberant public rejoicing; this seemed to many to signal the beginning of 
the end for the powerful Spanish elites, and to offer a relief from abject poverty for 
millions of landless peasants. However, the Republic’s attempts to reform powerful 
institutions like the Church and the Army, at the same time as challenging entrenched
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economic interests in the landed, industrial and banking oligarchies, never achieved the 
success expected by the Republic’s supporters on the left, whilst antagonising their 
opponents on the right.2 Separation of Church and State, modernisation of the top-heavy 
army and attempts to reform the deeply unequal distribution of the land were all regarded 
with horror by the established elites. In addition, attempts to meet the demands for 
regional autonomy from areas such as the Basque Country and Catalonia, further 
outraged the Spanish army, who believed in their duty to preserve ‘the true and 
indivisible Spain.’
The situation did not take long to escape from the Government’s rather tenuous 
control. Anarchist elements demonstrated their opposition to the Catholic Church by 
burning churches. The Government, unwilling to use the forces of order against workers, 
some of whom were their own supporters, sat on their hands. If the Government’s 
reformist programme had not already alienated the Army and Church, the Government’s 
inability, or unwillingness, to control their supporters, guaranteed their opposition.
The army’s withdrawal o f support was made explicit in August 1932 with General 
Sanjurjo’s pronunciamiento (military rising). The coup was a poorly kept secret and easily 
suppressed, but the event clearly showed that the Republican Government faced deadly 
opposition from sections of the Right in Spain. When Azaha’s Republican/Socialist 
Government lost the elections in 1933 and was replaced by a conservative/reactionary 
Government, many of the reforms were, at best, shelved or, in many cases, overturned. The
2 As Paul Preston points out, “Ultimately, the new regime was to fail because it neither carried through its 
threatened reforms nor fulfilled the utopian expectations of its most fervent supporters.” Paul Preston, A
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left was not long in voicing its outrage. In October 1934, in the mining areas of the Asturias 
in northern Spain and in Catalonia, a general strike rapidly turned into armed insurrection. It 
was brutally suppressed by the army, with the help of Moorish troops from North Africa, 
used for the first time in mainland Spain.3 In the ensuing repression, Republicans and 
Socialists across Spain were imprisoned, including almost the entire leadership of the 
Socialist trade union, the Union General de Trabajadores (UGT).
In the Spanish elections held eighteen months later in February 1936, a coalition of 
Socialists and Republicans united in a ‘Popular Front’ won a narrow victory over the 
opposing coalition of the Right and prepared themselves to revive the reformist programme 
of 1931. Meanwhile, elements of the Spanish Right, who had lost any faith in the Republic, 
prepared for war. The murder o f Calvo Sotelo, a prominent Catholic conservative 
politician, on 13 July by members of the Republican Assault Guard (itself a response to 
the murder of one of their comrades, Lieutenant Jose Castillo, the previous day), served 
as the perfect excuse for the leader o f the plot, General Emilio Mola. On the evening of 
17 July the garrisons rose in Melilla, Tetuan and Ceuta in Morocco, and the revolt 
quickly spread to the mainland. In conservative areas o f Spain such as Old Castile the 
rising was, in general, successful, but in other areas, including the major cities o f Madrid 
and Barcelona, the Generals met with bitter and effective resistance. However, whilst the 
coup was not successful in capturing Spain in its entirety, it was not an outright failure. 
To a great extent the Rebel and Government forces were evenly matched: the 
Republicans holding most of the navy, air-force and territory including the capital and the
Concise History o f the Spanish Civil War (London: Fontana, 1996) p.24.
3 Gabriel Jackson, The Spanish Republic and the Civil War 1931-1939 (Princeton: Princeton, 1976) p.157.
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vital industrial regions o f the Basque Country and Catalonia, whilst the Rebels controlled 
the majority of the army, including the formidable Army o f Africa under the command of 
General Franco.4 The Army o f Africa was the Spanish Army’s elite, battle hardened 
from the Morocco campaign. However, it was trapped on the wrong side of the strait of 
Gibraltar, and the Republicans controlled the vast majority of the navy.
At this point, forces outside Spain decisively altered the progress of the conflict. 
Despite Spain’s civil war beginning as a typically Spanish pronunciamiento, the struggle 
quickly took on significance beyond a domestic military Rebellion against a 
constitutionally elected Republican Government. Instead, it evolved from a civil war into 
‘world war in miniature,’ becoming, “the screen on to which foreigners projected then- 
own concerns with such luminous clarity.”5 The extent of foreign involvement ensured 
that the conflict lasted considerably longer than either side might at first have expected, 
though once the insurgent generals’ rising had failed in the major cities such as Madrid, 
the strategic position of the two sides virtually guaranteed a protracted struggle, rather 
than the swift pronunciamiento on which the Rebels had gambled.
There were two events that involved significant external assistance in the early stages 
of the conflict, and which had a profound effect on the development o f the war: the airlift 
of Franco’s Army of Africa by the German JU 52’s and Italian Savoia-Marchetti S.81
4 Raymond Carr, The Spanish Tragedy. The Civil War in Perspective (London: Phoenix, 2000) pp.87-89.
5 Piers Brendon, The Dark Valley: A Panorama o f  the 1930s (London: Jonathon Cape, 2000) p.307.
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bombers across the straits o f Gibraltar was absolutely crucial for the Nationalists;6 whilst 
the involvement of the International Brigades in the Battle for Madrid in the winter of 
1936-19377 helped inflict the first real defeat on the Rebels in their hitherto virtually 
unopposed march on the capital.8 These volunteers came from countries across the world 
to help the beleaguered Spanish Republic, many of them with bitter experiences of 
fighting against fascism and with personal scores to settle. To these ‘anti-fascists,’ Italy, 
Portugal, Austria and Germany had all fallen to fascism, and now Spain was similarly 
under mortal threat. Weary of this remorseless spread o f right-wing ideologies through 
much o f Europe, it was felt that in Spain the tide might, at last, be stemmed. Thus many 
thousands volunteered to fight for the Republicans, the majority o f whom served in the 
International Brigades.
The International Brigades were recruited and organised by the Communist 
International (the Comintern), which was quick to respond to the influx of foreign 
volunteers for the Republic. Originally reluctant,9 Stalin was, by the end of September
6 Robert Whealey, for example, points out that had the airlift not taken place, “the military Rebellion might 
have been overcome in a few weeks.” Robert Whealey, ‘Foreign Intervention in the Spanish Civil War’ in 
The Republic and the Civil War in Spain by Raymond Carr (ed.), (London: Macmillan, 1971) p.218.
7 The boost in morale of the population of Madrid caused by the arrival of a disciplined group of soldiers 
marching with precision must have been dramatic. Geoffrey Cox, a reporter of the battle for Madrid for the 
Daily Express claimed that there were over 3 000 International Brigaders in Spain by November 1936 (of 
whom about 60 were British) and that “trained men were fighting trained men at last”. Geoffrey Cox, The 
Defence o f Madrid (Gollancz, 1937) pp.69-76. However, Hugh Thomas argues that their influence was, at 
first, more psychological than military. Hugh Thomas, The Spanish Civil War, 3rd ed. (London: Penguin, 
1990) pp.479-481.
8 Though Franco’s political rather than military decision to divert to Toledo to relieve the besieged garrison 
played an important role in allowing time to prepare Madrid’s defences.
9 Stalin was at first tempted to leave it to France to support the Republic. Alan Bullock, Hitler and Stalin 
(London: Fontana, 1993) p.578. There were two factions within the Comintern. The moderates, of whom 
Stalin was originally a member, opposed intervention in the war. See E.H. Carr, The Comintern and the 
Spanish Civil War (London: Macmillan, 1984) p. 15 and Denis Smyth, ‘Soviet Policy Towards Republican 
Spain: 1936-1939’, in P. Preston & A. Mackenzie A (eds.), The Republic Besieged: Civil War in Spain 
1936-1939 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1996) pp.91-92. According to Walter Krivitsky, the
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1936, persuaded to support the idea of the formation of the Brigades by Dimitrov, the 
head of the Comintern, and by several senior Russian generals, who realised the potential 
value of military lessons that might be learnt in Spain.10 For Stalin, who was concerned at 
the extent of German and Italian help for the Rebels and its potential severely to weaken 
France, the International Brigades offered an opportunity to support the Spanish 
Republican forces without intervening directly, thus reducing the risk of alienating 
Britain and France with whom he was trying desperately to establish detente.11 The 
recruitment of the International Brigades was coordinated by the Communist Party in 
France where, like Spain, a Popular Front Government had been elected, and which was 
situated conveniently bordering Spain. Besides, the French Communist Andre Marty, 
who was later to play a central role as commander of the International Brigades’ training 
base at Albacete, was a member of the executive committee of the Comintern.
This influx of foreign volunteers into Spain came despite twenty-eight countries 
signing up to an agreement of non-intervention in the war, initially proposed by France, 
strongly championed by Britain, and flagrantly ignored by Russia, Italy and Germany.12
Russian intelligence officer, Stalin decided to help the Republic militarily on 31 August at a Politburo 
meeting in Moscow. (Thomas, Spanish Civil War, p.441). However, Alexander Orlov, the senior NKVD 
representative in Spain, claimed in an interview with Stanley Payne, that it was a few days earlier, on 
August 26 1936. Text of interview cited in Frank Schauff ‘The NKVD in Spain. Questions by Stanley 
Payne, answers by Alexander Orlov’, Forum Jur osteuropdische Ideen-und Zeitgeschichte, (4 Jahrgang 
2000), Heft 2, pp.229-250.
10 Vincent Brome, The International Brigades: Spain, 1936-1939 (London: Heinemann, 1965) p.15.
11 Stalin was determined to keep Russia’s foreign policy (overtly, if not covertly) in line with that of 
Britain and France, Russia’s potential allies against fascist aggression.
12 How much pressure the British Government put on the French Prime Minister M. Blum remains an open 
question. Hugh Thomas claims that Eden told Blum to “be prudent”, however Eden denied that the matter 
was discussed at all. See Anthony Eden, Memoirs Part 1: Facing the Dictators (London: Cassell & Co, 
1962) pp.401-403 and Thomas, Spanish Civil War, p.344. It was widely believed by supporters of the 
Republic that pressure had been put on the French Government. See ‘Spanish War Brings Powers into 
Conflict’, News Chronicle 27 July 1936 (p. 1) which claimed that, “there is reason to believe that during M.
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Meanwhile, the instigators o f the agreement, determined to limit the war to Spain, set up 
the impotent Non-Intervention Committee (NIC) in London, under the hopelessly 
ineffective chairmanship of Lord Plymouth.13 Indeed, so ineffective was the non­
intervention committee that the German representative, Joachim Von Ribbentrop, later 
joked that a better name for the NIC would have been the ‘intervention committee.’14 The 
British Government, fully aware that several countries were bypassing the agreement, turned 
a blind eye. The Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden later remarked, “better a leaky dam than 
no dam at all,”15 even though official documents confirm that the British Government knew 
that the Nationalists were benefiting far more from the agreement than the Republicans.16 
As one commentator on the British Government’s reactions to the war has observed, “The 
Foreign Office was less troubled by a war scare than a red scare.”17
Blum’s visit to London it was hinted to him that the British Government would consider it a friendly 
gesture if France declined materially to assist the Spanish loyalists.”
13 As Jill Edwards points out, the agreement was little more than “a series of slightly differing accords” 
with no real means of enforcement. Jill Edwards, The British Government and The Spanish Civil War 
(London: Macmillan, 1979) p.41.
14 Thomas, Spanish Civil War, p.396.
15 Hugh Thomas ‘The Spanish Civil War’, from History o f the Twentieth Century, by A.J.P.Taylor (ed.), 
(London: Pumell, 1968), p. 1601.
16 Sir Robert Gilmour Vansittart, permanent under-secretary at the Foreign Office, pointed out in 1939 that 
“the whole course of our policy on non-intervention has in reality as we all know worked in an extremely 
one sided manner.” FO 371/2415-W973/5/41, Vansittart to Halifax, 16th January 1939, cited in Jill Edwards, 
p.212. This was also acknowledged in Nationalist Spain: Pedro Sainz Rodriguez, a monarchist conspirator, 
declared that, “The fundamental reason for us winning the war was the English diplomatic position 
opposing intervention in Spain.” Enrique Moradiellos, ‘The Origins of British Non-Intervention in the 
Spanish Civil War: Anglo-Spanish Relations in early 1936’, European History Quarterly, 21:3, (July 1991) 
p.340.
17 Douglas Little, ‘Red Scare, 1936: Anti-Bolshevism and the Origins of British Non-Intervention in the 
Spanish Civil War’ Journal o f  Contemporary History 23 (1988) pp. 292. Little explains that, “What one 
critic has labelled Britain’s ‘malevolent neutrality’ in the Spanish Civil War, then, stemmed more from 
ideological than from strategic considerations. Despite considerable evidence that Germany and Italy were 
much more deeply involved than Russia during the early days of the Spanish strife, Britain quickly adopted 
a ‘better Franco than Stalin’ approach, which probably helped shape the strategy of appeasement over the 
following two years. Given disturbing signs from Madrid to Athens of a new wave of Soviet subversion in 
early 1936, by August, Whitehall clearly believed that republican Spain was better dead than red.” Little, 
pp. 306-307.
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Among the three thousand foreign volunteers who had arrived in Spain to help defend 
the Spanish Republic in late 1936, was a number from Britain. Some are well known, like 
John Comford, the brilliant Marxist intellectual, and Esmond Romilly, the nephew of 
Winston Churchill; others not so, such as William Gough, a metal finisher from Luton 
and Phil Gillan, a lorry driver from Glasgow.18 Many more arrived in Spain to fight 
alongside them and British volunteers were involved in many of the major battles in the 
conflict, from the defence o f Madrid between November 1936 and March 1937, to the 
last desperate Republican assault across the River Ebro in July 1938.19
British casualties in Spain were to be high, with as many as one quarter killed and 
over half o f the total number o f volunteers sustaining some kind o f wound.20 The last 
brigaders were withdrawn at the end of 1938 and returned to Britain in December just 
after the farewell parade in Barcelona, renowned for the impassioned speech of the 
Communist deputy from the Asturias, Dolores Ibarruri, lLa Pasionaria’:21
Comrades of the International Brigades! Political reasons, reasons of state, the good of 
that same cause for which you offered your blood with limitless generosity, send some of 
you back to your countries and some to forced exile. You can go with pride. You are 
history. You are legend. You are the heroic example of the solidarity and the 
universality of democracy... We will not forget you; and, when the olive tree of peace 
puts forth its leaves, entwined with the laurels of the Spanish Republic’s victory, come 
back! Come back to us and here you will find a homeland.
18 For details on the backgrounds of Gough and Gillan see the International Brigade Archive (IBA) Box 
21/A and Box D-7 File A/2. Both volunteers also appear in two personal accounts of the first months of the 
civil war. See Esmond Romilly, Boadilla (Hamish Hamilton, 1937) pp.39-43, and Keith Scott Watson, 
Single to Spain (London: Arthur Baker, 1937) p. 103.
19 See chapters three, four and five.
20 IBA Box C File 1/1. See also Bill Alexander, British Volunteers fo r Liberty (London: Lawrence & 
Wishart, 1982) pp.29-30.
21 See chapter five.
17
Introduction
FRANCE
PYRENEES
'o^X  Aragon Rpoii*
Front
EX—l
Zaragoza '♦ cuente$ ^  £|,f0 Barcelona
Belch,t« V Q u m to ^  £ 3  jy
C^Cospe* Ebro-""''"’” 
Gandesa*/ Offensive 
Great IA
Retreats A '
Salamanca S ^ ^ rRAN^
Brunete M a d r id  /  
Offensive •  ( /<p
Jaram a
Valley
Battle of Teruel •(Valencia
•T o ro z o n a  \  
*AlbacefeSPAIN
Cordoba MEDITERRANEAN
SEA
Map 1. Military actions of the British Battalion in Spain.22
Many would never return, with large numbers of German and Italian volunteers in 
particular, dying in concentration camps in World War Two. Some too fought and died 
with the French Maquis. And neither Pasionaria nor the volunteers could have imagined
22 Source o f  map: Peter Carroll, The Odyssey o f  the Abraham Lincoln Brigade (California: Stanford Press, 
1994) p.xvi.
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that they would have to wait so long to return.23 But, nevertheless, greatly reduced in 
number, grey haired and many walking with the aid of sticks; come back they did.
Sixty years earlier, these grey haired old men had been amongst the thousands who 
had volunteered for the International Brigades in Spain, despite the considerable danger 
of death or serious injury.24 Furthermore, they found that even the task of joining the 
Spanish Republican Army was not necessarily an easy one, for the journey to Spain itself 
involved risking imprisonment, or worse.
Before December 1936, when the Communist Party began recruiting in earnest, 
volunteers with their own passports and money often travelled to Spain under their own 
steam.25 However, following the British Government’s implementation of the Foreign 
Enlistment Act on 9 January 1937 and the banning of volunteers under the Non- 
Intervention Agreement in February 1937, recruitment obviously had to become rather 
secretive.26 Any person found guilty o f an offence under this act could be punished by a 
fine and up to two years in prison,27 though no one was ever actually prosecuted.28
23 A number of British volunteers travelled to Spain in 1981 to revisit the battle sites on which they had 
fought, and where many of their comrades had been killed or wounded. This was filmed by the BBC, and 
shown as ‘Return to the Battlefields’ the following year. In 1986, five years later, many of them returned 
for the fiftieth anniversary of the civil war held in Madrid.
24 The two following chapters explain why so many volunteers left the British Isles to fight for the Spanish 
Republic.
25 As Bill Alexander, one of the Commanders of the British Battalion, recounts, “A passport, the fare of £5- 
8-0, and a determination to fight were enough for the first few.” Alexander, p.43.
26 See S.P Mackenzie, ‘The Foreign Enlistment Act and the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939’, Twentieth 
Century History, 10:1, (1999)pp.52-66.
27 Bill Rust, Britons in Spain (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1939) p.9.
28 Alexander, p.45.
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The procedure for volunteering was similar for most of those who left for Spain 
during 1937 and 1938. Contacts would be made with the local Communist Party branch, 
which would send the volunteers to the party offices in King Street in London’s Covent 
Garden, until February 1937, after which they were sent to a nearby office above what 
would later become the Dependents’ Aid headquarters at 1 Litchfield St. Here they would 
be interviewed by R.W. Robson, known to all as ‘Robbie,’ who would assess their 
suitability, in military and political terms.29 Some potential volunteers were turned away 
for their lack o f experience in either field, but political commitment was regarded as an 
acceptable surrogate for military experience. Volunteers were also turned away if  they 
lacked credentials (membership o f a trade union or appropriate political organisation), but 
if  they returned they would usually be accepted, for, ‘This would be taken as evidence of 
their sincerity.”30
Those accepted would be told to purchase weekend return rail-tickets from Victoria 
Railway Station to Paris, which did not require a passport. At the railway station 
somewhat ineffectual efforts by the British Special Branch would be made to dissuade 
the volunteers from travelling. One volunteer described how,
Victoria Station was as thick as flies on ground with special agent men and detectives, 
you could tell by their huge boots.. .But they could do nothing about it.31
29 Robson was moved from the Communist Party’s office in King St. to Litchfield St. in February 1937 
following the British Government’s implementation of the Foreign Enlistment Act, which made it a 
criminal offence to volunteer for Spain. The office was, from June 1937, the headquarters of the 
International Brigades Dependents’ Aid Fund. Hywell Francis, Miners Against Fascism: Wales and the 
Spanish Civil War (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1984) p. 157.
30 Alexander, p.44.
31 Interview with Charles Morgan, Imperial War Museum Sound Archive (IWMSA) 10362/2/1.
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Some volunteers were followed, and the Communist Party and Dependents’ Aid offices 
were kept under surveillance, but little was done seriously to prevent the volunteers from 
going.32 Tommy James remembers that, “the CID fellows at Dover favoured us with a 
searching look,” but that no attempt was made to prevent them leaving.33 John Longstaff, 
who served as a runner with the British Battalion, remembered encountering a degree of 
hostility from a plain-clothes policeman, but little else.34 These somewhat half-hearted 
efforts to thwart recruitment made little impact for, as one of the British volunteers stated, 
they were confident that, “this was only intimidation. They had no legal right to do 
anything about it.”35 As S.P. Mackenzie has shown, the authorities recognised that there 
were major legal problems in applying the 1870 Foreign Enlistment Act to volunteering 
for the Spanish war.36
On arrival in Paris the volunteers underwent a medical examination and further 
checks on their political reliability.37 Care had to be exercised, for groups of volunteers 
would occasionally be arrested and repatriated back home after a stay in a French jail,38
32 Walter Gregory was followed from his home town, Nottingham, to London and on to Dover. He also 
believed himself to be being watched whilst he was in Paris but, again, nothing was done to stop him 
travelling to Spain. Walter Gregory, The Shallow Grave: A Memoir o f the Spanish Civil War (London: 
Victor Gollancz, 1986) p.24.
33 Lewis & Gledhill, A Lion o f  a Man (Yorkshire Art Circus, 1985) p.36.
34 Interview with John Longstaff, IWMSA 9299/13/3-4, cited in Mackenzie, p.63.
35 Interview with Edwin Greening, IWMSA 9855/7/2.
36 The act required that both sides, first, were at peace with Britain and, second, were recognised by Britain 
as de facto foreign states. As Rebel Spain was not recognised, this made the application of the act legally 
questionable. As S.P. Mackenzie states, “While the volunteers could be questioned and some turned back, 
and confrontations might be heated, nobody was ever arrested.” Mackenzie, p.63.
37 Alexander, p.46 and Rust, p. 10.
38 See, for example, the interview with Frank McCusker in Iain MacDougall (ed.) Voices from the Spanish 
Civil War: Personal Recollections o f Scottish Volunteers in Republican Spain, 1936-1939 (Edinburgh: 
Polygon, 1986) p.42. McCusker was arrested in Perpignan on the Franco-Spanish border, charged with 
vagrancy, and repatriated back to Britain. “They put me on the train, then they put me on the boat and put 
me back into London again. That was on the Wednesday. On the Friday I was back on the boat tae France 
again and I got right through then.” Alim Williams, a Welsh nurse, was arrested in the Pyrenees with
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though many volunteers believed that the French police didn’t make undue effort to catch 
them, and that many were sympathetic to their cause.39 William Feeley, a glass-worker 
from St. Helens in Lancashire, remembers being interrogated by a non-intervention 
observer in France who asked if they were on their way to Spain.
They said, “Well, where are you going?” So we said, “Beziers.” “And where are you 
going to after that?” “Back to Paris.” He said, “Not to Spain?” And they all had broad 
grins on their faces, cos they knew perfectly well where we were going. We put on an 
expression of horror at this, “Spain, no, not likely!” And they all just burst out laughing 
and left us there.40
In any event, were a volunteer to be arrested and returned to Britain, his next attempt to 
get to Spain was likely to be successful41
At Paris they would be met by a Communist Party representative, who for a time in 
1937 was Charlotte Haldane (under the pseudonym ‘Rita’42), wife o f J.B.S. Haldane, the 
scientist, and mother o f Ronnie Burgess, who served in the British Battalion43 
Volunteers would be given a stem lecture on the importance o f avoiding establishments 
offering the temptations o f sex and alcohol, though these warnings had a rather limited 
impact on some.44
another Welshman, Jack Roberts, for vagrancy. However, as both Williams and Roberts had money, the 
authorities were forced to let them go. They continued on their way. Both served in Spain and survived the 
war. Interview with Huw Alun Menai Williams, IWMSA 10181/5/2 & IBA Box D-7 File A/1.
39 See, for example, interview with George Murray in MacDougall, p. 101 and Alexander, pp.46-47.
40 Interview with William Feeley, IWMSA 848/4/1.
41 Mackenzie, p.63.
42 See ‘Diary of Sid Hamm’, in Robert Stradling, Brother Against Brother, (Stroud: Sutton, 1998) p.155.
43 Charlotte Haldane, Truth Will Out (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1949) p.l 13. Her son fought under 
his father’s name, Burgess, who had been Charlotte Haldane’s previous husband.
44 For this reason, in December 1936 Walter Tapsell, later a British Battalion Commissar, wrote back to 
Robson, responsible for recruitment in London, recommending that the sum of money given to volunteers
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From Paris they would travel to Spain by train, until February 1937, after which the 
usual route was to be smuggled in groups over the top of the Pyrenees. The volunteers 
would be gathered together in groups from many different countries. As well as British, 
there were, “Germans, Poles, Czechs, all sorts.”45 Many volunteers describe the tough 
physical demands of the climb, which could last for up to sixteen hours46- most o f the 
volunteers were, after all, from an urban background- though some relished the climb, 
such as George Wheeler, who described the climb as, “exciting and exhilarating,”47 or 
Tom Murray, who managed to carry one volunteer, previously injured in Spain, for much 
of the journey 48 Not surprisingly, a number of volunteers described how their eventual 
arrival was met with a mixture of relief and excitement that the climbing was finally over 
and they were, at last, in Spain.49
From the border they would then be taken by lorry a short distance to Figueras, a 
collecting point for volunteers entering Spain from the north, and then by train to the 
International Brigade HQ at Albacete (roughly half-way between Madrid and Valencia), 
where volunteers would be processed and divided up by nationality. British volunteers 
were then sent on to their base nearby at Madrigueras, until July 1937, after which it was 
transferred to Tarazona de la Mancha. Here their military training, such as it was, would 
take place, before they joined their comrades, the majority of whom fought as infantry on
be reduced. He also complained that a number of volunteers were arriving in Spain, suffering from venereal 
diseases. IBA Box C, File 8/2.
45 Interview with Harold Fraser, IWMSA 795/5/2. See also, for example, interview with John Dunlop, 
IWMSA 11355/13/3 and Dolly Shaer, Frank West: In His Own Words (unpublished).
46 See for example, the description of a volunteer who collapses from the strain of the climb. Rust, p.l 1 and 
Steve Fullarton’s remark that, “I can’t remember an awful lot about climbing the mountains, except that it 
was very tiring.” Interview with Steve Fullarton, in MacDougall, p.291.
47 Conversation with Richard Baxell, 26 February 2001.
48 Interviews with Steve Fullarton and Tom Murray, in MacDougall, pp.291 & 309.
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the front-line, where, as James Hopkins stated recently, the volunteers would find 
themselves in ‘the heart of the fire.’50 Few would escape unscathed.
49 For example, see interview with James Jump, IWMSA 9524/6/2.
50 James K. Hopkins, Into the Heart o f the Fire: The British in the Spanish Civil War (California: Stanford, 
1998).
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1. Who were the British volunteers?
“Because they were so scattered, therefore, there are no statistics 
of the makeup of the English volunteers, nor is it possible to know 
exactly how many there were of them.”
Judith Cook, Apprentices o f Freedom (London: Quartet Press, 
1979) p.23.
Since almost the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War, rather imaginative claims have 
been made, by both supporters and opponents of the Second Republic, of the level of 
foreign intervention for the Republic.1 The following assessment written just after the 
war by Arthur Loveday, a British supporter of Franco, is typical:
General Franco’s staff put them at 100 000 men and other experts at from 50 000 to 150 
000.. .They were certainly as numerous and possibly more numerous than foreigners 
fighting for Franco.2
Likewise, in 1952 the Spanish Foreign Ministry estimated the numbers at 125 000, and in 
1974, Andreu Castells’ work on the Internationals put the numbers at around 60 000.3
1 Typical is the claim by Harold Cardozo that, “at least 10 000 volunteers” had passed through Perpignan 
alone by the end of November 1936. Harold Cardozo, March o f a Nation (London: Eare & Spottiswoode, 
1937) p. 184. And it was not just assessments of the number of volunteers that were inflated. Estimates of 
the level of materiel supplied to the Republic have also been shown to be gross exaggerations. As Gerald 
Howson’s meticulous study demonstrates, “The material strengths of the two sides were balanced so 
unequally against the Republicans that a great deal of what has been published about the Spanish Civil War 
in general of the various battles in particular will have to be rewritten.” Gerald Howson, Arms fo r Spain: 
The Untold Story o f  the Spanish Civil War (London: John Murray, 1998) p.250.
2 Arthur F. Loveday, World War in Spain (London: John Murray, 1939) p. 134. Loveday was a 
Conservative M.P. and a devoted follower of Franco and dedicated his book to, “Spain the saviour of 
Western Europe from the Crescent, Lepanto, 1571 and from the Sickle and Hammer, 1936-1939.” Loveday 
was a regular contributor to the pro-Franco newspaper the Morning Post whose views were probably a 
fairly accurate representation of his own. The first of many letters from him appeared on 29 July 1936 p.9 
complaining of the use of the term “loyalists to describe Republicans who have discarded God and their 
King, destroyed Churches, persecuted priests, are supported by irregulars wearing the red shirt of 
communism and professing its doctrines, and do, in theory and in fact, represent anarchy. The side
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These generous estimates probably make the mistake of including the large number of 
Spaniards in the International Brigades within the calculations. The experiences of John 
Peet, a member of the British Battalion who worked in the Post Office in the International 
Brigade base at Albacete, “where all the names of the members of the International 
Brigades were card indexed” support this. Peet states that,
There has never been, as far as I am aware, an accurate estimate of how many men served 
in the International Brigades...It wasn’t easy to determine. I couldn’t simply count the 
cards to determine how many men were there. The cards included not only the names of 
the International volunteers, but also of the very considerable numbers of Spaniards, who 
by January 1938, had volunteered or been drafted into the Brigades to make up the 
strengths.4
The International Brigades always included a number of Spaniards, “the only way of 
replacing casualties”5 particularly after September 1937 when the Republican 
Government published a decree incorporating the International Brigades into the 
Republican Army6 and ruled that there must be a Spanish battalion in every international 
brigade, a Spanish company in every battalion and a Spanish section in every company.7
described as ‘ Rebels’ represent the maintenance of law and order, the bulk of the regular army, and those 
people who are loyal to God and the Christian Church.”
3 Figures from Spanish Foreign Ministry and Andreu Castells, Las brigadas intemacionales de la guerra
de Espana (1974) cited in Thomas, Spanish Civil War, p.982fn.2.
4 Interview with John Peet, in D. Corkhill & S. Rawnsley (eds.), The Road to Spain: Anti Fascists at War 
1936-1939 (Fife: Borderline, 1981) p. 104.
5 For example, after Brunete, in July 1937, estimates suggest that between sixty and seventy per-cent of the 
X I1 International Brigade were Spanish. R. Dan Richardson, Comintern Army (University of Kentucky 
Press, 1972) p.89.
6 A copy of this decree (in English translation) appears in Arthur Landis, History o f  the Abraham Lincoln 
Brigade (New York: Citadel Press, 1967) pp.331-335.
7 Numbers of British in the battalion fell after costly battles such as Jarama, then gradually rose again as
new recruits arrived to replace them. As Tom Wintringham, one of the commanders of the British battalion 
explained, “The number of ‘English’ in our battalion in this period [February to May 1937] varied from 
three-hundred to thirty-five.” Tom Wintringham, English Captain (London: Faber & Faber, 1939) p.141.
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Now, more than sixty years after the defeat o f the Republic, most estimates accept 
that between 1936 and 1938 over 35 000 people from perhaps as many as fifty-three 
nations left their homes to join the Republican forces.8 However, even the most generous 
estimates o f intervention for the Republic are dwarfed by the numbers intervening on the 
Nationalist side.9
Charlotte Haldane, who later became the Honourary Secretary of the Dependents’ 
Aid Committee in Britain and worked in Paris in early 1937 in the International Brigade 
office handling the British volunteers, later alleged that all foreign Communist parties 
had been assigned recruitment quotas for the International Brigades.
The Communist Parties were charged with the local and national organisation. The 
number of recruits each party had the task of raising was assessed according to its 
membership man-power and its sympathisers. The assessments were high; in many cases 
higher than the local Party leaders could possible attain.. .The British Communist party 
was also given a quota to raise. It was one of the smaller and more insignificant of the 
European parties.. .It had been at first decided only to send unmarried men over twenty- 
one. But the smallness of their numbers compelled the British C.P., under orders from the 
C.I. [the Communist International] to furnish its quota of volunteers, to extend its 
recruitment among married comrades and the youth of the Young Communist League.10
8 See Thomas, Spanish Civil War, p.985. John Peet’s estimate, drawn from the index cards at the post 
office in Albacete, was just over 40 000. Interview with John Peet in Corkhill & Rawnsley, p. 105. Bill 
Alexander, who served as a political commissar and later Commander of the British Battalion, originally 
claimed that the figure was around 42 000, though his most recent estimate of 35 000 was very near the 
contemporary estimate by the League of Nations which put the number near 32 000. For the original 
estimate, see Alexander, p.29. His revised estimate was mentioned in an interview with the author on 5 
November 1997 and again in a speech at University College London on 20 January 1998.
9 A huge number of foreigners arrived in Spain to fight for the Nationalists, of which a few were 
volunteers, though by far the majority was not. Hugh Thomas estimates that roughly 17 000 Germans, 75 
000 Italians and 75 000 troops from Spanish Morocco fought in Spain with the Nationalist armies. Thomas, 
Spanish Civil War, p.985.
10 Haldane, pp.87-93.
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This allegation has re-appeared in several other works,11 though there appears to be no 
original source to substantiate this claim. Furthermore, R.W. Robson, who was in 
responsible for recruiting the British volunteers states that, though fewer and fewer 
volunteers were turned down as the war progressed, “there was never any real pressure 
for recruits.”12 Nevertheless, there have been suggestions made that Britain’s quota was 
one thousand;13 if  so, even by the most conservative estimates, it more than doubled this 
number, with more than 2300 British volunteers arriving in Spain.14 Despite the belief of 
some of the earlier volunteers that they were signing up for a period of three months, (a 
belief that perhaps might have been more strongly debunked by recruiters), in reality 
volunteers signed up for an indeterminate time, and as many were not travelling with 
passports, or had surrendered them to the recruiters, any volunteers who were to regret 
their initial zeal found themselves in a difficult position when travel in and out of Spain 
was later made very difficult.15
11 Thomas, Spanish Civil War, p.454, K.W. Watkins, Britain Divided: The Effect o f  the Spanish Civil War 
on British Political Opinion (London: Nelson, 1963) p.175, Richardson p.32, Hopkins, p.157 and Cesar 
Vidal, Las Brigadas Internacionales (Espasa Forum, 1998) p.63 fn. 19.
12 Francis, Miners Against Fascism, p. 159.
13 R Dan Richardson quotes Harry Pollitt promising that, “The 750 men in the British men in the Brigades 
will soon become a thousand.” Richarson, p.32. There is also a reference to a numerical target in a letter 
from Ralph Bates to Harry Pollitt, (probably written in December 1936) in which Bates remarks, 
“Remember that even if you give us two battalions we shall need drafts to replace casualties.” However, 
neither statement really qualifies as firm evidence for a numerical quota. See IB A Box C File 8/2.
14 Based upon records kept in the International Brigade Collection in Moscow, the International Brigade 
Archive in London and the Public Record Office (PRO) in Kew, a computerised database of British 
volunteers for the Republic has been compiled by the author, which includes those that fought with the 
militias, members of the various medical units and volunteers from the myriad outposts of the British 
Empire. The database suggests that just over 2300 arrived in Spain, which tallies very closely with the 
estimate by Bill Alexander of 2340. The main files used to comprise the database were: Moscow 545/6/89- 
99; IBA Box 21 File A, Box C File l/2a, Box D-7 Files A/1 & A/2; PRO F0369/2514-K14742/12563/241 
& FO371/22654-W13505. A copy of the database is contained within this thesis. See appendix.
15 According to John Angus, some volunteers believed that they were only signing up for a limited period 
of time and would be able to return home in a few months. See John Angus, With The International 
Brigade in Spain (Loughborough: 1983) p.7. Many volunteers travelled without passports, or surrendered
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Any attempt to trace British volunteers for the International Brigades is faced with a 
number o f problems. Firstly, though the documents that survive the war are often 
detailed and comprehensive, there are many missing records and, in any case, record 
keeping was understandably imprecise, so there are a number of contradictory entries. 
Phonetic or erroneous spellings, imprecise handwriting and a complement of general 
clerical errors, ensures that many of the records are inherently unreliable, a problem 
which is exaggerated when working with mortality data. The Republicans spent most the 
war on the defensive and, in some cases such as the spring of 1938, in outright retreat, so 
there was not always time to recover the bodies, or passbooks, o f the deceased.16 This is 
assuming, that is, that the volunteer was carrying any information for, “there were no 
identification papers and etc. carried, by order.”17 The confusion surrounding 
identification of casualties was further complicated by the Republican authorities’ refusal 
to advise units if  a member had been hospitalised, as a letter from the Brigade base at 
Albacete to London admitted:
We are not told by anybody when our men are sent to hospitals, or when they were killed.
Nor are we supposed to divulge the information. Nobody knows.18
Thus, establishing whether a missing soldier had been captured, killed or wounded 
was:
them on their arrival in Spain, though some, such as Jason Gurney, decided prudently to hold on to their 
passports. See Jason Gurney, Crusade in Spain (London: Faber and Faber, 1974) pp.55-56.
16 Huw Williams served as a nurse and first-aider in Spain, and remembers that at Brunete, “A lot were 
dying. [There were] no identity tags. Nobody to report [casualties] to.” His belief was that all details of 
casualties were highly vague and inaccurate. Interview with Huw Alun Menai Williams, IWMSA 
10181/5/4.
17IBA Box 21 File B2/d.
18IBA Box 21 File B2/i.
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Often impossible. We don’t know it and there is no way of knowing it. We find out in die 
lines, but the chaps here (and I myself) have no conception of dates, day of the week and 
etc. Only approximate dates can be set in many cases.19
Nevertheless, despite the obstacles, attempts were made to keep track of the British 
Brigaders in hospital, and by late 1938 lists of those in hospital were being compiled.20
Many volunteers were listed as ‘missing in action,’ but as the shooting of prisoners by 
the Rebels was by no means a rarity, ‘missing’ all too often did mean killed. However, it 
is also true that some volunteers who were listed as ‘missing’ did later turn up in 
prisoner-of-war camps, such as San Pedro de Cardena21, or in some cases they had simply 
deserted. For example, Francis Casey from Glasgow was listed as having been killed at 
Jarama in February 1937 in the International Brigade’s records,22 though records in the 
Public Record Office (PRO) show a Francis Casey appealing to the British Consulate in 
Madrid for assistance in returning to the UK in March 1937.23 Similarly, the family of 
Jack Coward, a seaman from Liverpool, received a death certificate on 17 March 1939 
claiming he was killed on 3 May 1938. In fact, he arrived home safely later in 1939.24
A further problem tracing those from Britain is that by no means all the British 
volunteers fought with the ‘British’ battalion of the XV Brigade, which was not founded 
until the beginning of 1937. British volunteers who fought to defend Madrid in 
November and December 1936, such as John Comford and Esmond Romilly, mainly
19 Ibid.
20 See, for example, Moscow 545/6/89 pp.80-84.
21 See chapter six.
22 IBA Box 21 File A.
23 PRO F0889/2-76.
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fought with either the German Thaelmann Centuria or the French Commune de Paris 
(Dumont), Battalion whilst others, such as Felicia Browne and the volunteers from the 
Independent Labour Party (ILP) such as George Orwell, fought with other militia units. 
In addition, many of those who fought with the British Battalion were from various 
countries of the Commonwealth, and as the war progressed, increasing numbers were 
from Spain itself.25
A final problem faces anyone trying to trace individual volunteers. Within the ranks 
of volunteers, there was a widespread use of pseudonyms, which volunteers used for a 
number of understandable reasons.26 Jewish volunteers often anglicised their surnames; 
others changed around first and middle names, or dropped letters from their names. 
David Soloman became David Loman, Frank Squires became Frank Antrim and Charles 
Gautzman became Charles Boyd. Some changed their name completely: David 
Abrahams became Basil Minsk27 and Manassah Lesser became Sam Russell.28 No
24 Alexander, p. 83.
25 As McGarry has shown, tracing the Irish volunteers faces similar problems. Fearghal McGarry, Irish 
Politics and the Spanish Civil War (Cork: Cork University Press, 1999) p. 55.
26 There is also a particular problem differentiating between the large number of Scottish and Welsh 
volunteers with identical surnames (and sometimes forenames). The large number of Joneses, Evanses, 
Roberts and Prices also caused confusion at the time. Miles Tomalin’s journey to Spain with a group of 
Welsh: Bill Price, Goff Price, Leo Price, Jack Roberts and Tom Roberts, led him to compose a simple, but 
witty, limerick:
There was a young fellow named Price,
And another young fellow named Price,
And a fellow named Roberts,
And a fellow named Roberts,
And another young fellow named Price.
Francis, Miners Against Fascism p.232 and p.245 fn .36. There are also problems differentiating different 
members of the same family from each other. For example, Bill Alexander states that Danny Gibbons was 
wounded at Brunete, whereas it was actually his brother Tommy. (Alexander, p. 122). Danny was 
repatriated to Britain, following injuries sustained at Jarama, but later returned to Spain and was captured at 
Calaceite. See chapter six.
27 IBA Box 21 File A, Box D-7 Files A/1 and A/2 and PRO FO371/22654-W13505.
28 Lesser was ordered to change his name for slightly different reasons. Lesser/Russell served with the 
International Brigades from October 1936 to January 1937, before being injured on the Cordoba front.
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wonder, for most brigaders in Spain were under no illusions of the lack of sympathy 
towards them from either the Rebels, or from the British establishment, especially after 
volunteering for the Brigades was made illegal following the implementation of the 
Foreign Enlistment Act and the extension of the Non-Intervention Agreement to include 
volunteers in February 1937. Joe Norman, a Communist Party organizer with the British 
Battalion, described how a hostile British journalist questioned a group o f captured 
brigaders,
We did not feel better after we’d been sneered at by a reporter from The Daily Express. 
‘You’ll all be shot’, he told us encouragingly.29
On more than one occasion, the reporter’s spiteful words were to prove correct, and a 
false name did not necessarily guarantee any protection. James Rutherford, who was 
captured by the Nationalists at Jarama in February 1937 and repatriated to England after a 
prisoner exchange, later returned to Spain.30 He was unfortunate enough to be re­
captured, and even though using the pseudonym ‘Jimmy Smalls’, he was recognised and 
shot for being in contravention of a League of Nations directive that barred foreign ex- 
prisoners o f war from returning to Spain.31
Though the various records on the British volunteers are, for the reasons mentioned 
above, incomplete and in some areas unreliable, this is not to say that a reasonably 
accurate estimate o f various criteria, such as overall numbers, ages, occupations,
After a stint in Britain he returned to Spain to work for Radio Barcelona where there was another man with 
the same surname, so the Communist Party suggested he change it. ‘Russell’ is essentially Lesser 
backwards. Sam Russell was the name he wrote under as Daily Worker correspondent in Spain. Interview 
with Sam Russell, IWMSA 9484/6/1.
29 Judith Cook, Apprentices o f Freedom (London: Quartet Press, 1979) p.l 19.
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geographical origins and political affiliations cannot be reached. A combination of the 
files in the International Brigade Archive (IBA) and PRO in London, and the large 
number of memoirs and interviews, do enable a coherent and meaningful picture of the 
makeup of the British volunteers to be reached. This picture is considerably enhanced by 
the use of the International Brigade Collection in Moscow, which contains a wealth of 
details on the volunteers, including biographies, assessments, and their responses to 
detailed questionnaires on their background pre-Spain.32
The most important criteria for potential volunteers for Spain, at least during the 
winter of 1936-1937, was that they should have some military experience. A letter sent 
from Ralph Bates- a British intellectual who spoke both Spanish and Catalan, worked in 
the Republican Government’s propaganda and information services, and was the first 
editor of Volunteer for Liberty, the journal of the XV International Brigade; thus a Briton 
with considerable influence with the Communist Party in Barcelona33- to the General 
Secretary o f the CPGB, Harry Pollitt, in London made this need explicit:
30 IBA Box 21 File A.
31 See chapter six.
32 Moscow offers a particularly rich source of information on the background of the volunteers. In addition 
to numerous lists of names and details such as occupation, political affiliation, date of entry into Spain and 
age, there are a number of questionnaires completed by volunteers during 1937 and 1938. Though only a 
minority of volunteers completed the forms they are, nevertheless, an invaluable source. The first four 
sections are concerned with the volunteers’ background: personal details, occupational background, trade- 
unionism and social, cultural and sporting information. The fifth and final section is itself divided into five 
sections: affiliation and political activities, political and moral questions (probably to establish any 
deviationist or Trotskyist tendencies, the volunteers educational, intellectual and cultural background, 
military experience, and details of the time in Spain such as date of entry, campaigns, promotions etc. See 
Moscow 545/6/100-218 and 454/6/51, pp.89-218
33 There is some debate over Bates’ role within the Communist Party. Bates always maintained he was not 
a party member, yet he clearly had considerable influence in Barcelona. Whilst it is conceivable that Bates 
could have been editor of Volunteer fo r Liberty and have been a confidante of Harry Pollitt without actually 
being a party member- witness the British Battalion commander Fred Copeman who claimed he didn’t join 
the CP until 1937- the role and influence of Bates suggests that, if he was not actually a member of the 
party de jure , he was certainly a member de facto. For Bates’ background see Hopkins, pp.66-71.
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Military experience is really essential and only a small proportion of those without should 
be allowed.34
Bates argued that a year spent in the Officer Training School (OTC) at public school or 
university was not sufficient experience and, with the exception o f Bernard Knox and 
John Comford, who distinguished themselves in the fighting in Madrid in the winter of 
1936-7, he did not seem to hold the student volunteers in high esteem.35 Establishing 
exactly how successful the recruiters in London were in obtaining volunteers with 
military experience is difficult to ascertain, as few records list the volunteers’ previous 
military experience. In the six hundred or so records where there is a listing,36 over half 
claim to have no previous military experience, suggesting that Bates’ request was not an 
easy one for London to fulfill.37 However, if  militarily experienced volunteers were 
scarcer than the recruiters might have hoped, they could at least aim to ensure that 
volunteers possessed sufficient political discipline in its stead.
The political affiliation of the British volunteers for the International Brigades has 
usually been characterised as overwhelmingly Communist;38 and it is certainly beyond 
any doubt that the Brigades owed a great deal to the work of the Communist Party. As 
one recruit admitted,
34 IBA Box C File 8/2.
35 Ibid.
36 Moscow 565/9/90-91. See also the conclusions for a discussion of this issue.
37 The American recruiters also aimed to recruit volunteers with military experience. However, the 
stipulation was soon dropped. Thirty-four per-cent of the US volunteers had formal military training, 
another twenty three per-cent had fired a gun, and forty two per-cent had no military experience. Carroll, 
p.65.
38 Hugh Thomas estimates that over sixty per-cent of volunteers were members of the Communist Party. 
Thomas, Spanish Civil War, p.455. A study of a small number of the British volunteers gave a similar
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The Communist Party have always played down their role in the Spanish Civil War. And 
I think I understand why. There are political reasons. But there was no doubt that the 
Communist party was the driving force of the International Brigades.39
Communist Party 923
Labour Party 109
Irish Republican Congress 14
Social Democratic Foundation 1
Young Communist League 169
Communist Party of Australia 9
Independent Labour Party 15
Socialist League 6
British Labour League of Youth 5
Irish Republican Army 7
Friends of the Soviet Union 2
Communist Party of Canada 1
Communist Party of South Africa 1
Communist Party of Iraq 1
Socialist Party of Great Britain 1
Communist Party of New Zealand 1
Labour Party of South Africa 1
International Socialist Labour Party 1
None 224
Figure 1. Political Affiliation (where given).40
Yet, according to the records held in the IBA and Moscow, a large number of 
volunteers did not list any political affiliation at all.41 O f course this by no means 
suggests that they were not Communists, for it is clear that many Communists listed their 
political affiliation as ‘anti-fascist’ on their International Brigade identity card, not 
wanting to be singled out if captured.42 The International Brigade base at Albacete 
banned volunteers from carrying any record o f political affiliation for precisely this 
reason. As the Labour councillor Jack Jones observed, “People didn’t [flaunt] their
proportion. See M.J. Hynes. ‘The British Battalion o f the XVth International Brigade’, Unpublished B.A. 
Dissertation, University o f  Manchester, (1985) p.35.
39 Interview with John Tunnah, IWMSA 840/9/6.
40 Source o f  party data: IBA Boxes 21, 21a, D-7 File A/2 and Moscow 545/6/89-94. If the various 
Communist Party groups (including the YCL) are combined, the total number is 1107.
41 IBA Boxes 21, 21a, D-7 File A/2 and Moscow 545/6/89-94.
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membership of the Communist Party so much.”43 However, as can be seen from Figure 1, 
there is no doubt that of those for whom there is a record of political allegiance, by far the 
majority were indeed members of the Communist Party.44 This agrees with Bill 
Alexander’s estimate that over sixty per-cent of International Brigaders were 
Communists.45 However, though the majority were clearly Communists, accounts from 
ex-brigaders such as Fred Copeman state that there was never as much pressure to join 
the Communist Party in the British Battalion, as there was in others, such as the 
Yugoslavian Dimitrov Battalion.46 As Albert Charlesworth, a volunteer from Oldham, 
and a member of the Socialist League, not the Communist Party, described,
This was never mentioned at any time. I mean, the Communist Party had nothing to do 
with it really, although the Communist Party sent me out. That was their role finished. I 
mean, we were anti-fascists out there. We weren’t Labour Party members, we weren’t 
communists or anything like that. We were anti-fascists and that was it47
One hundred and nine British brigaders were recorded as members of the Labour 
Party, several o f whom were also members of the Communist Party, such as Lewis Clive,
42 See, for example the passbook of Fred Copeman held in the Imperial War Museum, or of Sam Wild, a 
photograph of which appears in Images o f The Spanish Civil War (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1986) 
p.93 and the numerous copies held in the personal files in Moscow.
43 Interview with Jack Jones, August 25 1978, Manchester 11,17-18, cited in Hopkins, p.250.
44 Of the roughly 1500 of whom there is information on political affiliation, 1105 were members of the CP 
or the YCL and 109 were in the Labour Party. It is very difficult to establish a precise figure for the number 
of CP members. The reasons mentioned above are likely to underestimate the numbers, whereas other 
sources, as diverse as the Daily Worker (the Communist Party newspaper) and the Daily Mail (who at one 
stage carried advertisements for the British Union of Fascists) are likely to have inflated numbers in order 
to exaggerate the Communist Party’s role in the conflict. A recent study of the British Battalion estimated 
that only half the British volunteers were party members; in fact this is an under-estimate of the level of 
party membership, as Figure 1 shows. As this chapter shows Hopkins, perhaps somewhat surprisingly, 
considerably underestimates the level of party membership in the British Battalion. Hopkins, p.54.
45 Alexander states that, “On 22 December 1936, of the 23 000 International Brigaders in Spain, sixty per 
cent were Communists.” Whilst the number of volunteers may be an over-estimate, the proportion is 
probably about right. See Alexander, p.67. It also conforms to an analysis of the American volunteers, of 
whom between two thirds, and three quarters, belonged to the Communist Party or affiliated organisations. 
Carroll, p. 19.
46 See Fred Copeman, Reason in Revolt (London: Blandford Press, 1948) p. 107 and Angus, p.3.
47 Interview with Albert Charlesworth, IWMSA 798/4/1.
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a descendent o f Clive of India, killed at Gandesa in Aragon in August 1938. That there 
are only seven members of the ILP listed as brigaders is, no doubt, due to the mutual 
mistrust between them and the Communists. Most members o f the ILP fought either with 
the Anarchist militias or with the Partido Obrero de Unification Marxista (known as the 
POUM), such as George Orwell, (fighting under his real name of Eric Blair), who was 
refused entry into the International Brigades for being ‘politically suspect’, and Bob 
Smillie who died, probably of appendicitis, in a Republican jail in Valencia in June 
1937.48 Some of the volunteers declared no political affiliation and a small number were 
relatively un-political, or disinterested, though those without strong political convictions 
appear to have mainly served with the various medical units. For example, Bruce 
Allender, who served as a first-aider with the International Brigade medical units in 
Spain, described himself as, “vaguely liberal.”49
The large number of volunteers who were not Communist Party members is not 
particularly surprising. Tom Buchanan suggests that the CP was keen to recruit members 
of other political organisations because, “the party was confronted with the problem that, 
while its members were the best pool for recruits, as a small party it could not afford to 
squander its slender resources.”50 While this may have played a part, there is little doubt 
that the party was keen to involve those from other political organisations to justify their 
claim that this was a genuine popular front of volunteers fighting for Spanish democracy,
48 George Orwell believed that Smillie died in suspicious circumstances, though recent research suggests 
that though his medical treatment was unsatisfactory, to put it mildly, Smillie was not actually murdered. 
See Tom Buchanan, ‘The Death of Bob Smillie, the Spanish Civil War, and the Eclipse of the Independent 
Labour Party’, Historical Journal, 40:2, (1997) pp.435-464.
49 Interview with Bruce Allender, IWMSA 11300/4/1.
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“the active representatives of the Peoples’ Front of Europe,”51 rather than- as critics 
would have it- a feature of a Communist plot to ferment revolution in Spain.
In addition to military experience and political reliability, age was another criterion 
applied to applicants for the International Brigades. The aim of the recruiters was for 
volunteers to be between the ages of twenty-five and thirty-five52 and, from the eighteen 
hundred or so British volunteers in the sample who gave their ages, it would appear this 
aim was, in the main, achieved.53 The average age of volunteers for the brigades was just 
over twenty-nine years, though the most common age was twenty-three, just outside the 
targeted age range for recruitment.54 An overall picture of the ages o f volunteers can be 
seen in Figure 2, which shows clearly that most recruits were between the ages of twenty- 
one and thirty-five.55
50 Tom Buchanan, Britain and the Spanish Civil War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) 
p. 141.
51 Louis Hearst, MS, (Author’s copy) p.57.
52 Alexander, p.33.
53 Source of age data: IBA Box D-7 File A/2 and Moscow 545/6/91.
54 This correlates very closely with the profile of the French volunteers whose average age on arrival was 
recently established to be 29 years and 9 months. “Les combattants fran^ais ont en moyenne, a l’arrivee en 
Espagne, vingt-neuf ans et neuf mois.” Remi Skoutelsky, L ’Espoir guidait leurs pas: Les volontaires 
franqais dans les Brigades internationales 1936-1939 (Paris: Bernard Grasset, 1998) p. 141. (This data is 
available in translation in Remi Skoutslsky, ‘French Combatants of the International Brigades’, The 
Volunteer, 20:3, (Fall 1998) p. 10). The Americans were only slightly younger, with an average (median) 
age of twenty-seven years. Carroll, p. 15. The age profile also mirrors a profile of sixty Welsh volunteers by 
Hywell Francis, which estimated an average age of thirty years. Hywell Francis, ‘Welsh Miners and the 
Spanish Civil War’, Journal o f Contemporary History, 5:3, (1970) pp.69-76. A study of a similar sized 
sample of British volunteers was made by M. Hynes, who calculated a rather lower average age of twenty- 
four years. However, as Hynes himself recognised, his sample consisted, in the main, of a number of the 
younger volunteers. See Hynes, p. 35.
55 Roughly three quarters (76.5%) of recruits were between the ages of 21 and 35 and half (49.9%) were 
between 25 and 35.
38
Who were the British volunteers?
120 
1 nniuu - 
80 I
I  nOU
An I .  Rl. ■4U
on J
l l j n n
0 . J i l i n 11 1 1 1 B I I  I I I I I  [] n  f l  n fl „  n fl
Age
Figure 2. Ages of British volunteers
The ages viewed proportionally can be viewed below, compared with a profile of the 
French and American volunteers.56
British French American
Under 21 4.2% 2.6%}
21-25 32.1% 24.8%} 38.0%
26-30 23.6% 32.6% 26.0%
31-35 20.4% 21.9%}
36-40 12.3% 13.7%} 36.0%
Over 40 7.3% 4.4%}
Figure 3. Ages by proportion
This comparison suggests that the British were not as rigorous with their age limits as 
the French, for there are almost twice as many recruits below twenty-one and over forty, 
though in both cases, four out of every ten recruits were over thirty years of age. There 
are few British recruits below the age o f twenty-one years, and only a very small number
56 For the French data see Skoutelsky, L ’Espoir guidait leurs pas, p. 142. For the American, see Carroll,
p.16.
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under eighteen, for volunteers under the age of eighteen were at first discouraged, until 
February 1937, after which they were not accepted at all.57 After this date those under 
eighteen already in Spain were either sent home or, if  like Charles Hutchinson they 
refused to leave, transferred to jobs away from the front line.58 Worth noting is that 
several volunteers lied about their ages to avoid being sent home, so the ages o f some 
volunteers may be unreliable. Tom Wintringham, commander of the battalion at Jarama, 
certainly believed that a number of volunteers lied about their ages.59 Joseph May later 
admitted to be sixty-three60, and both Thomas Patton61 and John Longstaff,62 who had 
claimed to be nineteen, were only seventeen.
Ethnic origin was not a concern of the recruiters for the British Battalion. As Bill 
Alexander stated,
Little attention was paid to religious or cultural background, and no one thought of keeping 
any record of Jewish volunteers.63
Nevertheless, Alexander still makes an estimation, based mainly on ‘Jewish sounding 
names’ that there were between one hundred and eighty and two hundred Jewish
57 However, some under age volunteers from Britain still got through the net. Thomas Hurley, an eighteen 
year old miner from Wales, is listed as joining the British Battalion on 10 March 1938 and Charles 
Matthews, a nineteen year old clerk from London, joined the battalion as late as 24 March 1938. Moscow 
545/6/91 p. 164 & p. 166. It seems that the Americans were more rigorous, with the youngest volunteer 
being eighteen years old. Carroll, p. 15.
58 Alexander, p.33.
59 “Some of the older men had lied as cheerfully about their ages as the youngsters. Officially our age limit 
was forty, there were men of over fifty who did as well as those half their years.” Wintringham, pp. 114- 
115.
60 Alexander, p.33.
61 In a letter from a Mrs M. Weaving of 5 Hospital Road, Colchester enquiring about her son, Michael 
Patton (real name Weaving) who joined in January 1937, Mrs Weaving states that his age was seventeen, 
though he told recruiters that he was nineteen. PRO F0889/2-46.
62 Interview with John Longstaff, IWMSA 92219/13/3.
63 Alexander, p.36.
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volunteers in the British Battalion.64 This is considerably larger than an earlier estimate, 
which had suggested that only about three per-cent of the British volunteers were 
Jewish.65 In fact, it seems likely that both these estimates understate the number of Jewish 
volunteers in the battalion. Recent research suggests that the proportion of Jewish 
volunteers was much higher, perhaps as much as twenty per-cent.66 This should not really 
be regarded as surprising, for Jewish activists had been in the forefront o f the opposition 
to Mosley and his Blackshirts, particularly in the metropolises of London and 
Manchester. Other religious origins are even harder to establish; at least eighty were 
Catholic (albeit lapsed). Only a very small number stated their religion as Protestant.
Establishing the geographical origins of the roughly two-and-a-half thousand 
volunteers faces several problems, due to the nature of the sources. First, many of the 
lists in the IBA do not always make clear whether the address given is the place of birth, 
the address o f next-of-kin, or the volunteer’s home address,67 though some of the 
ambiguous addresses are clarified clear by details contained in the Moscow files.68 
Second, as one might expect, many of the entries in the archives are vague, incomplete
64 Ibid.
65 Watkins, p. 168. This would estimate the total Jewish volunteers to number between approximately sixty 
and eighty.
66 See Martin Sugarman, ‘Against Fascism- Jews who served in the Spanish Civil War’, (Unpublished, 
2000) p.2. Peter Carroll’s analysis of the American volunteers suggests an even higher proportion, with 
over a third of American volunteers being Jewish. Carroll, p. 18. Other estimates record similar figures: 
Edward Lending suggests that somewhere in the region of a quarter of all International Brigaders were of 
Jewish extraction, with a figure of between ten and fifteen per-cent for the British volunteers. Edward I. 
Lending, ‘Jews Who Fought’, Horizons (Jan/Feb 1992) pp. 15-19.
67 For example, IBA Box D-7 File A/1 lists only an approximate area next to the volunteer’s name. In some 
cases it is as precise as ‘Shoreditch’ or ‘Lambeth’ in others merely ‘London’. There is no confirmation in 
this source whether this is the place of birth, home address, or a next of kin’s address.
68 For example, Moscow file 545/6/91 lists the volunteers’ addresses alongside a listing of their precise 
nature, e.g Wife’s address, Mother’s etc.
41
Who were the British volunteers?
or, sometimes, missing altogether.69 For example, the address o f a ‘T. Connaughton’ is 
listed as ‘? St. Helens’ in one source70, though in this instance at least, a full address 
appears in another.71 Third, there are frequent occasions when there are different 
addresses for volunteers in different sources, for which there could be any number of 
explanations. It is theoretically possible that the records could relate to different 
individuals, but a combination of name, address and date of birth gives a fairly reliable 
base for linking records in a sample o f this size. Other possible explanations are that one 
address could be the home address and another next-of-kin, or simply that the volunteer, 
or their family, had moved.72 On the occasions when there is more than one address and 
it has not been possible to establish which is the home address, details from one list have 
been given precedence to ensure a level o f consistency.73
69 Approximately two hundred addresses are either missing, or so vague or ambiguous as to be unusable for 
any meaningful analysis, though as this comprises less than ten per cent of the total, it is unlikely to skew 
the results significantly.
70 IBA Box D-7 File A/7.
71 IBA Box D-7 File A/2. Fortunately in this case there is a full address listed: Mrs Forbes, 50 Leslie Road, 
Tholte Heath, St. Helens. This must be either a care-of address or a next of kin. As Connaughton was 
thirty-nine years old in 1937 it seems unlikely that it would have been the address of his mother.
72 For example, Basil Paul Abrahams, who briefly used the name Basil Minsk during his first period in 
Spain, gives three separate addresses. As all three are within the Hackney area (one in Mare Street, 
Hackney; one in Cecil Street, Whitechapel; and one in Braydon Road, Stamford Hill) it seems very 
unlikely that they could refer to different volunteers. The three addresses come from PRO F0371/22654- 
W13505, IBA Box D-7 Files A/1 & A/2.
73 This was chosen to be IBA Box D-7 File A/2 as it contains more details, on a larger number of the 
volunteers, than any other single source. A rather more legible and complete version of this list appears in 
Moscow 545/6/40.
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Figure 4. Geographical Origins of Volunteers
The geographical origins of the volunteers are shown in the chart in Figure 4, which, 
for the sake o f clarity, has the various regions collapsed into geographical sectors, which 
are shown in Map 2, below.
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Map 2. The geographical sectors of the UK
It should be noted that the three areas with the highest totals are all skewed by the 
inclusion o f large cities: the South-East contains London, the largest city in the UK; 
Scotland contains Edinburgh and Glasgow; and the north-west includes Liverpool and 
Manchester. If the major conurbations were not included in the sector totals, the picture 
would look somewhat different, with Scotland as the largest sector with two hundred and 
fifty-nine volunteers,74 nearly twice as many volunteers as the next largest area, the
74 The total estimate o f  Scottish volunteers taken from the database o f  volunteers and including those from 
Glasgow, Edinburgh and Dundee is 549. IBA Box 21 Files A & C/2, Box C Files 2/1 & 2/2 Box D-7 Files 
A/1 & A/2 and PRO F0369/2514-K14742/12563/241. This estimate is higher than both Tom Buchanan’s 
figure o f  437 and Iain McDougall’s o f  476. See Buchanan, Britain and the Spanish Civil War p. 126 and ‘In
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south-east. As Figure 5 shows, the geographical origins o f the British volunteers, like 
their American comrades, clearly display a strong urban trend.75 Nearly half o f the 
volunteers in this sample gave an address from the largest cities in Britain, with over five 
hundred listing London, though the number of volunteers giving their addresses as 
London is artificially inflated,76 for many volunteers who gave a London address were 
from all over the British Isles and used a London address such as the Communist Party 
offices.77
•■••• • ■
London 520
Manchester 109
Birmingham 20
Liverpool 131
Leeds 21
Newcastle 21
Edinburgh 34
Glasgow 197
Figure 5. Numbers of volunteers giving an address in a major city78
Within these cities, certain areas sent larger numbers of volunteers than others. For 
example, Figure 6 shows the distribution of the volunteers from London displayed as a 
chloropleth map. Clearly, the majority came from the inner city areas, rather than the 
suburbs. Only one area, Whitechapel, contains more than twenty-five volunteers, and
the valley o f  Sorrow: Scots Voices from Spain’ compiled and presented by Iain McDougall and first 
broadcast on BBC Radio 4 (1986), taken from IWMSA 12943/2.
75 Over eighty per-cent o f the American volunteers came from America’s eleven largest cities, with nearly 
twenty per-cent from New York alone. Carroll, p. 15.
76 Probably no more than 350 volunteers were actually Londoners.
77 See below.
78 These numbers are based on the data available in the International Brigade archives in London and 
Moscow. However, there is little doubt that they are not representative. The numbers o f  volunteers from 
Manchester, Liverpool and Glasgow were probably higher, and the numbers from London perhaps 25% 
lower.
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only six others contain more than fifteen. All are inner city areas, of which two 
(Whitechapel and Bethnal Green) were traditionally areas of strong left wing support79, 
and had a high proportion of Jewish residents following the period of mass immigration 
in the late nineteenth century.80 The east-end of London in 1936 had a firmly established 
anti-fascist pedigree, with the Communist Party and Jews usually taking the lead, so it 
should come as no surprise that the area produced a comparatively high number of 
recruits for the International Brigades.81 It was also chosen by Oswald Mosley for one of 
the British Union o f Fascists’ provocative marches, which led to the notorious ‘Battle of 
Cable Street’ an event in which many who were later to volunteer for Spain were closely 
involved.82
79 In the 1931 elections, Bethnal Green and Whitechapel were two of the seven seats where Communists 
secured more than 10% of the vote, gaining 17.4% and 11.2% respectively. The other five were Rhondda 
East (31.9%), Fife West (22.1%) Greenock (18.2%), Rhondda West (15.7%) and Aberdeen North (11.2%). 
John Stevenson, & Chris Cook, Britain in the Depression: Society and Politics 1929-1939 (New York: 
Longman, 1994)p.315.
80 For Jewish immigration and the east-end of London see V.D. Lipman, Social History o f  the Jews in 
England 1850-1950 (London: Watts, 1954) and Lloyd P. Gartner, The Jewish Immigrant in England 1870- 
1914 (London: Simons, 1973).
81 Such as Charlie Goodman, a Jewish ex-brigader recently interviewed in The Guardian (13 April 1996) 
p.8 who described how a month after being released from prison for his part in the Battle of Cable Street he 
joined the International Brigades and left for Spain.
82 Many brigaders stated that their motivations for volunteering were based upon a hatred of fascism that 
owed a great deal to their experiences of anti-fascist activity in areas such as Whitechapel. See chapter two.
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Figure 6 Origins of London’s volunteers by geographical postcode
The west-end o f London is not an area one would immediately expect to produce 
many recruits, for it is, in the main, a commercial and retail area. That there are a 
relatively high number is mainly due to the presence o f the Communist Party 
headquarters at 16 King Street, Covent Garden and the Dependents’ Aid Office at 1 
Litchfield Street WC2 (which many volunteers used as a ‘care-of address), and also the 
Cypriot Centre in Soho.83 Nearly thirty recruits listed themselves as ‘London Cypriots’
83 All three offices were situated in central London, within a few minutes walk o f each other.
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and where any details are given, the London address is usually the Cypriot Centre.84 The 
use of addresses like the Cypriot Centre, the International Brigade Office and overseas 
consulates exaggerates the number of central London addresses, for as is usually the case, 
these offices are based in the centre of the city. For example, Mum Macdonald lists his 
address as ‘c/o the New Zealand Embassy in The Strand’ (WC2), Arthur Hayman and 
Hugh O’Donnell both list their address as ‘The Seaman’s Home, London E.I.’ and 
Francis North gives his address as ‘c/o the International Brigades Dependents Aid 
Committee, Litchfield Street, London WC1.’85 All of the areas surrounding central 
London produced a number of volunteers for the International Brigades, whereas the 
outer suburbs produced considerably fewer volunteers confirming, as one might expect, 
that London’s volunteers tended to come from the poorer inner city areas.86
Most o f the volunteers from London fought with the International Brigades in the 
British Battalion though, as mentioned earlier, some fought with the POUM and militias 
and many volunteered for the medical services. It is, in any case, perhaps not surprising 
that the number of volunteers from London is high; London played the central role in 
supporting the Spanish Republic that one might expect from the capital city. Volunteers 
for the International Brigades were channelled first through the recruitment office in the 
Communist Party Headquarters, then later through the Dependents’ Aid Committee
84 IBA Box C File 1/9.
85 IBA Box C File 2/1, Box D-7 Files A/1 & A/2 and PRO FO371/22654-W13505. (Litchfield Street is 
actually in WC2 rather than WC1).
86 Ibid.
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offices.87 London was also the scene of many protests outside the offices o f newspapers 
felt to be partial in their coverage o f the conflict.88
Other areas also generated large numbers of volunteers, several of which have been 
the subject of specific studies; such as the north-east of England.89 The ship building 
areas of Tyneside and Teeside sent a large number of volunteers, confirming the strong 
link between the shipping industry and the Communist Party.90 Newcastle-on-Tyne and 
Gateshead together sent more than forty volunteers, with roughly the same number from 
South Shields, Sunderland and Middlesborough combined.91 There has as yet been no 
specific study o f volunteers from the north-west of England, even though they numbered 
approximately three hundred and seventy. Two thirds o f the volunteers from the 
northwest came from the metropolitan centres of Manchester and Liverpool92, and a 
number from other cities such as Oldham.93
Another area that has been the subject of academic study is South Wales. Such was 
the level o f political ferment in South Wales in 1935 that one historian has drawn strong 
comparisons with the Asturian rising in Spain in 1934,94 though others maintain that
87 Ibid.
88 See for example a report in The Morning Post of a demonstration complaining about the press coverage 
of the conflict in papers such as itself and The Daily Mail. “250 communists protest outside the Daily 
Mirror in Tudor Street...the demonstrators included smartly dressed young women and negroes...who 
moved off to strains of the Internationale.” The Morning Post, 30 July 1936 p.l 1
89 See Don Watson & John Corcoran, An Inspiring Example: The North East o f  England and the Spanish 
Civil War 1936-1939 (McGuffm, 1996).
90 Stevenson & Cook, p.51.
91 108 volunteers give addresses in Tyneside.
92 Sources list 131 from Merseyside and 192 from Manchester, Lancashire and Cumberland combined.
93 Twelve volunteers listed their address as Oldham. See IBA and PRO sources listed in fn .85, above.
94 Francis argues that, “Parts of South Wales in 1935 had more in common with parts of France and Spain 
than with the rest of Britain...The social and political unrest in South Wales can in many ways be seen in a
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support for the Communist Party was concentrated in small localities and that, overall, 
South Wales remained overwhelmingly Labour.95 Certainly, some areas were more 
militant than others; the Welsh mining district of the Rhondda had a fearsome reputation 
similar to that of the east-end of London, and the other mining areas o f Merthyr and 
Aberdare were also areas to which the Communist Party looked for, and found, support.96 
Indeed, the Rhondda looked to be an area where the Communist Party might at last win a 
parliamentary seat, when A.L. Homer stood for Rhondda East in the bye-election of 
March 1933, and scored thirty-four per-cent of the vote.97 That Harry Pollitt, the general 
secretary of the Communist Party, later chose to stand in East Rhondda in the 1935 
election is clearly a testament to the radicalism of the Welsh mining region; a sentiment 
that ensured that more than sixty men volunteered to fight with the International Brigades 
in Spain, more than a third of the total number of volunteers from Wales. Of the 
approximately one hundred and seventy Welsh to fight in Spain, over seventy per-cent 
came from the mining regions.98
Scotland as a whole sent over five hundred volunteers to Spain,99 of whom just under 
fifty per-cent came from the two largest cities o f Edinburgh and Glasgow. Another
European context, and in particular, as comparable with the Asturian miners’ rising in Spain the previous 
year: both were primarily working-class rebellions against an authoritarian central government, even 
though the one was a full scale military rising and the other was a largely peaceful ‘demonstration’ of 
resistance.” Francis, Miners Against Fascism, p.68.
95 Stevenson & Cook, p. 161.
96 Stevenson & Cook describe how, “entering ‘Red’ Rhondda meant much the same as marching through 
the Jewish communities of the East End of London.” Ibid p.90.
97 Stevenson & Cook, pp. 144-152.
98 IBA Box C File 2/2, Box 21 Files A & C/2, and Box D-7/A/2 and Francis, ‘Welsh Miners and the 
Spanish Civil War’, pp.69-76.
99 A total of 437 for the number of Scottish volunteers appears in IBA Box C File 1/1, which Tom 
Buchanan quotes. Buchanan, Britain and the Spanish Civil War, p. 126. However, after an examination of 
the lists of volunteers in the IBA, PRO and Moscow, this would appear to be an underestimate.
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Scottish city to produce a particularly high number of volunteers was Dundee, which sent 
almost twice as many as the capital.100 Kirkcaldy, a town lying on the north side of the 
Firth of Forth, also sent a number out of proportion to its size, for this too was an area of 
strong Communist sympathies. Willie Gallagher become the first Communist MP in the 
election in 1935 following the Communist Party’s adoption of Popular Front tactics when 
it urged its members to vote Labour and withdrew from most seats, though not from West 
Fife and East Rhondda.101 As in Wales, the mining industry was an occupation on which 
the Communist Party could depend for support and it is no coincidence that miners 
played a major role in the British Battalion in Spain.
Over sixty volunteers came from Northern Ireland, with over two thirds coming from 
Belfast and all but a handful of the remainder coming from (London) Derry.102 As with 
those from the rest of the United Kingdom, the picture is o f recruits with overwhelmingly 
urban origins. Like the Germans and the Italians who ended up facing each other at 
Guadalajara, volunteers from the Irish Free State fought on both sides in Spain. A number 
of volunteers joined the Nationalists under General O’Duffy, who received considerable 
support from parts o f the Catholic hierarchy.103 Irish volunteers in the International
100 Sources (see above) list sixty volunteers from Dundee and thirty-three from Edinburgh.
101 Stevenson & Cook, pp. 151-154.
102 IBA Box 21 File A, Box D-7 Files A/1 & A/2, Box C File 2/2 and PRO FO371/22654-W13505.
103 There are several works written by Irish volunteers. For the republicans see Michael O’Riordan’s 
Connolly Column (Dublin: New Books, 1979) and for the Nationalists see the memoirs of General Eoin 
O’Duffy, the leader of the Blueshirts, Crusade in Spain (Dublin: Brown and Nolan, 1938). Seamus Mac 
Kee, a volunteer for O’Duffy who regretted his experiences, describes his tale in I  Was a Franco Soldier 
(London: United Editorial, 1938) that bears the mark of either a rather zealous convert to Marxism or, more 
likely, a ghost writer. Secondary works on the volunteers from Ireland include Sean Cronin’s study of one 
influential figure amongst the Irish republican volunteers, Frank Ryan (Dublin: Repsol, 1979). On the 
Nationalist volunteers there are Maurice Manning’s The Blueshirts (Dublin: 1970) Robert Stradling, 
‘Franco’s Irish Volunteers’, History Today, 45:3, (1995) pp.40-47, a article based on part of his
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Brigades numbered over two hundred and fifty, with a large proportion coming from the 
capital city o f Dublin, in this case just under twenty-five per-cent.104 This estimate 
includes Irish-Americans and is somewhat higher than a recent estimate, which claimed 
that roughly two hundred men from Ireland (including Northern Ireland) fought with the 
International Brigades.105 However, records in the IBA list only seventy-five volunteers 
from the Irish Free State within the British Battalion itself.106 Discrepancies in the 
varying estimates could be due to several factors. Firstly, there was willingness amongst 
some to play down the separate identity felt by the Irish volunteers.107 They stressed 
instead the view of the Brigaders as a unified international working-class movement 
motivated almost exclusively by the desire to fight fascism, even though there was 
sufficiently strong feeling amongst some Irish volunteers in January 1937 to leave the 
British Battalion and fight with the Americans108 in the Abraham Lincoln Battalion.109 
Many of the Irish volunteers had a history of (often armed) involvement in Irish 
Republicanism and were understandably less than happy fighting under English officers, 
particularly when it appeared that at least one, George Nathan, and possibly another, Wilf
monograph, The Irish and the Spanish Civil War (Manchester: Mandolin, 1999), and Fearghal McGarry, 
Irish Politics and the Spanish Civil War (Cork: Cork University Press, 1999).
104 This total includes those from Northern Ireland. In all, over three hundred Irish (including Irish- 
Americans) volunteered for the Republic.
105 Stradling claims that, “The substantial majority-sixty six per cent- of the (approximately) two hundred 
Irishmen who fought for the Spanish Republic were working-class men from the slums of Belfast and 
Dublin, along with other substantial urban centres like Cork and Waterford...About sixty Dubliners, many 
of them unemployed, along with some twenty-five Belfast men went to join the International Brigades. In 
contrast, only about a quarter hailed from rural backgrounds.” Stradling, Irish and the Spanish Civil War 
p.137.
106 IBA Box C, File 1/1. The actual number was probably nearer one hundred.
107 See chapter three.
108 For a good example of a British Communist official’s interpretation of this dispute, see Alexander, 
pp.68-69. Whilst Robert Stradling refers to this event as a “crisis and split”, Alexander stresses instead the 
“powerful arguments” that were put by several of the Irish opposed to leaving the British Battalion. Whilst 
Alexander accepts that, “there was a short period of tension,” he claims that, “these tensions, inevitable 
against the background of Irish oppression, vanished in action.”
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McCartney, had served with the notorious ‘Black and Tans’ in Ireland in actions against 
Irish Republicans.110 Secondly, as a number of Irish left to fight with the Abraham 
Lincoln Battalion, their names do not always appear in the records kept by the British 
Battalion, which form the basis of the files in the IBA. Lastly, some Irish volunteers may 
have been bom on the British mainland or elsewhere and not always listed themselves as 
Irish111 and, as has been shown, the widespread use o f pseudonyms makes an analysis of 
this type extremely problematic.
Australia 31
Canada 14
Channel Islands 1
India 4
New Zealand 12
South Africa 2
Figure 7. Volunteers from the Empire.
There were a number of volunteers in the British Battalion from outside the British 
Isles. In addition to the volunteers from Cyprus that have been mentioned previously, 
there were a number o f individuals who travelled from countries linked to Britain through 
the Empire and Commonwealth, including the Channel Islands, Canada, South Africa, 
India, Australia and New Zealand. More than thirty travelled from Australia, nearly half 
way around the globe, to fight with the British Battalion or serve in the medical
109 The American unit is often referred to as the Abraham Lincoln Brigade, though they were a battalion 
within the 15 Brigade.
110 See chapter three for an examination o f  the circumstances surrounding this issue.
1,1 See McGarry, p.55.
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services.112 Canada sent fourteen; there were twelve from New Zealand,113 and even four 
from India and two from South Africa.114
Overall, the geographical origins of the volunteers are clearly urban and in many cases 
from areas associated with occupations such as mining and shipbuilding. Figure 8 shows 
the twenty most frequent occupations drawn from the nearly thirteen hundred volunteers 
who have listed their employment.115 As can be seen, the occupations are, in the main, 
manual, with the most common being ‘labourer.’ The high number of miners confirms 
their reputation for being highly politicised, mirroring their Spanish brethren. After all, 
in the Asturias rising of October 1934, miners played a central role and bore the brunt of 
the repression that was imposed by the Foreign Legion and Moorish regulares led by 
General Franco. This must have helped fuel solidarity amongst the miners who joined 
the Republican forces in such large numbers.
There were a number of volunteers working as clerks, salesmen, electricians and in 
other non-manual occupations but the most common occupations of British International 
Brigaders were drivers, seamen, painters, bricklayers, carpenters, and steelworkers. The 
large number o f volunteers from the maritime trades is due partly to their politicisation; 
like mining, shipbuilding was an industry on which the Communist Party could
112 For the Australian volunteers, see Amirah Inglis, Australians in the Spanish Civil War (Sidney: Allen & 
Unwin, 1997).
1131 am grateful to Michael O’Shaughnessy for information on the volunteers from New Zealand.
114 These totals do not include those in other battalions or the medical services.
115 Information relating to occupations has been gleaned mainly from Moscow 545/6/90-91, from the trade 
union membership lists held in the IBA in Box C Files 2/1 & 2/2 and Box 21c File 2, and from 
miscellaneous lists such as the record of wounded volunteers from Liverpool in IBA Box D-7 File A/7. The 
various interviews with volunteers, both published and unpublished, have also been helpful here.
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consistently rely for support.116 Also, o f course, those working on board ships were in a 
position to jump ship in a Spanish port such as Valencia or Barcelona, and would have 
been able to work their passage on a ship bound for Spain, at least until Franco’s illegal 
naval blockade around Spain was accepted by the British navy, after which this would 
become considerably more difficult.
Labourer 149
Miner 92
Motor driver 60
Seaman 47
Clerk 37
Painter 28
Engineer 28
Metal worker 22
Salesman 21
Mechanic 21
Bricklayer 19
Journalist 16
Student 15
Tailor 14
Electrician 14
Carpenter 12
Nurse 11
Ex-Army 11
Cook 10
Figure 8. The most commonly listed occupations117
The occupations of the recruits were clearly mainly industrial and working-class, 
though this profile is much more applicable to those who joined via the Communist Party 
after December 1936, rather than to those who arrived in Spain under their own steam in 
the first few months. There were British volunteers in Spain from as early as August 
1936, however, the main bulk of the British International Brigaders did not begin arriving
116 Stevenson & Cook, p.51.
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in Spain until after November 1936, when recruitment by the Communist Party had 
begun in earnest. The nature of the recruits in the first few months of the war is rather 
different from those who arrived later, for foreign travel was not taken for granted by the 
majority o f the British population, needing money, know-how and, above all, a passport. 
This is borne out by an examination of the occupations of the early volunteers who 
fought with the various militia units around Madrid in 1936.118
MsoeHsnoaB
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Figure 9. Numbers per Occupational Sector
A summary o f the occupational makeup of the volunteers as a whole is shown in 
Figure 9, which classifies the occupations into their various occupational sectors. The 
picture o f the different sectors shows clearly the industrial working-class occupational
117 Certain occupations, such as labourers and general labourers; miners and coal miners; and writers, 
novelists and authors; have been combined for the sake of clarity.
118 See chapter three.
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profile o f recruits. As Figure 9 shows, the four largest are manufacturing, transport, 
‘trades’ and mining which, when combined, make up eighty per-cent o f the total number 
o f  recruits for whom there is occupational data available. As Figure 10 shows, this picture 
is supported by trade union membership: with the possible exception o f the Shop 
Assistants’ Union, all o f the ten trade unions with the largest numbers o f members are 
also all connected with manual occupations. O f the five hundred volunteers who declared 
trade union membership, over half o f them belonged to the five largest unions and well 
over a third to the top three. The large number of Welsh miners is again apparent in the 
forty-three members o f the South Wales Miners Federation.
Transport & General Workers Union 122
National Union of Seamen 50
South Wales Miners Federation 43
Amalgamated Engineers Union 39
National Union of Distributors and Allied Workers 14
National Union of Glass Metal Workers 13
Shop A ssistant's Union 13
Electrical Trades Union 11
Amalgamated Union of Building Trade Workers 11
Amalgamated Society of Workers 10
Figure 10. Trade Union Membership
It is clear then, that there is a distinct picture that can be drawn of the ‘typical’ British 
volunteer for the Republic in the Spanish Civil War. In the main, this picture conforms to 
that drawn in previous works, though there are some revisions that need to be made.
In Hugh Thomas’s influential work on the Spanish Civil War, he states that most of 
the recruits were young, over eighty per-cent were working-class, many were
57
Who were the British volunteers?
unemployed and over sixty per-cent were Communists.119 The preliminary findings 
drawn from this database support his estimates o f class background, though the average 
age o f volunteers is slightly higher than Thomas estimated. The picture is clearly not one 
of ‘young, naive and idealistic’ volunteers, for well over a quarter o f the total number of 
volunteers (where a date o f birth has been given) were over the age o f thirty. Like many 
of the names given, not all the ages were necessarily truthful, however it does appear that 
there was a higher proportion of mature recruits than previously believed. The level of 
Communist Party membership- sixty-two per-cent- is less than Thomas’s estimate. Both 
John Angus and Bill Alexander have remarked that there was no pressure to be a member 
of the Communist Party to join the Brigades, though anecdotal evidence suggests that 
many, like John Angus, joined whilst they were in Spain.120 Interestingly, John Angus’s 
political affiliation does not appear in any of the sources in the IBA, so it would appear 
that the advice not to disclose party membership was heeded, in his case at least.
Bill Alexander, who fought with the brigades as political commissar and later as the 
commander o f the British Battalion, is rather critical of some o f Thomas’s views 
regarding volunteers for the British Battalion.121 However, he does agree that many of 
the volunteers had experienced unemployment, though he also argues that it is impossible 
to determine any precise level of unemployment as the Communist Party kept no details 
of unemployment. This claim is rather countered by questionnaires held in the Moscow 
Archives which ask exactly that, nevertheless it is true that the sources do not really shed 
much new light on the number of unemployed recruits. Only a small number of brigaders
119 Thomas, Spanish Civil War, pp.454-456.
120 Angus, p.3.
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listed themselves as unemployed, but this is bound to be understating the number. 
Unemployment often carries a social stigma, perhaps even amongst Communists critical 
of the role o f capitalism in the economic depression and mass unemployment in the 
1930s. This problem is a familiar one to historians, where trying to establish the numbers 
employed within so-called ‘low status occupations’ is notoriously difficult. Many 
volunteers, rather than declaring themselves to be unemployed, may have given their last 
occupation, or listed work they had previously taken. Thus John Williams from South 
Wales described himself as an ‘ex-miner’ and many other volunteers either gave multiple 
occupations or, like Herbert Sines from London, listed their employment as ‘various’.122 
However, the number of unemployed is clearly not as high as some estimates would 
suggest, a fact pointed out at the time by Tom Wintringham, one of the earliest British 
volunteers to arrive in Spain, and a commander of the British Battalion in 1937.
I have been assured, by the brother of a minister of the National Government, that ‘all 
except about twenty were unemployed before they went to Spain’...The proportion of 
unemployed in our ranks when I knew the battalion varied between a quarter and an 
eighth, which is not so very much greater a proportion than that ‘normal’ in England 
thanks to the wisdom of those that rule us.123
The level o f trade union membership was fairly high, and the picture supports Bill 
Alexander’s remark that, “[a] high rate of trade-union membership was not untypical.”124 
This high level o f trade union membership amongst volunteers presents a clear contrast 
with the ambivalence towards the Republic shown by the leaders o f the British labour 
movement like Ernest Bevin, who were driven by a desire to, “preserve the unity of the
121 Alexander, p.32.
122 IBA Box 21c File 2.
123 Wintringham, p.330.
124 Alexander, p.37.
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British Labour movement and by a chauvinist hostility towards its Spanish 
counterpart.”125 Like the British Government, their views were always coloured by a 
deep fear and loathing of Communism.
The high level of Communist Party membership is important, for it helps provide 
some understanding of why nearly two and a half thousand British volunteered to fight 
with the Spanish Republican forces in the Civil War. However, only a small proportion 
of the total membership of the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) fought in Spain 
and, as we have seen, a number of the volunteers were not Communists, or waited until 
they arrived in Spain before joining. So, clearly some questions remain unanswered by a 
quantitative analysis of the socio-political background of the volunteers. What drove 
these individuals to travel hundreds of miles to fight in a foreign country ‘of which they 
knew little’? Were they the same reasons that encouraged people to join radical political 
organisations such as the CPGB or the ILP? The next chapter examines closely the 
motivations o f the volunteers for the Spanish Republic in order to come up with some 
answers to these questions.
125 Tom Buchanan, ‘Britain’s Popular Front? Aid Spain and The British Labour Movement’, History 
Workshop, 31, (1991) p.61.
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“The chance to strike back at fascism.”
Interview with Bill Alexander, December 1997.
“The very air we were breathing was different then.”
Interview with Freddie Brandler, May 2000.
No study of the British volunteers for the Spanish Republic would be complete 
without attempting to explain why nearly two and a half thousand men and women left 
their homes and families to volunteer to fight in a war in ‘a far away country.’ This issue 
seems to be particularly baffling to contemporary students, who find it difficult to 
understand why anyone- particularly anyone to whom foreign travel would have been 
considered extraordinary- would undertake a hazardous journey across Europe and an 
exhausting climb over the Pyrenees, all to risk death fighting in a foreign civil war. To a 
great extent, this puzzlement is founded on a contemporary belief that there is no longer 
‘a great cause’ worth fighting for, a view perhaps fostered by the difficulty many have 
found establishing ‘good from evil’ in bitter European conflicts, such as the civil war in 
Bosnia. Indeed, the view of the Spanish war as one between two equally abhorrent 
factions was widely prevalent amongst those elements of the British establishment who 
were not actively hostile to the Spanish Republic.1 The remark attributed to Stanley 
Baldwin, the British Prime Minister at the outbreak of the war, is somewhat revealing,
We English hate fascism, but we loathe bolshevism as much. So, if there is somewhere 
where fascists and bolsheviks can kill each other off, so much the better.2
1 For the British Government’s reactions to the war, see Edwards, op cit, Douglas Little, ‘Red Scare, 1936: 
Anti-Bolshevism and the Origins of British Non-Intervention in the Spanish Civil War’, Journal o f 
Contemporary History, 23, (1988) pp.291-311 and Enrique Moradiellos, La perfidia de Albion: El 
Gobierno britanicoy la guerra civil espanola (siglo veintiuno editores sa, 1996).
2 Cited in Edwards, p.38.
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The alien nature o f the conflict, a desire to ‘keep out of it’ and limit the war to Spain, lay 
behind support for the policy of non-intervention in the war, or so the somewhat 
charitable interpretation would have it. In fact, as many commentators have 
demonstrated, certain parts o f the British Government, much of the British establishment, 
and the higher echelons o f the labour movement, were all driven by a fear and loathing of 
Communism, that meant that the Republic was actively discriminated against.3 As E.H. 
Carr points out, “the non-intervention declaration was tainted with hypocrisy from the 
outset.”4 The complaint that, in the words of one Scottish volunteer, “the treacherous 
non-intervention pact”5 ensured that the Rebels were better armed, was a constant refrain 
amongst the British volunteers in Spain.6 As Jack Jones pointed out,
Since the Governments of the world, Governments like Britain and France were not 
prepared to go to their aid and were standing on the side-lines, many of us felt that it was 
right to give whatever help we could in supporting them.7
Roderick MacFarquar, who served as an ambulance driver and first-aider in Spain from 
January 1937 to October 1938, maintained,
3 Even though The Popular Front Government elected in 1936 did not actually include any Communists. As 
Enrique Moradiellos has pointed out, “The rigid adhesion by Britain to the Non-Intervention Pact signed by 
the European states in August 1936, with the corresponding imposition of a strict embargo on arms and 
munitions, produced uneven effects on the two Spanish camps.” Enrique Moradiellos, ‘The Origins of 
British Non-Intervention in the Spanish Civil War: Anglo-Spanish Relations in early 1936’, European 
History Quarterly, 21:3, (July 1991) p.339. For an examination of the level of inequality between the 
materiel supplied to the Republic and the Rebels, see Howson, op cit.
4 E.H. Carr, p. 17.
5 Hugh Sloan, ‘Why I Volunteered’, Scottish Trade Union Review, 51, (July-Sept 1991) p.31.
6 In a letter to the General Secretary of the British Communist Party, Harry Pollitt, dated 4 January 1937, 
Peter Kerrigan, the British Political Commissar at the International Brigade Headquarters at Albacete, 
described how, “The embargo is certainly affecting us here when you know that rifles are not available in 
sufficient numbers for effective training.” NMLH Manchester, CP/IND/POLL/2/5-6.
7 Corkhill & Rawnsley, pp. 139-140.
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The so-called Non-Intervention Agreement organised by Chamberlain and Eden throttled 
the Republic.8
This throttling of the Republic spurred many to volunteer, such as Louis Hearst, a 
volunteer from London who arrived in September 1936, soon after the implementation of 
the agreement.
When England took the reins of ‘Non-intervention’ I could hold back no longer. I put 
everything else aside, and decided that I could not identify myself even passively (being a 
Socialist both by personal conviction and by family tradition) with this political farce; I 
decided to go to Spain to defend democracy with deeds.9
The Spanish struggle was always seen within a wider European context. For those 
supporting the Rebels, the war was a crusade against communism, which many on the 
Right believed had been fermenting a revolution, that had been pre-empted by the 
rising.10 For those who were ‘neutral’ or considered the war of little relevance to British 
interests, it was important to limit the struggle between the two alien philosophies of 
fascism and communism to Spain and prevent the conflagration spreading. And for those 
supporting the Republic, the war was seen within the wider context of the struggle of 
democracy against international fascism, which had been taking place from Germany, to 
London’s east-end. In the words of one British volunteer, they were volunteering to help
8 Interview with Roderick MacFarquar, in MacDougall, p.85.
9 Hearst, pp.6-7.
10 Rumours of a Communist plot to launch a revolution in the summer of 1936 in Spain were widely cited 
by Rightists as a justification for the rising. Arthur F. Loveday produced documents he claimed proved the 
existence of a Communist conspiracy in Spain to launch a Bolshevik revolution that, he believed, Franco 
pre-empted with his own coup. Loveday included a translation of the documents in an appendix to his 
book, entitled, ‘Secret Documents detailing the plan for the establishment of a Soviet in Spain, the 
discovery of which was one of the immediate causes of the counter-revolution and the civil war’ See Arthur 
F. Loveday, World War in Spain (London: John Murray, 1939) pp. 176-183. General O’Duffy, the leader of 
the Irish contingent that fought- briefly- with the Rebels, also refers to a Russian “Manual of Action” for 
Spain which he blamed for the spate of church burnings that followed the declaration of the Republic in 
1931. Eoin O’Duffy, Crusade in Spain (Dublin: Brown and Nolan, 1938) p.43. This theory has been
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defend, “A duly and properly elected government, it wasn’t even a socialist government, 
more like a Labour one,”11 from the foreign aggression of international fascism. Thus, as 
we shall see, many volunteers believed passionately that the Spanish Republic’s fight was 
their fight.
If the war in Spain was not a ‘foreign’ war to the volunteers, neither was the idea of 
volunteering for a war in ‘a far away country’ a new one. As other works on British 
involvement in the Spanish Civil War have recognised, there was a tradition stretching 
back to the poet Lord Byron, of ‘volunteering for liberty.’12
There had, indeed, been a romantic and libertarian British tradition of volunteering in the 
nineteenth century which had made going to fight in other people’s wars a right- even a 
duty- of free-born Britons.13
Indeed, Lord Byron is cited in a memorial pamphlet to the British volunteers, issued after 
the war.
Out of the proud traditions of Britain’s past they came. Part of the long struggle for 
freedom, carried forward from Wat Tyler through men like Byron and movements like 
the Chartists, through Keir Hardie to the present day. Our modem bearers of Britain’s 
great traditions came forward in answer to the call, ready to give their lives that freedom 
might live.14
To many, this ‘Byronesque’ and heroic image of the volunteers is epitomised by a picture 
of the poet John Comford, his head sheathed in a white bandage; the young brave
systematically demolished by Herbert Southworth. See Herbert Southworth, Disinformation and the 
Spanish Civil War: the brainwashing o f Francisco Franco (London: Routledge, 2001).
11 Interview with John Henderon, in Wilson & Concoran, p.53.
12 Hopkins, p. 106, and Buchanan, Britain and the Spanish Civil War p. 121. Byron had himself volunteered 
to fight for the Nationalist cause in Greece in 1823-24.
13 Buchanan, Britain and the Spanish Civil War, p. 122.
14 Cited in Hopkins, p. 106.
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intellectual dying for liberty15. But as the previous chapter has shown, this view is not, 
and never has been, typical of British volunteers for the International Brigades. In the 
wealth of memoirs and oral accounts references to this ‘great historical tradition’ do not 
appear very frequently, if  at all. This does not mean that the volunteers were not 
following in the steps of Wat Tyler, Byron and the Chartists, but that this tradition was 
not a conscious factor in the motives of most of the British volunteers for joining the 
International Brigades. This is but one of several inaccuracies, myths and generalisations 
that surround explanations for the motivations of the men who fought in the International 
Brigades in Spain. Others take three main forms: that the volunteers were adventurers; 
that they were either paid mercenaries or tricked into volunteering; and that most of the 
volunteers were unemployed (the implication being that they only volunteered out o f a 
desperation, to get ‘off the dole’).
One of the more enduring accusations, that many volunteers joined the International 
Brigades more for adventure than for conviction, reappeared recently and claimed that:
Undoubtedly a group of men, often unemployed, volunteered because they sought
adventure and may have been misled about what they were letting themselves in for.16
Bill Rust, in his highly sympathetic account of the British volunteers, perhaps 
contributed, no doubt accidentally, towards the portrayal of the British volunteers as 
adventurers. In Rust’s eulogy to the British volunteers, he stated, “A spirit of adventure?
15 Walter Greenghalgh, who was with Comford when he was killed, remarks on this ‘Byronesque image’ 
of Comford, ironically claiming that it was the “heroic and romantic” (in the words of another volunteer, 
Sam Russell) bandage that was responsible for his death. See chapter three.
16 Buchanan, Britain and the Spanish Civil War, p. 127.
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Yes, and may our youth never lose that spirit.”17 The impression o f the volunteers as 
adventurers might also be gained from Hugh Thomas’s study of the civil war, which 
quotes Nick Gillain, a Belgian, who gave his reason for joining as, “spirit o f adventure, 
lassitude, and this rainy autumn of 1936.”18
Understandably, few volunteers accept this view, and many are at pains to point out 
that they themselves certainly were not adventurers.19 Tom Wintringham, Commander of 
the British Battalion at Jarama, who had a large involvement in the formation of the 
British Battalion, was quick to stand up for one o f his British comrades, George Nathan, 
when Nathan was accused of being an adventurer:
It was not so much his political views that had brought him to Spain as a certain alertness, 
an aliveness that could not be crushed out by the Labour Exchange and the hopeless 
monotony of odd jobs. An adventurer? No. He was not ‘on the make.’20
Though adventure may have played a part in motivating a small number of the 
volunteers, there seems little evidence to suggest it was a major factor, and certainly not 
representative of the majority. Indeed, one of the few volunteers to admit he volunteered 
for adventure and gain, was singularly disappointed, as Jimmy Jump, a volunteer from 
Cheshire who served as an interpreter, paymaster, clerk and machine-gunner with the 
Machine-Gun Company during his time in Spain, remembers:
17 Rust, p.7.
18 Nick Gillain, Le Mercenaire: carnet de route d'un combattant rouge (Paris: Artheme Fayard, 1938) 
quoted in Thomas, Spanish Civil War, 3rd ed., pp.454-455. In the Spanish edition, El mercenario: diario de 
un combatiente rojo (Tanger: Edit. Tanger, 1939) p.3 Gillain refers to his ‘boredom’ (aburrimiento). In 
Thomas’s portrayal of motivations in the earlier 1961 edition (p.299) he referred to volunteers, “purging 
some private grief or maladjustment,” which was removed from later editions.
19 See, for example, Bob Clark, No Boots to My Feet (Student Bookshops, 1984) p.22.
20 Wintringham, p.66.
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I met a number of people, like the Blackburn waiter, whose political awareness was nil at 
the time of going. I remember another man, John Smith.. .he was a Glasgow shipyard 
worker I think, and he told me that he went to Spain for three things: “Loot, women and 
wine.” And then he added, with a touch of sadness in his voice, “And I’ve never come 
across much of any of them.”21
The second accusation: that the British volunteers were duped or ‘hoodwinked’ by 
Communist recruiters into joining the International Brigades should be given less 
credence still. The claim first appeared in the right-wing press, particularly in the Daily 
Mail and Morning Post,22 which carried numerous unfounded stories about the Spanish 
Republic and its supporters.23 This accusation in particular has infuriated British 
members of the International Brigades. Bill Alexander argues vehemently that, “there is 
not a scrap of evidence that anyone went to Spain without being told that they were going 
to fight as a soldier.”24 In James Hopkins’ recent study of the British volunteers, he 
supports Alexander’s claim:
21 Interview with James Jump, IWMSA 9524/6/2, also cited in Philip Toynbee (ed.), The Distant Drum: 
Reflections on the Spanish Civil War (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1976), pp.l 12-113.
22 The Morning Post often argued that those leaving Britain were misguided rather than heinous criminals. 
A satirical poem appeared on the 2 March 1937 (p. 12) that typifies the portrayal of volunteers as ‘dupes’:
I grant that you will seek in vain,
Among the volunteers in Spain,
Defying death and wounds and dirt,
One with ‘S. Cripps’ upon his shirt.
Not Labour’s leaders, but its dupes 
Are Caballero’s British troops 
Who volunteered- it sounded fine- 
For well paid work behind the line,
But when they reached the actual spot,
Were told to fight or else be shot.
23 See for example, ‘Britons Lured to Red Front’, Daily Mail, 18 February 1937 p. 13, which claims that a 
Scottish volunteer, John Bruce, who had been captured by the Nationalists, had been told he would be 
working in Spanish vineyards for £6 per week and that he had only been informed he would be required to 
fight once he arrived in Spain. It seems probable that Bruce recounted this story hoping it might save his 
life. If so, he was to be proved mistaken: Bruce was executed by the Rebels in February 1937. The rumour 
that ‘down-and-outs’ were picked up on London’s embankment, drugged and smuggled across to Spain 
was another story that originated in the right wing press. See Alexander, p.31.
24 Alexander, p.32.
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It was a choice freely made, based on their experience of life, their reading of books and 
newspapers, and the kind of open exchange of ideas that they had known on street 
comers, in great public places, and in their educational classes.25
In fact, volunteers were fully informed of the seriousness of the situation in which 
they were placing themselves. Several opportunities were offered to volunteers to change 
their mind, not just in London, but also in Paris and in Spain itself. John Longstaff, a 
runner with the British Battalion, describes in detail the lecture he was given by ‘Robbie’ 
at 1 Litchfield Street in London when, in August 1937, Longstaff volunteered to join the 
International Brigades:
They told me that if I went out there, that if I got killed there’d be no pension for my 
family. That was the first thing. They told me that if I got badly wounded and lost a limb 
or became blind or something, that again there’d be no pension. And neither could they, 
who’d be agreeing that I could go out, would be able to pay me any pension, they had no 
money.
They told me that the food I’d be eating would be Spanish food and I might not like it but 
you can’t eat any more because that was the only food that they can provide. They told 
me that the clothing I’d be wearing would be poor quality clothing. They told me that I 
wouldn’t be issued with boots, that I’d have to wear an item called alpagartas which is a 
straw based sandal. They told me that my rate of pay would be the rate of pay of the 
Spanish Army which if I think correctly, was round about five pesetas a day which 
worked out about three halfpence for each peseta, something of that nature.
They told me that if I went into hospital, that I might not have the drugs necessary to get 
me better from suffering from an illness. And that if I lost a limb- they came back to 
these points time and time again- so I was under no illusion as to what it meant. They told 
me that I would be joining the British Battalion of the International Brigade, they told me 
that I would not get leave until the war was over unless I was so disabled I was of no 
further use to the peoples of Spain.26
25 Hopkins, p.211.
26 Interview with John Longstaff, IWMSA 92219/13/4. Longstaff s experience was not unique. Baruch 
Ramelson, a Canadian who served with the Mackenzie-Papineau Battalion but who was recruited through 
Britain, described how Robson, “Pointed out all the difficulties, all the hardships, “Was I certain I knew 
what I was letting myself in for?” He wanted to assure himself absolutely that I quite knew what I was 
doing, that I was aware both politically and physically, that I was not going to Spain for a picnic or just to 
visit Spain to see what it was like, that my intentions were serious.” Interview with Baruch ‘Bert’ 
Ramelson, IWMSA 6657/6/1. See also Gurney, pp.37-38: “[Robson] delivered himself of a sort and rather 
threatening lecture. He was completely fair and frank in what he had to say. It was a bastard of a war, we 
would be short of food, medical services and even arms and ammunition. If any of us believed that we were 
going into a fine adventure we might as well pack up and go home right away.”
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On arrival in Paris, many volunteers were advised that if  they wished to change their 
minds, and return to Britain, it was still possible for them to do so.27 Jimmy Jump 
recounts how,
We were given a medical examination and we were given a final opportunity to change 
our minds if we wanted to, they said, “If you want to change your minds do so now, 
they’ll give you a ticket back and that will be the end of it.” But none of my group did.28
Jan Kurzke, a German volunteer who fought in the British section of the Commune 
de Paris Battalion in Madrid in 1936, remembers clearly one o f Andre Marty’s 
subordinates at the brigade base in Albacete briefing the volunteers on the war, and what 
was expected of the volunteers, before advising them that they were not yet in the 
Spanish Army and that any who wished to change their minds would be returned to 
France.29 Perhaps as many as eighty volunteers30 who left London for Spain either 
changed their mind, or were refused admission into the brigades on their arrival in Spain 
on medical or age grounds, or because their behaviour (usually drunkenness) on the 
journey to Spain had suggested that they might be trouble-makers.31 Chris Smith, a 
volunteer from Glasgow who volunteered in the spring of 1937, was at first refused 
permission to volunteer by Peter Kerrigan, an experienced Communist Party member
27 “We had another medical there [Paris], by the way, and we all were given the opportunity, I must state 
this, we were all given the opportunity, if you wished to return, now is the time. We were told that before 
we left London, when we got to Paris and when we got to the Spanish frontier. Even when we got to Spain 
we were told, “If you want to go back, you can go back. There’s no shame in going back.”” Interview with 
HughMacKay, IWMSA 12025/5/2.
28 Interview with James Jump, IWMSA 9524/6/1.
29 Jan Kurzke, MS, p. 18.
30 This number is an estimate based upon lists of British men repatriated from Spain held in PRO 
F0369/2514-K14742/12563/241 & FO371/22654-W13505.
31 For example, In a letter to Alec Cummings, on the 5 February 1937, Mike (probably Economides), 
relates that eight British volunteers have been held back at Figueras for, “They have always been and are a 
liability...They [have] got to be sent back to [j / c] quickest possible as you will understand they cannot be 
kept here indefinitely.” Moscow 545/6/89 p.4.
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who had attended the Seventh World Congress of the Comintern in 1935 and later 
became the Base commissar at the International Brigade Headquarters in Albacete. 
Kerrigan didn’t believe Smith understood the seriousness of the situation in Spain and 
told Smith to come back in two weeks if  he was determined to volunteer, and if not, “I’ll 
forget all about it.” In the event, Chris Smith did return, and served in the Anti-Tank 
Battery in Spain from May 1937, until he was repatriated in October 1938.32
Whilst Fred Copeman, one of the commanders of the battalion in Spain during 1937, 
hinted that young single members of the Communist Party were encouraged to volunteer, 
he states categorically that, “They really honestly didn’t just pick up people. In any case I 
wouldn’t have taken them out.”33 The accusation that volunteers were ‘duped’ into 
volunteering made Maurice Levine, one of many volunteers from Manchester, 
sufficiently angry to write a letter to the Manchester Guardian refuting the stories that 
had appeared in the Daily Mail.
I remember writing to the Guardian in which they published a letter from me and Dave 
Mowat. We refuted the idea that we were mercenaries and that we’d left good homes and 
I’d left a job and so had he. It wasn’t true the allegations in the Daily Mail made against 
us that we’d been lured to Spain and hoodwinked by promises that we’d be picking 
oranges.34
Whilst it may be true that not all the volunteers had as detailed an understanding of the 
full horrors of warfare as Edwin Greening, a canvasser from Wales who had read widely
32 Interview with Chris Smith, IWMSA 12290/9/3 and correspondence with Richard Baxell.
33 Interview with Fred Copeman, IWMSA 794/13/9.
34 Interview with Maurice Levine, in Corkhill & Rawnsley, p. 12.
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on warfare before he volunteered,35 the portrayal of the volunteers as dupes or, in the 
words of a senior member of the British Foreign Office staff in Spain, as ‘misguided 
stiffs,’36 is clearly not accurate. Hugh MacKay, a Scottish volunteer who is unusual in 
that he admits volunteering on the spur of the moment is, nevertheless, determined to 
demonstrate that there was no element of coercion.
Oh, I just decided to go to Spain, spontaneously I suppose. No hassle. I didn’t even think 
about what I could do or what I shouldn’t do, I just decided to go to Spain, and that was 
it.. .Anyone begging me to go or influencing me in any way? No, no. I went of my own 
accord.37
That the volunteers were paid mercenaries, seduced off their life on the dole- another 
accusation to appear regularly in the Daily MaiPs- is also somewhat improbable. As Tom 
Buchanan points out, “Pay was minimal and erratic”39 in the International Brigades and 
rather unlikely to have been sufficient to tempt men into risking their lives. Any 
volunteers who did would have been sorely disappointed for, where they were paid at all, 
International Brigaders were not always paid as much as Spaniards; in February 1938 the 
payment for a Spanish soldier in the 15 International Brigade was lOOptas, whilst that of 
an International was 70ptas.40 An interesting twist on the ‘financial incentive’ accusation
35 Greening recounts how, “My uncle Gwillam had twelve magnificently illustrated volumes of the First 
World War, so I knew exactly what war was all about. I had my eyes open, and my brain. I knew I was 
likely to be a casualty.” Interview with Edwin Greening, IWMSA 9855/7/2.
36 Letter from J.H. Milanes, Acting British Consul in Madrid, to W.J. Sullivan, HM Consul in Valencia, 27 
April 1937. F0889/2-118.
37 Interview with Hugh MacKay, IWMSA 12025/5/1. Peter Carroll pointedly makes the same statement 
about the Americans: “No official in the Communist Party ever ordered anyone to go to Spain.” Carroll,
p.66.
38 L.B. Shelmerdine, ‘Britons in an ‘un-British’ war: domestic newspapers and the participation of UK 
nationals in the Spanish Civil War’, North West Labour History, 22, (1997-1998) p.31.
39 Buchanan, Britain and the Spanish Civil War p. 127.
40 Salamanca, PS-Aragon (R) Carp. 7.
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appeared in an anonymous contemporary account, penned by a disillusioned ex-member 
of the British Battalion. He asked,
How widely is it known that the local branches of the Communist Party were receiving a
bonus for every recruit they sent out to the International Brigades?41
Whilst the author may have been a member of the British Battalion, (and by his own 
admission was hardly an exemplary recruit) there is no evidence to support this 
accusation. That this account was published by Bums, Oates and Washbome, whose 
other titles on the civil war are all extremely pro-Nationalist, does not add any reason for 
trusting the anonymous author’s objectivity. Certainly, the volunteers resent this 
accusation and are vociferous in their denials.42
The last o f the accusations, that a number of the recruits were, or had recently been 
unemployed appears, on first sight, to be not unreasonable. However, the implicit 
suggestion here is that as the volunteers were unemployed, there was little for them in 
Britain, so the offer of paid service in the Spanish Republican Army was an attractive 
proposition. When Tom Buchanan recently outlined what he considered to be a motive 
for volunteering, he remarked how one recruit had stated that he wanted, “to get the hell 
out of the dole,”43 and this interpretation resurfaced in Ken Loach’s film, Land and 
Freedom. However, though it is clear that many volunteers, like Tommy Kerr from
41 Anon, In Spain with the International Brigade: A personal narrative (London: Bums Oates and 
Washbome, 1938). p. 25.
42 For example, see the interview with Charles Bloom in which he states that, “We were offered nothing, 
and I will further state that when we were offered our salaries a lot of comrades refused to accept it.” 
Interview with Charles Bloom, IWMSA 992/6/3.
43 Buchanan, Britain and the Spanish Civil War, p. 127.
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Aidrie,44 had been through or were experiencing unemployment, the evidence suggests 
that most volunteers were not unemployed. K.W. Watkins’ assertion that, “Somewhere 
between an eighth and a quarter were unemployed, the rest relinquished their jobs, often 
secure ones, in order to go”45 is supported in several other studies 46
In fact, though there are several generalisations that may be drawn,47 the reasons lying 
behind the decisions to volunteer for Spain are as wide and as diverse as the volunteers 
themselves. And indeed, as one volunteer noted, individuals often had many reasons for 
electing to fight in Spain.48 Miles Tomalin, who served with the Anti-tank Battery in 
Spain between May 1937 and December 1938, pointed out that, “Undoubtedly the great 
majority are here for an ideal, no matter what motive prompted them to seek one.”49
What becomes clear from interviews with volunteers is that, as Tom Buchanan 
recently noted, “It is easier to define what the volunteers were fighting against than what 
they were fighting for.”50 The constantly recurring theme in the volunteers’ interviews 
and memoirs is that most felt that they were fighting not so much for something they all
44 Wilson & Concoran, p.64.
45 Watkins, p. 168.
46 See, for example, Corkhill & Rawnsley, p.xii: “Only one in eight of the volunteers was out of work at 
the time of leaving for Spain and many abandoned regular and sometimes well-paid employment.” and 
L.B. Shelmerdine, p.35: “Whilst undoubtedly experience of unemployment was for many volunteers a 
formative influence, it had been estimated that more than 75% of volunteers were actually in work at the 
time of their recruitment.”
47 For example, Bill Rust presents a straightforward analysis: “Who were these men of the International 
Brigade, and why did they volunteer? For the most part they were workers, though some were intellectuals 
from the middle classes.” However he does go on to admit that: “It would be a fruitful study to analyse the 
motives of each volunteer and the exact reasons which led him at a given moment to offer his services.” 
Rust, p. 6.
48 Interview with George Baker, cited in Francis, Miners Against Fascism, p.213.
49 Miles Tomalin’s unpublished diary, cited in Thomas, Spanish Civil War, p.455.
50 Buchanan, Britain and the Spanish Civil War, pp.127-128.
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believed in, but against something to which they were all opposed: the spread o f fascism. 
Thus, the supporters o f the Republic, like those o f the Rebels, saw the war as a struggle 
for national liberty.51 As Jud Colman, one of many Jewish volunteers from Manchester 
explained, “The first thing was to defeat Franco, to defeat the fascists.”52 Bill Alexander, 
in what might be seen as the ‘official’ history of the battalion, not surprisingly stresses 
this rather pointedly:
The dynamic force which drove volunteers from Britain to Spain and welded them into 
an effective fighting unit was a deep hatred of fascism.. .The British volunteers went to 
Spain because they understood that fascism must be checked before it brought wider 
repression and war.53
When Esmond Romilly, nephew of Winston Churchill and author of one of the best 
memoirs o f the British volunteers, was asked, ‘Why have you come to Spain?’ he knew it 
was a simple question to answer. “This was an easy one, the poster on the barracks wall 
proclaimed the answer: ‘To smash fascism.’”54 However, this explanation (that 
volunteers went to Spain ‘to smash fascism’) is rather simplistic and begs many 
questions. As Romilly stated:
I am assuming it will be taken for granted that everybody who joined the International 
Brigade had ‘political convictions’; but these were not necessarily the only reasons why 
they joined.55
The statement raises the issue o f the volunteers’ perceptions o f the war in Spain. 
After all, though Franco may have draped himself in fascist ideological window dressing
51 As Hywell Francis notes, “the Civil War was merely a defensive action to save a bourgeois Popular 
Front Government from fascism and a struggle for national independence.” Francis, Miners Against 
Fascism, p.210.
52 Interview with Jud Colman, IWMSA 14575/3.
53 Alexander, pp.30-31.
54 Romilly, p.50.
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when it suited him, this was more to outmanoeuvre any rivals in the Nationalist camp, 
than a result of any ideological leaning. But to the British volunteers for the International 
Brigades, Franco was backed by the fascist powers of Italy and Germany and was thus 
clearly a fascist, at least by association.56 Thus, rather than a civil war within Spain, to the 
volunteers this war was one more episode in the European war against fascist aggression, 
“a world war in embryo” in the words of the liberal News Chronicle.51 And to many of 
the British volunteers this was the latest episode in an international struggle many of 
them had already participated in at home.58
In Britain the battle was with Oswald Mosley and his supporters in the British Union 
of Fascists (BUF), who had been combated with some degree o f success. Several 
volunteers witnessed how grass-roots protests had made many areas of the country no-go 
areas for the Blackshirts and the size of the demonstration in Cable Street in London in 
October 1936 had sent a clear message. And whilst Mosley and his Blackshirts may have 
been seen as the British representation of this European fascist phenomenon, by 1936 
they were no longer a powerful political movement in Britain, more, ‘an irritant than a 
threat.’ From a membership of around 50 000 in 1934, the British Union of Fascists
55 Ibid, p.22.
56 At the same time, of course, the Rebels referred to the opponents as Los Rojos, (‘the Reds’). As I shall 
later show, these perceptions of the opposing factions were reinforced by various parts of the British media.
51 News Chronicle, 2 September 1936, p.2. Many volunteers refer to the war as ‘the anti-fascist war,’ rather 
than as a civil war.
58 Thus there was little quarter given to the enemy. There is no doubt that many of those in the Rebel army 
were neither fascists nor even supporters of the Nationalist cause. Many were victims of the geographical 
division of Spain and left with little choice but to fight. Nevertheless, Bill Alexander is scathing of George 
Orwell’s refusal to shoot at a Rebel soldier with his trousers down for, Alexander claims, “this man...might 
have fired machine guns to butcher 4,000 in the Badajoz bullring.” Bill Alexander, ‘George Orwell and 
Spain’, in Christopher Norris (ed.), Inside The Myth. Orwell: views from the Left (London: Lawrence & 
Wishart, 1984) p.97.
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(BUF) had slumped to around 5 000 in 193559 and even though, after 1935, numbers 
were increasing, back up to 10 000 by March 1936, the BUF only ever, “challenged, not 
threatened the British body politic.”60 But the volunteers from Britain did not see it these 
terms, as Bill Alexander explains:
It was not only from abroad that the menace came. Oswald Mosley was actively trying to 
build a fascist movement in Britain, and sent disciplined, uniformed groups of Blackshirts 
to beat up Jewish people in London’s East End. British fascists also attacked unemployed 
workers in Merthyr Tydfil, Aberdeen and elsewhere; any hecklers or interrupters at 
Mosley’s rallies were treated with extreme brutality. It was clear that British fascism had 
the same ugly face as its German counterpart.61
The views expressed by Sam Wild, leader of the British Battalion during the latter part of 
1938, are typical o f many of the volunteers:
Well, to me it was elementary. Here was fascism spreading all over the world, the rape of 
Abyssinia, the rise of fascism in Germany and the persecution of the Jews there, and the 
rise of the Blackshirts in Britain with their anti-Semitism, and especially their anti- 
Irishism. I felt that somebody had to do something to try and stop it.62
Wild makes no distinction between fascism in Germany, Italy, Britain or, crucially, 
Spain; indeed they are clearly perceived as manifestations of the same evil. Italy, 
Germany, Portugal, Austria, and now Spain were all ‘going fascist’. As the Labour 
Councillor (and later General Secretary of the Transport and General Workers’ Union) 
Jack Jones, who served in Spain between March and August 1938, explained:
The awful realisation that black fascism was on the march right across Europe created a 
strong desire to act. The march had started with Mussolini and had gained terrible 
momentum with Hitler and was being carried forward by Franco. For most young people
59 Robert Thurlow, ‘The Failure of British Fascism 1932-1940’, in A. Thorpe (ed.), The Failure o f  Political 
Extremism in Inter-War Britain (University of Exeter, 1989) p. 122.
60 R. Benewick, Fascist Movements in Britain (London: Penguin, 1972) p.301.
61 Alexander, p.30.
62 Interview with Sam Wild, in Corkhill & Rawnsley, pp. 18-19.
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there was a feeling of frustration, but some determined to do anything that seemed 
possible, even if it meant death, to try to stop the spread of fascism.. .This was Fascist 
progression. It was real and it had to be stopped.63
And drawing parallels between the regimes was perhaps not that unreasonable; fascism 
is, after all, a somewhat fluid ideology.64 As an article in The Times remarked in 1936, 
“‘Fascism’ is a very comprehensive term nowadays.”65 The rapid and determined support 
for the Spanish Rebels by Germany and Italy provided convincing evidence for a 
connection between the regimes. And parallels could also be drawn between continental 
and British fascism: David Goodman, a volunteer from Middlesbrough, cites the anti- 
Semitism o f Hitler in Germany, and of the BUF in Britain, as a major factor in his 
decision to volunteer.
Influences during that period were the rise of Hitler and the threat of fascist aggression 
spreading around the world in the 1930s. There was the humiliation and degradation of 
the Jewish communities and the confiscation of their property, so you had this feeling of 
kinship with the victims of Hitler in Germany. Then, over the years, there was the 
external aggression of the Nazi regime when Hitlerism was able to extend those same 
policies to other territories and new Jewish communities were the victims.66
Charles Hutchison, a lorry driver from London, felt with the Jewish volunteers that 
fascism was a very real threat to his existence, beyond any theoretical abstraction. As he 
later stated,
63 Introduction by Jack Jones in Cook, p.vii-ix.
64 “Behind the one name lie a hundred different forms.” Eccleshall, Geoghegan, Jay & Wilford. Political 
Ideologies (London- Unwin, 1990) p.218. As Mussolini himself admitted, fascist ideology needed to be 
flexible: “The ideology aimed to be pragmatic.” Fascism has been referred to by political scientists as an 
ideology without a political theory, “completely wanting in ideological concepts.” See Zeev Stemhall, ‘Fascist 
Ideology* in Walter Laquer (ed.), Fascismr A Reader’s Guide (Aldershot: Scholar Press, 1991) pp.315-316 & 
p.319.
65 The Times, 24 October 1936 p. 13.
66 Interview with David Goodman, in Corkhill & Rawnsley p.95.
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I am half black. I grew up in the National Children’s Home and Orphanage. Fascism 
meant hunger and war.67
For these volunteers, this was a struggle that went beyond national boundaries, a 
perspective lucidly expressed by the sculptor, Jason Gurney, from London:
The Spanish Civil war seemed to provide the chance for a single individual to take a 
positive and effective stand on an issue which appeared to be absolutely clear. Either you 
were opposed to the growth of Fascism and you went out to fight it, or you acquiesced in 
its crimes and were guilty of permitting its growth...for myself and many others like me it 
was a war of principle, and principles do not have a national boundary.68
And in Spain, for the first time on Continental Europe, the ‘fascists’ were not having 
it all their own way. At the outset of the war the two sides were relatively balanced and 
there seemed a genuine chance that, at last, the hitherto seemingly irrevocable advance of 
fascism might, at last, be held back.69 To political exiles from countries such as Italy and 
Germany this, o f course, was the moment they had been waiting for- their chance to 
strike back against the cause of their exile. But the British were hardly political exiles, 
even if  many had been jailed for subversion, or anti-fascist activities.70
Many o f the British volunteers for Spain had been involved in fighting the BUF, at 
their meetings, such as Olympia in 1934 and Victoria Park in Hackney in July 1936, and 
at the biggest and most infamous of all confrontations in Cable Street in the Jewish
67 Hynes, p.40.
68 Gumey, p.36.
69 As Lloyd Edmonds, an Australian attached to the transport unit of the XIV and later the XV 
International Brigade remarked, “The was here is the one that will decide the history of Spain and of 
Europe for the next few years. If the myth of fascist invincibility is destroyed, ordinary folks can sleep 
quiet.” Lloyd Edmonds, Letters from Spain (Sydney: George Allen & Unwin, 1985) p. 172.
70 For example, over twenty Welsh volunteers, including the Political Commissars Harry Dobson and Will 
Paynter had served prison terms for political activities. Francis, Miners Against Fascism, p. 193. Wilf 
McCartney, the first commander of the British Battalion, had recently served a term in prison for supplying 
secrets to the Russians. Alexander, p.65.
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neighbourhood of London’s East-End in October 1936. As Noreen Branson has shown, 
these were important moments in the growing realization that direct action against 
Mosley’s Blackshirts was a highly effective strategy. It was also realized that it was a 
strategy the official Labour movement was not prepared to countenance.
To some on the left the lessons were clear. So long as there was no opposition, Mosley’s 
movement went from strength to strength. In contrast, the challenge at Olympia, though it 
had involved relatively small numbers, had achieved an important result. It had led the 
BUF to reveal itself in its true colours. It had brought home the ugly truth about fascism 
to many who had hitherto been barely conscious of the menace.71
Wally Togwell, a waiter from St. Pancras, is a typical example of this type of seasoned 
anti-fascist campaigner:
Wherever the fascists were, our group of the YCL was there also. I was thrown out of the 
Albert Hall, I took part in anti-Mosley demo[nstration]s at Olympia and Hyde Park, I was 
at Cable Street helping to erect barricades.72
Joseph Garber, a cabinet-maker’s apprentice from Bethnal Green in London had been an 
anti-fascist activist with the Young Communist League (YCL) and had been involved in 
clashes with Blackshirts at Olympia. He felt that his involvement in fighting against 
fascism in Britain was a major factor in his volunteering for Spain,
I decided to go to Spain especially after the Cable Street battles when we stopped the 
Blackshirts getting through73
71 Leaders of the ‘Co-ordinating Committee for Anti-fascist Activity’ formed on 25 July 1936 at Conway 
Hall, in Red Lion Square, London, called on all members of the working-class to demonstrate at Mosley’s 
next meeting in Hyde Park in September. The Labour Party executive and the TUC General Council called 
for their affiliated bodies to have nothing to do with the counter-demonstration. Noreen Branson, History o f  
the Communist Party o f Great Britain 1927-1941 (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1985) p. 121.
72 Interview with Wally Togwell, in Hynes, p.27
73 Interview with Joe Garber, IWMSA 14277/4.
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Charles Goodman, a Communist Party member from Whitechapel, had also been 
involved in anti-fascist activities. He had been a part of all the major demonstrations 
against Mosley in London: at both Olympia and the Albert Hall, in the St. George’s area 
of East London, and in Cable Street.74 And one of the well-known intellectual volunteers, 
the poet and writer Christopher St. John Sprigg (also known as Christopher Caudwell) 
was arrested along with seven others on 7 June 1936 for protesting against Mosley in 
Victoria Park in London.75 Bob Cooney, an office-worker from Aberdeen who later 
gained the reputation as probably the best political commissar in the British Battalion in 
Spain,76 had a long history o f anti-fascist activity: “I felt we had to smash them off the 
streets,” he remarked later.77
The view was widely held that elements of the British establishment, particularly the 
police, did not treat anti-fascists as leniently as Mosley’s Blackshirts.78 So whilst the 
volunteers were not political exiles as such, the Communist volunteers in particular were 
members of a dissenting political culture with more in common with anti-fascists from 
other European countries than British mainstream political culture. Volunteering to fight 
in Spain was a natural extension of the fight against Mosley and what were believed to be 
his powerful backers. Just as the fight against Mosley and his supporters was against the
74 Interview with Charles Goodman, IWMSA 16612/4.
75 Daily Worker, 9 June 1936, p.3.
76 “Very brave- high political development. Best Bn. Commissar in Brigade. (Work among Spanish very 
weak in Bn). Very party conscience [sic].” (Unsigned, probably by Bill Rust) Moscow 545/6/118 p.34.
77 Cook, p. 19.
78 The Daily Worker frequently carried stories alleging that the police were not even-handed in their 
treatment of members of the BUF and those opposing them. Whilst the anti-fascist demonstration at Cable 
Street is the best-known example, others, such as the rally at the Albert Hall in March 1936 also produced 
outraged coverage over several days. See ‘Crowd’s Tussle With Police’, Daily Worker 23 March 1936, p .l, 
‘Police Violence Against Prisoner Alleged’, 24 March 1936, p.l and ‘Protest In Commons’, 31 March
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British exponent of international fascism, so the fight against Franco’s forces was the 
Spanish equivalent.
So, to the British who volunteered for the war in Spain, and indeed to many foreign 
observers, the conflict was not seen so much as a domestic war between Spanish 
Republicans and Nationalists, but as part of the international struggle between fascism 
and communism. Walter Gregory, who arrived in Spain in December 1936, is typical 
when he states that,
Although the war was fought exclusively on Spanish soil, I never saw it as a domestic 
conflict79
As AJ.P. Taylor shrewdly observed, “What men believed at the time was more 
important than what was actually happening”80 Volunteers explaining their motives for 
volunteering for the war in Spain are much more likely to state that they were opposing 
Hitler and fascism, than defending the Spanish Republic against Franco, though this is 
not to say that they would have disagreed with this interpretation. Time and time again 
the refrain, “We went to Spain so that we could defeat Hitler,”81 is repeated in interviews 
with volunteers. John Henderson, a woodworker from Gateshead who arrived in Spain in 
early 1937, puts across this view of Spain as a country under an invasion from Mussolini 
and Hitler very cogently:
1936, p.l.over a confirmation that police were taking into account arrested persons’ past records (i.e. Party 
membership).
79 Gregory, p. 178.
80 A.J.P.Taylor, English History 1914-1945 (Oxford, 1992) p.395. In another of his works, Taylor 
explained how, “It was universally believed at the time that this Rebellion was the next stage in a deliberate 
Fascist strategy of conquest - Abyssinia the first step; reoccupation of the Rhineland the next; and now 
Spain. The Spanish Rebels were supposed to be puppets of the two Fascist dictators.” AJ.P. Taylor, The 
Origins o f the Second World War (London: Penguin, 1979) p. 156.
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When the Spanish war got under way, the issues were perfectly clear to me. Franco was 
being used by Hitler to form part of an international fascist conquest and unless this was 
stopped there’d eventually be another world war. This was quite apart from the domestic 
issue of here was an army general who’d attacked a duly and properly elected 
government.82
Some o f the volunteers saw Franco as no more than a puppet whose masters were 
Mussolini and Hitler, whilst others saw him as the Spanish equivalent. This perception of 
the internationalism, rather than the nationalism of Franco’s movement, was what the 
volunteers constantly remarked upon, just as supporters for the Rebels accused the 
Republicans as being pawns of Moscow.
For these British volunteers, information about the war in Spain came via two main 
channels. For those who were members of political organisations such as the Communist 
Party or the Labour Party (at least the grass roots members), or involved in trade union 
activities, there was regular contact with the multifarious aid-Spain organisations.83 As 
Tom Buchanan states, “It was through campaigns o f this nature that British people came 
most directly into contact with the conflict.”84 Meetings were often addressed by ex­
members of the British Battalion, who had either been repatriated following injury or 
extended service, or in some cases, sent back to Britain especially for this task.85
81 Interview with Bob Cooney, in Cook, p. 148.
82 Watson & Concoran, p.29.
83 For the British labour movement’s responses to the civil war in Spain see Jim Fyrth, The Signal Was 
Spain (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1986) and two works by Tom Buchanan: The British Labour 
Movement and the Spanish Civil War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) and Britain and the 
Spanish Civil War.
84 Buchanan, Britain and the Spanish Civil War, p.93.
85 In two letters to Harry Pollitt, dated 29 March and 3 April 1937, Fred Copeman states that, “We send 
you four of our best comrades, although at this time we can do with every available man in the line. We 
feel that it is of the utmost importance that the British working-class be given the news direct from men of 
the Battalion.” CP/IND/POLL/2/5-6, NMLH Manchester. See also Alexander, pp. 137-138.
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But for those not actively involved in the ‘aid-Spain movement’86 the most influential 
source of information was likely to be the British national press.87 There were 
considerably more national newspapers published in the 1930s than there are now, and 
there was, likewise, a considerably larger readership. Three national British newspapers’ 
coverage of the civil war was strongly pro-Republican: the News Chronicle, the Daily 
Herald and the Daily Worker, though the Manchester Guardian, whose influence rather 
belied its small regional circulation, was also pro-loyalist. The coverage of the Spanish 
Civil War in the British press has come under considerable, and justifiable, criticism for 
the extent o f flagrantly biased coverage.88 George Orwell’s oft-quoted remark is perhaps 
the most well known:
No event is ever correctly reported in a newspaper, but in Spain, for the first time, I saw 
newspaper reports which did not bear any relation to the facts, not even the relationship 
which is implied in an ordinary lie.89
His criticism could be equally applied to a number of newspapers, with both Nationalist 
and Republican sympathies.90
86 Whether, or not, the numerous organisations raising aid for Spain constitute ‘a movement’ is a matter of 
some contention. For this debate see Buchanan’s, ‘Britain’s Popular Front?’ and Britain and the Spanish 
Civil War, and Jim Fyrth, ‘The Aid Spain Movement in Britain 1936-1939’, History Workshop, 35, (1993) 
pp. 153-164.
87 In 1939 1,100 people were asked on what they based their opinions- over a third said newspapers, by far 
the largest proportion. The basis of opinion was: Newspapers 35%; Friends 17%; Radio 13%; ‘Own 
opinion’ 8%; Recent history or travel 8%; Books 5%; Other factors 10%; Negative 4%. Charles Madge & 
Tom Harrison, Britain by Mass Observation (Middlesex: Penguin, 1939) p.30.
88 In the main, the reporting of the war in the British Press infuriated the British volunteers in Spain. Whilst 
the Daily Worker and News Chronicle could be relied upon to put across the republican line including 
regular attacks on the ‘farce’ of non-intervention, most could not. Both William Forrest of the News 
Chronicle and Sefton Delmer of the Daily Express visited the battalion in April 1938, and were popular 
with the volunteers, because they, “Could be relied upon for their authentic reporting, in contrast to so 
much unfounded, ill-informed and partial rubbish which all too often passed for objective coverage of the 
war in the British press.” Gregory, p .l 14.
89 George Orwell, ‘Looking back on The Spanish War’, from The Penguin Complete Longer Non-Fiction 
o f George Orwell (Middlesex: Penguin, 1983) p.478. Stephen Spender also criticised the ‘heroics’ printed 
in many left wing newspapers. See the New Statesman and Nation, 1 May 1937, pp.714-715.
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Daily Herald 
Daily Worker 
News Chronicle 
Manchester Guardian
2 ,000,000  2 ,000,000  2 ,000,000  2 ,000,000
N/A 60,000 N/A N/A
1,360,000 1,324,000 1,273,436 1,298,757
N/A_______50,000 N/A________ N/A
Figure 11. British pro-Republican National Daily Newspaper Circulation Figures 1936-1939.91
The News Chronicle was the best selling liberal newspaper in Britain and owned by 
Cadburys through a trust. The paper’s political editor was A.J. Cummings, extremely pro- 
Soviet, who has been described as, “probably the most influential, important, and well 
informed radical journalist o f the 1930s.”92 The paper remained determinedly pro- 
Republican throughout the war93 and News Chronicle correspondents in Spain included 
Arthur Koestler and John Langdon-Davies, both o f whom were members of the 
Communist Party and penned avidly pro-Republican books on their experiences in
90 Supporters o f  both parties in the civil war accused the British press o f biased coverage in favour o f their 
opponents. Brian Crozier, a Nationalist sympathiser, was just as critical o f  the coverage o f  the war: “The 
dreadful fact is that the reporting of the war in the Western press was overwhelmingly pro-Republican and 
indelibly coloured by Comintern fabrications.” Philip Toynbee (ed.), The Distant Drum (London: Sidgwick 
& Jackson, 1976) p.59.
91 The Newspaper Press Directory (London: Mitchell & Co) 1936 pp.312-313 & 1937 pp.313-314; The 
Press by Michael Curtis (London: News Chronicle, 1951) pp.56-67; Audit Bureau o f  Circulations 
(London), Volume 6, (April 1937), Vol. 7, (September 1937), Vol. 9, (November 1938), Vol. 10, (March 
1938), Vol. 11, (September 1938) and F.R. Gannon The British Press & Germany J936-1939, (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1971) pp.34-74.
92 Franklin Reid Gannon, The British Press and Germany 1936-1939 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971) 
p.40.
93 The reporting o f  the ‘rising’ in Barcelona in early May 1937 provides a good example o f  how the News 
Chronicle often uncritically reported the Communist Party line. John Langdon-Davies writing in the News 
Chronicle on the 10th May 1937 (p.5) described the event as “a frustrated POUM putsch”, though events 
had clearly been instigated by the attempted eviction by force o f members o f  the CNT from the Barcelona 
telephone exchange. However it should be said, that Claude Cockbum’s (writing as Frank Pitcairn) 
reporting in the Daily Worker, made the often blinkered coverage in the News Chronicle seem positively 
benign by comparison. See, for example, ‘Pitcairn Lifts Barcelona V eil’ Daily Worker, 11 May 1937, (p .l) 
which claimed that German and Italian agents, “in cooperation with the local Trotskyists” were preparing 
“a situation o f  disorder and bloodshed.” Cockbum went on to state that, “The POUM, acting in cooperation 
with well known criminal elements...planned, organised and led the attacks in the rearguard, accurately 
timed to coincide with the attack on the front at Bilbao...In the plainest terms the POUM declares it is the 
enemy o f the People’s Govt.” See also James Pettifer (ed.), Cockbum in Spain (London: Lawrence & 
Wishart, 1986) pp. 182-188.
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Spain.94 The News Chronicle repeatedly stressed the importance of the international 
context of the war of Spain95 and that Britain would soon be fighting the fascists itself.96 
The paper always gave the International Brigades extremely positive coverage, though 
cautiously did not mention the volunteers until the end of November 1936, by which time 
a “phantom column” of three thousand volunteers had come to the aid o f Madrid.97 The 
News Chronicle's reporting of meetings in aid of Spain played a significant part in the 
decision o f Leslie Preger, another of the large number from Manchester to volunteer:
I saw an account in the News Chronicle of a trade union meeting which set up a Medical 
Aid Committee and appealed for lorry drivers and Spanish speaking people. So I hared 
off to London to volunteer and I was accepted.98
Other volunteers such as Dougal Eggar, an ex-metropolitan policeman from London, also 
cite the News Chronicle's reporting as influential." The newspaper’s argument that, “On 
it [the International Brigade] hangs the fate of democracy in Spain and, it may be, of 
Europe,” was one that would be repeated by many of those who volunteered to fight to 
defend the Spanish Republic. The statement by the News Chronicle that, “If they [the 
Spanish Republic] should fail, not they alone, but all of us would be the losers,”100 could 
have come from one of the volunteers themselves.
94 John Langdon-Davies, Behind The Spanish Barricades (London: Seeker & Warburg, 1936) and Arthur 
Koestler, Spanish Testament (London: Victor Gollancz, 1937). Koestler describes how he deliberately 
contrived atrocity stories as part of the propaganda campaign. Arthur Koestler, Invisible Writing (London: 
Collins, 1954)pp.333-335.
95 See, for example, ‘Behind The Censorship in Spain’, which describes how “what is going on in Spain is 
extremely important for the rest of the world.” News Chronicle, 20 July 1936, p.8.
96 ‘What the fall of Irun means to Spain and us’, News Chronicle, 7 September 1936, p.l.
97 ‘Phantom Column Defends Madrid From Moors’, News Chronicle, 21 November 1936, p.l.
98 Corkhill & Rawnsley, p.30.
99 Interview with Dougal Eggar, IWMSA 9426/4/3.
l°° News Chronicle, 7 April 1938, p. 10.
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In addition to reporting the events in Spain in a manner sympathetic to the Republic, 
whilst attacking ‘the farce’ of non-intervention,101 the News Chronicle also carried 
reports by British volunteers such as Esmond Romilly of their experiences in Spain102 
and printed the last letters of Christopher Caudwell, following his death at Jarama in 
February 1937.103 The ill treatment of British subjects by the Rebels, such as the arrest 
and imprisonment under threat of execution of their correspondent Arthur Koestler, was 
worthy of an outraged leader article.104
The Daily Herald was also pro-Republican, though it supported the Government’s 
policy o f non-intervention in the war, and thus came in for bitter criticism from the Daily 
Worker. The Daily Herald was the national newspaper of the trade union and labour 
movement and acted as their official voice-piece, with around two million sales every 
day. Thus the Daily Herald closely followed what one commentator has described as a 
media consensus at the start of the war, that Britain should ‘keep out of it.’105 The 
following statement that appeared in The Times in August 1936 summarises this position 
clearly:
The British Government are unquestionably right to send a favourable reply to the French 
proposal that a policy on non-intervention should be adopted towards Spain...it is really
101 One of the best examples of the News Chronicle’s bitter criticism of non-intervention is, ‘I accuse’ by 
Vemon Bartlett, News Chronicle, 13 October 1937, p. 10.
102 See for example, ‘One Night on the Spanish front’, News Chronicle, 13 January 1937, p.10.
103 ‘Last letters of a hero’, News Chronicle, 28 June 1937, p.10.
104 ‘Koestler’, News Chronicle, 7 April 1937, p.10. For the arrest of Koestler by the Rebel press officer 
Luis Bolin, see Koestler, op cit, pp.223-227, Sir Peter Chalmers-Mitchell, My House in Malaga (London: 
Faber & Faber, 1938) pp.279-291, and Luis Bolin, Spain: The Vital Years (London: Cassell, 1967) pp.248- 
249. Bolin was the Rebel officer who arrested Koestler, and would later achieve notoriety for issuing a 
panicked denial not only that Nationalist planes bombed Guernica, but that Nationalist planes had even 
been airborne on the 26 April 1937. See Herbert Southworth, Guernica! Guernica! (London: University of 
California Press, 1977)p.338.
105 Shelmerdine, p.30. The Daily Worker was the exception to this consensus.
86
Why did they go?
imperative for everyone that a general policy of non-intervention should be adopted., .the 
civil war in Spain might very easily become a civil war in Europe. That must at all costs 
be prevented.106
The paper’s influence on the volunteers must be seen therefore, as negligible. Likewise, 
the Manchester Guardian, though clearly pro-Republican, was more politically 
independent than many of its rivals and its reporting of the conflict was much more 
measured than that of the News Chronicle or, particularly, the Daily Worker,107
Whilst pro-Republican newspapers such as the News Chronicle and the Manchester 
Guardian had what was essentially a liberal readership, the Daily Worker, Britain’s 
Communist daily newspaper, was aimed squarely at members, and potential members, of 
the British Communist Party. The Daily Worker's role in disseminating the Communist 
Party’s interpretation of the nature of the conflict in Spain played an essential part in the 
recruitment o f volunteers for the Spanish Republic. Bill Alexander noted that many 
would-be volunteers heard about recruiting through the paper.108 As one volunteer 
described, the newspaper was seen as ‘the Bible’ and he read it avidly to make sure that 
he was following ‘the line’ correctly.109 Many others remark upon their readership of the 
newspaper110, whose influence on members, and potential members, o f the CP was 
unrivalled.
106 ‘No Intervention,’ The Times, 5 August 1936, p.13.
107 Though still a regional newspaper, The Manchester Guardian was regarded by many as a national, even 
though its circulation was even lower that the Daily Worker's.
108 Alexander, p.44.
109 Interview with Jud Colman. IWMSA 14575/3.
110 See for example, Stanley Harrison, Good to be Alive: The Story o f Jack Brent (London: Lawrence & 
Wishart, 1954) p.6.
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As one would expect, the paper unequivocally supported the Republicans during the 
civil war, though this was always achieved within the context of the official Communist 
Party line, whether it be the criticism of the POUM in Spain that so outraged George 
Orwell, or support for affiliation of the Communist Party to the Labour Party in Britain, 
that so offended the labour establishment. The Spanish Civil War was the major issue for 
the paper in the second half of 1936; on only one occasion did the conflict not receive 
coverage on the front page.111 The constitutional crisis surrounding the abdication of 
Edward VIII of December 1936 which so dominated other British newspapers had to 
share the Daily Worker's front-page.112 In fact, the Daily Worker had played close 
attention to the events in Spain throughout 1936, following the Popular Front’s victory in 
the February election. The paper was quick to point out the relevance o f the events in 
Spain for Britain; that the success of the Spanish ‘peoples front’ provided an object 
lesson for the British working-class.113
A number of Party figures who were to have a bearing on Spain were regular 
contributors to the newspaper. Ralph Fox, who was killed in Spain and received several 
glowing obituaries in the paper,114 wrote a regular feature entitled ‘A Workers 
Notebook.’ Tom Wintringham who with Fox, founded The Left Review, and was 
commander o f the British Battalion at Jarama, wrote regular articles on the war in
111 This was 14 October 1936 when the front page was taken over by reports of the Communist Party 
Conference, in particular a long statement by Harry Pollitt.
112 The news to vie with the abdication was ‘Loyalists Advance Six Miles’, Daily Worker, 11 December 
1936, p.l.
113 Daily Worker, 19 February 1936, p.5.
114 See, for example, ‘Ralph Fox Killed In Action’, Daily Worker, 5 January 1937, p.l.
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Abyssinia.115 Wintringham also reported on the early stages o f the war in Spain, and 
wrote an article claiming that the Rebels were cheating their Moorish troops by paying 
them in worthless foreign currency.116 R.W. Robson, known as ‘Robbie’ when in charge 
of vetting new recruits for the International Brigades, penned an article encouraging 
readers to join the Communist Party.117 A half-page article written by Will Paynter, who 
would later be base political commissar at the International Brigade Headquarters at 
Albacete, published articles to support his successful election campaign for a seat on the 
executive of the South Wales Miners’ Union.118
The war in Spain was covered by Claude Cockbum (writing under the pseudonym of 
Frank Pitcairn) who had been in Barcelona in July 1936 to cover the Workers’ Olympiad 
for the Daily Worker and had briefly fought for the Republic in the Sierra Guadarrama, 
and by William Rust, a senior figure in the British Communist Party and its 
representative in Spain. When the uprising began in July 1936, the Daily Worker carried 
reports confidently predicting that the ‘unity’ o f the Spanish working-class would 
triumph:
The fascists have suffered a crushing blow and it is only a matter of days before they are 
finally beaten.119
Reports criticising the reporting of the conflict in other newspapers were not long in 
coming, and it was the voice of the Labour Party, the Daily Herald, which was first
115 See, for example, the Daily Worker, 15 May 1936, p.5.
116 “Look I’m Rich”, Daily Worker, 11 November 1936, p.l.
117 ‘You Should Join the Communist Party’, Daily Worker, 8 April 1936, p.4.
118 Daily Worker, 10 July 1936, p.4.
119 Ibid.
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censored.120 Other articles complained of the biased coverage in other pro-Rebel 
newspapers, particularly Lord Rothermere’s Daily Mail.121
Pitcairn stressed that the Communists were playing the central role in the defence of 
the Republic,122 likewise that the British volunteers were playing a similar part in the 
International Brigades.123 At the same time, articles demonstrated the Communist Party’s 
support for the Republican Government, following the line outlined by Georgi Dimitrov, 
the Bulgarian Secretary-General of the Comintern, at the Seventh Congress in 1935. This 
replaced the policy o f ‘class against class’ which had portrayed bourgeois Republican 
parties as ‘social fascists,’ with the policy of Popular Frontism, aligning all parties from 
Social Democrats to Communists in a People’s Front against fascism. For example, an 
article penned by Andre Marty, the future leader of the International Brigades, stressed 
that the party’s task was to, “Defend, consolidate and develop the bourgeois democratic 
revolution,” and argued that, “The present struggle in Spain is not between Capitalism 
and Socialism, but between fascism and democracy.”124 This was essential, if  the 
Communist Party was to have any success in pursuing two major aims: first, embroiling 
the British labour movement in a ‘united front’ in the defence o f the Republic and,
120 Daily Worker, 23 July 1936, p.2.
121 ‘How Atrocity Stories Are Faked’, Daily Worker, 18 August 1936, p.4. The Daily Worker repeatedly 
denied the stories of church burnings and killing of nuns and clergy, enrolling luminaries such as Dr. 
Montessori and various members of the church to support their claims. See Daily Worker, 11 August 1936, 
p.4 and ‘I Saw Nuns Quietly Sewing’, Daily Worker, 15 August 1936, p.5. Indeed, Pitcairn later wrote how 
it was in fact the Rebels who were murdering clergy, not the Republicans. See ‘Fascists Murder Pastors in 
Spain’, Daily Worker, 17 October 1936, p.3.
122 See ‘Communists to Fore’, Daily Worker, 24 July 1936, p.5 and ‘How Communists Saved Spain’, Daily 
Worker, 11 August 1936, p.5.
123 See, for example, John Strachey’s ‘Looking at the News’ weekly column on 5 January 1937, cited in 
Francis, Miners Against Fascism, p. 162. “An ever growing stream of British workers is leaving this country 
to join the Column. Are we doing enough to support them? We cannot do too much.”
124 ‘Democracy v Fascism’, Daily Worker, 5 August 1936, p.4.
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second, persuading the western democracies that their major foe was fascism, not 
communism, and that an alliance with Russia was essential if  fascism was to be 
contained. The Daily Worker was thus quick to pounce on reports o f intervention on the 
side o f the Rebels, which would display the international- rather than national- aspects of 
the struggle in Spain such as ‘Italian Arms for Fascists’.125
However, at least until mid-November, 1936 the Daily Worker was extremely 
cautious in requesting direct military help for the Republic. At first the paper did not 
overtly request volunteers for the Republic, and instead limited itself to criticisms of the 
British Government’s policy of non-intervention in the conflict on one hand, and pointing 
out the significance of the war for Britain (the threat of fascism) and the British working- 
class (the need for unity) on the other. However, the Daily Worker did regularly suggest 
ways in which the Republic could be assisted, without actually mentioning volunteering. 
For example, one article that appeared to be aimed at women, demonstrated ways of 
making bandages.126 In October 1936 the Daily Worker printed a request for letters and 
deputations to be sent to Transport House, the headquarters o f the Trades Union 
Congress, pressing them to drop their support for non-intervention.127 Regular 
advertisements for the ‘Relief Committee for the Victims of Fascism’ pressed home that 
this was the chance to contribute to the great cause from Britain. And indeed, many 
did,128 some of whom later went to Spain, like the Manchester furniture re-holsterer, Josh
125 Daily Worker, 28 August 1936, p.l.
126 ‘You Can Help Spain’s Wounded With Bandages’, Daily Worker, 20 October 1936, p.7.
127 ‘“Neutrality” Farce Drags On’, Daily Worker, 21 October 1936, p.l.
128 For two conflicting assessments of the extent of British aid for the Spanish Republic see Fyrth, The 
Signal Was Spain and Buchanan, The British Labour Movement and the Spanish Civil War.
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Davidson.129 However, following the success of foreign medical units in Spain in August 
and September 1936, Frank Pitcairn’s article requesting medically trained volunteers 
appeared on the front page. It stated that:
There is urgent and vital need for stretcher-bearers, sanitary and medical orderlies, lorry 
drivers, mechanics, nurses, surgeons, Red Cross workers of all kinds, with experience if 
possible.130
The request stops short o f asking for military trained volunteers, but clearly shows that 
the Communist Party had now decided to be actively, rather than passively, involved in 
the war in Spain. The situation was similar in France, where the Communist press was at 
first reluctant to explicitly put out a request for military volunteers for the Spanish 
Republican forces.131
Whilst there were mentions of British individuals in Spain such as the death of the 
artist Felicia Browne,132 it was not until mid-November that any reports of an organised 
international contingent o f volunteers appeared, and even then in somewhat coded terms. 
Under the headline, ‘The Big News Yesterday’ the Daily Worker described how,
The Government forces have received powerful and well-trained re-inforcements, which 
British eye-witnesses have admired for their military precision and martial bearing.133
129 “I wasn’t interested in politics at all until the rise of Hitler and when Mosley came into the picture in 
England...There were people from the Manchester area who we know personally, that were in Spain, but 
nobody from my branch. We took a big part in the Youth Foodship for Spain Campaign.” Interview with 
Josh Davidson in Corkhill & Rawnsley p. 159.
130 ‘Medical Unit “A Godsend’” , Daily Worker, 12 September 1936, p.l.
131 Skoutelsky, ‘French Combatants of the International Brigades’, p.7.
132 ‘English Sculptress Killed In Spain’, Daily Worker, 4 September 1936, p.5.
133 Daily Worker, 9 November 1936, p.l.
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Whilst there is no explicit mention of an international column, the meaning is clear, as is 
the Communist’s typical admiration of discipline. The article described how the 3 000 
reinforcements marched down the Calle de Alcala to the west of Madrid. Two days later 
the report was no longer ambiguous and reported how, “Spaniards, Germans, Hungarians 
and Yugoslavs, belonging to the International Brigade” had stemmed the Rebel advance 
on Madrid.134 However, there was, again, no mention of a British contingent. The 
eulogistic portrayal o f the volunteers was continued a week later when Harry Pollitt 
described how,
Men Are Flocking From All Over Europe.. .To Help Save Europe.. .Have you read of the 
magnificent part of the International Legion is playing in Spain? We are proud of the fact 
that a number of our comrades are playing a leading part in the work of this legion.135
If there was any doubt that Pollitt was referring to British, rather than international 
comrades, it was resolved three days later when Pollitt described how, “The British 
section o f this International Legion is carrying out a great fight.”136 The appeal continued 
in December 1936 with a warning to the ‘forces o f democracy’ and what is virtually a 
call to arms:
The International Column and the Spanish Militia are fighting for the democracy not only 
of Spain, but also of Britain and all of Europe. Never was there a greater need for all the 
forces of democracy in this and other countries to support and strengthen a band of men 
who have now to defy not only Franco’s men, but all the weight of German militarism.137
134 ‘Men Of Four Nations Stem Advance’, Daily Worker, 12 November 1936,p.l.
135 ‘How Madrid Dug In Its Heels- And Struck Back’, Daily Worker, 21 November 1936, p.2.
136Daily Worker, 2 4 November 1936, p.l.
137 ‘Support Them’, Daily Worker, 2 December 1936, p.l.
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Stories of the intervention of Italian138, German and Moorish forces on the side of the 
Rebels were essential in fostering the picture of a nation and its legitimate government 
under siege. Again, articles portrayed the struggle as the Spanish people fighting against 
foreign invaders, an image which appears in many of the volunteers’ memoirs:
We are witnessing the fascist invasion of a peaceful democratic country.139
In December 1936 the Daily Worker carried several, at the very least, highly 
exaggerated reports,140 describing the role of thousands of German troops in the attack on 
Madrid.141 Several volunteers remember this German attack on Madrid having played an 
important part in their decision to volunteer. Frank Graham from Sunderland believed 
that:
The full significance of what was going on wasn’t realised until you had the Germans in 
the fight for Madrid. The early battles for Madrid where the German fascists played a 
very important part I think brought the whole thing up to the front.142
This theme was regularly referred to by other British volunteers, such as Albert 
Charlesworth, the metal polisher from Oldham:
I was, and still am, inclined to side with any little party where I think an injustice is being 
done, and this, I think, is what took me to Spain...There was the German and the Italian 
involvement. I knew of it before I went and that’s what made it so unjust.143
138 See for example, ‘Italian Troops Land In Spain’, Daily Worker, 7 December 1936, p.l and ‘Italian 
Troops For Franco- Army Pilots Promised 20,000 lire Salary’, Daily Worker, 9 December 1936, p.3.
139 ‘Spain- A Second Abyssinia’, Daily Worker, 22 August 1936, p.4.
140 ‘German Troops March on Madrid’, Daily Worker, 2 December 1936, p.l and ‘Nazi Legions Join 
Franco’, 5 December 1936, p .l, which reported how, “Twenty thousand German troops are reliably 
reported to have reached Spain to fight for the fascist Rebels.”
141 Whilst estimates of German aid to the Rebels very greatly from c. 17,000 (Thomas, Spanish Civil War, 
p.985) to “some 50,000” (Alexander, p.22) there is little doubt that the reports in the Daily Worker of 
thousands of German troops involved in the attack on Madrid are false.
142 Corkhill & Rawnsley, p.37.
143 Ibid, pp.42-43
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As James Brown from Paddington in London phrased it,
You can over-simplify it in terms of goodies and baddies but in essence it was very clear 
cut. After the Spanish people appealed for help when Hitler and Mussolini had invaded 
and they were ferrying Moroccan troops over, I decided to go.144
The Daily Worker constantly stressed the vital role the British were playing in the 
defence of the Republic, though remarking how much more could be achieved with more 
volunteers. On 5 December 1936, the Daily Worker described in glowing terms how the 
one hundred British volunteers in the International Legion were a “fine cool, brave” 
response to the German intervention.145 By 12 December, it was reported that the British 
contingent numbered three hundred, but demanded that, “We Must Make The British 
Unit Stronger And Mightier Yet.”146 Frank Pitcairn reported how, by the middle of 
December,
The fourth all-British company has arrived.. .Soon, it is to be hoped, we shall have our 
own British battalion.147
Having lost their earlier caution, the Daily Worker sang the praises of the British 
contribution to the Republican war effort.148 Harry Pollitt continued to claim that the 
British volunteers were extremely highly regarded (and thus vital) and, on 19 December, 
made a clear plea for British volunteers for Spain. Under the headline ‘Spain Has A Job 
For You To Do’, Pollitt claimed that,
144 Interview with James Brown, in Corkhill & Rawnsley, pp.48-49.
145 ‘Britain’s Answer to 20,000 Nazi Troops’, Daily Worker, 5 December 1936, p.3.
146 ‘British Unit Tops 300’, Daily Worker, 12 December 1936, p.l.
147 ‘British Fighters Now Pouring Into Spain’, Daily Worker, 15 December 1936, p.l.
148 ‘British Best Of Battalion’, Daily Worker, 13 December 1936, p.l.
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The British section of the International Brigade continues to earn high praise. There are 
now over 400 of our best and bravest in it.149
Two days later the British contingent numbered “over four hundred and fifty”, and 
was “growing every day.” Pollitt described how one hundred and fifty men, led by Peter 
Kerrigan, who had been closely involved in organising the Scottish part o f the National 
Unemployed Worker’s Movement’s (NUWM) march on London in 1936, were departing 
for Spain.150 By 23 December, Frank Pitcairn believed there were now sufficient British 
volunteers ‘to form two companies’.151 The following day, the paper proudly proclaimed 
the naming of the British volunteers as the Saklatvala Battalion,152 after the Indian 
Communist M.P. for Battersea, though this name never actually caught on with the 
volunteers themselves. This was followed by a more circumspect, but just as passionate 
appeal from Charlotte Haldane, whose son and husband were both in Spain, to “talk, talk, 
talk of the Brigade”, for, “a lot more can be done.”153 The Daily Worker's appeals for 
volunteers continued throughout 1937 and into 1938 and, as one would expect, were 
mainly successful with those already in the Communist Party or Young Communist 
League (YCL), and those closely involved with them.
Until the beginning o f the Spanish war, the Communists repeatedly had stressed their 
opposition to war, setting up organisations such as the British Anti-War Council. 
However, with the outbreak of the war this policy quickly had to change. As Kevin
149Daily Worker, 19 December 1936, p.l.
150 Daily Worker, 21 December 1936, p.l.
151 Daily Worker, 23 December 1936, p.l.
152 Daily Worker, 24 December 1936, p.l.
153 Daily Worker, 28 December 1936, p.5.
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Morgan has pointed out, “the Communists’ heroic efforts on behalf of the Spanish 
Republic suggested that their commitment to peace was secondary to their commitment 
to resist fascism, even to the point of war.”154 This was a grave problem for supporters of 
the Republic on the left, who had formed their politics under the tide o f pacifism that 
swept over the country after the Great War. Opponents of intervention in Spain were not 
slow to point out the inconsistency of opposing rearmament in Britain, whilst supporting 
arming the Republicans in Spain.155
The organisation and recruitment of the International Brigades represents the 
outstanding success for the British Communist Party, for though extremely vocal, the 
party was singularly unsuccessful in its attempts to break into the mainstream body 
politic. Senior figures in the Labour Party and trade union movement opposed 
communists’ attempts at affiliation, even to the extent of expelling the Labour M.P. 
Stafford Cripps for supporting affiliation in 1937, long after the Labour Party had refused 
to countenance it. Likewise, communist attempts to get around Labour Party antipathy 
towards them by setting up ‘unity’ fronts and organisations to ‘aid Spain’ were met with 
outright hostility.156 Labour Party activists were warned not to get involved on threat of 
expulsion with organisations they felt to be communist ‘fronts.’ The list of unacceptable
154 Kevin Morgan, Against Fascism and War: Ruptures and Continuities in British Communist Politics 
1935-194J (Manchester University Press: 1989) p.57.
155 See, for example, ‘Europe and Spain’, The Times, 21 August 1936, p.l 1.
156 For an examination of the role of the aid Spain movements in support of the Spanish Republic, see 
Fyrth, The Signal Was Spain) and Buchanan, The British Labour Movement and the Spanish Civil War. For 
official Labour’s reactions to the war (and to the Communist Party’s response) see C. Fleay, & M.L. 
Saunders, ‘The Labour Spain Committee: Labour Party Policy and the Spanish Civil War’, The Historical 
Journal, 28:1, (1985) pp.187-197.
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organisations was not a short one and is illuminating; both in the Communist Party’s 
machinations and in the hostile reactions o f the Labour movement.157
Hugo Dewar has shown how, “The general effects of the economic crisis, the shock 
of the destruction of the German working-class movement, and the outbreak of the 
Spanish Civil War, induced a leftward mood both of organised labour and among 
intellectuals.”158 This led to a rise in the support for direct action during the 1930s, 
particularly in the demonstrations against the BUF. However, attempts to succeed 
through the ballot box met with only one success, the election of Willie Gallagher in the 
West-Fife by-election where he scored 29.2% of the vote. Harry Pollitt, standing in East 
Rhondda, an area that generated many recruits for the International Brigades,159 was 
unsuccessful even though he polled 30.6% of the vote. The membership of the party tells 
its own story, peaking at nearly 11 000 in 1926 at the time o f the General Strike, then 
slipping into decline until 1931, after which the membership starts to increase once more.
157 The list included:
League Against Imperialism 
Left Wing Movement 
Minority Movement 
Workers International Relief
National Unemployed Workers’ Movement
Friends of Soviet Russia
National Charter Campaign Committee
International Labour Defence
British Anti-War Council
European Workers’ Anti-Fascist Congress
See Labour Party Annual Report 1933 p.30 & 1934 p.12, cited in Branson, p.l 17.
158 Hugo Dewar, Communist Politics in Britain: The CPGB from its Origins to the Second World War 
(London: Pluto, 1976) p. 109.
159 Many of the British volunteers hailed from ‘Red Rhondda’ including influential figures such as the 
political commissars Will Paynter and Harry Dobson, plus Billy Griffiths, the battalion party secretary in 
the summer and autumn of 1938.
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(See Figure 12 below). Between 1935 and 1942 Communist Party membership rose from 
7,700 to 56,000, mainly as a response to the rise in European fascism.160
1922 5 116
1926 10 800
1927 7 377
January 1929 3 500
December 1929 3 200
May 1930 2 850
November 1930 2 555
November 1931 6 279
1932 9 000
December 1934 5 800
February 1935 6 500
October 1936 11 500
May 1937 12 250
September 1938 15 750
July 1939 17 750
Figure 12. British Communist Party membership161
The membership o f the British Party numbered less than a quarter o f the American 
Communist Party (which had 41 000 members in 1936, rising to 82 000 in 1938), yet the 
total number o f British volunteers was approximately 2400, around 200 less than the 
American total.162 Whilst, clearly, travelling the vast distance from the US to Spain 
presented a major obstacle to the American volunteers, it still suggests that the number 
that volunteered from Britain (of whom, as we have seen, perhaps seventy per-cent were 
CP members) represents a remarkable achievement.
At the same time, other, more subtle forces, played a part, if  not in directly influencing 
people to volunteer, then certainly in forming the cultural and political milieu in which
160 Stevenson & Cook, p. 154.
161 Dewar, p.94, Branson, p. 188 and Stevenson & Cook, p.315.
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many of the volunteers were steeped. The most influential of these was undoubtedly the 
Left Book Club (LBC), established in early 1936 by the publisher Victor Gollancz, a 
member of the Labour Party, but with sympathies for the further left. The editorial panel 
consisted of Gollancz, together with John Strachey, and Harold Laski from the London 
School o f Economics, the latter two both being regular contributors to the Daily Worker 
and supporters of affiliation of the CP to the Labour Party.163 The rapid rise in 
membership of the Left Book Club was astonishing and exceeded all expectations: 9 000 
members by May 1936, 28 000 by October, almost 40 000 in March 1937 and 57 000 by 
the spring of 1939.164 The LBC produced a journal, The Left News, which was distributed 
free to members and there were many powerful affiliated university organisations: by 
1938 the Oxford University October Club had 300 members and the Cambridge Socialist 
Club had 1 000 members, plus hundreds of local discussion groups, many of whom 
became involved in Spanish Aid organisations.165
The Left Book Club published many works by Communists or sympathisers, including 
Soviet Communism by Sidney and Beatrice Webb, and had a close relationship with the 
Communist Party; regular advertisements for the LBC appeared in the Daily Worker. The 
LBC published several works on the war in Spain o f which Spain in Revolt, published in 
1936, was perhaps the most widely read and most influential.166 Several volunteers, such 
as Len Crome, the Commander of the 35 Medical Division, cited the influence of the
162 The Americans numbered approximately 2600, plus perhaps 150 more who served in Republican 
medical units. Carroll, pp. 13-14.
163 Dewar, pp.121-122. John Strachey penned a regular feature in the paper, ‘Looking At The News.’
164 Branson, p.214.
165 Stevenson & Cook, p. 155.
166 Hopkins, pp. 119-120.
100
Why did they go?
LBC on their political development,167 and within Spain, members of the British 
Battalion often participated in political discussions focusing on the LBC’s monthly 
selection.168 Nearly half o f the books commissioned were written by Communists, and 
roughly one sixth of the membership were party members. As Ronald Blythe stated,
No small national Communist Party ever had so respectable, brilliantly organised and 
popular a vehicle for its propaganda as that provided by the Left Book Club in the Britain 
of the late thirties.169
Many of the volunteers had also been involved in the hunger marches organised by 
the National Unemployed Workers Movement (NUWM), one of the many Communist 
dominated organisations, “the most important organisation of the unemployed during the 
depression.”170 A number of studies have commented on the strong link between 
participating in the hunger marches, and later volunteering for the Spanish war:
If one is to seek a major factor in the motivation of a significant proportion of the British 
Battalion, one could well begin with the hunger marches and the conditions which 
provoked them.171
As Lance Rogers, one of the large number of Welsh Communist volunteers, explained,
It was a continuing process. Here we were in Mythyr Tydfil in a continuing struggle night 
and day. The Hunger March over, we left for the Spanish war. It was a fulfillment and a 
most natural step to take.172
167 Interview with Len Crome, IWMSA 9298/4/1.
168 Hopkins, p.211.
169 Ronald Blythe, The Age o f Illusion (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1963) p. 115.
170 Stevenson & Cook, p. 163.
171 Hynes, p. 17. See also, Francis, Miners Against Fascism, pp.80-81, which outlines the connection 
between the NUWM and Spain. Four of the leaders of the march which left South Wales for London later 
fought in Spain: Tim Harrington, D.R. Llewellyn, Will Paynter and J.S. Williams.
172 Interview with Lance Rogers, South Wales Miners’ Library, cited in Francis, Miners Against Fascism,
p.161.
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And as James Hopkins has pointed out, for many of the recruits who were members 
of the CP or the YCL, or otherwise politically active in left-wing political organisations, 
volunteering for Spain appeared to be a logical development in their political activities:
There was a logical, sequential development of issues in the lives of many British 
militants: first, looking for explanations for the unemployment and repression they 
experienced; second, seeing the rise of fascism on the continent as an issue that 
concerned them; and third, seizing the opportunity to strike back at oppression, if not in 
Great Britain, then in Spain.173
John Lochore, who fought in Spain between 1936 and 1937, was a leader of the youth 
on the Scottish Hunger march in 1936.174 Peter O’Connor, a volunteer from Ireland, who 
served from Christmas 1936 until July 1937, when he was, “repatriated for political 
reasons with an excellent record,”175 claimed that,
Being politically conscious and having participated in a couple of hunger marches, I felt 
fascism was hell-bent on war.176
Sam Wild, Fred Copeman, Peter Kerrigan and the Labour Councillor Jack Jones had all 
been involved in the NUWM. So too had many others who are less well-known, such as 
Frank Graham from Sunderland,177 Sidney Quinn,178 and John Henderson:
A number of my comrades from the Party and the NUWM around the Tyne had 
volunteered and it was on my conscience that me, who’d been shouting his bloody mouth 
off about fascism and Spain and how we had to do something, well, I felt I had to go.179
73 Hopkins, p. 107.
74 Alexander, p.37.
75 IBA Box 39 File A/29.
76 Cook, p.25.
77 Interview with Frank Graham, IWMSA 11877/6/1.
78 Interview with Sidney Quinn, IWMSA 801/3/1.
79 Wilson & Concoran, p.53.
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Another volunteer, Tommy Kerr from Aidrie, remembered that,
I was out of work and became active in the National Unemployed Workers Movement 
and the Young Communist League; I went on their marches in Glasgow.180
Sidney Quinn, from Scotland, who was unemployed at the age of twenty-one, went on a 
hunger march to London before joining the army. After he was sent home from Aden in 
1936, he returned to unemployment and became involved in anti-Mosley protests before 
volunteering for Spain in November 1936.181 Hugh Sloan (who fought in Spain under the 
name Hugh Smith), a miner from Fife, the seat of Britain’s sole Communist M.P., 
explained how,
My participation in political activities and the conditions which I saw around me at home 
gave me a growing understanding of what was happening.182
As the previous chapter demonstrated, geographical considerations also played a part, 
for there were certain areas in Britain that sent large contingents o f volunteers; in 
particular large conurbations such as London, Manchester and Liverpool. These were 
areas o f high Communist Party membership, with large Jewish communities and, 
frequently, a combination of both. London’s east-end provides perhaps the best example: 
as chapter two has shown, Whitechapel, Bethnal Green, Hackney and Stamford Hill sent 
a large contingent of volunteers. London’s east-end was historically an area of high 
Jewish residency, the population in the east-end soaring between 1880-1914, following
180 Watson & Concoran, p.64
181 Interview with Sidney Quinn, IWMSA 801/1/1 & Cook, pp.17-18.
182 Hugh Sloan, ‘Why I Volunteered’, Scottish Trade Union Review, 51, (July-Sept 1991) p.31.
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the pogroms in Eastern Europe.183 It also had a strong militant Communist Party, of 
whom many o f the members were Jewish, motivated by stories of the persecution abroad, 
particularly in Germany, and by personal experiences o f intimidation by Blackshirts in 
their own neighbourhood.184
South Wales too had a particularly militant character, led by the South Wales 
Miner’s Federation (SWMF), and was another area targeted by the BUF. A large anti­
fascist demonstration in Tonypandy in the Rhondda in May 1936 successfully prevented 
the BUF from meeting. Thirty-one men and five women were summonsed for incitement 
to riot and several Communists were jailed, including Harry Dobson who was later a 
political commissar and was killed in 1938.185 Upon his release Dobson, who had served 
six months hard labour, is supposed to have asked, “How do I get to Spain?”186 The 
Rhondda was a particularly fertile area for the CP, especially the ‘Little Moscows’ of 
Maerdy and Bedlinog.187 As Hywell Francis has noted,
The oral history evidence collected in the area has suggested that there was something of 
a revolutionary syndrome with the same men being involved in strikes, hunger marches, 
victimisation and the International Brigades.188
Welsh miners, aware o f the severe repression that miners in the Asturias had suffered 
after the abortive rising o f October 1934, would have seen from the front page of the
183 Lipman, pp.84-87.
184 Stevenson & Cook, p. 144.
185 See Daily Worker, 13 July & 7 & 9 December 1936, and Ibid p. 94.
186 Francis, Miners Against Fascism, p.94. Also cited in Hopkins, p. 173.
187 Stevenson & Cook, p. 157.
188 Francis, ‘Welsh Miners and the Spanish Civil War’, p. 179.
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Daily Worker how their Spanish brethren were once again in the thick of the action.189 
Welsh miners’ requests for aid for the Spanish Republic were given front-page coverage 
in the Daily Worker,190 Though Francis argues that the means test was always a more 
important issue for the South Wales miners,191 their militancy generated by the hard 
conditions of their employment lay behind the motivations of the more than one hundred 
Welsh volunteers who fought in Spain.
The large Irish contingent within the British Battalion, from both the Free State and 
Northern Ireland, both Catholics and Protestants, had their own particular reasons to 
volunteer. Bob Doyle, a cook from Dublin, stated that,
I joined the Republican movement because of Kit Conway and I was in the youth section 
of the 1st Battalion of the Dublin IRA.. .From the beginning of 19361 was hearing more 
of Spain in the news and from the propaganda of the Catholic Church. The official press 
was one hundred per-cent in support of Franco.. .1 thought there was a danger that Ireland 
would go fascist and that was one of the motivating factors making my mind up to go. I 
didn’t know much about Spain but my thoughts on die way to Spain were that every 
bullet I fired would be a bullet against a Dublin landlord and capitalist.192
Likewise, Peter O’Connor later stated that he felt that Spain,
Offered a chance to reverse the decision of the war of 1922-23, to vindicate a cause 
which had then been tragically overthrown by traitors who were.. .little less than agents 
of British imperialism.193
For some volunteers the decision to go was influenced by friends, or comrades from 
the local party branch, who had themselves decided to go. Harry Addley was a friend of
189 ‘Miners Bomb Fascists’, Daily Worker, 11 August 1936, p.l.
190 ‘Welsh Miners Want Aid For Spain’, Daily Worker, 3 September 1936, p.l.
191 Francis, Miners Against Fascism, p.107.
192 Corkhill & Rawnsley, pp. 147-149.
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Arthur Ovenden and both volunteered together.194 Phil Gillan from Glasgow for whom, 
“politics became a way of life” joined the Gorbals branch of the YCL, who used to take 
him hiking to Milngavie near Loch Lomond. He remembered that half a dozen others 
from the branch went to Spain and were killed including John Connolly, Jimmy Rae, 
Jimmy Hyndman, and Martin Messer.195 Maurice Levine, one of the many volunteers 
from Manchester, stated that,
One of the prime factors in me making an application to go to Spain was that Eddie 
Swindell, a glass worker friend of mine, was very friendly with Arnold Jeans who had 
already gone to Spain with Clem Beckett.196
Levine also worked for the Manchester clothing manufacturers, Marshall and Crosslands, 
with Jud Colman. Levine and Colman, together with Ralph Cantor, George Westfield, 
Bill Benson, and Eddie Swindells, all travelled to Spain together.197
Several o f the volunteers in the early stage o f the war were already in Spain, or 
nearby.198 George Hardy was a member of British Workers Sports Federation in 
Barcelona at the outbreak o f the war and later returned as a volunteer.199 Bill Scott, an 
ex-member of the IRA, was at the Workers Olympiad in Barcelona, “the socialist riposte
193 Stradling, Irish and the Spanish Civil War, p. 140.
194 Romilly, pp.40-41.
195 Interview with Phil Gillan, IWMSA 12150/4/1.
196 Corkhill & Rawnsley, p.8.
197 Interview with Jud Colman, IWMSA 14575/3/1.
198 The sculptor Felicia Browne, the first British volunteer to be killed in Spain, was already painting in 
Spain. See chapter 3.
199 Ibid.
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to the Berlin Olympics,”200 when war broke out, as was a friend o f Leslie Preger from 
Manchester:
He came back towards the end of July full of stories about the uprising and brought back 
cartridge cases, flags and all the rest of it.201
Sam Masters was on a cycling holiday with Nat Cohen around Spain and was in 
Barcelona in July 1936 when the fighting started.202 Ralph Bates was walking in the 
Pyrenees with his wife Winnifred when fighting began. They both served in Spain: he in 
the Republican Government’s propaganda and information service and she as a liaison 
officer.203 Many others joined because of the influence of their family, friends, or work- 
colleagues. Tommy Kerr felt that his uncle, who had been a member o f the Communist 
Party, was a great influence on him:
With him I read books, talked things over and saw the general lie of the land, you might 
say.. .When I said I was interested in going to Spain Uncle Bill said, ‘If you want to go, 
go right ahead.’204
In a number of cases, different members of the same family volunteered. Ronald 
Burgess served in the International Brigades, whilst his mother Charlotte Haldane worked 
in Paris in the recruitment office and his step-father, the illustrious world-famous scientist 
J.B.S. Haldane, visited the Republican front and worked on measures to counter potential
200 Tom Buchanan, ‘A Far Away Country of Which We Know Nothing? Perceptions of Spain and its Civil 
War in Britain, 1931-1939’, Twentieth Century British History, 4:1, (1993) p.3.
201 Interview with Leslie Preger, in Corkhill & Rawnsley, p.30.
202 Soviet War Veterans’ Committee, International solidarity with the Spanish Republic, 1936-1939 
(Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1976) p.64 & Wintringham, p.26.
203 Alexander, p.41.
204 Watson & Concoran, p.64.
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gas attacks.205 Thomas Gibbons, who died at Brunete, was one of three brothers to 
volunteer.206 Mick Brown, who deserted in December 1936 declaring, “This isn’t war, 
this is bloody madness. I’ve had enough,”207 was the brother of George, company 
commissar at Brunete, who was killed at Villanueva de la Canada.208 Thomas Murray, a 
farm-worker from Edinburgh, like so many others, explained that he volunteered 
because:
My interest in the Spanish Civil War, of course, was aroused by the circumstances in 
which a democratically elected government was attacked by a junta of military 
officers.209
However, he was unusual in that he had met La Pasionaria previously, at the 
International Peace Congress in Brussels where she had made a great impression on 
him.210 In addition, his sister Anne was a nurse in Spain and his brother George was in 
the British Anti-Tank Battery of the XV International Brigade.211
Other volunteers had been involved in a variety o f protests. Joseph Norman’s political 
teeth were cut on an action to gain access to open spaces in what is now the Peak District, 
where he met other individuals who would later fight in Spain:
My first real experience of political activity was the mass trespass on Kinderscout in 
Derbyshire which eventually led to the designation of the area as a National Park. Dozens 
of those that fought the police and landowners on that mass trespass were later to fight
205 Thomas, Spanish Civil War, p.606 and Brome, pp. 18-20. See also the following chapter.
206 The others were Joseph (who fought with the Americans) and David (known in Spain as Danny). IBA 
Box D-7 Files A/1 and A/2.
207 Interview with Walter Greenhalgh, IWMSA 10356/3/1.
208 IBA Box D-7 File A/2 and see chapter four.
209 Ian MacDougall, ‘Tom Murray: Veteran of Spain’, Cencrastus, 18, (Autumn 1984) p. 16.
210 Ibid.
211 IBA Box D-7 File A/1, Box C File l/2a & interview with Anne Murray, IWMSA 11318/2/1-2.
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and die in Spain- men like Clem Beckett and George Brown. Some received up to six 
months hard labour for that trespass.212
Whilst virtually all the volunteers were driven by a hatred o f fascism and a large 
number had experience o f political or trade-union activity, there would, no doubt, have 
been many men in Britain who fulfilled these criteria, yet did not volunteer. After all, 
there were over ten thousand members of the Communist Party in 1936 213 For some of 
the volunteers it was not just their political conviction which pushed them into 
volunteering, but other things acted as a catalyst. John Comford, who was one of the first 
British volunteers to be in Spain, claimed that he simply wanted, “to find out what was 
happening.”214 John Angus, later to be a political commissar at a Republican ‘re­
education ’ camp, expressed the oft-stated view that:
Like many young men of the time I was oppressed by the gathering menace of Hitler in 
Europe and frustrated and almost in despair at the passive, indeed cooperative, attitude of 
our National Government towards this fascist advance.215
But he went on to explain that,
On the personal side I had nothing very much to inhibit me from going away. A rather 
uninteresting and unrewarding job, no particular girlfriend, friendly but not very close 
relations with my father.216
One volunteer, a clerk from Middlesborough, admitted he had, “No real recollection of 
Blackshirts, or class conflict, or Spain to any degree, apart from Spanish and Latin-
212 Cook, p.25.
213 See Figure 12.
214 Alexander, p.41.
215 Angus, p.2.
216 Ibid.
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American music,” and that he hated his work.217 After he had been working for eighteen 
months, the revolt broke out in Spain:
One day I brought The Times...1 remember reading a paragraph saying, “There is no 
doubt that if the Spanish Republican government wins the war a socialist state will be set 
up”. Really that was the trigger. I thought, Christ, here’s a way out.218
Likewise, the veteran activist Fred Copeman who had been involved in numerous hunger 
marches and demonstrations felt, “it would make my girl proud of me.”219
John Peet, a teacher from London, was unusual in that he had had travelled 
extensively through Europe and had experienced personally what Hitlerism and Fascism 
represented:
I think I had a much more immediate reason than many of the people who went from 
Britain for more theoretical reasons, because I had been through central Europe, I had 
seen Nazi Germany, I had seen a clerical fascist dictatorship which had already been 
established in Austria. I could see, as everybody could practically see, that the Nazis were 
going to take over Austria and Czechoslovakia in the near future and that another World 
war was on its way and it seemed fairly obvious that the war in Spain was only a 
precursor of that war 220
Similarly, the Labour Councillor Jack Jones had been involved in campaigns to free 
political prisoners in Germany, after meeting some young German sailors:
I’d talked with young German seamen some of whom were later put in concentration 
camps, I think in one case was executed. So I knew something about what was going on 
in Germany.221
217 Interview with David Marshall, IWMSA 9330/4/1.
218 Cook, p.25.
218 Interview with David Marshall, IWMSA 9330/4/1.
219 Cook, p.32.
220 Corkhill & Rawnsley, pp.101-102.
221 Ibid, pp. 138-139.
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Nevertheless, whilst there might have been as many reasons for volunteering as there 
were volunteers, and whatever their individual reasons for volunteering happened to be, 
there were factors that all the volunteers had in common: they all shared a hatred of 
fascism, which they combined with the willingness and determination to do something 
about it. The war in Spain brought together those who had been sympathetic to particular 
causes, whether it was the right to ramble in the Peak District, or protesting against BUF 
marches. For opponents o f fascism, and its advocation of intolerance and injustice, the 
Spanish war was the defining moment. As one American volunteer eloquently put it, “I 
saw in the invaders o f Spain the same people I’ve been fighting all my life.”222
222 Eluard Luchelle McDaniels from Mississippi, cited in Carroll, p. 18.
I l l
3. Madrid, 1936: Manning the Spanish barricades
“We realized perfectly that if Madrid fell the war would go on. It 
was only one front of many.” Esmond Romilly, Boadilla (London:
Hamish Hamilton, 1937) p. 51.
Following the crucial airlift o f Franco’s Army of Africa across the strait into southern 
Spain in early August 1936, the Rebel army advanced swiftly northwards towards 
Madrid. By 10 August they had reached the old Roman town of Merida and linked up 
Franco’s southern zone with the northern zone under General Mola. The Rebels then 
turned on the town of Badajoz, the capital of Extremadura, which lay near the Portuguese 
border and remained in Republican hands. Despite a desperate defence, the town was 
captured by Franco’s African columns and a brutal repression followed, during which 
nearly two thousand people were shot. Stories and rumours of this savagery inflicted on 
the defenders preceded the advance of the Rebel army on Madrid, and worked 
considerably to the Rebels’ advantage. Militiamen, terrified at the prospect of being 
outflanked, retreated headlong, often dropping their weapons and ammunition, back 
along the main roads to Madrid, where they could be picked off with ease by the 
advancing Rebel forces.1
At the end of September, the Rebel army made another detour to lift the siege of the 
city of Toledo which, crucially, allowed the defending Republicans time to prepare the 
defences in Madrid. After another massacre of militiamen- Moorish soldiers killed two 
hundred Republican wounded in the hospital in Toledo by throwing grenades into the
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wards- the march towards Madrid resumed. By 1 November, the Rebels had reached the 
south-west of Madrid adjacent to the Casa del Campo and University City. Here, at last, 
the advance was slowed by a defence established by militia units and madrilenos, under 
no illusions of what defeat would mean for them. On 10 November, the desperate last 
ditch defence was joined by a new force, an international column o f volunteers; the first 
o f the International Brigades, determined to help ensure that Madrid would not fall, that 
the Rebel army would not pass.
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Map 3. The Rebels’ advance on Madrid, October-November 1936.2
1 Preston, Concise History, p.89.
2 Source o f  map: Gabriel Jackson. A Concise History o f  the Spanish Civil War (London: Thames & 
Hudson, 1974) p.89.
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In fact, foreign volunteers, a number of whom had come from Britain, had been drifting 
into Spain right from the outset of the civil war. However, until the creation of the British 
(XVI) Battalion of the XV International Brigade just after Christmas 1936, there was no 
single group of British volunteers. Instead, volunteers joined the various militia units or 
were attached to battalions of French or German volunteers.
As has already been shown, the majority of the British volunteers for Spain came 
from a working-class background. However, the ‘first few’ do not entirely conform to 
this analysis, though to many of the British volunteers who arrived before the beginning 
of 1937, stories o f the ‘poets war’ were still insulting. Esmond Romilly (ironically one of 
the number o f middle-class volunteers himself) left Spain in December 1936 claiming 
that, “Nearly all o f them- as far as I could see- were working-class people.”3 However, 
despite Romilly’s observation, there is no doubt that the first British volunteers to arrive 
in Spain comprised a much higher proportion with middle-class or ‘intellectual’ 
backgrounds, than those who arrived from 1937 onwards when the Communist Party had 
established a firmer hold on recruitment.4 For example, amongst the small number of 
British that fought in the battles of Madrid at the same time as Romilly in November and 
December 1936 was a scientist (Lorimer Birch), the restaurant owners (Harry Addley and 
Bert Ovenden)5 and, in particular, the literary intellectuals Christopher Caudwell (whose 
real name was Christopher St. John Sprigg) and John Comford. The presence of
3 Romilly, p.30.
4 John Tunnah, a postman from Edinburgh who served in Spain from November 1936 to May 1937 stated 
that, “The earlier people tended to be more intellectual than those who came later.” Interview with John 
Tunnah, IWMSA 840/9/3. Likewise, Bill Alexander says of the early volunteers: “The early units contained 
a high proportion of intellectuals. They proved to be less tolerant, at first, than workers from the factory
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Caudwell and Comford in the battles in Madrid of 1936 did much to help create the myth 
that the Brigades were made up of large numbers of intellectuals, the “vague notion that 
everyone in the Brigades was a poet or writer.”6 In addition to being more ‘middle class’ 
than the later volunteers, the first few were also younger than those who arrived later.7
During these early stages of the war there were several groups o f British volunteers 
fighting with the Republican forces. One fought with the Tom Mann Centuria on the 
Aragon front in late 1936, before joining another group o f British in the mainly German 
Thaelmann Battalion in Madrid in November 1936, and who were virtually wiped out in 
the battle at Boadilla del Monte to the west o f Madrid in December. A second group of 
British volunteers fought with the Muerte es Maestro Centuria to the south of the capital, 
and a third comprised a section of the French Commune de Paris Battalion8 who also 
fought in Madrid in November 1936 in the first of the major battles in defence of the city. 
There were also a number of other volunteers fighting or serving with militia columns, 
medical units and in a number of other areas, such as naval units and the Republican Air 
Force.
floor, of unexplained delays, of incomprehensible orders from above, and of other such irritations which 
regular soldiers regard as quite normal.” Alexander, p.54.
5 IBA Box 21 File A, Box D-7 File A/2, Alexander, p.43, Romilly, pp.40-31 and Scott Watson, p.36.
6 Alexander, p.36. A good example of this myth is the description by a British volunteer who later stated 
that, “The men of the International Brigades were, for the most part, intellectuals and numbered many 
scholars amongst them; it was common for them to be proficient in four or five languages besides holding 
high degrees in science, the law and a multitude of other subjects.” Interview with John Anthony Myers, in 
The West London Observer, 24 February 1939, p.5.
7 The age profile of the early volunteers also differs considerably from that of the volunteers who arrived in 
Spain after Christmas 1936. The average (mean) age was just under 25 years, with the most common age 
(mode) being 20 years. This compares with 29 years and 23 years respectively for the British volunteers as 
a whole. Source of age data: IBA D-7 File A/2 and Moscow 545/6/91.
8 Usually known as the Dumont Battalion, after their Commander.
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The first British volunteers to arrive in Spain fought with Spanish militia units that had 
sprung up as early as July to defend the Republic against the military uprising. The best 
known are the sculptor and artist Felicia Browne, who was painting in Barcelona when 
the rising began, and John Comford, who arrived in Spain on 8 August 1936. Felicia 
Browne was eventually allowed to volunteer for a militia unit in Barcelona after attempts 
to dissuade her by both the party and the leader of the unit, and was killed on 28 August 
1936 in a mission to blow up a munitions train near Tardienta in Aragon.9 Browne was 
attempting to give first aid to a wounded comrade when she was hit by a number of shots 
and killed outright. John Comford arrived with a friend and fellow Trinity College 
student, Richard Bennett,10 a week before Britain’s decision to ban the selling of arms to 
Spain, which was later extended to prevent British volunteers leaving for Spain. Comford 
briefly fought with the POUM militia units in Huesca in August on the Aragon front, 
before returning to Britain to help raise more recruits for the Republic.11
Others also became involved almost immediately following the military rising. Two 
clothing workers from London, Nat Cohen and Sam Masters, were cycling around the 
Pyrenees on holiday.12 Both Communist Party members, they made their way to 
Barcelona to volunteer and, with three other British volunteers,13 participated in a raid on
9 See IBA BoxA15.
10 Bennett went to work for Barcelona Radio, the voice of the Partido Socialista Unifacado de Cataluha 
(PSUC) the Catalan Socialist Party. Alexander, p.51 and Thomas, Spanish Civil War, p.367.
11 Comford later returned to Spain with six other volunteers in mid-October when he joined the XI 
International Brigade. The group was formed into the No. 4 section of the machine-gun company of the 
Commune de Paris Battalion.
12 After being wounded, Cohen was repatriated back to Britain, Tom Wintringham claims in November
1936, Alexander in April 1937. Wintringham, p.41 & Alexander, p.46. Masters was killed at Brunete in
July 1937. IBA Box 21 File A, & Box D-7 File A/1.
13 These were Richard Kisch, Tony Willis and Paul Boyle. IBA Box C File 5/2 They were also
accompanied by a young Canadian woman called Lee Aylward. See Alexander, p.51.
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Mallorca in August 1936, which was, unfortunately, widely expected by the Rebel forces 
defending the island.14 Led by two Spanish captains from the Air Force and Civil Guard, 
the raid failed to penetrate more than a few kilometres inland of the landing-point at 
Porto Cristo, on the east of the island, before being forced to retreat back to the 
mainland.15 Richard Kisch, a young Jewish volunteer in the Centuria, was injured by 
machine-gun bullets in the abortive attack and repatriated back to Britain in October after 
only a month in Spain.16 Nat Cohen, who distinguished himself in the action, was elected 
leader of the group, which on its return to Barcelona became the Tom Mann Centuria.17 
The British members o f the Centuria are listed in Figure 13 below.
David Marshall, who arrived in August, was another British volunteer in the Tom 
Mann Centuria. Marshall could not have been less the hardened political activist; he is 
highly unusual amongst the British volunteers in Spain in admitting that he lived, “totally 
outside” the world o f politics before his time in Spain.18 Marshall paints a vivid picture of 
Barcelona at the end of the summer o f 1936, “seething with enthusiasm.” His 
descriptions o f several of his comrades are just as vivid, though, in the case of Keith Scott 
Watson, who left the Centuria to work as a journalist with Sefton Delmer of the Daily 
Express, not always so enthusiastic.19 Watson did not endear himself to the Communists
u Ibid.
15 See Thomas, Spanish Civil War, pp.381-383 and Alexander, p.51.
16 In a letter from Tom Wintringham to Harry Pollitt on the 5 September 1936, Wintringham asks Pollitt to 
“look after this boy and use your well-known disciplinary powers to make him look after himself for a bit.” 
IBA Box C File 5/2. See also Richard Kisch, They Shall Not Pass, (Letchworth: Wayland, 1974).
17 A photograph taken in September of some of the British volunteers with the Tom Mann Centuria 
appeared in the Daily Worker on 19 September 1936. This photograph has appeared in several works on the 
British volunteers. See, for example, Alexander, following p.80 and Hopkins, following p. 178.
18 Interview with David Marshall, IWMSA 9330/1/2.
19 Marshall had nothing but bad to say about Keith Scott Watson who, he claimed, had only “come for the 
sensation...certainly he was a shit and he pissed off quickly.” Interview with David Marshall, IWMSA
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by later sabotaging their attempt to explain to a Labour Delegation in Spain that 
[Republican] Spain was a democratic country.20
— J p m
Avner Sid Killed at Boadilla del Monte in December 1936
Barry/William Jack AKA ‘Blue.’ Killed at Boadilla in December 1936
Birch Lorimer Killed at Boadilla in December 1936
Cohen Nat Leader o f Tom Mann Centuria. Repatriated in April 1937
Cox Ray Killed at Boadilla in December 1936
Donavan John AKA ‘Paddy.’ Deserted to Barcelona and later fought with Lenin Division. 
Returned to UK 1937.
Gillan Phil Wounded at Boadilla. Repatriated to UK in February 1937
Kisch Richard Wounded in Mallorca, September 1936. Repatriated in to UK in October 
1936.
Marshall David Wounded at Cerro de los Angeles, November 1936. Repatriated to UK in 
November-December 1936.
Masters Sam Killed at Brunete in July 1937
Scott Bill Hospitalised with kidney problems, December 1936. Later joined British 
Battalion. Repatriated to Ireland in 1937.
Sheller Alex Returned to UK in August 1936 without joining the front line.
Watson Keith Left the Thaelmann Battalion to work as a Daily Express journalist in 
November 1936.
Wintringham Tom Later Commander of British Battalion. Repatriated in November 1937
Figure 13. British Members of the Tom Mann Centuria21
At the same time, another member of the Centuria, Tom Wintringham- who would 
later become a Commander of the British Battalion- wrote to Harry Pollitt in London 
urging the party to support the Centuria officially and turn it into a British column.22 He 
wrote on 6 September and again a week later, explaining what type of volunteers he
9330/4/1. Esmond Romilly was more tactful, but believed Watson was “over-cynical” and did not take any 
o f the rules and regulations seriously enough. Romilly, p.43. Watson puts his side o f  the story in his 
memoir. And he readily admits he found the discipline o f the Communists too much for him. Regular 
arguments with the ‘orthodox’ Lorimer Birch, meant that, “I began to take the war less and less seriously.” 
Scott Watson, p.53.
20 Bill Rust recounts that the attempt, “did not come off as he had just explained the real role o f  the 
Communists. The fellow is just poison.” Letter from Bill Rust to Harry Pollitt, 26 May 1938, IBA Box C, 
File 22/6.
21 These details are drawn from the computerised database o f the British volunteers. See appendix.
22 Alexander, p.52.
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thought was needed: “a respectable number of English comrades, CP, LP or TU, to make 
a Centuria.” Wintringham’s criteria for potential recruits were straight-forward, and laid 
no great weight on military experience:
Send ten per-cent trained men if you can to act as corporals, and the rest kids and 
enthusiasts. Most of them will come back with very valuable experience.23
At this stage, the emphasis seems to have been more with the political dimension than 
the military. Wintringham also wrote expressing his concerns that the British Communist 
Party needed to urgently establish, “effective representation and control of the work of 
the C.P.G.B, present and future, in Barcelona.”24
By the end o f October, after a stay of six or seven weeks during which time the 
Centuria took part in no fighting, the volunteers were becoming bored and desperate to 
get involved.25 Phil Gillan, a lorry-driver from the Gorbals in Glasgow,26 who also 
arrived in September, remarked on their disappointment following unfulfilled 
expectations of being sent to the Aragon front.27 Thus the British volunteers welcomed a 
decision to group foreign volunteers together, which led to their transfer to Albacete and 
their official attachment to the mainly German Thaelmann Battalion.
23 IBA Box C File 5/4 and Alexander, p.52
24 IBA Box C File 5/4.
25 Interview with David Marshall, IWMSA 9330/1/2.
26 Phil Gillan was the ‘Jock’ referred to in Esmond Romilly’s Boadilla.
27 Interview with Phil Gillan, IWMSA 12150/4/1.
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On 2 October 1936 a new contingent o f British volunteers arrived. James Albrighton, 
a student from Salisbury, arrived with six other British volunteers28 and was joined two 
days later by another half-dozen from Britain.29 Albrighton is unusual in that he kept a 
diary of his experiences in Spain30 and that his role in the war has received little 
attention.31 His story deserves attention for, according to Albrighton, his group was 
involved in ‘special duties’ including the involvement in executions.32 Albrighton’s 
group were charged with, “searching out and destroying the fascist spies in Madrid” and 
acting as a firing squad. As recompense for these special duties his unit received extra 
pay, leave and privileges. Albrighton is unusually candid about the use of executions in 
the Republican Army and claims that at the end of January 1937 two Spanish members of
28 They were Albert Bentley a Seaman, George Middleton and John Beale (both students), Bruce 
Campbell, Sid Morton and a Scot, David Mackie. See James Albrighton’s diary, IBA Box 50 File L.
29 Pat O’Malley and Frank O’Connor from Dublin, Sidney Lloyd Jones from Wales, John Henderson and 
Frank Garland from London and the Southeast and Michael Harris from Birmingham. Ibid.
30 Ibid. The only other diary to have appeared is that by Fred Thomas, a member of the British Anti-Tank 
Battery. See Fred Thomas, To Tilt at Windmills: A Memoir o f  the Spanish Civil War (East Lansing: State 
University of Michigan Press, 1996). Hugh Sloan, another member of the battery also kept a diary, but had 
to leave it behind during the Aragon retreats in the Spring of 1938. Interview with Hugh Sloan, in 
MacDougall, p.227.
31 Bill Alexander’s work is the only one to include a reference to Albrighton. See Alexander, p.53. The role 
of Albrighton and his comrades in the Muerte es Maestro has been largely overlooked. According to 
correspondence between Albrighton and Alexander held in the IBA, his diary was not typed up until the 
early 1980s. (See IBA Box 50 File Al/1-8). However, there are some questions over Albrighton’s veracity 
that remain unanswered. For example, in the questionnaire Albrighton completed when he later joined the 
International Brigade, Albrighton makes no reference at all to his time spent in the Centuria in 1936. See 
Moscow 545/6/101. No International Brigader I have spoken to recalls meeting Albrighton in Spain, 
however, there is a photograph of Albrighton in Spain taken later in the war and he is listed in a file held in 
Moscow, though with a later date of arrival than Albrighton claims. See Moscow 545/6/39.
32 Official histories of the International Brigades have not surprisingly played down accounts of 
executions. In later correspondence with Bill Alexander, Commander of the British Battalion, Secretary of 
the International Brigade Association, and publisher of an official history of the British volunteers, James 
Albrighton asks whether to include any mention of executions in which the MM Centuria were involved in 
his diary:
“I have now typed out the few cases in which the MM company was involved and will appreciate 
it if you will after reading these extracts from my diaries advise me if you think it would be best 
for me to delete them or retain them.” (IBA Box 50 File Al/5)
Bill Alexander’s reply is not enclosed, but Albrighton’s following letter clearly illuminates a reluctance to 
face these rather awkward issues:
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his Muerte es Maestro company were charged with desertion at an open court martial, 
after having been discovered by a patrol behind enemy lines. The two Spaniards 
eventually admitted they were trying to return to their families. According to Albrighton, 
Andre Marty, infamous for his rigid discipline, was determined to make an example of 
them, ‘por encourager les autres Albrighton claims that they were both executed by a 
firing squad made up o f members o f their own unit.
Mackenzie David
Albrighton Jam es
Zanettou Benitzelos
Lloyd-Jones Sidney
Bentley Albert
Middleton George
Campbell Bruce
Morton Sidney
O’Malley Patrick
O’Connor Frank
Beale John
Garland Frank
Harris Michael
Hudson William
Henderson John
Figure 14. British members of the Muerte es Maestro Battalion
Albrighton’s group fought in one of the three sections o f the Spanish Muerte es 
Maestro Centuria, which was involved in the desperate attempts to halt the Rebels’ drive 
on Madrid in early October 1936 from Toledo, which had fallen on 27 September. 
Several o f the British contingent, including their leader, Sidney Lloyd Jones, were killed
“I appreciate your advice regarding the performance o f some o f MM’s “Special Duties”, your comments 
were very much what had been going through my own mind and it has been for that reason that I have been 
rather reluctant to write about them.” IBA Box 50 File Al/6.
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on 14 October 1936 in a counter-attack on Rebel Moorish troops at Chapineria, roughly 
thirty miles to the west o f Madrid.33
Albrighton’s unit, together with other militia columns, was forced backwards as the 
Nationalist Army swept towards Madrid. On 30 October, Albrighton witnessed the 
bombing of Getafe, site of a Republican airfield just to the south of Madrid. Albrighton 
describes in harrowing detail the heavy bombing o f the town, during which a school was 
hit.34
I consider this scene as one of wholesale carnage that exceeds any other act of barbarism 
that history has recorded over the past several centuries.. .This is indeed the modem 
version of the slaughtering of the innocents.. .1 find it very distressing to even try and 
describe the picture that I saw.. .The remnants of limbs, the particles of flesh and blood 
splattered against white washed walls, fragments of all that remained of what only a few 
minutes before had been innocent, carefree, joyful toddlers playing in the morning’s 
sun.35
On 9 November Albrighton and the Muerte es Maestro Centuria were transferred to 
the Casa del Campo, in a last-ditched attempt to prevent the Rebels from entering the 
Spanish capital. Here the centuria was to fight alongside the newly formed XI 
International Brigade, which included several British volunteers. Like many Madrilenos,
33 Alexander, p.53.
34 Photographs of the victims were later used in Republican propaganda to demonstrate the vicious nature 
of the Nationalists. This was the basis of the ‘If you tolerate this, your children will be next’ poster, and the 
recent song by The Manic Street Preachers. A copy of the poster appears on the rear cover of Colin 
Williams, Bill Alexander, & John Gorman, Memorials o f  the Spanish Civil War (Stroud: Sutton, 1996).
35 Albrighton recalls that this bombing made a deep impact on the Republican forces to the south of 
Madrid. For some time after the bombing an oft-heard battle cry was, ‘Recuerdos Getafe.’ James 
Albrighton’s diary, 30 October 1936.
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Albrighton at first believed that the International Brigade was a Russian force that had 
come to the Republic’s aid.36
About ten minutes ago we had a messenger with fresh orders.. .He tells that the Russians 
are driving the Fascists back.. .He has also seen the Russians, they are all in a different 
uniform from ours.. .They have steel helmets and new rifles.. .They even have tanks 
standing by ready for their big offensive.37
The following day the members of the centuria were informed that the forces were, in 
fact, ‘Internationals,’ and Albrighton later met several of the British members o f the 
Brigades. In the Hall of Philosophy in the University City on 14 November, Albrighton 
met Bernard Knox and John Comford, who were fighting there as part of the XI 
International Brigade. On 16 November he also ran into three British members o f the 
Thaelmann Battalion fighting with the XII International Brigade: Bill Scott, Lorimer 
Birch and the young Esmond Romilly. There, “someone tried to kid me he is related to 
Churchill,” Albrighton declared unbelievingly (which indeed, Romilly was, much to the 
disgust o f his uncle). He also met Jock Cunningham who suggested Albrighton transfer to 
their section, but Albrighton instead elected to stay with the Muerte es Maestro Centuria 
where, shortly afterwards, he was elected a political commissar.
Albrighton’s unit suffered similar casualties to other units involved in the desperate 
defence o f Madrid. By 14 November the centuria was reduced to only forty men out of 
the original one hundred and twenty-eight. Albrighton’s diary describes how since 10
36 Jan Kurzke, a German volunteer who fought with H. Fred Jones and the other British in the XI 
International Brigade in University City, later recalled the bemusement created by the volunteers’ 
international origins. The volunteers were welcomed by Spaniards crying, ‘“Viva la democratica.’ ‘Viva 
Rusia.’” who asked them, “‘Where are you from?’ someone shouted. ‘London’ we shouted back, ‘Paris, 
Marseille, Warsaw.’ ‘But Russia,’ they cried, ‘Are you not from Russia?’ They seemed baffled by our 
‘No.’” Jan Kurzke, MS, p.8.
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October, forty-two men had been killed (including two Britons, Albert Bentley and 
George Middleton on 12 November), twenty-seven seriously wounded and another ten 
missing, presumed dead. After Albrighton was put in charge of a section of sixteen men 
in the Casa del Campo, eight of them were killed by a single salvo of shells.
Albrighton remained with Spanish units and later served alongside the British number 
one company led by Captain George Nathan, as part of the XIV International Brigade 
under the Polish General ‘Walter.’38 He worked as a medic at Jarama where he witnessed 
the decimation of the British Battalion, and in several other major conflicts, before being 
repatriated following a serious injury in the spring of 1938.
Whilst many foreign volunteers, like James Albrighton, were fighting with various 
militia units in which they had ended up almost be chance, the Spanish Government had, 
in October, started taking steps to formalize integration o f the extrajaneros into the 
Spanish Republican Army. On 12 October 1936, Largo Caballero, the Spanish Prime 
Minister, agreed to the formation o f International Brigades and the town of Albacete, 
which lay on the main railway between Valencia and Madrid, was chosen as their base.39 
By 14 October, there were already six hundred and fifty recruits from overseas and, by
37 James Albrighton diary, 9 November 1936.
38 ‘Walter’ was yet another pseudonym. His real name was Swierczewski and he later became the 
commander of the 35 Republican Division. For Walter’s role in Spain see Len Crome, ‘Walter (1897- 
1947): A Soldier in Spain’, History Workshop Journal, 9, (Spring 1980) pp.l 16-128.
39 A decree formalising this was published later on 22 October. Alexander, p.53.
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the end of October, over two thousand.40 On 25 October the first o f the International 
Brigades was formed (the XI) which went into battle on 9 November.
Following the Government’s evacuation to Valencia on 6 November, the defence of 
the Spanish capital was officially conducted by General Jose Miaja, later to be heralded 
as ‘the hero of Madrid,’ though, in reality, Miaja’s Chief of Staff, General Vincente Rojo, 
was the true director of operations.41 The International Brigades made up a small but 
significant part o f the force defending Madrid, approximately 1900 in the XI 
International Brigade, with another 1550 joining in the following week. Disciplined, 
determined and many with military experience, they took their place along side 35 000 
Spanish militiamen, with a further 75 000 armed men able to be called upon.42 The XI 
International Brigade was commanded by General ‘Kleber,’43 and consisted of the Hans 
Kahle, later to be called the Andre Marty Battalion; the Dombrowski Battalion, and the 
Commune de Paris Battalion, which included amongst their number several British 
volunteers. Bill Rust estimates that there were twelve British members in the machine- 
gun (No. 4) section,44 though there were, in fact, slightly more.
40 Moscow 33987/3/832, cited in Ronald Radosh, Mary M. Habeck & Grigory Sevostianov (eds.), Spain 
Betrayed. The Soviet Union in the Spanish Civil War (London: Yale University Press, 2001) p.104.
41 Several observers, such as the New York Times journalist Herbert L. Matthews and the Soviet journalist 
Mikhail Koltzov, suggest that Miaja was anything but the courageous and determined figure of his 
reputation and that, on the contrary, he was “weak, unintelligent [and] unprincipled.” Rebel Generals such 
as Franco and Quiepo de Llano considered him an “incompetent coward.” Preston, Concise History, p. 130.
42 Cox, p. 106.
43 ‘Kleber’ was a pseudonym for Lazar or Manfred Stem, a Hungarian with a colourful history. See 
Thomas, Spanish Civil War, p.459. As with the British volunteers, the use of the ‘nom de guerre’ was 
widespread amongst the ‘Russian’ military advisors.
44 Rust, p.22.
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No. 4 section was part o f a company commanded by a Parisian building worker, 
Alfredo Brougere45 and, according to one of the British members of the unit, Bernard 
Knox:
There was a core of convinced Communists all right (who did not, of course, need to be 
recruited) but the rest were a heady mixture of ex-Legionnaires, unemployed workers, 
kids just out of the Lycee, and the inevitable contingent, in a French unit, of semi­
alcoholics.46
Barry William ‘Blue’. Australian. Killed at Boadilla, December 1936.
Burke Edward Also known as Edward Cooper. Wounded Cordoba, December 1936, 
died in hospital, Madrid, 12 February 1937.
Clarke Robert AKA ‘Jock. Probably from Glasgow.
Cornford John Killed Cordoba, December 1936.
Cunningham Jock Later commander o f  the British Battalion. Repatriated August 1937.
Hinks Joe Later commander o f  the British Battalion. Repatriated August 1937.
Jones H ‘Freddie.’ Leader o f  No.4 Section. Killed Madrid, November 1936
Knox Bernard Political leader o f battalion. Repatriated around January 1937.
Lesser Sam AKA Sam Russell. Repatriated January 1937. Later returned to Spain 
to work for the CP as broadcaster and and replaced Peter Kerrigan as 
correspondent with the Daily Worker.
Mackenzie David Incorrectly reported killed, December 1936. Actually repatriated
McLaurin Griffin ‘Mac’. Bom in New Zealand. Killed Madrid, November 1936.
Patton Thomas Irish. Killed at Boadilla, December 1936.
Sawyers Robert Scottish. Wounded at Boadilla, December 1936. Repatriated February 
1937.
Sommerfield John Incorrectly reported killed December 1936. Returned to Britain in 
January 1937.
Sowersby George From Edinburgh. Arrived October 1936, repatriated January 1937.
Symes Robert Killed Madrid, November 1936
Yates Steve Bom in New Zealand. Killed Madrid, November 1936
Figure 15. Members of No. 4 Section, Commune de Paris Battalion, XI International Brigade.
Several o f the British, including H. Fred Jones and Jock Cunningham, had previous 
military experience and were generally fairly scathing about the whole ‘set up.’47 Jan 
Kurzke, a German volunteer who arrived in Spain with John Comford’s group, described
45 Interview with Sam Russell, IWMSA 9484/2.
46 Bernard Knox, Essays Ancient and Modern (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1989) p.267.
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the suspicion with which the contingent o f militarily experienced British volunteers 
viewed the concept of political commissars, who operated along side the traditional 
military hierarchy (such as it was in 1936) and were charged with maintaining the morale 
and political will of the volunteers:
They scorned the ideas of political commissars, ‘They [Cunningham and the others] were 
soldiers first,’ they said. We had a great many arguments about it. They thought that the 
political commissars would meddle with tactical and military matters and said it was 
impossible to have two commands. They did not understand that the job of political 
commissar was as important as that of any other army officer.48
Sam Russell49 described the military calibre of the British contingent in the Commune 
de Paris Battalion as, “just a collection of odds and sods,”50 though the ‘Oxbridge 
contingent’ (three from Cambridge and one from Oxford) had all been to schools with 
cadet corps.51 What little ammunition was available was, according to Russell, bad and 
“quite dangerous,” bullets were loose in the casing so every clip o f cartridges had to be 
checked individually.52 There were no weapons available and drill was conducted in 
whichever style the nationality o f the instructor determined. As another British member 
of the battalion, John Sommerfield, noted,
We saw the Spanish and the Poles, the Italians and the Germans, the French and the 
Hungarians, and they each had their own way of doing things.53
47 Interview with Sam Russell, IWMSA 9484/2.
48 Jan Kurzke, MS, p. 15. The five British scorning the use of political commissars included H. Fred Jones, 
who was to command the contingent at Madrid where he was killed, Jock Cunningham, later to be a highly 
competent commander of the British Battalion and Joe Hinks, who was also to command the British 
Battalion. Kurzke described the other two as, “George, [possibly Sowersby] a pale thin young man with a 
red beard which made him look like Christ, and Pat [T. Patton], a young Irishman.”
49 Russell, whose real name was Manassa Lesser, was repatriated back to Britain after the Battle of Jarama 
in February 1937, before returning to Spain as Daily Worker correspondent where he succeeded Peter 
Kerrigan, and as the British Communist Party representative in Spain.
50 Interview with Sam Russell, IWMSA 9484/6/2.
51 Knox, Essays Ancient and Modern, p.266.
52 Interview with Sam Russell, IWMSA 9484/6/6.
53 John Sommerfield, Volunteer in Spain (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1937) p.31.
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The multi-national nature of the brigade caused misunderstandings and confusion. The 
drilling was all in French, the movements as well as the commands, which many of the 
British found baffling. Knox was also highly critical of the training at the International 
Brigade base:
One thing is certain: the training we were given at Albacete, the Brigade base, was a 
farce.54
Nevertheless, on 7 November the newly formed XI Brigade marched along the 
Grand Via in Madrid on their way to the front.55 Two days later the British volunteers in 
the XI Brigade found themselves occupying a ridge in the Casa del Campo, the park to 
Madrid’s west, bounded by the Manzanares River.56 The British took up defensive 
positions overlooking the park, waiting for the Moroccan Regulares to advance.57 On the 
morning of 9 November 1936, the battalion positions were shelled, and once it had ended
54 Knox, Essays Ancient and Modem, p.263. Later arrivals from Britain would also criticise the level of 
training, as indeed did general Walter, the commander of the 35 Division. “A month ago I was with the 
English and Canadian battalions of the XV Brigade. It is difficult to convey in words the state of weapons 
and how dirty, especially the rifles. The bores of their barrels were not much different from a seventeenth- 
century musket barrel found at Belchite. No fewer than 95 percent of the rifles had no bayonet or cleaning 
rod, all lost since time immemorial. There was only a handful of cleaning rags in the brigade.” But Walter 
went on to state that the XV Brigade improved dramatically after Teruel, “That the 15th sometimes seems 
completely different from what it was a short time ago.” Report by General Walter, Commander of the 35th 
Division, 14 January 1938, Moscow 35082/1/95, cited in Radosh, pp.440-444. However, not all volunteers 
feel that the training was insufficient. Jack Edwards, a CP activist in Liverpool, arrived in Spain with no 
military experience, yet believed his training at Madrigueras, supervised by Joe Harding who had served in 
the British Army for ten years was, in the circumstances, very good. When Edwards later volunteered for 
the RAF during World War Two, his proficiency with a rifle was noted by an NCO who was somewhat 
puzzled by Edwards’ claim that he had never served in the military. Interview with Jack Edwards, IWMSA 
808/3/2.
55 Bernard Knox, who witnessed the arrival of the volunteers, claims that the descriptions of the march 
down the Grand Via that appeared in the contemporary newspapers are mostly wrong. He believes that they 
were getting confused with the arrival of the XII International Brigade a few days later. Knox, Essays 
Ancient and Modem p.256.
56 This was where the battalion spent “the night by the lonely river” described by John Sommerfield. On 
the other side of the River Manzanares was the estate, which the Army of African soldiers had occupied. 
Sommerfield, pp. 113-121.
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the Commune de Paris Battalion moved forward to meet an expected assault by the Rebel 
forces facing them in the Casa del Campo. It came as predicted, but was directed at the 
German positions, where the line was held.58 Later the same day, the XI Brigade 
launched an assault on the, mainly Moorish, Rebel soldiers and though initially 
successful, the Republican force was counter-attacked by a Rebel force, made up of 
greatly superior numbers. Two New Zealanders, Steve Yates and Griffith McLaurin, who 
had travelled to Spain from Britain, accompanied by a British volunteer, Robert Symes, 
left the main group to set up a forward machine-gun position.59 The following day the 
cost o f the battle was counted; over a hundred from the French battalion had been killed, 
including McLaurin and Yates, who were killed whilst covering a Republican infantry 
retreat in the Casa del Campo with a Lewis machine-gun. Robert Symes was badly 
injured and died shortly afterwards o f his wounds.60 Despite this setback, by the morning 
of 10 November 1936, the defenders had recaptured the entire park with the exception of 
Mount Garabitas, and the Rebels were forced to abandon the direct attack through the 
Casa del Campo.61
The following day, on the 11 November, the volunteers were, with the rest of the 
Commune de Paris Battalion, involved on an unsuccessful flank attack near Aravaca, to 
the west o f Madrid, just north of the Casa del Campo, where they were involved in a 
freak accident. One of the British volunteers was injured and the leader of the group 
(John Sommerfield’s ‘Freddie’) was killed, when an ambulance broke through a
57 Kurzke, p.40.
58 Ibid, p.43.
59 Alexander, p. p.57 & IB A Box 21“ file A.
60 Hearst, pp. 160-161, IB A Box 21a File A & Alexander, p.57.
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roadblock formed by a steel cable, which snapped and hit the group.62 Following the 
death of Jones, Joe Hinks, who had fought with both the British Army and the Chinese 
Red Army (and would later command the British Battalion), was elected commander.63
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Map 4. The Rebels’ direct assault on Madrid, via Casa del Campo, November 1936.64
Severla days later, Hinks’ group advanced into the University City near the 
Philosophy and Letters building, which was occupied by Spanish Moroccan soldiers on 
15 November.65 Here they then attacked the Rebel communication lines, and moved into 
the Philosophy building, where they fought alongside some o f Durruti’s anarchists and a
61 Thomas, Spanish Civil War, p.481.
62 ‘Freddie’ was actually the leader o ff the British section, H. Fred Jones, a Communist who had served in 
the Grenadier Guards. Kurzke, p.57.
63 Sommerfield, pp. 135-9.
64 Source o f  map: Jackson, p.89.
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number of Asturian miners. Bernard Knox, the political responsible o f the battalion, was 
later very critical of these Anarchist columns who, he claimed, were often out­
manoeuvred and out-flanked:
They were capable at times of almost insane bravery and much given to dramatic 
gestures, but they could not be relied upon.66
The Commune de Paris Battalion defended the Philosophy and Letters building 
successfully for a week, with the literary figures, John Comford, John Sommerfield, and 
Bernard Knox, all resorting to using books as barricades against Rebel small arms fire.67 
However, the defending force was hit by a (probably Republican) artillery shell and in 
the explosion John Comford received a head injury that required his head to be bandaged. 
The image o f Comford, fighting on despite his bandaged head became a powerful image 
of resistance, though, ironically, it seems probable that his unwillingness to cover the 
bandage with a hat or helmet probably contributed to his death.68
By 23 November, General Mola’s Rebel forces controlled two thirds of the area of 
University City, yet it had become clear to the Nationalists that the Republican forces 
were now well established and organised and that the direct frontal attack on Madrid had 
failed. Consequently, the Rebel generals reluctantly called off their attack. With the
65 Sommerfield, p. 139.
66 Knox also claims that it was the Anarchist columns that gave way to a Nationalist assault on 17 
November. Knox, Essays Ancient and Modern p.253.
67 Here Knox met the first leader of the International Brigades, General Kleber, the ‘Russian’ (actually 
Hungarian and whose whose real name was Stem) who managed to get their obsolete and dangerous 
French St. Etienne machine-guns replaced with Lewis guns. Bernard Knox, Premature Anti-Fascist (New 
York University, 1998) p.7.
68 See below, p. 150.
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frontline reduced to a stalemate, on 7 December, Joe Hinks’ British contingent was 
withdrawn with the rest of the Commune de Paris Battalion to Albacete for a short rest.69
Meanwhile, another group o f British had also been fighting in Madrid, as part of the 
XII International Brigade. This group numbered more than a dozen, and included 
members of the Tom Mann Centuria who had been united with other British volunteers 
who had arrived later, such as Esmond Romilly, when they were transferred to Albacete. 
Bill Rust claims that there were eighteen British attached to the Thaelmann Battalion70 
though, like many of the numerical calculations of foreign volunteers, this probably 
includes volunteers from outside the UK, such as the American Ettore Fontana (known as 
‘Jerry’) and Richard Whateley from Australia. Esmond Romilly counted only ten when 
he joined the group at Albacete in October following their machine-gun training in 
Barcelona.71
The Thaelmann Battalion was divided into companies, which were themselves 
divided into ‘zugs’ (sections) o f thirty men; the British contingent was No. 3 zug o f No. 1 
Company. At both company and zug level the commanders were Germans, though the 
zug was divided into two smaller groups o f ten men which were both British led: one by 
Arnold Jeans from Manchester who, fluent in six languages, also acted as interpreter; the
69 Alexander, p.58
70 Rust, p.22.
71 Romilly, pp.44-45.
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other by Lorimer Birch, a scientist from Cambridge University and one o f Esmond 
Romilly’s ‘Real Communists.’72
Addley Harry ‘Tich’. Killed at Boadilla, December 1936
Avner Sid Killed at Boadilla
Birch Lorimer Killed at Boadilla
Cox Ray Killed at Boadilla
Donovan John ‘Paddy. Left battalion before battle o f  Boadilla and 
joined POUM militia. Repatriated July 1937
Fontana Ettore ‘J erry '. American. Deserted from battalion before 
battle o f  Boadilla.
Gillan Phil ‘Jock’. Wounded in the neck at Boadilla. Repatriated 
1937.
Gough William ‘Joe’. Killed at Boadilla
Jeans Arnold Killed at Boadilla
Marshall David Wounded in November. Repatriated to England
Messer Martin Killed at Boadilla
Norman Philip Deserted back to UK before battle o f  Boadilla.
Ovenden Arthur ‘Babs’. Repatriated December 1936
Romilly Esmond Repatriated December 1936
Scott Bill Repatriated to Ireland in 1937.
Thornycroft Chris Battalion armourer, later with 35 Division Medical 
Services. Repatriated to England April 1938.
Watson Keith Left before battle o f  Boadilla to work as a journalist 
with the Daily Express.
Whateley Richard ‘A ussie’. Seaman from Melbourne. Repatriated 1937.
Figure 16. ‘British’ Members of the English Section of the Thaelmann Battalion, X I1 International 
Brigade.
At the village o f ‘ Villafranca’ near Madrid, the volunteers were split into machine-gun 
groups o f five and taught how to advance in ‘little triangles’ in which Lorimer Birch fired 
the machine-gun, Ray Cox loaded, David Marshall ran back and forwards with 
ammunition, whilst Romilly and ‘Chris’ (Thomycroft, who rapidly decided he wasn’t cut
72 Romilly differentiated himself from those volunteers he termed ‘Real Communists’ such as John 
Comford and Lorimer Birch. A ‘Real Communist’, he claimed, could be defined as, “A serious person, a 
rigid disciplinarian, a member o f  the Communist Party, interested in all the technical aspects o f  warfare, 
and lacking in any such unselfish motive as fear or reckless courage.” Romilly, p.64.
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out to be an infantryman73) positioned themselves twenty yards in front protecting the 
machine-gunners with rifle fire.74 However, when the tactic was actually tried later under 
fire, Romilly’s first two attempts at firing were thwarted by defective ammunition.75
The British group was involved in a number o f small skirmishes to the south of 
Madrid, as the Rebels continued their advance on the Spanish capital.76 The first occurred 
on 12 November, when they launched a badly planned, ill executed and disastrous attack 
on Cerro de los Angeles, a hill to the south of Madrid.77 As David Marshall describes, the 
military preparations for the attack were hopeless and the volunteers’ level of military 
proficiency was appalling, “We hadn’t even fired the rifles before we went into action.”78 
Chris Thomycroft, who was operating as the No. 2 on a Lewis machine-gun, didn’t even 
realize the operation was for real and for some time believed that the operation was a 
training exercise.79 As Phil Gillan described,
We were engaged in our first action, at a place called the Hill of the Angels. On top of the 
hill was what we called a fort, but I think it was a monastery. The Moorish forces were in 
there and our job was to attack it and put them out. Anyway it didn’t work out that way 
and the losses on our side were fairly heavy, fairly substantial.80
73Interview with Chris Thomycroft, IWMSA 12932/3/1.
74 Romilly, p.66.
75 Romilly, p.72.
76 In Romilly’s account of these skirmishes he changes the names of many of the villages caught up in the 
fighting. It seems likely that the village Romilly refers to as Melilla, was in reality Villaconejos, which is 
roughly ten miles south of Madrid.
77 Alexander, p.54.
78 Interview with David Marshall, IWMSA 9330/4/2.
79 Chris Thomycroft soon became the battalion armourer for, as Romilly recounts, he was, “A first rate 
technician.” Thomycroft repaired machine-guns for the Thaelmann Battalion who refused to allow him to 
become an ordinary militiaman. Romilly, p.138 and interview with Chris Thomycroft, IWMSA 12932/3/1.
80 Interview with Phil Gillan in McDougall, p. 15.
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During the debacle Marshall was wounded in the foot by a sniper’s bullet and he was 
repatriated soon afterwards.81
The group was soon withdrawn to Chinchon just south of Madrid for re-organization, 
before being moved to a new billet at Fuencarral, directly to the north of the city, where 
they took up reserve positions and made occasional attempts to retake positions held by 
the Rebels. Hans Beimler, the German communist and leader of the Thaelmann Battalion, 
was killed in one o f these abortive raids.82 The stalemate was broken two weeks before 
Christmas, when the Thaelmann Battalion was transferred to the village of Boadilla del 
Monte, west o f the capital, which had come under a very heavy Rebel artillery barrage.
The Thaelmann Battalion were ordered to advance, though as Romilly recognised, the 
Republican forces were already in a disorganized retreat. Unbeknownst to the members 
of the Thaelmann Battalion, the other British group, fighting with the Commune de Paris 
Battalion, was amongst the Republican forces forced out o f Boadilla by the Rebel 
advance.83 During their retreat Bernard Knox was injured by a bullet in the throat, but it 
pissed right through and he survived.84 He later described his feelings as he lay, believing 
himself to be dying:
I have since then read many accounts by people who, like me, were sure that they were 
dying, but survived. Many of them speak of a feeling of heavenly peace, others of visions 
of angels welcoming them to Heaven. I had no such feelings or visions; I was consumed 
with rage- furious, violent rage. Why me? I was just 21 and had barely begun living my 
life. Why should I have to die? It was unjust. And, as I felt my whole being sliding into
81 Interview with David Marshall, IWMSA 9330/4/2-3 & Alexander, p.60.
82Romilly, p. 143.
83 Rust, p.22.
84Kurzke, p. 103.
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nothingness, I cursed. I cursed God and the world and everyone in it as the darkness
fell.85
In the confusion the English section advancing with the Thaelmann Battalion became 
separated from their Spanish comrades and came under intense machine-gun fire from a 
ridge, which only moments before had been occupied by the Spanish Republican soldiers. 
As they in turn tried desperately to retreat they were caught in a murderous crossfire with 
bullets also coming from their own trenches.86 Only seventeen of about forty managed to 
retreat successfully. Richard Whateley later recounted what had happened to the others: 
the Rebel soldiers pretended to be Republicans and called out ‘Camaradas! ’ as they 
moved into the trenches and then ‘finished o ff any wounded.87 News o f the loss of six 
British volunteers (Lorimer Birch, Ray Cox, Harry Addley, Sid Avener, Joe Gough, 
Arnold Jeans and Martin Messer) appeared in the Daily Worker on 28 December, which 
claimed that German, rather than Spanish soldiers, had killed them.88 With most o f the 
contingent killed, this saw the end of the involvement o f a British group in the 
Thaelmann Battalion. Of the surviving British, Phil Gillan returned to Britain, after 
spending two or three weeks in hospital in Castellon de la Plana, north of Valencia.89 
Romilly, accompanied by ‘Babs’ Ovenden, also returned safely to Britain, just as 
Romilly’s brother Giles was arriving in Spain.90
85 Knox, Premature Anti-Fascist, p.9.
86 Romilly p. 191 letter dated 4 January 1937 from Peter Kerrigan to Harry Pollitt, CP/IND/POLL/2/5-6, 
NMLH Manchester.
87 Romilly p. 191.
88 ‘Nazi Troops Kill Six Britons In Madrid’, Daily Worker, 28 December 1936, p.l.
89 Interview with Phil Gillan, IWMSA 12150/4/4.
90 ‘On Leave from Spain’ Irish Times 4 January 1937, p.3. A photograph of the two back in Britain was 
taken at the Daily Worker offices on the 9 January 1937. IBA Box A2 File A/3.
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It has been suggested that the arrival of the first international volunteers made the 
crucial difference; that they ‘saved Madrid.’ Geoffrey Cox writing in the News Chronicle 
described the International Brigades as, “the first truly international army since the 
crusades,” and was in no doubt that their arrival prevented the fall o f Madrid:
Whatever happens, their name will go down to (sic) history as one of the finest and most 
courageous bodies of men ever in arms.91
As several historians have pointed out, it is certainly beyond doubt that the arrival in the 
first week of November 1936 of a well-disciplined group of soldiers provided an 
important psychological boost to the population of Madrid.92
The military efficiency exhibited by the Internationals, which by Spanish military 
standards was phenomenal, was seen by many as one of the most important contributions 
to the defence of the city.93
However, as Hugh Thomas points out, it is hardly conceivable that they ‘saved 
Madrid,’ for they comprised less than five per cent of the defending forces.94 Phil Gillan, 
an ex-territorial, fought in the battles in the University City also feels that, though the 
foreign volunteers played an important role, it was the Spanish who actually saved 
Madrid:
91 ‘They fight with the International Column’, News Chronicle, 21 December 1936, p. 8.
92 See for example, Thomas, Spanish Civil War, p.480. ‘The example of the International Brigades fired 
the populace of the capital with the feeling that they were not alone.”
93 Richardson, p.61.
94 “It has been argued that the International Brigades saved Madrid.. .This 11th International Brigade, 
however, comprised only about 1,900 men. The 12th International Brigade, which arrived on the Madrid 
front on the 13* November, comprised about 1,550. This force was too small to have turned the day by 
numbers alone. Furthermore, the Republican Army had checked Varela on 7th November, before the arrival 
of the Brigade.. .The bravery and experience of the Brigades was, however, crucial in several later battles.” 
The discovery of the Rebel plans in the pocket of a Spanish officer found dead inside an Italian tank also 
played a part. Thomas, Spanish Civil War, pp.477-480.
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The International Brigades played a big, big part but it was the Spanish troops themselves 
that held them out because the front was a big long front.95
Bernard Knox agrees:
Obviously the Eleventh Brigade did not “save” Madrid; the city had saved itself on the 
seventh, but the arrival of the Eleventh on the eighth and of the Twelfth some three or 
four days later, maybe an important and possibly decisive contribution to the continued 
success of the defence in the bloody weeks to come.96
Likewise, the ‘English Captain’ Tom Wintringham, who took over command of the 
British Battalion from Wilf McCartney on 6 February 1937 and, as an ex-captain in the 
British army, had some experience of military strategy, admitted that:
Don’t let us exaggerate: our Brigade did not save Madrid. Madrid would have saved itself 
without us.97
However, this does not mean that he believes the International Brigades’ role was 
negligible, and Wintringham stresses that,
Without us Franco would have got further into Madrid; he would have crossed the Casa 
del Campo and forced his way into the streets of the city itself. There street-fighting 
would have stopped him; but he would have had a foothold in the city. That he has not 
got; thanks to the fighting quality, the skill in action, the digging powers of our first 
International Brigade.98
Following the reorganisation of the Republican Army that had created formal 
international brigades of foreign volunteers in November, new arrivals were incorporated
95 Interview with Phil Gillan, IWMSA 12150/4/2.
96 Knox, Essays Ancient and Modern, p.260.
97 Wintringham, p. 135.
98 Ibid. This view is supported by R Dan Richardson for example, who states that, “In all these battles the 
International Brigades played the major role.” Richardson, p.83.
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into these units, rather than in the plethora of volunteer’s militias that had sprung up in 
the summer. By the end of 1936 volunteers were arriving from Britain in such numbers 
that Tom Wintringham’s dream of uniting the British volunteers in a battalion, rather than 
attaching small groups to a German or French unit, was becoming a realistic possibility. 
During December 1936, Ralph Bates, a senior party official who worked in the 
Republican Government’s propaganda and information services, wrote back to Britain 
that,
What is wanted is a body of military volunteers. Not ones and two’s of who usually have 
the poorest of reasons for coming out, but definitely organised and controlled by the 
party. The sending of a few comrades out in small groups does not lead to good results. 
They are put into predominantly Spanish, or at least foreign-speaking regiments, and get 
into difficulties as a result."
The first step towards the creation of a British battalion came in December with the 
creation of an English speaking company, as part of the XIV International Brigade 
commanded by a Polish Red Army Colonel, Karol Swierczewski, who used the nom-de- 
guerre ‘General Walter’ whilst in Spain. The one hundred and forty-five strong British 
contingent100 comprised the No. 1 Company of the French XTV (La Marseillaise) 
Battalion, which was commanded by a Frenchman, Lieutenant-Colonel Delasalle. The 
company itself was placed under the command of an Englishman, Captain George 
Nathan, an experienced army officer who presented the very image o f the British Army 
Officer, dressed impeccably and carrying a cane.101 A number of the English speaking 
company had seen action before. In addition to the company commander, George Nathan,
99IBA Box C File 8/3.
100 Figure cited in a report from Peter Kerrigan to Harry Pollitt, undated, CP/IND/POLL/2/5-6, NMLH 
Manchester.
101 In fact, Nathan had a somewhat chequered past, which would later create political difficulties within the 
English speaking battalion. See below.
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and the section commanders, Jock Cunningham and Joe Hinks, who had some military 
experience, there were a number of others, including Sam Russell and John Comford 
who had seen action in Madrid in the XI International Brigade.102 There were also a 
number o f IRA veterans, such as Kit Conway who commanded another section, and the 
first of several Cypriot volunteers to arrive via London, Mike Economides, who would 
later become political commissar of the British Battalion.103
The English speaking company was based in the small town of Madrigueras and was 
sent to the Cordoba front on Christmas Eve 1936, where they were involved in an attempt 
to capture the town of Lopera, about 30 miles to the west of Cordoba in southern 
Spain.104 Many recruits had not handled a weapon before their arrival at Andujar railway 
station, near Lopera, when they were presented with Austrian Steyr rifles, constructed at 
the turn o f the century.105 On 28 December, the poorly armed and trained British 
company advanced up the hill towards the town, to find it heavily defended by Rebel 
forces. For John Tunnah, a postman from Edinburgh who had arrived the previous 
November, his first experience of action in Spain was terrifying:
We were moving against a town called Lopera. And the resistance stiffened...at times I 
could see parts of the town just coming out of the trees and little else. And it seemed as if 
every point of it was spouting fire- mainly at me.106
102 Alexander, p.86.
103 Interview with Mike Economides, IWMSA 10428/5/2.
104 ‘The First British Company’, Volunteer for Liberty, 2:29, (August 13, 1938) p.4.
105 There are numerous examples of complaints from volunteers in No. 1 Company about the poor training 
and equipment. See, for example, interviews with Walter Greenhalgh, IWMSA 10356/3/1, and Joe Monks, 
IWMSA 11303/4/2. To make matters worse, the French Chaucat machine-guns were inherently unreliable 
and invariably jammed after one or two rounds had been fired. Alexander, p.87.
106 Interview with John Tunnah, IWMSA 840/9/5.
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Faced with a superior enemy force- in particular from enemy aeroplanes which 
machine-gunned the British lines causing considerable panic and confusion107- the British 
had little alternative than to make, what Bill Alexander later described as, an “orderly and 
controlled” retreat, during which heavy casualties were inflicted.108 The company 
commissar, Ralph Fox, a talented author who wrote a regular column for the Daily 
Worker and the ‘poet-intellectual’ John Comford, were both killed.
Without the experience of George Nathan, who managed to organise the withdrawal 
under a heavy Rebel artillery barrage, the number of casualties would probably have been 
much higher.109 Nathan was an experienced officer, o f whom other volunteers spoke 
highly, “resourceful, brave as a Lion and respected by all.”110 The battalion moved 
backwards and forwards over the next three days, repeatedly re-occupying positions as 
the Rebels launched their own powerful counter-offensives.111 However, any hope of 
capturing Lopera had long since passed.
To the senior figures at the International Brigade base, the operation at Lopera was a 
disaster, and efforts were made to discover why the battalion had been so disorganised 
and ineffective. Andre Marty, Commander of the International Brigades at Albacete, and 
Peter Kerrigan, a senior party figure from Scotland and political commissar for all
107 Report from Peter Kerrigan to Harry Pollitt, undated, CP/IND/POLL/2/5-6, NMLH Manchester.
108 Nathan estimated that, by 31 December, between twelve and fifteen British had keen killed, twenty- 
eight wounded, and a dozen deserted. This reduced No. 1 Company to eighty-two men in the line, plus 
another twenty-five on guards duties. Ibid.
109 Interview with Walter Greenhalgh, IWMSA 11187/9/3-4.
110 Thomas, Spanish Civil War, p.490.
111 Interview with Walter Greenhalgh, IWMSA 111 87/9/4 and Alexander, p.88.
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English speaking volunteers at Albacete, launched an investigation.112 Marty accused the 
French commander o f the Marsellaise Battalion, Delasalle, o f cowardice and treason and 
claimed that Delasalle was spying for the Rebels113. Whether Marty had any hard 
evidence to support the accusations is still a matter of some contention- Marty neither 
liked nor trusted Delasalle and is often cited as the personification o f Stalinist paranoia in 
Spain- however, George Nathan, who was at the trial, was fully convinced o f his guilt, as 
was Maurice Levine who, with Sid Quinn, was Delasalle’s escort from his prison cell to 
the court-room.114 Further insight into the matter comes from James Albrighton, who 
states that he was actually present at the trial when four French witnesses gave evidence 
against Delasalle. The French witnesses stated that two wounded French volunteers 
claimed to have witnessed him going in the direction o f Lopera, which was under Rebel 
control at the time. Albrighton stated that Delasalle was found guilty after admitting 
working for French intelligence though, “acting more as an unofficial observer and 
reporter than a spy.” Albrighton also spoke to both Tom Wintringham and George 
Nathan about Delasalle, who claimed that a search ordered by Marty had discovered 
papers linking him to a French fascist movement. According to James Albrighton, 
Delasalle died cursing Marty for being, “a maniac, [and] a homicidal neurotic.”115
112 Kerrigan had an exceptional party pedigree: he studied at the Lenin School in Moscow from 1929 to 
1930 and was a delegate to Seventh World Congress of Comintern in 1935. He was heavily involved in the 
NUWM and acted as election agent for Willie Gallagher in Fife.
113 See Hopkins p.421,/« 90. However, Bill Alexander claims that he was accused of working for the 
French intelligence service. Alexander, p.88.
114 See Wintringham, pp.83-6 and Maurice Levine, Cheetham to Cordova: Maurice Levine, A Manchester 
Man o f  the Thirties (Manchester: Privately Published, 1984) p.36. Unfortunately Sid Quinn is able to shed 
little light on this issue. See interview with Sidney Quinn, IWMSA 801/3/1.
115 Albrighton also claims that Delasalle accusing Marty of being responsible for the deaths of hundreds of 
innocent members of the International Brigades. This seems somewhat unlikely, at least in December 1936,
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However, Walter Greenhalgh, who also fought with the No. 1 Company at Lopera, is 
less convinced. He believes that Delasalle was made a scapegoat and that, “We much 
preferred to believe that there was treachery rather than incompetence.”116 Greenhalgh’s 
account came from his friend, a Dutchman called Piet Jansen, who acted as interpreter at 
the trial, even though another of Jansen’s friends, Maurice Levine, claims that Jansen 
confirmed to him that Delasalle had confessed to spying against the Russians in 
Bucharest.117 Like Greenhalgh, Joe Monks believed that the military disaster that led to 
Delasalle’s execution was also a result of a very disorganised command structure. Monks 
argued that Lopera was too big a sector for an officer with the rank of only Colonel, and 
really needed an officer with the rank of general or higher.118 Likewise, in a recent 
conversation with the author, Sam Russell stated that contrary to his opinion at the time, 
he now believed that Delasalle was guilty of nothing worse than incompetence.119
Overall, the balance of probability seems to suggest that the evidence of the four 
Frenchmen, which was little more than hearsay, was not reliable. Though Delasalle may 
well have had connections with French military intelligence, he was unlikely to have 
been a Rebel spy, and became a scapegoat for the disaster at Lopera. Nevertheless, as 
James Brown, a volunteer from London who had arrived in November recounts, whether
and even if Marty had been responsible for the deaths of hundreds, Delasalle was in no position to have 
known about it. Albrighton diaries, IBA Box 50.
116 Interview with Walter Greenhalgh, IWMSA 11187/9/4.
117 Hopkins, p.421 fn  93.
118 Interview with Joe Monks, IWMSA 11303/3/4.
119 Conversation with Richard Baxell, 10 March, 2001.
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guilty of espionage or not, many of the British blamed Delasalle for the heavy casualties 
at Lopera and were not unhappy to see the back of him.120
Despite the failure of the battalion as a whole, No. 1 Company as a whole was seen as 
having operated effectively (despite their inexperience and poor weaponry). George 
Nathan was promoted to replace Delasalle as battalion commander, and Jock 
Cunningham, who had fought with the Commune de Paris Battalion in the XI 
International Brigade, replaced him as company commander.
The company remained at Lopera for about ten days, before being transferred back to 
Madrid to help contain a major Rebel offensive that had been launched to the north-west 
of the city, at Las Rozas. Following the failure o f his frontal assault on Madrid through 
the Casa del Campo, Franco attempted instead to close the circle around the north of the 
capital. By the 3 January, the Rebel offensive had captured Majadahonda and Las Rozas 
and cut the road between Madrid and Corunna in several places.121 Here, according to 
Sidney Quinn, many volunteers saw Spanish women fighting in action for the first 
time.122 The battalion attempted to retake the Madrid-Corunna Road but, amidst rapidly 
deteriorating weather conditions, by 15 January, their attempts had ground to a halt. 
Again, there were a number of casualties: Walter Greenhalgh was hit in the neck by a 
bullet,123 but was lucky enough to make it to Benicasim hospital, where he was operated
120 “The boys were glad he was shot, that I’ll say, that I’ll say.” Interview with James Brown, IWMSA 
824/5/3.
121 Alexander, p.88.
122 Interview with Sidney Quinn, IWMSA 801/3/1.
123 Interview with Walter Greenhalgh, IWMSA 11187/9/4.
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on by the American Dr. Sollenberger.124 Seven of Walter Greenhalgh’s comrades were 
not so lucky and were killed at Las Rozas.125 Only sixty-seven volunteers of the one- 
hundred and fifty in No. 1 Company who had left for Lopera on Christmas Eve still 
remained to be transferred back to Albacete and united with the other English speaking 
volunteers.126
Within Britain, news o f the arrival of the international column in Spain and its British 
contingent was received with varying reactions.127 The Government, pursuing its 
increasingly beleaguered policy o f ‘non-intervention’, was anxious to discourage 
volunteers from travelling to Spain, though it was forced to explain to Germany and Italy 
that controlling the actions of British citizens was rather more problematic than in those 
countries with totalitarian regimes. Much of the British media supported the 
Government’s disapproval of British subjects not ‘keeping out of it.’ The Times had been 
particularly concerned to see the appearance of foreign volunteers arriving in Spain to 
fight with the International Brigades. However, described as an “anti fascist legion”128 it 
avoided any mention o f British volunteers although, as reports o f Britons fighting for the 
Republic had appeared in other British newspapers, it seems unlikely that they could have
124 Sollenberger had saved the lives of Esmond Romilly and ‘Babs’ Ovenden at Boadilla, not with his 
medical skills, but by picking up a rifle and covering their retreat. Alexander, p.61.
125 They were: Denis Coady from Ireland, James Hyndman and James Kermode, both from Scotland, 
James Knottman one of many Manchester Communists, Robert Coutts from North Shields and George 
Palmer and H. Wise from London and the South-East.
126 Alexander, p.89.
127 Curiously, the trenchantly pro-Rebel newspaper, the Morning Post, reported the use of the International 
Brigades in the defence of Madrid with grudging respect, describing “the 2000 strong force of English, 
French, Germans and Russians”, as “admirable shock troops.” Morning Post, 12 November 1936, p. 11. 
This should, however, probably been seen in the context of the paper’s determination to portray the British 
volunteers as misguided, duped into volunteering by the evil machinations of Moscow.
128 The Times, 13 November 1936, p. 14.
145
Madrid, 1936: Manning the Spanish barricades
been unaware that British volunteers were fighting in Spain.129 At the beginning of 
December, The Times was still avoiding any mention of British volunteers amongst the 
several hundred volunteers that had arrived.130 It seems likely that The Times, either 
independently, or under pressure from the Government, tried not to give too much 
publicity to the British volunteers for the International Brigades, and thus tried to help 
stem the influx of volunteers leaving for Spain.
Even when The Times did finally admit that British volunteers were present in the 
International Brigades, it was still maintained that, despite plenty of evidence to the 
contrary, “No large contingent has, happily, left this country.”131 The Times also included 
a rebuke to ‘the few’ who had gone or might be thinking of going:
Those young enthusiasts might do worse than pay occasional visits to the morgue at 
Madrid to see what they are defending [i.e. the victims of political murders]. Foreign 
intervention, so far from defeating fascism or Communism in Spain, has merely increased 
their importance.132
Despite this, by 4 January, there were four-hundred and fifty volunteers, enough 
British for them to refer to themselves as the ‘English Speaking Battalion.’133 The 
battalion, including the remainder o f the volunteers from No. 1 Company, was sent to 
Madrigueras, a small village about twenty miles from Albacete, which would become the
129 For example, on the 21 November the Daily Worker had reported the existence of international 
volunteers in a detailed report by Harry Pollitt. ‘Men are flocking from all over Europe...to help save 
Europe’, Daily Worker, 21 November 1936. Likewise, on the following day the News Chronicle described 
a “phantom column” of around 3000 troops defending Madrid from the Moors.
130 The Times, 1 December 1936, p. 15
131 The Times, 7 January 1937, p.13.
132 Ibid.
133 IBA Box C File 8/5.
146
Madrid, 1936: Manning the Spanish barricades
British volunteers’ base.134 Bill Rust described the village as, “not very lively...like all 
Spanish villages it also had a church- a very big one; and a school- a very small one.”135 
Arrivals to the village were told,
That the local priest had been a Franco supporter and when he.. .got wind of Franco’s 
revolt that he got up into the bell tower of die church with a machine-gun and fired on 
anyone who went to the local fountain for water.136
It was while the English-speaking volunteers were based at Madrigueras in January 
1937 that the Irish volunteers controversially elected to leave the British Battalion and 
fight instead with the American volunteers in the Lincoln Battalion. Clearly this decision 
rankled with many o f the British, and it was claimed pointedly, “That distinctions must 
be made between anti-fascist working-class comrades from Britain and British 
imperialism.”137 However, establishing this distinction was not helped by the widely held 
belief that at least two senior British officers in the battalion, Wilf McCartney and 
George Nathan, had played a part in British Army covert activities in Ireland.138
134 Alexander, p.65.
135 Rust, p.28.
136 Interview with John Dunlop, IWMSA 11355/13/4. How true this tale was is difficult to tell; churches 
and priests often featured as exponents or victims in atrocity stories told by both sides during the civil war.
137 Alexander, p.69. Thus Dave Springhall, the Brigade Commissar, was removed from his post, “because 
of his grave political mistake in helping the Irish Section of the British Battalion to transfer to the American 
Battalion.” IBA Box C, File 1/77.
138 Nathan had served, probably as an auxiliary, with the Black and Tans in Ireland in the 1920s and strong 
rumours linked him to involvement in a hit squad that murdered two prominent members of Sinn Fein; 
George Clancy, the former Lord Mayor of Limerick and George O’Callaghan, the ex-mayor in May 1921. 
For Nathan’s alleged involvement in the murders see Richard Bennett, ‘Portrait of a Killer’, New Statesman 
(24 March 1961) pp.471-472, also Hopkins, pp. 174-175, Vidal, p. 109, and Stradling, Irish and the Spanish 
Civil War, pp. 192-200. According to Joe Monks, one of the Irish volunteers, Nathan admitted to having 
worked for British intelligence in Limerick. Interview with Joe Monks, IWMSA 11303/4/1. McCartney 
was also rumoured to have served in the Black and Tans in Ireland. Richard Bennett in The Black and Tans 
(London: Edward Hulton, 1959) p. 147 states that the Black and Tan auxiliaries, “used the Long Bar at the 
Trocadero as their headquarters, where they were advised by their ringleader, who later achieved a certain
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That divisions arose between the English and Irish is not surprising; James Hopkins 
suggests that, “most, if  not all, of the Irish volunteers were members of the Irish 
Republican Army.”139 Certainly a number had been, and both the leading figures amongst 
the Irish contingent, Frank Ryan and Chris ‘Kit’ Conway, were experienced IRA 
fighters.140 Not surprisingly, the ex-IRA activists and supporters found fighting alongside 
their old adversaries extremely difficult, no matter the international rhetoric of the 
political commissars.141 Likewise, many of the English seemed to find it difficult to 
overcome an ignorant and stereotypical view of the Irish as wastrels and drunkards. And 
not all were as tactful as the postman from Edinburgh, John Tunnah, who stated that,
There were Irish attached to the British Battalion. And they were grand people. But 
ideologically they didn’t hit it off.142
The official history of the British Battalion which resides in the Moscow archive, is very 
uncomplimentary about the Irish volunteers, and suggests that many of the British were 
glad to see the back of them.143
At any rate, the Irish comrades proved to have among them elements of very bad 
character. Some were habitual drunkards, others of very bad anti-fascist spirit. On several 
occasions some Irish comrades were carried into Battalion Barracks late at night by the 
local peasants, so drunk they could not stand or walk.144
notoriety as a Soviet agent, to threaten to ‘blow the gaff about conditions in Ireland.” This may well be a 
reference to McCartney.
139 Hopkins, p. 174.
140 Stradling Irish and the Spanish Civil War p.131 & Alexander, pp.68-69. For the background on Frank 
Ryan, see Sean Cronin, Frank Ryan: The Search for the Republic (Dublin: Repsol, 1979).
141 Joe Monks, a volunteer with a strong IRA background, later criticised both the name of the battalion 
and the title of Bill Alexander’s book on the battalion. Monks felt that the volunteers were ‘international’
and should have been labelled as such. Interview with Joe Monks, IWMSA 11303/4/3.
142 Interview with John Tunnah, IWMSA 840/9/4.
143 “The friction that existed between the English and Irish was so great that the separation was
welcome[d] by both groups.” Moscow 545/3/467, p.20.
144 Moscow 545/3/467, p.21.
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It also states that some of the Irish volunteers were not welcomed; one sailor who had 
been living in London before he went to Spain, was described as an, “absolute drunkard 
and undisciplined” and Fred Copeman refused to allow him back into the British 
Battalion at Brunete.145
Bill Alexander later claimed that, “English, Scots, Welsh and all other nationalities 
mixed, with some chaffing and jokes, and without thought to their label ‘British’,”146 but, 
as he later admits, there was a degree of tension between the Irish and English volunteers. 
His claim that, “These tensions, inevitable against the background of Irish oppression, 
vanished in action,”147 seems rather too upbeat. What is, however, true is that the 
surviving Irish volunteers returned to the British Battalion after the Battle o f Brunete.
To Bill Alexander, the military contribution of the early British volunteers, who 
arrived before the Communist Party had gained control o f recruitment, was not as 
significant as from those who arrived after Christmas 1936. As this chapter has shown, it 
is true that the first few volunteers from Britain differed from those who arrived after the 
end of 1936, in that they were generally younger and more middle class. The youthful 
enthusiasm of those like Esmond Romilly, one the few to survive at Boadilla, earned 
them a grudging respect from some of the older, more experienced volunteers. Phil 
Gillan, was in no doubt that Romilly was courageous:
145 Moscow 545/3/99, p.8.
146 Alexander, p.36.
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[He] was a very brave little lad who volunteered for most things, but in other ways as a 
soldier, you know, a big question mark.. .how he wasn’t killed, really I don’t know.148
Unfortunately, Gillan’s main recollection of Romilly as a soldier, was that he could never 
put his ammunition pouches on properly and that as he tied up his trousers with string, 
they were constantly falling down.149 Romilly, candid as ever, makes no secret o f this, 
and also suggests that his lack of military professionalism was hardly a rarity,
I never managed to keep any of my stuff together. Fortunately, losable objects like belts 
and bayonets and plates could be found anywhere- abandoned by someone else.150
Ironically, it is claimed that John Comford, the very epitome o f the Byronic figure, died 
precisely because of a result of this image- his white bandage acting as a perfect target for 
the Moorish snipers in the Rebel Army who, as Phil Gillan remembers, were expert 
shots.151 Walter Greenhalgh, who claimed to have seen Comford killed at Lopera, 
describes how Comford climbed up to the brow of the hill to reconnoitre and the sun 
caught his ‘lovely white bandage’. Comford, who had refused to wear a hat, was shot 
through the head.152
Hugh O’Donnell, who was in charge of the English volunteers in Barcelona, was also 
ambivalent about the overall quality of the early volunteers, claiming at the beginning of 
1937 that, “the poor organisation...makes it impossible at the base to sort out the wheat
147 Alexander, p.69.
148 Interview with Phil Gillan, IWMSA 12150/4/2.
149 Ibid.
150 Romilly, p.86.
151 Interview with Phil Gillan, IWMSA 12150/4/2.
152 Interview with Walter Greenhalgh, IWMSA 10356/3/1.
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from the chaff.”153 The battalion would be given little chance to overcome these 
problems, for the following month would provide these British volunteers with a 
terrifying ordeal through which few would pass unscathed. In February 1937 the 
volunteers, both wheat and chaff, found themselves facing Franco’s crack troops, the 
Moorish Regulares, at the Jarama Valley.
153 Letter from H. O’Donnell to R. Robson, 8 January 1937. IBA Box C File 9/5.
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“It wasnae a battle at a’, it wis a bloody slaughter as far as we 
were concerned.”
Interview with Frank McCusker in Ian MacDougall, Voices from 
the Spanish Civil War: Personal Recollections o f  Scottish 
Volunteers in Republican Spain, 1936-1939 (Edinburgh: Polygon, 
1986) p.43.
Following the return of No. 1 Company to Albacete at the beginning of 1937, the 
British Battalion was considered to be of sufficient strength and readiness for front-line 
action. With the Yugoslav Dimitrov Battalion, the Franco-Beige Battalion1 and the 
American Abraham Lincoln Battalion, they comprised the XV International Brigade, 
which was commanded by the, “incompetent, bad-tempered and hated” Russian, Colonel 
Gal.2 Gal’s chief of staff was the Englishman, George Nathan, who had shown himself at 
Lopera to be a rather different proposition. Nathan had allegedly served in the Guards 
regiment in the British Army, and those that served with Nathan in Spain cite him as both 
an extraordinary character, and an exemplary soldier.3 The XV Brigade commissar was a 
Yugoslavian called Copic, a rather more popular man than Gal, whom he would later 
replace as brigade commander;4 Copic was assisted by the French Communist Jean 
Chaintron, known in Spain as ‘Barthel.’5
1 Also known as the 14 February Battalion.
2 Gal’s real name was actually Janos Galicz. He was a naturalised Russian, bom in Austro-Hungary. 
Thomas, Spanish Civil War, pp.590-591 & Richardson, p.72.
3 See, for example, interviews with Walter Greenhalgh, IWMSA 11187/9/6 and James Brown, IWMSA 
824/5/3. See also Hopkins, p. 177 and previous chapter.
4 Walter Gregory states of Copid that, “As an intelligent man with a good appreciation of the tactics and 
strategy of warfare, Copic was ideally suited to take command of the brigade. His expertise, coupled with
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The British Battalion was commanded by a Scottish journalist, Wilf McCartney, who 
had impeccable revolutionary credentials, having served ten years in Parkhurst prison for 
spying for Russia.6 The battalion political commissar, working alongside McCartney, was 
Dave Springhall, the secretary of the London district of the Communist Party, a member 
of the party’s political bureau, and who had studied at the Lenin School in Moscow, the 
finishing school for the Communist Party’s elite.7
The battalion itself was divided up into four companies, a machine-gun company plus 
three of infantry. No. 1 Company was led by Jock Cunningham, ex-Argyll and 
Sutherland Highlanders, and veteran of the battles in University City in Madrid and 
Lopera. No. 2, the Machine-Gun Company, was led by Tom Wintringham who, after his 
time in the Tom Mann Centuria had become an instructor at the officer training school in 
Pozorrubio. Wintringham also acted as second-in-command of the British Battalion. No. 
3 was led by Bill Briskey, an experienced trade union activist from London, and No. 4 by 
Bert Overton, who had served in the Welsh Guards regiment in the British Army. There 
were now approximately seven hundred and-fifty British in Spain: five hundred in the
his popularity, assured him of our respect and admiration. Indeed, I cannot remember Copic being the 
subject of criticism.” Gregory, p.58.
5 J. Delperrie de Bayac, Les Brigades internationales, 1936-1938 (Librairie Artheme Fayard, 1968) p.226. 
Barthel had been the Secretary of the Communist Party of Algeria before his arrival in Spain. Richardson, 
p.73.
6 Alexander, p.65.
7 As John Halstead and Barry McGoughlin state, “Of the eleven Battalion Political Commissars in the 57th 
(British) Battalion of the 15th Brigade, nine, if not all, had been sent to the ILS [International Lenin School 
in Moscow] or had worked in the Comintern bureaucracy in Moscow. They were, in chronological order: 
Douglas Springhall, George Aitken, Bert Williams, George Coyle, Jack Roberts, Ernest Torrance, James 
Bourne, Eric Whalley, Harry Dobson, Walter Tapsell and Bob Cooney.” John Halstead and Barry 
McLoughlin, ‘British and Irish Students at the International Lenin School, Moscow, 1926-37.’ (Conference 
Paper, Manchester, April 2001) p.3. Ralph Fox, the intellectual founder of the Left Review (with Tom
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British Battalion8, sixty in other units of the XV International Brigade (such as mapping 
and catering), seventy-five new arrivals, twenty-five still at the base at Madrigueras9 and 
in hospital, plus another twenty in the cavalry.10 So, at the end of January 1937, despite 
the loss of most o f the Irish contingent, the British Battalion was in relatively good 
health, with all but one o f its commanders from company level upwards having military 
experience, and with most of them having already gained some experience in Spain.
However, in early February 1937 came several changes, of which the most significant 
was the replacement of Wilf McCartney as commander of the battalion in somewhat 
suspicious, or at the very least bizarre, circumstances. As part of his parole requirements 
following his release from Parkhurst, McCartney had regularly to report to the authorities 
and he was due temporarily to return to England. Prior to his departure, a farewell supper 
was held in his honour at the International Brigade base at Albacete. At the end of the 
evening, Peter Kerrigan, the political commissar at the base, was exchanging pistols with 
McCartney, when the pistol went off, wounding McCartney in the arm11 and ensuring his 
period of leave became rather more permanent.
Wintringham) and Daily Worker journalist who was killed at Lopera in December 1936 and other senior 
party figures, such as the Brigade Commissar Peter Kerrigan, had also studied at Moscow.
8 Figure quoted in a letter of 4 January 1937, from Peter Kerrigan to Harry Pollitt. CP/IND/POLL/2/5-6, 
NMLH Manchester.
9 According to Jud Colman who had fought with No. 1 Company both as Las Rozas and at Lopera, the 
veterans of No. 1 Company were mainly kept together and became the brigade guard charged with 
guarding the HQ, and thus didn’t fight as much at Jarama as many other groups. “I was very relieved. I’m 
not that sort of a hero. I’d be a fool if I was.” Interview with Jud Colman, IWMSA 14575/3/2.
10 Alexander, p.93. An estimate appearing in the Daily Worker in February 1937 put the number slightly 
higher, at eight hundred. ‘They Fight for Freedom’, Daily Worker, 17 February 1937, p.5. At least thirty 
earlier arrivals, including Richard Kisch, David Marshall, Esmond Romilly and ‘Babs’ Ovenden, had been 
sent home.
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James Hopkins’ recent study of the British Battalion raises the old controversy of 
whether, or not, the shooting was an accident. Bill Alexander states that, “Kerrigan was 
deeply upset, offering his resignation” and is categorical that the shooting was an 
accident. Many other volunteers agree with him.12 And as Alexander argues, “Accidents 
with weapons were not uncommon among so many untrained men.”13 However, as James 
Hopkins points out, this explanation is somewhat disingenuous, for neither McCartney 
nor Kerrigan were ‘untrained men’, inexperienced in the use o f firearms.14 Indeed, both 
had served in World War One. Furthermore, though originally believed to be the only 
man in Spain capable of leading the British Battalion15, by the end o f January, McCartney 
had lost the confidence of Peter Kerrigan and Tom Wintringham and was suffering from 
a lack o f self-belief. He was also, according to Kerrigan, becoming increasingly critical 
of the party.16
One person who believed that the shooting was no accident was Fred Copeman, who 
later commanded the battalion himself. As Copeman remarked pointedly,
What would a bloke be doing cleaning a bloody revolver in a taxi and [sic] he’s got all 
day and all night?17
11 Hugh Thomas states that it was his leg, rather than arm that was injured by the bullet. Thomas, Spanish 
Civil War, p.591 n.l
12 See for example, interview with Walter Greenhalgh, IWMSA 11187/9/3.
13 Alexander, p.91.
14 Hopkins, p. 170.
15 On the 4 January 1937, Peter Kerrigan wrote to Harry Pollitt that, “Com[rade] McCartney has been 
appointed Battalion Commander and I feel it is a very good appointment.” CP/IND/POLL/2/5-6, NMLH 
Manchester.
16 IB A C/9-10, also cited in Hopkins, p. 169.
17 Interview with Fred Copeman, IWMSA 794/13/1.
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Copeman is not the only one to level the accusation. George Leeson, who fought with the 
Machine-Gun Company at Jarama, had nothing good to say about McCartney. Describing 
him as “a complete poseur”, Leeson is in no doubt that Kerrigan shot McCartney 
deliberately.18 John Tunnah, who served as a runner in the British Battalion, is also 
convinced that it was no accident.19 Nevertheless, though the shooting conveniently 
ensured the removal of McCartney from his position, it is unlikely that it was anything 
more than an accident, despite Copeman’s protestations.20 McCartney was already 
returning to Britain, and had Peter Kerrigan and Harry Pollitt decided that the British 
Battalion would be better served in Spain without McCartney, they could easily have 
prevented him from returning to Spain, as they would later demonstrate when three senior 
British figures in Spain, the brigade commissar George Aitken, the former battalion 
commander, and now a brigade staff officer, Jock Cunningham, and battalion commissar 
Bert Williams, were recalled to Britain, following heated arguments after the battle of 
Brunete.21
McCartney was replaced as battalion commander by Tom Wintringham, with Harold 
Fry, an ex-sergeant from the British army who had served in India and China, taking 
command of the Machine-Gun Company.22 At the same time the battalion commissar, 
Dave Springhall, was promoted to commissar of XV International Brigade and replaced
18 Interview with George Leeson, IWMSA 803/4/2.
19 Interview with John Tunnah, IWMSA 840/9/5.
20 Any study of Copeman’s interview would suggest that his claims should be treated with caution. 
Copeman also claimed (without any real supporting evidence) that Tom Wintringham deliberately shot 
himself and that the British political Commissar Walter Tapsell and the American Commander Robert 
Merriman were assassinated by the Russians. See conclusions, below.
21 Fred Copeman and Walter Tapsell were also recalled, but allowed to return to Spain. See following 
chapter.
22 Rust, p.62.
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by George Aitken, the full-time Communist Party organiser for the North-East of 
England. The new commanders took up their posts on 6 February 1937, but were not 
given much time to settle in for, the same day, the Rebels launched an offensive to the 
south-east of Madrid, in an attempt to cut the vital road linking the capital city of Madrid 
with Valencia, the seat of the Republican Government.23 By the evening the Republicans, 
including advance elements of 15 International Brigade, had been pushed back to the 
Jarama River, and Rebel troops were within shelling distance of the road.24
The following day General Miaja, in charge o f the defence of Madrid, sent General 
Lister’s 11 Division from Madrid to reinforce the defending Republican force, and on 9 
February, the Republican defences were reorganised along the heights to the east o f the 
Jarama river. Meanwhile, the five hundred British in the battalion left their base at 
Madrigueras and were taken by train to the International Brigade base at Albacete, and 
then by lorry to Chinchdn, about twenty-five kilometres from Madrid and fifteen 
kilometres south-east o f the site o f the Rebel advance.
23 The Republican Government had ‘divisively and controversially’ moved itself to Valencia on the 6 
November 1936 when it looked at though the capital city might well fall to the Rebels. Preston, A Concise 
History o f  the Spanish Civil War, p. 117.
24 Thomas, Spanish Civil War, p.588.
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Map 5. The Rebels’ attempt to encircle Madrid, February 1937.25
Despite the Republicans’ defensive efforts, a small number of Moorish troops 
managed to creep stealthily cross the railway bridge on the small dirt road which ran 
towards the Madrid-Valencia Road (between San Martin de la Vega and Morata de 
Tajuna) after knifing the sentries, members of the French Andre Marty Battalion o f the 
XIV International Brigade. The rest o f the Rebel column crossed immediately after them, 
then moved forward into the Tajuna valley, in an attempt to cut the road.26 The bridge 
had been set with explosive charges, which the Republicans detonated, but the bridge
25 Source of map: Jackson, p.99.
26 Ibid, p.589.
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remained relatively unharmed.27 During the evening of 11 February, another Rebel unit 
also managed to get across the Jarama, using the same strategy employed at dawn. 
During the night they consolidated their position, in preparation for an assault on the 
ridge which overlooked them, the Pingarron Heights.
The newly formed XV International Brigade were now thrown in to the defence. The 
British were transferred from Chinchon early in the morning of 12 February to the 
junction o f the Morata to St. Martin de la Vega and Chinchon to Madrid roads, where 
they arrived at 5.30 a.m.28 The battalion was ordered to move forward towards the Jarama 
River, which lay beyond the next ridge. They moved off, fuelled with “copious quantities 
of coffee”29 and stirred by a speech from their political commissar, urging them to make 
whatever sacrifices were necessary to stem the Rebel advance.
We are prepared to sacrifice our lives, because this sacrifice is not only for the peace and 
freedom of the Spanish people, but also for the peace and freedom of the French people, 
the Germans, the English, the Italians, the Czechs, the Croats, and for all the peoples of 
the world.”30
The volunteers moved up the hill in single file to a plateau overlooking the Jarama River, 
near a farmhouse where the cookhouse was established.31 The three British companies 
then continued to advance, having little idea when they would meet the enemy.
27 Ibid.
28 Interview with Patrick Curry, IWMSA 799/3/1 and Alexander, p.94.
29 Gregory, pp.43-44.
30 Moscow 545/3/466 pp. 12-13. “Estamos dispuestos a sacrificar nuestra vida, porque este sacrificio no se 
hace solo para lograr la pax y la libertad del pueblo espanol, sino que, tambien para la paz y la libertad de 
los pueblos franceses, alemanes, ingleses, italianos, checos, croatos, y para todos los demas pueblos del 
mundo.” The identity of the speaker remains uncertain, for the Battalion Political Commissar, George 
Aitken, was not a Spanish speaker.
31 Gregory, p.44.
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We dropped down into the first gulley and there we were told to leave all the packs, large 
packs and the belongings and like, which we did.. .We continued to advance up the hill 
and on to the top and into the olive groves.. .There was still no fighting going on- at least 
not with us. We could hear the artillery and the like but there was no fire of any kind 
coming to us and we weren’t firing.32
The British had no maps and thus had no knowledge of the position of the Nationalist 
forces. Jason Gurney, the London sculptor, was one o f the volunteers who helped to draw 
sketch maps of the area, but as he stated,
Under these circumstances I think it must have been quite impossible for Gal [the 
Commander of the XV International Brigade] to have had any precise idea of the state of 
affairs at the front from his position at Brigade Headquarters.33
The volunteers moved forward over the ridge, then after crossing a narrow sunken 
road, began to descend into the valley of the Jarama River, which lay in front o f them. At 
this point, the British volunteers began to come under fire from the Rebel force, which 
the Republican command did not realise had already crossed the river. For Albert 
Charlesworth, a metal-polisher from Oldham, it seemed like a beautiful day. It was a 
dream from which he would shortly be very rudely awakened:
I thought it was a glorious day actually. It was a nice day, beautiful day. There was the 
sun got up, it got really warm and the birds seemed to be singing very nicely to me. We 
weren’t being fired on although firing seemed to be taking place-1 thought so anyway. 
But it wasn’t until eleven o’clock in the morning that I realised that the birds that were 
singing were bullets whistling past and there was a fierce battle going on.34
32 Interview with Albert Charlesworth, IWMSA 798/4/1.
33 Gurney, p. 101.
34 Ibid.
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Charlesworth was not the only volunteer not to realise the lethal situation they were 
marching into. James Maley, who had served in the British Territorial Army, was one of 
the volunteers in No. 2 Company advancing towards the river. He later described the 
confusion as they moved forwards through retreating Republican soldiers.
After two hundred yards going forward the retreat was coming back and going down past 
us and we were going through. There were soldiers running past us and we were going 
up. And there were soldiers of the British Battalion dropping as we were going up. 
Without firing a shot they were getting killed.35
When they realised that the Rebels had already crossed the river, the British rapidly 
pulled back to the top of the ridge, later to be named ‘Suicide Hill’ by the surviving 
British volunteers, and took up defensive positions, with No. 3 Company to the left, No. 4 
Company to the right, and the Machine-Gun Company just behind them. They then 
prepared to engage with the advancing Rebel forces.36
For many of the British volunteers, it was their first experience of action and they 
were facing the battle hardened, elite Moorish regulars o f Franco’s Army of Africa. The 
Moorish troops, “the most ferocious enemy in the world,” were highly skilled soldiers, in 
their element when advancing across the open terrain o f the Jarama Valley.37 Jason 
Gurney described the absolute horror the advance of the North African troops had on the
35 Interview with James Maley, IWMSA 11947/3/1.
36 Tom Wintringham’s description of the engagement contains a useful sketch map of the positions during 
the morning of 12 February 1937. See Wintringham, p.62.
37 As battle-hardened crack soldiers, the Moroccan soldiers were used as shock troops by the Rebels, just 
as the International Brigades were for the Republicans. Many other volunteers refer to the terror of coming 
up against the Moors. See for example, interview with David Anderson, in MacDougall, p.94.
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poorly trained volunteers and effectively summarised the inequality between the two 
opposing factions.
Nobody at Madrigueras had said anything about artillery fire or the genius of Moorish 
infantry to move across country without presenting a target for anyone but a highly- 
trained marksman- a category that included no one in our outfit.. .[The Moors] were 
professionals, backed by a mass of artillery and heavy machine-gun fire supplied by the 
German Condor legion. It was a formidable opposition to be faced by a collection of city- 
bred young men with no experience of war, no idea how to find cover on an open 
hillside, and no competence as marksmen.38
The volunteers discovered that the minimal training they had received at Madrigueras in 
no way readied them for taking on Franco’s elite soldiers, despite their initial 
confidence.39 What training there was, as one would expect, owed much to the British 
Army.40 James Maley described his experiences of military training.
Well it really wasn’t much. It was really marching and we didn’t really get time to train 
because we were only there five weeks before we were moved up to the front41
Likewise, Harry Stratton, a Swansea taxi-driver, described how,
[We] were issued with rifles (Russian made) and ammo on the way. I hadn’t handled a 
rifle until then, but Jock McCrae had taught me rifle drill with a walking stick on the way
38 Gumey, p. 104 & p.l08.
39 According to James Hopkins, “Those who had five weeks training, as many did, felt supremely 
confident, despite the deficiencies of their weapons and the sudden replacement of their battalion 
commander.” Hopkins, p. 187. Hopkins’ recent work on the British volunteers is unusual in that it devotes 
very little time to the battle at all; as one reviewer pointed out, “despite claiming familiarity with the 
battlefields, he covers this central aspect of the volunteers’ experiences in about twenty pages.” See Robert 
Stradling’s review of Into the Heart o f the Fire in the English Historical Review, 115:460, (February 2000) 
pp. 164-166.
40 “It was very much on the lines of the British Army. Long route marches of ten to fifteen miles...rifle 
practice...machine-gun practice, though we had very few machine-guns.” Interview with Charles Bloom, 
IWMSA 992/6/2.
41 Interview with James Maley, IWMSA 11947/3/1.
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And John Tunnah, who at least had served in the Royal Navy Volunteer Reserve, put it 
very succinctly,
I can’t even remember my training. I can remember one miserable day, only about a 
morning, running about a field. And I think that was my training.43
Of course, many of the problems with training were a result of the well-documented 
limitations of quantity and quality of Republican arms.44 Guns and ammunition were 
scarce in the extreme, as Eddie Brown, an experienced anti-fascist activist from Scotland 
wryly pointed out, “Ye couldnae waste ammunition. We had none to waste.”45
In fact, the ammunition situation was critical, for the members o f the Machine-Gun 
Company found that their Maxim machine-guns had been given cartridge belts filled with 
the wrong ammunition.46 Worse still, the lorry under the command of the British sergeant 
on which the correct replacement ammunition had been loaded, had been involved in an 
accident and overturned.47 Deprived of their machine-guns, Fry’s company, only seventy- 
two men strong, were forced to resort to firing their rifles desperately at the Moorish 
soldiers advancing expertly towards them.
42 H. Stratton, To Anti-Fascism by Taxi (West Glamorgan: Alun Books, 1984) p.35.
43 Interview with John Tunnah, IWMSA 840/9/3.
44 For a meticulous analysis of the shenanigans surrounding arms procurement for the Republic, which 
ensured they were equipped with sub-standard armaments, see Howson, op cit.
45 Interview with Eddie Brown, in MacDougall, p.l 10.
46 The problem was a symptom of the Republican Army’s forced dependence on antiquated military 
supplies. The belts were the correct type for Maxim machine-guns, and the bullets were also for Maxims, 
but for guns of a more modem design than the war-time German Maxims the British were equipped with. 
Wintringham, p.69.
47 The sergeant had been drinking to steady his nerves and had crashed the truck three miles from the 
British positions, killing a man. Charles West, one of the captured members of the machine gun company, 
described how he had found the sergeant, “Sitting by the road-side holding his head in his hands,
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Tom Wintringham had initially ordered No. 1 Company to hold in reserve, much to 
the disgust o f its commander, the ex-IRA man Kit Conway,48 but due to the Rebel threat 
it was soon moved up to a small bare hill to the north, to the right of the companies on the 
ridge. Under the ferocious Rebel attack, the Franco-Beige Battalion further to the north of 
the British was forced to pull back, which brought the British companies and the battalion 
headquarters under lethal enfilading machine-gun fire which swept across them from 
their right. The British held on desperately, but for the British volunteers it was utter 
carnage. Tom Clarke, a labourer from Dundee, described how many of the volunteers 
were brave to the point o f recklessness,
Unfortunately you had fellows who, more out of bravado than anything else, when they 
were firing, instead of lying down and taking cover, they were standing up. It was just a 
slaughter.49
As Jason Gurney, the London sculptor could see,
These were completely raw troops, imperfectly trained and disciplined, ordered to hold a 
position on an exposed hillside against heavy artillery fire. They had no entrenching 
equipment, nor had they received any instruction in fortification.50
Both No. 3 and No. 4 Companies came under sustained artillery fire and, as the day 
progressed, casualties mounted up quickly. The wounded were taken out o f the line under 
fire by stretcher-bearers such as Tom Clarke, a friend of Bob Cooney from the hunger
completely drunk.” CP/IND/POLL/2/5-6, NMLH Manchester. The sergeant’s Moscow file states, 
“Conduct in line not good. Absolute drunkard.” Moscow 545/3/99 p. 8.
48 No. 1 Company was made up of a combination of those who had fought as Las Rozas, and new untrained 
volunteers who had arrived shortly before the battle. According to Jud Colman who had fought with No. 1 
Company at Lopera and Las Rozas, No 1 Company were mainly kept together and became the brigade 
guard charged with guarding the HQ, and didn’t fight as much at Jarama as many other groups. “I was very 
relieved. I’m not that sort of a hero. I’d be a fool if I was.” Interview with Julius Colman, IWMSA 
14575/3/2.
49 Interview with Tom Clarke, in MacDougall, p.61.
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marches o f 1934, whilst, nearby in Chinchon, members of the Scottish ambulance unit, 
such as Roddy MacFarquar, ferried the wounded to Republican hospitals.51
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Map 6. The British positions at Jarama.52
No. 3 Company lost their commander, Bill Briskey, and his replacement, Ken Stalker, 
within a short time of each other. Also killed were Christopher St. John Sprigg, the
50 Gurney, p. 109.
51 The Scottish Ambulance Unit was run by a woman by the name o f Fernanda Jacobsen who believed that 
the unit’s role was to help both sides. She had close links with the British Government and used the 
Ambulance Unit to ferry Rebel sympathisers from embassies in Madrid to Valencia. Not surprisingly, 
many members o f  the unit, such as Len Crome, Maurice Linden, Roddy MacFarquar and George Burleigh 
were firmly opposed to the use o f the unit for this purpose and three o f  them left the Scottish Ambulance 
Unit in March 1937 to join the International Brigades (the other- Burleigh- returned to Britain). See 
interviews with Len Crome IWMSA 9298/4/1 & Roddy MacFarquar, in MacDougall, pp.80-83.
52 Source o f  map: Rust, p.42.
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‘brilliant Marxist intellectual,’ and his close friend Clem Beckett, the daredevil speedway 
rider (and the inventor o f the ‘wall o f death’ motorcycle stunt). Frank Graham, another 
member of the company saw them killed when their French Chaucot light machine-gun 
jammed.53 Deprived of leadership, the rapidly diminishing numbers o f the company 
attempted desperately to prepare themselves for the inevitable assault that would follow 
the end of the barrage. Meanwhile, No. 4 Company was also sustaining casualties at a 
horrifying rate, but under their terrified Commander were making little preparation to 
defend themselves against the imminent assault.54
By the late afternoon, the desperate position of the battalion and its mounting 
casualties left them with little option but to attempt an orderly retreat from Suicide Hill 
back to the plateau, where the battalion headquarters was situated. Where possible, they 
dragged their wounded comrades with them, covered by Sam Wild, the battalion 
armourer, and a few other volunteers.55 But, as Albert Charlesworth noted, “There 
weren’t many to go back to the sunken road.”56 As the remaining British pulled back, 
Moorish soldiers rushed forward over the top o f Suicide Hill to occupy the positions 
relinquished by the retreating British.
However, after a desperately frustrating day spent without ammunition for their 
machine-guns, the correct calibre ammunition had at last appeared, though it still required
53 Interview with Frank Graham, IWMSA 11877/6/2.
54 Gurney, p. 107.
55 Rust, p.45.
56 As Charlesworth retreated he also joined the long list of casualties when he was blown into the air by an 
artillery shell. After a spell in hospital he rejoined the battalion and became its postman. Interview with 
Albert Charlesworth, IWMSA 798/4/1.
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Harold Fry, helped by Fred Copeman57, to load the shells individually by hand into the 
belts. Fry and Copeman quickly brought the machine-guns into operation and used them 
with devastating effect on the North African soldiers who, for once, were caught out in 
the open and totally unawares. Copeman bullied the frightened volunteers into holding 
fire until the Regulares were almost on top of them, much to their alarm:
On they came. And, of course, the nearer they came the more timid the bloody crowd got. 
They wanted to fire. They wanted to kill them, you know. They’d heard about Moors 
doing awful things to prisoners. “Never mind the effing Moors. Hold your fire.” One kid 
said, “I’ll fire and eff you too.” So I got stuck into him. And we held on.58
Joe Garber, a cabinet-maker from Whitechapel was one of the company who was very 
reluctant to hold fire, but remembers things slightly differently:
And this silly bastard comes along, Copeman, don’t fire yet.. .And I thought, “Sod this” 
and I opened up.59
The Moroccan troops retreated out of range, which brought to an end the first day of 
the battle o f Jarama. The battalion had endured seven hours of heavy losses, and, “Out of 
the 400 men in the rifle companies, only 125 were left. Altogether less than half the 
battalion remained.”60 The remnants o f the battalion gathered at the battalion HQ on the 
sunken road, or the cookhouse next to the farm, desperate for food and water. After dark, 
Jason Gurney was asked by the battalion commander, Tom Wintringham, to reconnoitre 
the sunken road which ran across the plateau, near its forward edge. Here Gurney made a
57 Fred Copeman was officially second in Command of No. 1 Company and had been in the Franco-Beige 
battalion when the British Battalion had been transferred to Jarama. He rejoined them at Jarama and 
attached himself to the Machine-Gun Company. Rust, p.46.
58 Interview with Fred Copeman, IWMSA 794/13/2.
59 Interview with Joe Garber, IWMSA 12291/10/5.
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horrifying discovery; about fifty injured men were lying on stretchers, where they had 
been left and forgotten in the chaotic and desperate times during the day. By the time 
Gurney discovered them it was too late; most were dying or already dead.61
During the night about thirty stragglers from No. 3 Company were found at the 
cookhouse by the battalion political commissar, George Aitken. Where possible, Aitken 
cajoled them to return to the line but, as he freely admits, forced some volunteers back to 
the front under threat of his pistol.62 However, Aitken did not use his pistol; he, like most 
of the other senior figures in the battalion, was vehemently opposed to the shooting of 
deserters.63 Aitken claims that he was approached at Jarama by higher officers, “and a 
civilian” on the idea of trying, and possibly shooting, some of the deserters. Aitken 
resisted it and remained totally opposed to the idea of shooting men who had volunteered. 
He later stated categorically that, “there was nothing of the kind while I was there.”64 
Coerced or not, the volunteers were a desperately needed addition to the frontline, as 
indeed was some desperately needed food and drink that Aitken also brought forward.65
The second day of the battle was to be no less terrifying for the shocked volunteers. 
The battalion commander, Tom Wintringham, prepared the depleted forces as best he 
could. Harold Fry’s (No. 2) Machine-Gun Company were kept in a forward position,
60 Alexander, p.97. Rust estimates that, including officers and members of the Machine-Gun Company, a 
total of two hundred and seventy-five British were still in action by the end of the first day. Rust, p.46.
61 Gurney, pp. 113-114.
62 Interview with George Aitken, IWMSA 10357/3/1. One disgruntled volunteer later wrote his memoirs 
anonymously and referred significantly to this event in an attempt to discredit the battalion. Anon, In Spain 
with the International Brigade: A personal narrative (London: Bums Oates and Washbome, 1938) p. 24.
63 Fred Copeman was also sympathetic to those who cracked under the intense pressure of combat in Spain. 
Interview with Fred Copeman, IWMSA 794/13/4. See conclusions below for a discussion of this issue.
64 Interview with George Aitken, IWMSA 10357/3/2.
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overlooking the valley and river below them. No. 4 Company, under Overton, were 
placed to the right and No. 1 Company were facing the open left flank, now under the 
command o f Andre Diamant (an Anglicized Egyptian, whose name appears variously as 
Andre Diamond and Andre Diamont) following the wounding of Kit Conway. Stand-to 
was at three am. Dave Springhall, the assistant brigade commissar brought orders from 
Brigade headquarters that the British Battalion should prepare for an advance on the 
Spanish forces, which he said would be supported by tanks and another International 
Brigade.
When dawn broke Fry’s company were able to see Rebel soldiers who had moved up 
in the night between the ridge and Suicide Hill and drive them back with concentrated 
machine-gun fire.66 During the day the Franco-Beige and Dimitrov Battalions on the right 
were again driven back and the British Battalion found itself once more surrounded on 
three sides. By late afternoon Wintringham was aware that a Rebel assault on Fry’s 
position was imminent, as small groups of Nationalist troops could be seen working their 
way forward to Fry’s right, where Bert Overton’s No. 4 Company was situated. At this 
point the nervous Overton finally panicked, and withdrew his company right back to the 
sunken road, as he had been begging George Aitken to allow him to do all day.67 This left
65 Gumey, p. 117.
66 Rust, p.47.
67 See written reports from members of the Machine-Gun captured that day; Harold Fry, Bert Levy, Donald 
Renton, Charles West and Basil Abrahams undated, CP/IND/POLL/2/5-6, NMLH Manchester. They are 
bitterly hostile and critical of Overton, describing how he withdrew his company after two shells had fallen 
to their right and claimed Overton had stated, “God Damn it! It is too bloody hot here; I am getting out of 
it.” See also interview with George Aitken, IWMSA 10357/3/1. Aitken claims that it was later rumoured 
that Overton threw a Mills bomb into the company’s ammunition dump to justify the retreat.
Clearly Overton panicked at Jarama, but some responsibility must also lie with his commanders for his 
weakness had been recognised before the battle. Tom Wintringham described Overton as “a fool, a 
romantic, a bluffer who wanted to be courageous but had lived too easily, too softly” and went on to admit
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the Machine-Gun Company’s flank totally unprotected and Rebel forces quickly took 
advantage of the situation and surrounded them. A note written by Harold Fry to Tom 
Wintringham just before their capture, reports that Fry had located the Rebel forces’ HQ. 
Wintringham responded by promising that food and water would be delivered that night, 
with a reassurance that Number One and Three Companies were behind Fry’s company 
and an instruction to, “Hold on.”68 Shortly after Wintringham had written the note, the 
Machine-Gun Company was overrun by Nationalist forces, and the note was never 
delivered. As many as thirty members of the Machine-Gun Company, including its 
commander Harold Fry, and his number two, Ted Dickenson were captured.69
The exact circumstances of the capture of the Machine-Gun Company remain rather 
unclear. Originally it was believed that they had been tricked into surrendering by 
Nationalist troops who approached the British positions singing the Internationale and 
holding their clenched fists raised in the Popular Front salute. Several accounts describe 
how,
I heard the strains of the ‘International’ coming from the direction of the outpost trench. 
As I got nearer I was surprised to see numbers of Fascists coming over the land between 
us and them, singing the ‘International’ and holding up their fists in the anti-fascist salute. 
Our boys were holding up their fists in welcome to the boys who were coming over. I had 
not the least doubt that here was a mass desertion from the Fascist lines. ‘Yank’ Levy
that, “Macartney, myself, Springhall- we had already to some extent seen through O. at Madrigueras.” 
Wintringham, pp. 109-110.
68 CP/Ind/Poll/2/6 (Manchester).
69 There are discrepancies between differing accounts over the numbers captured at Jarama on 13 February 
1937. Bill Alexander states that there were thirty captured (p. 183), whereas James Maley- who was himself 
captured that day- states that the number was twenty-eight. Interview with James Waley, IWMSA 
11947/3/2. My research support’s Alexander’s findings. Carl Geiser lists twenty-seven of the thirty in his 
study of the American prisoners-of-war Prisoners o f the Good Fight (Connecticut: Lawrence Hill, 1986) 
pp.270-271 note 7. The three he missed were a volunteer named Struthers or Stuhldeer, John Bruce from 
Alexandria and S. J. Giles from Liverpool. In addition, two volunteers, Jack Flynn and Fred Jones, were 
captured at the end of February.
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seemed to be the first to realise the trick that had been played, but by this time there were 
swarms of Fascists in the trench.70
This story appears, in various forms, regularly in accounts o f the battle, such as an 
article in Workers Weekly recounted by Tom Spiller71 from New Zealand, a member of 
No. 4 Company, and in the book of contributions of volunteers edited by the Irish 
Republican leader, Frank Ryan.72 Another version appear in the Moscow archives, which 
states that,
At about 5.30, the men of the Machine-Gun Company, still lying in the trenches, heard 
during a lull in the firing the singing of the international and saw a body of men 
advancing towards their positions, giving the anti-fascist salute and shouting: “Vivan las 
Brigadas Intemacionales” At that distance and because of the similarity of dress, our 
comrades mistook them for the Spanish Battalion. Some thought it was a mass desertion 
from the fascist lines. Our comrades held up their fists in welcome to the men who were 
coming over. When they were about 30 metres from the Machine-Gun Company’s 
positions, Company Commander Fry, recognised them as fascists by their Mauser rifles 
and the dress of their officers. So he immediately gave the order to load and fire. Hand to 
hand fighting took place. Many died in the fascist ranks. The Company lost 10. Comrades 
M. Gunners, Doran and his crew Jasper Philies and Plum were blown up by grenades 
while operating their machine-guns. Katscoronas, veteran of four revolutions, 
ammunition gone, died cracking skulls with his rifle butt.73
This story has become part of the legend o f the battle of Jarama,74 though doubts must 
remain about this version of events.75 That even the relatively inexperienced British 
volunteers could confuse conspicuous Moorish troops with Republican soldiers seems
70 This version is by Bill Meredith and appears in the Battalion Diary of the Battle of Jarama. See Fred 
Copeman collection, Imperial War Museum. It also appears in Rust, pp.48-49 and Frank Graham, The 
Battle o f Jarama (Newcastle: Frank Graham, 1987) pp. 15-21.
71 Workers Weekly, 21 May 1937.
72 Frank Ryan, (ed.). The Book o f  the XVth Brigade: Records o f  British, American, Canadian and Irish 
Volunteers in the XVInternational Brigade in Spain 1936-1938 (Madrid: War Commissariat, 1938) pp.54- 
55.
73 Moscow 545/3/467 pp.12-13. It seems likely that this version was also written by Bill Meredith. (The 
last three volunteers mentioned were probably Elins, Plumb and Katsaronas).
74 James Hopkins’ recent study of the British Battalion also claims that Fry’s Machine-Gun Company was 
infiltrated and captured by Moors. Hopkins, p. 190.
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unlikely, particularly as the Moors had been their main adversaries the previous day. But 
as Donald Renton, who was the Machine-Gun Company’s political commissar and one of 
the captured that day explains, the situation was very confusing with various 
contradictory instructions being given:
There were different voices raised, you know, to keep firing. Others were for cease fire- 
“These are our own comrades.”76
Nevertheless, there is an alternative, and more convincing version, which originates 
with George Leeson, a section commander in the Machine-Gun Company, another of the 
volunteers captured that day.77 Leeson states that the troops that infiltrated Fry’s 
Machine-Gun Company were members of the Spanish Foreign Legion who had replaced 
the North African troops. As Bill Alexander has pointed out, the similarity o f uniforms of 
the Foreign Legion and the Republican Army, combined with the general confusion at the 
time makes this explanation highly plausible.78 Leeson believes that Fry mistook the 
advancing Nationalist soldiers for deserters and stood up and told his company to cease 
fire,
And led them all in singing the Internationale and standing up and giving thanks.. .About 
half the men holding that line were shot as they came over. The rest of us just had our 
rifles knocked out of our hands and we were surrounded.79
John Tunnah, a Scottish volunteer acting as the battalion runner at Jarama, was 
watching events from the plateau overlooking the battle, and is in no doubt that the story
75 Fred Copeman always insisted that this version was correct: “Well, I know bloody well they were 
because I was there...They got our uniforms from blokes who were killed.” Interview with Fred Copeman, 
IWMSA 794/13/1.
76 Interview with Donald Renton, in MacDougall, p.25.
77 See Interview with George Leeson, IWMSA 803/3.
78 Alexander, pp.98-99. Alexander’s analysis of the capture also appears in Geiser, pp.14-15.
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of the Nationalists soldiers deserting with their hands raised whilst singing the 
Internationale is false. Tunnah rather scathingly states that,
I’ve heard this story about the Moors coming over singing the Internationale.. .1 wouldn’t 
have this for one minute. I don’t believe it.. .Moorish soldiers, almost illiterate, could 
understand probably some Spanish commands, who live in North Africa and talk the 
Arab dialect, and they’ve been sweeping round through the south of Spain for the past six 
months going pretty fast. And then somehow on the way they leamt to sing the 
‘Internationale’ as they come over the hill at the International Brigade. And a British 
Commander that would believe such a thing? Well!80
Tunnah believes that Harold Fry did not dispute Bill Meredith’s version of events for he 
realised that his company was in the wrong position and felt responsible.81 Tunnah argues 
that the machine-gun group were too far forward and should, instead, have been on the 
plateau to the rear with himself and Fred Copeman:
They shouldn’t have been there. They should have been up on the ridge beside us but 
thought that they were in a safe place, a good.. .well-placed to deal with the enemy 
probably and relatively safe themselves. And they sat there. And whoever the military 
commander was on the other side saw the opportunity and came over in force at first light 
in the morning and swept round both sides of them. They hadn’t a chance. And if they 
hadn’t surrendered they would have been killed.82
In fact, Tom Wintringham was fully aware that the placement of the Machine-Gun 
Company was unconventional, but the position was the only one offering a good field of 
fire.
79 Interview with George Leeson, IWMSA 803/4/3.
80 Interview with John Tunnah, IWMSA 840/9/7.
81 Ibid. However, James Maley, a member of the Machine-Gun Company, believed that his Company was
in a good tactical position. Maley states that, “After the first day there was a lull. We stayed where we 
were... We knew we had a good field of fire.” Interview with James Maley, IWMSA 11947/3/2. As a map 
of the battle site shows, though the Company may have had a good field of fire, Tunnah is right to point out 
that the position was extremely vulnerable to having any line of retreat cut off.
82 Ibid.
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According to the text-book it was wrong to have the heavy machine-guns out in front.
But their position was really a magnificent one, and the only one available with a good 
field of fire covering nearly a mile of front.83
As Wintringham rather pointedly states, “Well dug in, with plenty of belts and 
ammunition, our machine-gunners could hold that terrace- if  their flanks were safe.”84 
Overton’s withdrawal o f No. 4 Company ensured that this was not the case; realising the 
extent of his error, Overton tried to make amends by leading a charge of forty men in a 
desperate attempt to retake the trenches recently occupied by Fry’s Machine-Gun 
Company. The Nationalists soldiers simply mowed them down with the machine-guns 
they had just captured. Only six of the forty men made it back to the British positions. In 
the melee Tom Wintringham sustained a leg wound, which ended his period of 
commander of the British Battalion and George Aitken, the battalion political commissar, 
took temporary control. By nightfall only one hundred and sixty still remained in the 
line.85 With Wintringham injured, Fry captured, and Overton in tatters, the British 
Battalion was in an unenviable position. Thus the arrival of the experienced and widely 
respected Jock Cunningham, who took over command from Aitken during the evening, 
came not a moment too soon.
The third day o f the battle, on the fourteenth o f February, brought a new assault on 
the British line by a fresh Rebel brigade, supported by tanks. With the British machine- 
guns crushed underneath the tanks, the desperately weakened British line finally broke 
and the volunteers retreated in small groups back down the slope towards the Chinchon
83 See report on the battle of Jarama, Moscow 545/3/467, p.l 1.
84 Wintringham, p.99.
85 This total includes the remaining few remaining members of the Machine-Gun Company.
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road and the cookhouse, where they gradually congregated. Here they were visited by 
Lieutenant-Colonel Gal, the Commander of the XV International Brigade, who explained 
that they were the only troops between the Rebels and the Valencia Road.86 Despite their 
physical and mental exhaustion, in a display of impressive courage, one hundred and 
forty volunteers marched back with Jock Cunningham and Frank Ryan to try and 
recapture their lost positions. Though under no illusions about the situation they were 
marching into, the volunteers marched back, singing the Internationale to bolster their 
spirits, and collected a number of stragglers on the way. Joe Garber was one of the 
starving and desperate British volunteers who ended up at the cookhouse and was talking 
to Paul Lewis, one of the brigade staff, when George Nathan marched up and persuaded 
him to return with him to the front.87
Then we started getting together all remnants. Spaniards as well, all start singing the 
International and he was in front, with Jock Cunningham, and marching up, pushing, and 
we were singing away and then we start to scream up this hill.. .back to the sunken 
road.88
The march back into the line on the third day o f Jarama has, not surprisingly, become 
one of the images used in sympathetic accounts o f the British involvement in Spain.89
86 Unknown to many of the British at the time, there were also no troops to their left, where a Spanish 
cavalry regiment was supposed to be. This made their desperate defence extremely critical for the Republic. 
“There were no troops to the south of the English...all our reserves were up to the north...It would have 
been impossible to stop a Fascist attack south of us. There was our weak spot.” Gumey, pp.113-114. 
Fortunately for the British Battalion, and for the Spanish Republic, the Rebel forces, “did not find this weak 
spot until February 14th or 15th, when it was no longer very weak.” As Tom Wintringham argues, “That is 
the justification, the achievement, of the defence of Suicide Hill. We held our own half-mile or more; we 
masked the utter weakness, emptiness, of the three miles south of us.” Wintringham, p.82.
87 Different accounts name Jock Cunningham, Frank Ryan, George Aitken and George Nathan as the 
leaders of the march back to the line. The two most likely to have led the march were Cunningham and 
Ryan, so Garber is probably confusing Nathan with Ryan.
88 Interview with Joe Garber, IWMSA 12291/10/6.
89 An account by Frank Graham appears in his book on Jarama. It states: “The events which followed were 
some of the most glorious in British working-class history. As these men began to climb the hill again, they 
broke spontaneously into the Internationale. These soldiers who had previously left the front line and gone
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However, there is no doubt that, as Hugh Thomas admitted, “It was a brave 
performance.”90 The volunteers’ courage, and the deception that enabled them to fool the 
Rebel forces into thinking they were faced by more than a handful o f men, held the line at 
a critical moment for the Republic. Frank Graham was another o f the volunteers who 
returned to the front:
We advanced up the road and we were told whenever we could get into a position, when 
we met strong opposition and we couldn’t go any further we should stop there and hold 
that ground. We went up the road to reach the top of the hill and we nearly reached the 
top and then we came under heavy fire and we dug in there and we held that up. One of 
the things we did was, we were told we had to keep on firing, no matter what happened, 
and we weren’t to worry too much about firing accurately and we had to keep up the 
firing along at least two miles of the front to create the impression there was a large 
number of troops there and we hoped that that would stop them. We couldn’t kill many, 
we’d kill a few by accident. We went on firing, we got spare rifles, and most of us had 
two or three rifles because the rifle got so hot that we couldn’t use them. And we went on 
firing the whole of that day for about seven or eight hours without stopping.91
The Rebel soldiers, no doubt fooled into believing them to be fresh reinforcements, 
retreated back to their earlier positions and, during the night of 14 and 15 February, 
Republican units were brought up and the gap in the line was finally plugged. Both sides 
dug defensive fortifications and a stalemate ensued, which neither side was able to 
overcome. The positions remained virtually static for the rest of the war.
some distance stopped in surprise, and those who were sitting on the sides of the slope, jumped up to look 
at this strange band of men, bearded, dirty, ragged, covered with blood, who after three days’ hard fighting 
were proudly marching along. They broke into applause and they too began to sing. The whole 
mountainside echoed with their song, the song of struggle. More and more men began to join the marching 
column. It was a real regrouping!” Frank Graham, p.24. Similar accounts of ‘The Great Rally’ appear in 
Rust, pp.51-54 and Ryan, pp.58-61.
90 Thomas, Spanish Civil War, p.592. Robert Stradling agrees: “Although the British Battalion was neither 
significantly outnumbered nor outgunned by the forces actually facing it, its achievement was nonetheless 
an epic one. The assertion may ultimately be incapable of proof, but this writer is confident that its 
conduct- especially on 12 February- represents the greatest single contribution to the victory of Jarama, and 
thus to the survival of Madrid.” Stradling, Irish and the Spanish Civil War, p. 166.
91 Interview with Frank Graham, IWMSA 11877/6/3.
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Celebrated as a great victory over the fascist army, the battle of Jarama was, like the 
earlier battles for Madrid in November and December 1936, really only successful in that 
it stemmed the Rebels’ advance on Madrid. And at great cost: the Republicans lost 
somewhere in the region of 25 000 soldiers, to the Nationalists 20 000. Of the five 
hundred who had gone into battle with the British Battalion on 12 February, a 
conservative estimate would suggest that one hundred and thirty six were killed, a similar 
number wounded, with at least fifty leaving the front line (though some of these would 
return to the battalion), leaving approximately half the battalion remaining.92 The lack of 
numbers forced the command to amalgamate No. 3 and 4 Companies on 15 February.
On 27 February an attempt was made to break the stalemate with an offensive, 
involving the recently arrived American volunteers in the Lincoln Battalion. In what was 
later described as a, “well planned but poorly executed” attack, many volunteers refused 
to advance. Twelve English who did advance were all shot instantly.93 Charles Morgan, 
one o f the volunteers from Manchester, was involved in the disastrous attack.
We were all in trenches, we were told on the morning that there would be air cover, there 
would be a bombardment. There was neither. We were just rushed over the top to face 
crossfire machine-guns. It was a slaughter. We didn’t stand a cat in hell’s chance! I saw 
lads, my comrades that I’d leamt to love, die and some of these boys never fired a bloody 
shot.94
As Jud Colman, a comrade of Morgan from the Manchester YCL, explained,
92 If the Irish fighting with the Lincoln’s are included, the number killed could be as high as 166. A number 
of A number of others working in medical units were also killed.
93 Moscow 545/3/467 p.32. At least twenty more British were killed on the same day.
94 Interview with Charles Morgan, IWMSA 10362/2/1.
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Most of the attacks were almost suicidal, because there’s no way you can send men 
against machine-guns without losing some. It was just physically impossible.95
The high level o f British casualties at Jarama came as a severe shock to Pollitt and the 
other party leaders, which may explain why it took until 6 March for news of the British 
casualties at Jarama to appear in the Daily Worker.96 The article admitted that losses 
numbered as many as four hundred but, as one might expect, stressed the ‘heroic’ and 
‘epic’ nature o f the British defence:
You have never read and you never will read a story greater than this.
When you have read it, you will know why there are no words in the English language 
capable of doing justice to this “epic of valour unequalled in all history”:- the epic of the 
Anglo-Irish Battalion of the International Brigade at Arganda Bridge: The Epic of British 
and Irish men who “endured so that they might possibly prevent such things happening in 
our native land.”
When you have read how the Anglo-Irish Battalion saved Arganda bridge- and saving it 
helped to save Madrid, and Britain and all Europe from war and death, you will 
understand why the young general in command said that in all his career he had “never 
seen such tenaciousness and bravery.”
Nothing that we can do will ever fully repay our debt to these men who fought for us and 
died for us.97
The high level o f casualties and, in particular, the disaster o f 27 February made a 
huge impact on the volunteers’ morale, which was already in a bad way due to the 
extended period in the front line which followed the slaughter o f 12 to 14 February.98 As 
a report drawn up at Albacete in April 1937 described, the high levels o f casualties at 
Jarama took their toll, with the injury of the highly popular and experienced Jock
95 Interview with Jud Colman, IWMSA 14575/3/3.
96 News of the Battle of Jarama appeared as early as the 15 February, ‘Franco Fails. The Battle East of 
Madrid.’ Daily Worker, 15 February 1937, p.2. The Jarama casualty list was important enough to be taken 
back to London personally at the end of February 1937 by Sam Russell who had been wounded the 
previous December at Lopera. Interview with Sam Russell, IWMSA 9484/6/4.
97 Daily Worker, 6 March 1937, p.l.
98 As James Hopkins describes, ‘The furious bloodletting that month in the valley of the Jarama, caused in 
no small part by the ineptitude of the higher command, and the long, slow attrition that took place in the
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Cunningham and his replacement by the “quick-tempered” and relatively inexperienced 
Fred Copeman causing particular concern amongst the company commanders." Most of 
the British contingent regarded Jock Cunningham as a highly effective leader of the 
battalion,100 though he had his detractors, such as David Hooper, a Welsh volunteer who 
had arrived in December 1936. Hooper believed that Cunningham “was full o f bullshit, 
and [George] Aitken took the can time after time for Cunningham’s mistakes.”101 The 
disgruntlement permeated right through to the upper ranks of the battalion; in a visit to 
Spain in March 1937 Harry Pollitt was forced to bring together Jock Cunningham and 
George Aitken, together with Fred Copeman and Bert Williams in an attempt to resolve 
differences amongst the leaders in the battalion.102 The situation was further exacerbated 
by the conditions in the trenches caused by terrible weather; it rained for long periods 
making it virtually impossible to ever get warm and dry, and making any attempt at 
hygiene very difficult. A spate of orders from battalion headquarters warned of the 
importance of the digging and using of latrines,103 but, “There were times when, in spite 
of urgent need, there was a reluctance to let the pants down in the face o f the icy wind,
trenches in the spring and early summer, had encouraged that cynicism felt by every soldier.” Hopkins, 
p.239.
99 Moscow 545/6/93 p.l.
100 Joe Monks, who had fought alongside Cunningham in the battles around Lopera and Las Rozas in late 
1936 described how, “This small Scot was thought of by most as one of the makers of that military magic 
which had obliged the newspapermen to regard the so far successful defence of Madrid as a military 
miracle.” Joe Monks, With the Reds in Andalusia (London: Privately Printed, 1985) p. 13.
101 David Hooper, No Pasaran. A Memoir o f  the Spanish Civil War (London: Avon, 1997) p.31. However, 
Hooper’s remarks should be treated with caution. He also accuses, with little foundation, Cunningham of 
trying to get his mates elected as company leaders, and Aitken of using Brigade funds to pay for his two 
sons’ university education. See Hooper, pp.34-35.
102 Matters would come to a head in August-September and five senior figures of the battalion would be 
called home. See below.
103 See orders of 11 April 1937, which stated, “The attention of all comrades is drawn to the regulations 
concerning the use of latrines. Only the latrines provided must be used. The co-operation of all comrades in 
this connection will do much to preserve the health of the battalion.” Moscow 545/3/495, p.4.
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and one would try to wait for a least a momentary let-up in the rain.”104 Waste food was 
also not disposed of, raising the risk of dysentery and typhoid. This issue cropped up 
regularly in the battalion orders, particularly when there seemed to be an unwillingness to 
be inoculated.105
The volunteers’ disgruntlement at their long period on the Jarama front line was made 
considerably worse by the lack o f leave, especially when, on the occasions when they 
were relieved from front-line duties and sent to Morata de Tajuna between 5 and 9 
March, and Alcala de Henares at the end of April, the leave ended with them returning to 
their old positions on the Jarama front. In fact, apart from the two short rest periods, the 
British Battalion remained at Jarama until 17 June when, after seventy-three days in the 
line, the Brigade was finally withdrawn to Mondejar, allowing some o f the British to take 
a few days rest in nearby Madrid.
On the night of 27 and 28 April, Bert Overton’s actions during the battle o f Jarama 
were raised in a battalion meeting.106 The meeting was chaired by Bert Williams, who 
had replaced George Aitken as battalion commissar on 23 March, when Aitken was 
promoted to Brigade commissar. During the meeting it was also alleged that, further to 
his conduct on 12 and 13 February, whilst in hospital Overton had promoted himself
104 Moscow 545/3/467 p.40.
105 See, for example, battalion orders of 11 April and 15 May 1937. Moscow 545/3/495, p.6.
106 Basil Abrahams, one of the XV Brigade Staff, further alleged in a later report completed after his 
repatriation that, on 13 February, Overton had been responsible for filling ammunition belts with the 
incorrect ammunition. NMLH Manchester, CP/IND/POLL/2/5-6.
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from sergeant to captain and had since been claiming the pay.107 Bill Alexander recounts 
that, “all were allowed to speak” at the meeting though (apparently without any sense of 
irony), he states that Overton was not present to make his own defence.108 At the official 
brigade court-martial which followed shortly afterwards, Overton was charged with 
desertion, promoting himself to captain and drawing the pay and sentenced to work in a 
labour battalion. Overton was later killed, “by a shell while carrying munitions to a 
forward position.”109 As James Hopkins points out, several brigaders have hinted darkly 
that Overton was, if  not actually murdered, certainly sent deliberately, “into harms 
way... [as]... an expedient means of getting rid of a soldier who had become a dangerous 
embarrassment.”110
Whilst the main British contingent making up the British Battalion remained on the 
Jarama front until May/June 1937, a small group of new arrivals and those recently 
released from hospital were formed on 15 March into No. 2 Section of an Anglo- 
American company in the XX Battalion of the 86 (Mixed) Brigade.111 The Brigade was 
sent to the Pozoblanco sector on 20 March, about eighty kilometres north of Cordoba in 
the south o f Spain. A novel form of attack using a train, behind which the battalion 
followed on foot, was abandoned when the train came under heavy artillery fire and was 
forced to retreat rapidly into a tunnel.112 The Anglo-American section was then
107 See report by members of the machine gun company, undated, NMLH Manchester, CP/IND/POLL/2/5- 
6, and Wintringham, p.l 13.
108 Alexander, p. 107.
109 Ibid.
110 Hopkins, p.268. See conclusions for a discussion of this issue.
111 Alexander, p.l 11. The section included two later commanders of the British Battalion, the Irishmen 
Peter Daly and Patrick ‘Paddy’ O’Daire.
112 Alexander, pp.l 14-115.
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transferred to the nearby Chimorra front, on the same sector, positioned high in the peaks 
where there was virtually no cover, forcing volunteers to build piles o f stones to shelter 
behind.113 In a disastrous error they were attacked by an Anarchist battalion, and several 
of the volunteers were killed. Not surprisingly, many men were disheartened and there 
were a number o f desertions, before Will Paynter, the British base commissar, managed 
to get them transferred to the British Battalion.114
July 1937 saw the British Battalion thrown once more into battle in a well planned 
but, ultimately, over-ambitious attack planned by the sophisticated Republican tactician, 
General Rojo.115 The offensive, launched fifteen miles to the west o f Madrid, was a 
diversionary attack designed to relieve the pressure on Santander in northern Spain, by 
breaking through the Nationalist lines at their weakest point.116 Thus, on 2 July, rested 
and back up to strength with new recruits from England and those recovered from their 
wounds, the battalion, with the other battalions comprising the XV International Brigade, 
were moved out o f Albacete. The brigade now comprised six battalions, plus the newly 
formed Anti-Tank Battery, which had been transferred from the XXIV Brigade.
The Anti-Tank Battery was formed in May 1937 and issued with three Soviet 45mm 
guns, capable o f firing both armour-piercing and high explosive shells which, at that
113 Whilst at Chimorra Joe Monks met an American, Max Evershuk, who vehemently believed that 
German and Italian workers were sabotaging shells. Much to his comrades’ horror, Evershuk was in the 
habit of hammering off the tips of shells and bombs looking for goodwill notes. Monks, pp.35-36.
114IBA Box 50/File Mk.
115 As Alexander states, “The plan was bold and imaginative. However, in hindsight, and considering the 
level of training and the reserves available to the Government, it was clearly over-ambitious.” Alexander, 
p.l 19.
116 Preston, Concise History, p. 198.
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time, represented state-of-the-art military technology.117 The battery was comprised of 
forty men who had been training at the British headquarters at Madrigueras, who were 
taught how to use the new guns by a number of Russian instructors. They represented 
somewhat o f an elite unit; James Hopkins repeats Fred Copeman’s claim that the 
volunteers for the Anti-Tank Battery were selected from, “good-looking students...as a 
kind of apartheid” to keep them apart from the overwhelmingly working-class infantry 
companies.118 Copeman claims that he deliberately chose intellectuals to be members of 
the battery, and put Malcolm Dunbar in command because of, “his university accent, the 
neatness of his appearance, and his romantic good looks.”119 Likewise, the political 
commissar for the battery, and Dunbar’s replacement when he was wounded, was Hugh 
Slater, also a middle-class university educated volunteer.120 However, Fred Copeman’s 
version of events is not supported by other members of the Anti-Tank Battery. Bill 
Alexander, who served as the unit’s political commissar before his promotion to adjutant 
of the British Battalion, states categorically that,
Copeman was not involved in the selection of volunteers in the UK. I can say with even 
greater emphasis that Copeman had nothing to do in the selection of the British members 
of the XVth Brigade Anti-Tank Battery.121
117 Thomas, Spanish Civil War, pp.22-23.
118 Hopkins, p.224. Copeman claimed that they were, “All students picked by me...Good looking students, 
our bloody problem. First they get on well together. Secondly, they were a bit of a bloody problem. Third, 
they were intellectuals and they tended to discuss with each other and not with the mass of blokes. And 
therefore, if they’re going to do a job, why not give them a job they’ll like. They’ll be together. They’ll talk 
much higher intellectually than us. If they’ve got any problems then they’ll sort them out among their 
bloody selves.” Interview with Fred Copeman, IWMSA 794/13/8.
119 Hopkins, p.225.
120 Slater’s real name was actually Humphrey, rather than Hugh. In December 1936 he had been working 
as a reporter for the Communist Weekly, ImPreCorr (International Press Correspondence).
121 Letter from Bill Alexander to Richard Baxell, 26 August 1999.
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Fred Thomas, who fought with the battery between May 1937 and December 1938 and 
wrote one of the most detailed- and balanced- British memoirs of the war, states that it 
was Malcolm Dunbar, rather then Copeman, who selected the volunteers:
Somebody chose the forty or so of us and omitted the known drunks and general 
nuisances, but not Fred Copeman.122
The Anti-Tank Battery was part o f the XV Brigade, together with the infantry 
battalions who were grouped into two regiments: the British, the Lincoln and Washington 
in one, the Franco-Beige, Dimitrov and Spanish in the other. The experienced and 
popular George Nathan was chief of operations for the brigade, and the British Battalion 
was now under the command of Fred Copeman, who had taken over from Jock 
Cunningham on 17 March.123 It was, believed Copeman, a very different situation to that 
experienced at Jarama:
Brunete was an action where we had everything. We had the arms. The battalion was 
660. Every man was trained and the commanders knew their job.124
It was a well-equipped Republican offensive, with fifty thousand men, one hundred and 
thirty-six pieces o f artillery, one hundred and twenty-eight tanks and one hundred and 
fifty aircraft.125
122 Letter from Fred Thomas to James Hopkins, 8 June 1999. (Courtesy of Fred Thomas). Chris Smith 
agrees, and states that, “all the people were CP, YCL or close to the Party” citing Copeman’s notorious 
anti-party attitude as the one reason why he wouldn’t have been asked to select the members of the battery. 
Letter from Chris Smith to Richard Baxell, 12 December 2000.
123 Cunningham had been hit in the side by a machine-gun bullet in an action to clear a Rebel occupied 
trench at Jarama. Rust, pp.57-58.
124 Interview with Fred Copeman, IWMSA 794/13/6.
125 Brome, p. 199.
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Orders arrived at midnight on 6 July for the launch of the offensive aimed at 
capturing the heights around Brunete and pushing back the Rebel artillery out of range of 
Madrid. The British Battalion’s orders were to move on the village of Villanueva de la 
Canada, a few miles before Brunete. They arrived at dawn, after a twenty-kilometre 
march, and were at first held in reserve, but when the Spanish unit failed to capture 
Villanueva de la Canada, the XV International Brigade was brought in to assist them. 
Whilst the American Washington Battalion advanced on the northern end of the village, 
the British and Dimitrov Battalions launched an assault on the south in an attempt to cut 
off the defending Rebel force, but were held off by machine-guns and snipers placed in 
the church tower, and were forced to take what cover was available and wait in mid­
summer temperatures o f over one hundred degrees, desperate with thirst, until 
nightfall.126 As darkness approached several of the cornered Rebels tried to escape by the 
subterfuge o f hiding behind civilians and opened fire as they approached the Republican 
forces. In the confusion several of the villagers were shot and killed in crossfire, as Fred 
Copeman explained:
A crowd came out of the village. It was getting dusk and the village was on fire anyway. 
It was still defending itself. We were going to storm it anyhow and were on our way. And 
then a crowd of people came out and down the road, women and kids, be about a hundred 
of them. And we greeted them. I said, “Cease fire, lads. Let these women through.” And 
when they got right in the middle of the battalion- it was now getting a bit dark- all hell 
let loose. Bloody hand grenades were being thrown. There were fascist troops behind 
them. And they got through. That eased off. And then somebody was calling on the road. 
A bloke was lying on the road calling. And by now the only light was the flames from the 
village. And Bill Meredith went over to help him and it was one of these fascists. And as 
old Bill bent over to help him he [the Rebel soldier] shot him [Meredith], killed him.127
126 Gregory, p.67 and Carroll, p.141.
127 Interview with Fred Copeman, IWMSA 794/13/7.
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As other members o f the battalion testify, they were left with little choice but to shoot 
back, knowing full well that this would cause civilian casualties.128 Albert Charlesworth, 
the Oldham apprentice, had been separated from the main body o f the battalion, but could 
hear that something significant was happening,
A terrible hullabaloo went out. Firing burst out in all directions, there was shouting, there 
was screaming. After a few minutes I could hear the voice of Fred Copeman crying, 
“Stop firing! Stop firing! And very shortly [sic] the firing did stop and everything went 
deadly quiet.129
Villanueva del Pardillo
1 VdbnuevadeLiCatMda
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Map 7. The Republican Brunete Offensive, July 1937.130
128 As Sid Quinn stated, “Under the rules o f war we had no option. We shot everything in front o f  us. And 
they took a few o f our men as well.” Interview with Sidney Quinn, IWMSA 801/3/2.
129 Interview with Albert Charlesworth, IWMSA 798/4/1.
130 Source: Alexander, p. 120.
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Villanueva de la Canada was eventually captured by midnight. Peter Harrisson, who 
worked as an administrator in the hospital run by Dr. Tudor-Hart131 visited the village of 
Villanueva de la Canada, soon after it had been captured.
It was a vision of what would be only too familiar in the future. A village reduced to 
rubble, seen in those pictures of villages on the Somme from the first World War. It had 
been defended by small fortified positions on an old front line protected by barbed wire. 
Huge bomb craters everywhere and overall the stink of the decaying enemy dead buried 
beneath the rubble, and flies, flies and more flies.132
The following day the British Battalion advanced on Mosquito Ridge- the heights 
overlooking the Guadarrama River and the villages o f Romanillos and Boadilla del 
Monte- that had been its original objective, before it had been pinned down by the 
Nationalist forces defending Villanueva. As the British Battalion crossed the river, 
Villanueva de la Canada was already coming under attack from Rebel artillery and 
planes. As they moved forward they also came under air attack, which caught the 
relatively inexperienced Americans of the Lincoln and Washington Battalions, who were 
just ahead of them, unawares
Some aircraft- three Junkers 52s- came over. We got down, the Americans got down. The 
’planes passed overhead and immediately the Americans got up. We stayed down. The 
Americans got up and started to advance, the ’planes circled back- had seen them- circled 
back and dropped bombs on them.. .We found that quite a large number of Americans 
had been killed by these bombs.133
131 Alexander Tudor-Hart had been one of the founders of the Spanish Medical Aid Committee (SMAC) in 
Britain. He arrived in Spain in December 1936 and remained in Spain until he was repatriated in October 
1938. See Fyrth, Signal was Spain, pp.62-67.
132 P.D. Harrisson, Unpublished MS, (Author’s copy, courtesy of David Leach), p.l 17.
133 Interview with Albert Charlesworth, IWMSA 798/4/2.
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The brigade runner, Frank Graham, was ahead of the main British contingent and 
discovered that Mosquito Ridge, the strategically vital heights overlooking the capital, 
was unoccupied.
Now if we’d reached the top of that hill, we might have won the battle, because below 
was the road. But we had no mobile, we had no trucks, we were on foot carrying all our 
packs and that, and the heat. It took them all the time to reach the fortifications. I knew 
then that as they as they came to the fortifications I saw two or three people [Rebel 
soldiers] on the top of the hill and I knew it was over. We tried five days to take the hill. 
In fact we shouldn’t have tried because it was impregnable, it was so difficult. Once we’d 
lost the surprise, at that point I think we should have just dug in and waited. We had 
terrible losses. We couldn’t get water up to the troops and so on.134
Weakened by fatigue, thirst and constant bombardment from the air, the brigade 
could not advance sufficiently rapidly to capture the unoccupied heights and Rebel forces 
quickly took the opportunity to move into the position. Rebel artillery laid a two-hour 
barrage on the advancing Republicans, which allowed even more Rebel reinforcements to 
be brought up. These forces were able to pin down the British Battalion by well-directed 
artillery and gunfire, combined with total air superiority. P.D. Harrisson could see that, 
“Existence for the soldiers was almost unbearable under the boiling heat and the flies,”135 
and as Huw Williams, a Welsh nurse and first-aider working at Villanueva described, the 
situation for the wounded was diabolical. The medical unit ran out o f morphia within the 
first hour, and water remained desperately short, leading to more than fifty per-cent of the 
seriously wounded dying within an hour.136
134 Interview with Frank Graham, IWMSA 11877/6/3.
135 Harrisson, p.l 17.
136 Williams’ description of his experiences of the mortally wounded at Brunete is a powerful epithet: “A 
badly wounded man is...a less concerned man you’ll never meet. He’s very, very quiet. Terribly quiet.
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As David Anderson, who was commanding one of the British companies, and had 
seven years experience in the Gordon Highlanders observed,
Mosquito Hill was a position that we couldn’t capture with the means that we had. It was 
absolutely impossible. I mean, they had domination, and as a matter of fact we could see 
right behind, the lights of the supplies going up to the fascist positions. It wasn’t long 
before we realised that the position we occupied was absolutely impossible. And then of 
course we had to withdraw. It was the end of the offensive as far as the Republican 
Government was concerned.137
Fred Copeman is probably correct when he pointed out that the brigade shouldn’t have 
bothered taking Villanueva de la Canada, and should have pressed straight on to 
Mosquito Ridge.
The taking of the village of Villanueva de la Canada, it was just a whole day’s slaughter 
where we just got casualties and couldn’t hit back except to take the tower and one old 
tank.138
Frank Graham viewed the failure to capture the heights in even more serious terms.
It was a great defeat because, firstly, we’d lost too many men. We hadn’t inflicted very 
heavy casualties on the enemy and some of our best troops had been lost in the process. It 
weakened considerably the Republican Army. Of course there were many big battles took 
place but, in a sense, although it’s difficult- looking back it’s easy to say it-1 think, in a 
sense, that a lot of us realised that the war had been lost at that point.. .After that it was 
only a question of prolonging it as far as possible until changes could be taking place in 
Europe. Well, the changes didn’t take place. It was only after the war was over that the 
changes began to take place.139
Never says a word...A badly wounded man is the most silent person you’ll ever come across. Next to a 
dead man.” Interview with Huw Alun Menai Williams, IWMSA 10181/5/3.
137 In David Anderson’s Company, numbers were reduced from one hundred and six, to twenty-four. 
Interview with David Anderson, in MacDougall, p.92.
138 Interview with Fred Copeman, IWMSA 794/13/6.
139 Interview with Frank Graham, IWMSA 11877/6/3.
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Having failed to capture the ridge, the Brunete offensive was to proceed no further. 
Though the Republic had gained over sixty square kilometres of territory, the offensive 
could hardly be judged a success. The Romanillos Heights, the Republic’s main 
objective, remained in Nationalist hands. Furthermore, from this time, the International 
Brigades would only make up five per-cent of the Republican Army, compared to twenty 
per-cent before Brunete.140 The British Battalion had three hundred and thirty-one 
volunteers in the ranks at the start of Brunete and only forty-two remained at the end.141
With the offensive now at a standstill, on 11 July the British and American Battalions 
were moved temporarily into reserve positions but, a week later, the Rebels launched a 
huge counter-attack, comprising at least three hundred planes and three hundred artillery 
pieces. The British Battalion- boosted by the return of some o f the less seriously 
wounded from earlier actions and a small number of new volunteers, but still less than 
one hundred strong- was split into two groups, one led by Joe Hinks, who had been a 
section leader at Lopera, and the other by Walter Tapsell, an experienced political activist 
who had been the circulation manager for the Daily Worker. Outnumbered and 
overwhelmed, both groups were forced to withdraw, as were other Republican forces, 
including the elite V Regiment of General Lister, which was pushed out of the town of 
Brunete itself. The failure o f the offensive and the subsequent retreat, which incurred the 
loss o f valuable troops and armaments, was to become a recurring scenario for the 
Republic. Whilst the Republic haemorrhaged men and arms, the Rebels enjoyed an
140 Brome, p.90.
141 Hopkins, p. 256. Walter Gregory agrees that 43 remained, but claimed 600 had gone into the attack on 6 
July. Gregory, p.74. One of the killed was George Nathan, who was killed by a shell on the last day of the 
battle.
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increasing dominance, fortified both by their allies, and the certain knowledge that the 
only countries which could save the Republic were determined not to do so. As 1937 
moved into 1938, the main thrust of the war would move west from Madrid to the 
Aragon. But for the Republic, the pattern would remain the same: in the battles at 
Belchite, Teruel and the Ebro, “an initial Republican breakthrough was followed by an 
attritional battle due to the lack o f exploitation and, eventually, a stalemate ensued so 
both sides then planned new offensives to break the deadlock.”142
142 Matthew Hughes & Enriqueta Garrido, ‘Planning and Command: the Spanish Republican army and the 
battle of the Ebro, 1938’, International Journal o f Iberian Studies, 12:2, (1999) pp.107-108.
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offensive.
“It was a marvellous moment when we climbed out of the boats and 
scrambled up the south bank [of the River Ebro]. What 
exhilaration! We were on the move again, we were taking the 
initiative and we were on top of the world.”
Walter Gregory, The Shallow Grave: A Memoir o f the Spanish Civil 
War (London: Victor Gollancz, 1986) p. 121.
The costly failure of the Brunete offensive left the units of the XV International 
Brigade in a state of crisis.1 A report by ‘Gallo’ (Luigi Longo, formerly an Italian youth 
leader and a senior member of the Comintern who had been involved in the creation of 
the International Brigades) estimated that over half of the brigade was killed, wounded or 
missing after the offensive.2 The situation was deemed so serious that a report written by 
the departing base commander at Albacete went as high as Stalin, who ordered Marty to 
report on the situation and put forward proposals to resolve the problems.3 Of the small 
number of British volunteers who were still fit for front-line service following the 
offensive, many were low in morale, and questions were being asked regarding the
1 As a report drawn up by Georgi Dimitrov on 30 July 1937 depicted, “[The International Brigades] are 
experiencing great difficulties. Many brigades and battalions lost many wounded and killed. In several 
military units, soldiers and cadres have overstrained themselves. The new contingents are too insignificant 
to make it possible to carry out serious changes in composition. Relations with the Spanish military powers 
are not entirely good. Many wounded men and invalids remain without support or the right to it. The 
commander of the Albacete base [probably Vital Gayman] was in such a state of depression that we were 
forced to dismiss him immediately.” Moscow 33987/3/1015, cited in Radosh, p.233.
2 Gallo estimated that of the 2144 troops of the 15 International Brigade taking part in the Brunete 
offensive, 293 were killed, 735 wounded and 167 missing. Moscow 35082/1/42 cited in ibid, p.238.
3 The report was drawn up in August 1937 for Marshall Voroshilov, who passed it on to Stalin. Marty 
believed that the International Brigades’ major problem was the lack of personnel following the high 
casualties sustained at Brunete. He argued for recruitment to be channelled into the existing brigades, rather 
than creating any further international units and argued against intermingling internationals and Spaniards 
at battalion level or lower. More frequent and longer rests, and stronger political and military leadership 
was also required. See Moscow 35082/1/90 & 33987/3/1033, cited in ibid, pp.241-249.
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discipline and commitment of their Spanish comrades. Disputes that had been simmering 
since Jarama between senior British figures in Spain took on an increased significance.4 
Walter Tapsell, the British Battalion’s political commissar, openly criticised the 
Republican battle strategy5 and accused the commander of the XV Brigade, Gal, of gross 
incompetence.6 Tapsell, perhaps somewhat rashly, declared that,
Only stupidity or a deliberate disregard for life would keep men in such an exposed 
position [on Mosquito Ridge]. Gal isn’t fit to command a troop of Brownies, let alone a 
People’s Army.7
For this insubordination, Gal wanted Tapsell shot, though Gal was persuaded to back 
down by Fred Copeman, the commander of the battalion, who went to the brigade HQ to 
remonstrate with Gal- backed up by Joe Hinks’ Machine-Gun Company. In fact Gal was 
already unpopular with the British, for his dislike of George Nathan had led to Nathan’s 
transfer to the XTV International Brigade after Jarama.8
Blame and accusations were flying around within the battalion, and a major argument 
developed between Walter Tapsell on one side and George Aitken and Jock 
Cunningham- both on the brigade staff- on the other. The central feature of the dispute 
was that Tapsell believed that the promotion of Cunningham and Aitken to the Brigade 
Staff had cut them off from the battalion. Tapsell was particularly unhappy about the
4 See IBA Box C, Files 8/2,16/1, 16/3,17/1 and 17/7.
5 Tapsell argued, as did Fred Copeman, that the capture of Villanueva de la Canada achieved little apart 
from allowing the Rebels enough time to bring up reinforcements on to the Romanillos Heights 
overlooking Brunete and Madrid. Malcolm Dunbar, then commander of the Anti-Tank Battery, later 
promoted to the XV Brigade Staff, admitted as much to Fred Thomas, one of the British members of the 
battery. Thomas, To Tilt at Windmills, p.36.
6 Hopkins, p.242.
7 Reynolds News, 23 July 1961, cited in Brome, p.205.
8 Brome, p.206.
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discussions surrounding what he termed, “The annihilation o f the British Battalion,” a 
plan to incorporate it into the American battalion. However, the argument also developed 
a personal dimension. Tapsell complained that George Aitken had accused him of being a 
bad influence in the battalion and responded by claiming that six weeks previously, Jock 
Cunningham had demanded Aitken’s return to Britain, on the grounds that he was, 
“utterly useless.”9 Walter Tapsell claimed that, “Aitken’s temperament has made him 
distrusted and disliked by the vast majority of the British Battalion who regard him as 
being personally ambitious and unmindful of the interests of the battalion and the men.”10 
He also alleged that Cunningham, “fluctuates violently between hysterical bursts of 
passion and is openly accused by Aitken of lazing about the Brigade Headquarters doing 
nothing.”11
Dave Springhall, the assistant brigade commissar at Albacete, claimed that there was 
a total disintegration of the battalion leadership after Brunete, and though Aitken denied 
that the situation was this serious, he did admit that certain leading figures had collapsed 
under the incredible strain. Aitken claimed that Bert Williams, a political commissar then 
working with the Americans, was, “at the end of his tether,” Fred Copeman, “was in a 
very bad state” and Walter Tapsell was, “absolutely demoralised, and not quite normal.”
This showed itself in the statements he [Tapsell] was making to all and sundry and very
loudly about the whole offensive and about the new Spanish Army. For him the whole
9 Letter from Walter Tapsell, 9 August 1937, IBA Box C, File 16/1.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid. An official report published in April 1937 was also not very complimentary about Aitken. 
Describing him as “a good comrade who works hard,” it continued, “Nevertheless, I found surprisingly bad 
outbursts against him expressed by some of the soldiers in the line. These outbursts, I believe, are due 
firstly to the high nervous tension among the comrades, and secondly because Comrade Aitken himself 
does not seem to have the best manner of approach to the comrades. I believe that comrade Aitken could 
work better in the Brigade than in the Battalion.” Moscow, 545/6/93, p.l.
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offensive had been a ghastly failure and a severe defeat while the new Spanish forces 
were worse than useless- a menace. It is no exaggeration to say that he was talking as one 
panic-stricken. He was also loudly criticising in front of all the men the whole conduct of 
the operation—shouting about our lack of artillery and aviation, creating the impression 
that the British Battalion had had a specifically raw deal, had been deliberately placed in 
all the tough spots, a suggestion which was absolutely false and which, in the frightfully 
difficult circumstances then prevailing, was criminal and dangerous. (What would have 
happened if I had talked thus to the comrades when we put in reserve for a few days after 
the desperate days at Jarama?)12
As Aitken pointed out, it was important to recognise, “what three weeks battle such as 
we went through at Brunete can do to some men.”13 Aitken’s criticisms were supported 
by Will Paynter, the base commissar at Albacete who had arrived in May,14 who accused 
Tapsell of, albeit unwittingly, encouraging anti-brigade feeling and general disaffection, 
just as Bill Rust later criticised Fred Copeman, Bill Alexander and Sam Wild.15 As Bill 
Alexander states, both Tapsell and Copeman had what were, essentially, nervous 
breakdowns following Brunete. In fact, Tapsell was physically detained for some days 
after his outburst, as Aitken believed that, “He was not at the time fully responsible for 
his actions.”
The disputes were unable to be settled in Spain, so the five leading figures involved 
were called back to Britain in late August 1937 to try and resolve them. After an 
exchange of bitter accusations and counter-accusations, Harry Pollitt ordered Jock
12 Letter from George Aitken to Political Bureau, IBA Box C, File 17/7.
13 Ibid.
14 IBA Box C, File 17/1.
15 Bill Rust claimed that “Copeman refers, almost without exception, to the Brigade in a disparaging 
fashion...he has also been successful in infecting Cde. Alexander his adjutant with this same attitude. Wild 
has a long established anti-brigade tradition.” ‘Report & recommendations re. the English Battalion,’ 
December 1937, P5 AR6, Salamanca.
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Cunningham, Bert Williams and George Aitken to stay in Britain, whilst Fred Copeman 
and Walter Tapsell were to return to Spain.16 Copeman describes how, at the meeting,
Harry [Pollitt] got up and said, “The only people who have expressed a point of view as 
to what is happening to the battalion at the moment, that they’re out there and we’re here, 
has been Fred Copeman and Wally Tapsell. And therefore my proposal is that they return 
to Spain and everybody else remain where they are and now start to build up political 
support for the dependants because there’s no longer any recruitment possible.17
The decision infuriated George Aitken, who wrote a letter stating that he wanted,
To protest against the decision to send Comrade Tapsel[l] back to Spain. This decision, in 
my opinion, is monstrous and dangerous and the decision that Comrade Copeman should 
also return to Spain is a grave mistake.18
As John Angus later remarked, the removal of several leading figures in the battalion 
back to Britain created more bad feeling in the battalion,19 for volunteers were now 
required to remain in Spain for the duration of the war as the International Brigades were 
reformed in line with the decree (eventually published in September 1937), which 
brought them under the auspices o f the Republican Army.20 The XV International
16 It was claimed that Copeman had been removed from his command by Gal because of his “irrational 
behaviour,” that Bert Williams had been an ineffective Political Commissar, that Cunningham was unable 
to complete his duties on the Brigade Staff and that Aitken had failed to challenge brigade orders which 
forced the battalion into impossible positions. Alexander, p. 131.
17 Copeman has a rather egocentric view of his own role: “Now, Jock was a bit of a problem. Jock didn’t 
get on with Harry Pollitt, by the way. Harry Pollitt literally worshipped Fred Copeman. He was the boy for 
Harry. You know what I mean? I couldn’t do anything wrong where Harry Pollitt was concerned.” 
Interview with Fred Copeman, IWMSA 794/13/7-8.
18 Letter from George Aitken to the Political Bureau, undated, IBA Box C, File 17/7. Aitken bitterly 
resented suggestions that he was only made Brigade Commissar because he was an old friend of Copic, 
whom he had met in the Lenin School in Moscow.
19 Angus, p.7.
20 Even though many had been told they would only be in Spain for a maximum of six months. See 
conclusions.
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Brigade was incorporated into the 35 Division, under the command of General ‘Walter’, 
whom the British soon came to prefer to Gal.21
The Brigade was also reorganised internally. Malcolm Dunbar, originally in charge of 
the new Anti-Tank Battery, was replaced by Hugh (Humphrey) Slater, previously a 
reporter for Imprecor (International Press Correspondence, the English language 
newspaper of the Comintern), and Dunbar became chief o f operations for the brigade. 
Tom Wintringham, now recovered from his wounds sustained at Jarama, and following a 
spell at the officer school at Pozzorubio, joined Dunbar on the brigade staff. By August 
1937, the battalion was now just over four-hundred strong, o f whom just under half were 
British. From now on, the British would always be in the minority in the battalion.22
In mid-August 1937, the 35 Division was transferred to the Aragon front, which was 
to be the objective of a new offensive aimed at capturing the town of Zaragoza and 
diverting Franco’s attention away from his Northern campaign, which had seen the Rebel 
forces advancing ominously towards Santander.23 On 24 August, an assault on Quinto, a 
strongpoint near Zaragoza, began. The British Battalion was kept in reserve, but the 
British Anti-Tank Battery was used to blast the numerous Rebel strongholds in the 
village with their high-velocity Soviet guns, where, “the tenacity of the Nationalist
21 For an assessment and personal testimony of the role of General Walter (whose real name was Karol 
Swierczewski) in Spain, see Len Crome, ‘Walter (1897-1947): A Soldier in Spain’, History Workshop 
Journal, 9, (Spring 1980) pp. 116-128.
22 By the end of 1937, internationalists also made up approximately also totalled roughly half of the XV 
Brigade as a whole. Report by General Walter, Moscow 35082/1/95, cited in Radosh, p.452.
23 Brome, pp.219-220.
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garrisons astounded the attackers.”24 During the street-fighting which eventually secured 
Quinto, Tom Wintringham, the former commander, was wounded once again.
The day after the capture o f Quinto, the British Battalion was ordered to attack what 
they were informed by Brigade Staff was the Tightly held’ Purburrel Hill, a natural 
strongpoint overlooking the town which, on the contrary, had been expertly fortified with 
the advice o f German military advisors.25 It took the British Battalion two days, and the 
loss of three volunteers, including its commander Peter Daly,26 to capture the hill.27
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Map 8. The Aragon offensive of August-September 1937.
Attacks on the first day met with a fierce and determined resistance, which the British 
were unable to overcome. Sheltering from the machine-gun fire was as much as most 
volunteers could manage and Paddy O ’Daire, the new commander o f the battalion, 
withdrew the battalion to await artillery support, despite the wishes o f Copic, the brigade
24 Thomas, Spanish Civil War, pp.725-726.
25 Gregory, p.78.
26 Peter Daly, “from a long line o f Irish revolutionary stock” was mortally injured at Purburrel Hill, and 
replaced by Patrick ‘Paddy’ O ’Daire, another Irish activist. Ryan, p.287.
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commander. During the night the British captured a Rebel patrol, which had left the hill 
in a desperate search for water. The Rebel soldiers confirmed both the strength of the 
defences and the inadequacy of the water supply. Had the battalion the time to wait, the 
defenders would have been forced by their thirst to surrender, but, unfortunately for the 
British, the strategic importance of the hill to the offensive on Zaragoza meant that they 
were not able to do so. Thus, 26 August saw the beginning of a new attempt by the 
battalion to capture the hill. However, this time the defences were first bombarded by the 
Anti-Tank Battery. Thanks to the accuracy of the guns- and the thirst-induced weakness 
of the defenders- little resistance was encountered when the frontal assault up the hill 
followed, and the hill subsequently fell to the British.
On 27 August, the dwindling numbers of the XV International Brigade moved on to 
the nearby town of Belchite. The British Battalion was now down to just over one 
hundred men and, following the huge struggles entailed in capturing Quinto and 
Purburrel Hill, morale was even lower than it had been.28 When the battalion was ordered 
to move to Mediana, ten kilometres north of Belchite, in order to hold off approaching 
Rebel reinforcements, some members o f the battalion refused to follow the order. The 
commander, Paddy O’Daire, called a meeting of all the Communist Party members in the 
battalion who agreed both to obey the order and to persuade the rest o f the group to do 
likewise. Albeit reluctantly, the battalion marched on Mediana and made a ‘short and 
sharp’ attack on the Rebels, which forced them back into the town, where the battalion
27 Gregory, p.80.
28 Alexander, p. 150.
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took up positions on the adjacent hillside.29 Meanwhile, the Anti-Tank Battery and the 
other battalions o f the XV Brigade were engaged in a desperate assault on Belchite; 
according to Bill Alexander, the three guns in the Anti-Tanks fired 2700 shells in two 
days.30 Belchite was finally captured on 6 September, following some of the most 
desperate hand-to-hand fighting seen in Spain, which left the town of Belchite virtually 
reduced to dust.31
A later assessment of the Republican Aragon offensive of 1937 by one of the British 
volunteers claimed that,
The list of our victories was beginning to lengthen: Purburrell Hill, Quinto. Mediana, 
Belchite. Never before had we advanced so successfully.32
However, the Republican offensive in Aragon must be regarded as a failure, despite the 
bravery and sacrifice of the Republican forces, for it failed in achieving its main objective 
of capturing Zaragoza, and thus relieving the pressure on the northern front. By the end 
of the month Santander was in Nationalist hands; two months later the entire northern 
Republican zone would be too.
Following the assault on Belchite, the British were pulled out of the line for 
desperately needed rest. On 23 September 1937, whilst they were in their reserve 
positions, the official decree incorporating the International Brigades into the Republican
29 Gregory, p.81.
30 Alexander, p. 151.
31 After the end of the war, Franco left the town as a ruin in order to demonstrate the damage caused by 
‘Los Rojos.’ The American battalion suffered extremely heavy casualties in the offensive; so did the
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Army was published. It ruled that there must be a quota o f Spanish soldiers in the 
International Brigades and confirmed that volunteers were required to remain in the 
Republican Army until the end of the war. Within the XV International Brigade, there 
was also a change, with the Canadian Mackenzie-Papineau Battalion (known as the Mac- 
Paps) replacing the Dimitrov Battalion, which was transferred to the 129 Brigade.33
Just over two weeks later, on 11 October 1937, the XV International Brigade was 
briefed for an operation against the Aragon town of Fuentes de Ebro, within sight of 
Zaragoza, which had held out the previous month. The XXTV Spanish Battalion was to be 
carried forward on tanks, whilst the other three battalions, including the British, were to 
launch an assault on the Rebel lines, before advancing on Zaragoza. The Anti-Tank 
Battery was held back from the main battle and Hugh Sloan, Bill Alexander’s runner, was 
able to observe the disaster unfold. When the operation was launched in the early 
morning of 13 October, Sloan counted forty-seven Republican tanks waiting to 
advance.34 Like the offensive at Brunete, the strategy was rather more sophisticated than 
the tactics; as Bill Williamson, a Canadian volunteer who was watching the offensive 
remarked,
I think the High Command had seen too many documentary movies of the Russian Red 
Army exercises. There was a very famous one which I saw myself in Spain called Red 
Army Exercises in 1936. This was the first showing of mass landing of parachute troops 
anywhere in the world and the army advancing with the whole battalion put on the back 
of tanks. Some guy in the High Command had seen this thing and thought it was
defending Rebel forces. Captured prisoners told Ernest Hemmingway that over 1200 were killed defending 
Belchite. Brome, p.223.
32 Gregory, p.82.
33 Thomas, Spanish Civil War, p.969.
34 Interview with Hugh Sloan, in MacDougall, p.215.
201
Into Aragon, 1937-38: Teruel, 'the great retreat ’ and the Ebro offensive
appropriate for Fuentes de Ebro. Whereas it might have been quite okay on the flat plains 
of the Ukraine, it was completely unsuitable for the terrain we were attacking over.35
The plan was a disaster. The Anti-Tank Battery was forbidden to fire, the artillery barrage 
was inadequate and there was only one air force bombing raid in support. The infantry 
got left behind the tanks and suffered very heavy casualties. At one point the panicked 
brigade staff ordered the Anti-Tank Battery to advance on the Rebel lines. None of the 
guns were able to fire and the battery’s second-in-command, Jeff Mildwater, was injured 
in the knee, before the battery was wisely withdrawn. The British Battalion also lost 
another commander: Harold Fry, the commander of the Machine-Gun Company at 
Jarama, who had returned to Spain in the summer. With Paddy O’Daire away on officer 
training at Pozorrubio, his place had been taken temporarily by Fry who, along with 
several others,36 was killed on 13 October in the unsuccessful attempt to capture Fuentes 
de Ebro.
Following the disastrous Fuentes operation, the British Battalion remained in the line 
for ten days, before returning once again to rest at Mondejar and Ambite. During 
November came another reorganisation of the Republican army. Whilst the XV 
International Brigade was in reserve, the battalions were allocated numbers: the British 
Battalion was to be the 57 Battalion, the Lincolns 58, the Spanish 59 and the Mac-Paps 
60.37 By mid-November, despite the return of volunteers who had recovered from 
wounds suffered during the Aragon campaign, the British members o f the battalion still
35 Interview with Bill Williamson, IWMSA 12385/18/17.
36 These were Eric Whalley from Mansfield, C. Larlham from Chelsea, Frederick McCulloch from 
Glasgow, Arthur Robinson from Hartlepool and George Westfield from Liverpool. IBA Box C File 2/1.
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numbered only one hundred and fifty, less than the numbers o f a standard company in the 
British army.
The battalion rested until December, during which time they received several 
illustrious visitors: the Daily Worker correspondent and member of the British 
Communist Party central committee, Bill Rust, in November, and the American singer 
Paul Robeson in early December, accompanied by his wife and Charlotte Haldane, the 
secretary of the Dependents* Aid committee.38 The Labour Party leader, Clement Attlee, 
arrived late in the evening of 6 December with two members o f the Labour Party 
executive committee, Ellen Wilkinson and Philip Noel-Baker, and the No. 1 Company 
was re-named the Major Atlee Company in the Labour leader’s honour.39 On Christmas 
Day there was another visit from Harry Pollitt and J.B.S. Haldane and a much-welcomed 
feast o f pork, wine and nuts, organised by the battalion’s quartermaster, Lieutenant 
Robert ‘Hooky’ Walker.40 All the volunteers also received a food parcel from Britain. To 
entertain the volunteers and raise moral, Wally Tapsell organised a sports fiesta. Whilst 
an Englishman won the boxing, both the British football teams from the battalion and the 
Anti-Tank Battery were soundly beaten by Spanish teams.41
37 However, these numbers were only ever used for official purposes. The British Battalion was usually 
referred to as el batalon ingles.
38 Based at Number 1 Litchfield Street in London, the Dependents’ Aid Committee was responsible for 
looking after the families of the British volunteers, many of whom were in dire financial hardship. The 
Committee was often accused, erroneously, as being a front for recruitment for the International Brigades. 
In fact Robson worked on the floor above but, as Alexander admits, the “close liaison...gave rise to 
difficulties.” Alexander, p. 141.
39 Hopkins, p. 196 & Alexander, pp. 135-136.
40 Alexander, p. 161.
41 Rust, p.101.
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Just after Christmas Fred Copeman, who had returned to Spain with Walter Tapsell at 
the end of October, was taken into hospital for an appendix operation, and later invalided 
home after complications set in. Bill Alexander replaced Copeman as commander of the 
battalion with Sam Wild, the battalion armourer at Jarama, becoming his adjutant.
On 15 December 1937 the Republicans launched another offensive in the Aragon, 
which, at first, went well.42 General Lister’s troops had surrounded Teruel by the 
evening, and by Christmas day, Republican soldiers had fought their way into the town. 
On 8 January, the Republic scored a spectacular success when, in appalling freezing 
conditions, the Rebel colonel, Rey d’Harcourt, surrendered the town to the Republic. 
Republican supporters all over the world hailed the victory as a turning point in the war 
and a demonstration of the might of the new Republican army 43 But it was, once again, 
to be a short-lived victory. Within days, a Nationalist offensive threatened to win back 
the Republican’s hard fought gains. On 17 January, the International Brigades were 
thrown in to the battle in a desperate attempt to stem the Rebel advance 44 The XV 
International Brigade were moved to confront the main point of the Rebel offensive on 
the outskirts o f Teruel, with the British Battalion positioned at Santa Barbara, in three 
feet of snow.45 The Machine-Gun Company occupied Rebel emplacements on the edge of 
a cliff and the Anti-Tank battery were placed to support the battalion. The three days 
from 17 to 19 January saw the Rebels directly assault the XV Brigade positions. On 17
42 Like the Brunete offensive, one of the aims of the action was to pre-empt a Rebel offensive, this time at 
Guadalajara. Thomas, Spanish Civil War, p.788.
43 ‘Teruel: the turn of the tide’, News Chronicle, 23 December 1937, p.8.
44 Alexander, p. 165.
45 As the Welsh medical orderly and first-aider Huw Williams remembers, it was “Very, very cold. [Teruel 
was] a cruel battle.” Interview with Huw Alun Menai Williams, IWMSA 10181/5/4.
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January, the same day that a delegation of Labour MPs arrived at Teruel as guests of 5th 
Army Corps commander, Juan Modesto46, three British rifle companies, No. 3 led by 
Sam Wild, with Nos. 1 and 4 following, were ordered across the Alfambra River into the 
valley to protect the Canadian Mac-Paps, whose position was becoming increasingly 
desperate, due to Rebel artillery fire. It was the first experience of warfare for Garry 
McCartney, a railway worker from Glasgow, who had arrived the previous June.
Teruel was a real baptism of fire and it was harrowing in the extreme to experience a dive 
bomber strafing the ground 47
Frontline 
Dec. IS 1837
End of bailio >*■  Ml
Map 9. The Republican Teruel Offensive, Winter 1937-1938.48
19 January saw a huge artillery bombardment on the British positions,49 which the 
battalion held onto doggedly, forcing the Rebel forces to give up their direct assault on
46 Rust, p. 109.
47 Interview with Garry McCartney, in Corkhill & Rawnsley, p.87.
48 Source o f  map: Thomas, Spanish Civil War, p.790.
49 Garry McCartney, a Scottish volunteer in the Machine-Gun Company, observed the barrage from the 
hillside overlooking the valley. He described how the artillery “landed shells marking a square o f quite 
large dimensions and then saturated the square not only with shell fire and machine-gun fire, but they sent 
across their aircraft to bomb it.” Interview with Garry McCartney, in MacDougall, p.247.
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Teruel. The brigade recognised that the British Battalion had shown bravery and 
determination, and promoted Bill Alexander to the rank o f captain and commended 
Walter Tapsell for his work as political commissar.50 However, it was at some cost. The 
Machine-Gun Company was unable to protect the three companies in the valley who 
were decimated, though they were at least able to cover their eventual retreat. Twenty- 
one British were killed in this action, thirteen of them from the Major Atlee Company.51 
In all the battalion lost one third of its number at Teruel.52 The depleted British force was 
withdrawn, but once again their period of rest and recuperation was to be short-lived, as 
the Rebels’ counter-attack gained momentum.
On 6 February the British and three other battalions of the XV International Brigade 
were concentrated at Segura de los Banos, forty miles north of Teruel. With the British 
Battalion desperately short of manpower, Bob Cooney, an experienced activist from 
Scotland, joined the battalion as a soldier.53 Cooney was another senior party figure who 
had studied at the Lenin School in Moscow between 1931-1932 and who Peter Kerrigan 
had refused permission to go to Spain for a year. Cooney was to become a very effective 
political commissar with the battalion, earning high praise from his superiors.54
50 Bill Alexander, p. 166. General Walter, the commander of the 35 Division of which the British Battalion 
was part, praised highly the actions of the XV Brigade at Zaragoza, stating that their discipline had 
improved dramatically since the previous year. Report by General Walter, Moscow 35082/1/95, cited in 
Radosh, p.440.
51 Rust, pp.l 13-114.
52 Alexander, p. 167.
53 Corkhill & Rawnsley, pp.l 16-118.
54 Cooney was lauded as, “Very brave- high political development. Best Battalion Commissar in Brigade.” 
Moscow 545/6/118 p.34. An assessment by John Gates, the highest ranking American in Spain, describes 
Cooney in the following terms: “Es el mejor comisario que tenemos, tiene iniciativa y puede trabajar 
independientemente, reacciona pronto a problemas, trabajo entre espanolas es debil. Sin reprocha.” (He is 
the best commissar we have, he has initiative and is able to work independently, reacting quickly to 
problems, though his work with the Spanish is weak. Without reproach). Moscow 545/6/118 p.21.
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On 16 February the battalion made a night attack on Segura de los Banos, in an 
attempt to divert attention away from Teruel. Despite initial advances, the story was to be 
the same.55 Bill Alexander’s time as battalion commander ended here with a wound to the 
shoulder and his adjutant Sam Wild took over. With superior numbers and armaments the 
Rebel army pressed the Republicans back, and on 21 February, the Republican Army 
retreated from Teruel. The British Battalion were withdrawn from Segura de los Banos to 
Lecera where they remained in reserve for a fortnight. For the Republic, Teruel was to be 
the first o f a number of retreats during the first half o f 1938, which would end with the 
Republic split into two parts, and Rebel soldiers dancing triumphantly in the 
Mediterranean at Vinaroz.
On 7 March 1938, Franco launched a massive and well-prepared attack on the 
Republican forces in the Aragon. What began as a series of break-throughs for the 
Nationalists, swiftly became outright retreat for the Republicans, as their lines virtually 
collapsed.56 As Hugh Thomas noted, “the best troops of the Republic were weary after 
Teruel. Their material was exhausted: half the men even lacked rifles.”57 The XV 
International Brigade, led by Bob Merriman, the American chief o f staff, were ordered to 
move up from Lecera, and set up their headquarters at Belchite, which had fallen to the 
brigade the previous autumn. The British Battalion, under the command of the newly
Similarly, Peter Kerrigan described him as one, “whose work it is impossible to speak too highly. Through 
the whole of this two months without a break of any kind and in every action, his steadiness has been a 
sheet anchor for others.” Letter from Peter Kerrigan to Harry Pollitt, 27 September 1938, IBA Box C, File 
25/5.
55 Rust, pp.l 15-116 & Alexander, pp. 167-168.
56 Brome, p. 245.
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promoted Sam Wild, were sent north on the road towards Mediana and Fuentes de Ebro, 
where they met retreating Republicans coming in the opposite direction. The battalion 
was attacked by a heavy machine-gun, artillery and air barrage as the Rebels advanced in 
large numbers, forcing the British back into Belchite, which came under increasing 
pressure from the Rebel forces.58 Bombarded with anti-tank and anti-aircraft shells, the 
British Battalion and the members of the Anti-Tank Battery were virtually surrounded 
and forced to retreat swiftly from Belchite to avoid being cut off.59 The Spanish battalion 
adjutant, Jose Calatayud Mayguez, the No. 1 Company commander, and thirty other men 
were killed or wounded in the desperate attempt to escape from Belchite.60 The Anti- 
Tank Battery was forced to destroy one of their guns that couldn’t be moved; low flying 
Nationalist aircraft destroyed another. With the battery no longer in existence, the men 
were incorporated into the British Battalion.61 The defence of Belchite delayed the 
Rebels’ capture of the town, but only by one day. It fell to Rebel soldiers from Navarre 
on 10 March.62 Together with a Spanish and American battalion of the XV International 
Brigade and fifty Spaniards from the 135 Brigade, the British Battalion made a fighting 
retreat.
What was to follow was nearly a week o f a desperate struggle to retreat and evade 
being cut off by the rapid advance of the huge Nationalist force, which was constantly 
infiltrating the Republican lines, or punching holes with lightning motorised attacks, thus
57 Thomas, Spanish Civil War, p.798.
58 Rust, p.142.
59 Interview with Hugh Sloan, in MacDougall, pp.222-223.
60 Report by Sam Wild, Moscow 545/3/497, p.22.
61 Alexander, p. 172.
62 Thomas, Spanish Civil War, p.798.
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repeatedly making the Republican positions untenable.63 The battalion retreated past 
Lecera and Vinaciete, where they were briefly re-united with the other battalions of the 
XV International Brigade, before marching desperately for fifty kilometres through Hijar 
and Alcaniz as they too fell to the seemingly unstoppable tebel push.64 Frank Graham, the 
Newcastle volunteer who had briefly occupied Mosquito Ridge at Brunete the previous 
July, remembered the retreat into Caspe with horror:
Over the mountains, to Caspe, the only way there, no roads at all, just over the 
mountains. We had to work by more or less guessing the direction to get there. We 
arrived in Caspe, terrible journey, never stopped walking.. .no food, no water.65
IS th March
R e tr e a t  of the B ritish  B a tta lio n
Map 10. The retreat through Aragon of Spring 1938.66
63 As Hugh Thomas states, “The fronts hardly existed. There were isolated acts o f  resistance by one or 
other o f the republican units, as well as confusion, breakdown o f communications, suspicion o f  treachery.” 
Thomas, Spanish Civil War, p.801.
64 Rust, pp. 144-145.
65 Interview with Frank Graham, IWMSA 11877/6/5.
66 Source o f  map: Gregory, p. 103.
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David Stirrat, an unemployed driver from Glasgow, had arrived in Spain the previous 
November and the retreats through Aragon were his first experiences o f action. Driven by 
lorry from Teruel, where he had arrived too late to join the British Battalion, he was 
sitting, unarmed, in the back of the lorry.
The lorries made a sudden about-turn and there was an outbreak of fighting in olive- 
groves on either side of the road and men were running and climbing onto the lorries. We 
were going like the clappers back down the road again. We almost got captured. This was 
at Caspe.. .There was a big retreat really. We were maybe stopping in fields and they’d 
issue arms and take them back in again. There were all sorts of problems.67
On 15 March, six days after the battalion had begun their defence of Belchite, the 
remnants o f the British Battalion arrived at Caspe, where they were forced to fight a 
heavy rearguard action, much of it hand-to-hand, in what Sam Wild considered to be an 
untenable position.68 Unbeknownst to them, the British members of the XV International 
Brigade were fighting the XIV Bandera of the Spanish Foreign Legion, which included 
one of the few British volunteers for the Rebels, the ‘right-wing Tory,’ Peter Kemp. The 
battle was just as bitter and hard fought for Kemp’s unit:
On the 17th March, at Caspe on the borders of Aragon and Catalonia, I fought my bitterest 
engagement of the war- ironically enough, though I did not know it then, against British 
units of the XIV [sic] International Brigade; in twenty four hours of fighting- often at 
hand to hand- my company suffered seventy-five per cent casualties, and I myself was 
wounded three times.69
Sam Wild, the British Battalion commander, Joe Norman, the Communist Party organiser 
with the battalion, Robert ‘Hooky’ Walker the quartermaster, and Harry Dobson, another 
Communist Party representative within the battalion, were all captured, but managed to
67 Interview with David Stirrat, in MacDougall, p.267.
68 Report by Sam Wild, Moscow 545/3/497, p.23.
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escape.70 Despite a desperate attempt organised by Sam Wild and Malcolm Dunbar to 
defend Caspe, by the end of the 15 March, it too had to be abandoned, when it was 
encircled,71 despite “prodigies of valour,” by the defending units of the XV International 
Brigade.72 It was only two days later, when the exhausted volunteers arrived at Batea, 
that Republican reinforcements arrived and the Nationalist advance was- temporarily- 
halted.73 In a written report of the retreats, Sam Wild wrote,
I complained to brigade after the Caspe action on the lack of written orders, stating at the 
time that the lack of written orders was responsible for a lot of the confusion 74
The retreats were a time of great disorder for the British volunteers, and for many a 
time of panic and near-exhaustion.75 Bill Alexander’s description of the march from 
Vinaciete towards Alcaniz provides a graphic picture of the desperate position in which 
the battalion found itself.
This march was hell for the battalion. The heat was intense, there was no water. Even at 
Vinaciete boots and feet were in a sorry condition. The moving columns were strafed by 
low-flying planes for mile after mile, each strafing run breaking the line of march. The 
remnants of other units were on the move, and it was almost impossible to keep together 
as an organised unit. Some of the battalion got left behind or mixed up with other units.76
On 19 March the International Brigade base at Albacete was closed and transferred to 
Catalonia. Remnants o f the XV International Brigade regrouped in Batea and the
69 Peter Kemp, ‘I Fought for Franco’, in A.J.P. Taylor (ed.). History o f the Twentieth Century (London: 
Purnell, 1968) p. 1608.
70 Rust, pp. 146-147.
71 Alexander, p. 176.
72 Thomas, Spanish Civil War, p.800.
73 Rust, p. 148.
74 Report by Sam Wild, Moscow 545/6/495, p.27.
75 As Hugh Thomas describes, “The fronts hardly existed. There were isolated acts of resistance by one or 
other of the republican units, as well as confusion, breakdown of communication, suspicion of treachery.” 
Thomas, Spanish Civil War, p.801.
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battalion found itself with yet another commander, George Fletcher, when Sam Wild was 
sent to Barcelona for medical treatment. The emergency encouraged many who were sick 
and injured to return to the battalion, which soon numbered six hundred and fifty, its 
highest number ever.77 They would soon be needed.
Just over a week later, on 30 March 1938, the Rebels launched another offensive in 
Aragon, south of the Ebro River. Retreating from Belchite towards Calaceite the British 
awoke the following day to very heavy rain and poor visibility.78 The battalion was 
ordered to take up defensive positions, so just before daylight broke the battalion was 
marching alongside both sides o f the road leading out of Calaceite, with No. 1 Company 
in front and Nos. 3, 4, and the Machine-Gun Company following behind. As it turned 
daylight the battalion was ordered to ‘dig in’ beside the road, before the order was 
countermanded a shortly afterwards and they were ordered to return to the road and move 
forward as quickly as possible.79 As they approached a bend in the road they were met by 
a number of tanks, which were at first believed to be their own, but were quickly 
discovered to be Italian, when they drove between the two columns and opened fire on 
the British volunteers.80 Several members of the Machine-Gun Company managed to set 
up two o f the heavy machine-guns and set one of the tanks on fire, and force the tanks to
76 Alexander, p. 173.
77 Alexander, p. 178. However, it should be remembered that by far the majority of this number were 
Spaniards. By March 1938 there were barely enough British to form a Company of two hundred, let alone a 
Battalion of one thousand.
78 Interview with Joseph Leo Byrne, IWMSA 12930/3/2
79 Official report compiled by Jack Jones and Garry McCartney on Calaceite and San Pedro. IBA Box C 
File 3 /la.
80 Gregory, p.108 and report by Bob Cooney, Moscow 545/3/497 pp.17-18.
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retreat temporarily, but the British Battalion was heavily outnumbered.81 A large number 
o f the Major Atlee Company were forced to surrender, with at least fifty others hit by 
Italian gunfire.82 In frantic attempts by the other companies to withdraw, a machine-gun 
crew was also captured. David Stirrat from Glasgow was part of one of the machine-gun 
teams firing on the Italian tanks:
We were getting attacked from the right flank. When I looked round the other machine- 
gun had completely disappeared. Groups of prisoners were beginning to appear in front 
of us under the guard of Fascists. They obviously had us surrounded.83
The full extent of the predicament that the British Battalion was in became clear when 
Italian tanks were observed approaching from Calaceite, which had been in Republican 
hands only that morning. The loss o f senior experienced members o f the battalion 
including the political commissar, Walter Tapsell, who was killed and the battalion 
commander, George Fletcher, who was wounded in the early stages o f the ambush, as the 
report on the incident remarked, “naturally added to the confusion.”84 Tapsell had 
mistaken the Italian tanks for Republicans from the Communist Fifth Regiment under the 
command of Enrique Lister, and was gunned down as he approached the tanks to 
convince the driver that they were on the same side.85
‘Tappy’ was marching at the head of the Battalion when the surprise attack came. “He 
had that grim, determined look on his face which couldn’t help but inspire us all,” 
remarked one British comrade, recalling the scene. He challenged the tank commander, 
but was shot down with a bullet through his shoulder. A Spanish lieutenant rushed to his 
aid, and drove off the Fascists, thus giving ‘Tappy’ time to crawl out of the line of fire; 
but he was never seen again.86
81 Report by George Fletcher, Moscow 545/3/497, p.33.
82 Interview with Harold Collins, IWMSA 9481/4/3.
83 Interview with David Stirrat, in MacDougall, p.269.
84IBA Box C File 3/la.
85 Geiser, pp.60-61.
86 Rust, p.154. See also Rust’s obituary of Tapsell in the Daily Worker, 26 July 1938, p.3.
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Other members of the battalion such as David Gilbert,87 the battalion runner, and Frank 
Ryan, the Irish Republican leader, were amongst those captured.88 Those who managed 
to escape capture were mainly either on patrol or in the Machine-Gun Company who 
were bringing up the rear.89
The members of the battalion who managed to evade capture retreated away from the 
road to avoid both the advancing ground force and also the air attacks from Nationalist 
aircraft. Their retreat this allowed the Italian tanks and armoured vehicles to sweep 
forward along the road. For the volunteers it was a sobering lesson on the size and 
strength o f the Rebel force that they were attempting to contain.90 With the leaders of the 
battalion captured or killed, the volunteers split into small groups and, finding Calaceite 
already in Rebel hands, attempted to make their own way past the Rebel forces to the 
front line, which was moving further and further away from them by the hour.91 Only 
around eighty o f the battalion made it back to Gandesa to meet up with the remainder 
under the command of Malcolm Dunbar.
87 Carl Geiser refers to him as ‘Tony’, the name by which he was known in the Battalion.
88 As an officer, Frank Ryan was fortunate not to have been shot on the spot, particularly as he identified 
himself as such. Ironically, as Sean Cronin explains, Ryan’s bravery was probably one of the factors that 
saved his life. Cronin believes the other factors were the Italian commander’s orders against summary 
executions and that Ryan’s rank was sufficiently high that the question of his execution was passed up to 
senior Rebel officers. Cronin, p.136.
89 Interview with Joseph Leo Byrne, IWMSA 12930/312.
90 Interview with David Stirrat, in MacDougall p.268. Thirteen divisions of the Rebel Army plus a huge 
number of tanks, artillery, anti-tanks guns backed up with over 900 aircraft were massed for the push 
through Aragon to the Mediterranean. The defending Republican forces were outnumbered in the region of 
five to one. Alexander, pp. 169-170.
91 Gregory, p. 109.
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It was the first experience of action for George Drever, a research-chemist from 
Leith. Separated from the main force, he hid in a ditch with two comrades while Italian 
tanks passed over them. After three days o f trying to find their way back to the front line 
they were captured early in the morning by a Spanish cavalry unit.92 For many of the 
other volunteers attempting to return to the battalion, the situation was not much better. 
With no food supplies, two Scottish volunteers, David Stirrat, and his companion Donald 
Weston, were forced to ask locals for help, even though this entailed the risk of being 
turned over to the Nationalists. They attempted to live off the land, but this was no easy 
task for industrial workers brought up in an urban environment.93 John Angus, the former 
commissar at the ‘re-education’ camp St. Lucas, managed to evade capture at Calaceite, 
and marched through the night with a group of Internationals in an attempt to get back to 
his unit. After marching across country, they unexpectedly bumped into a group of Italian 
Nationalist soldiers resting on the main road. Quick thinking by an American comrade 
saved them when, on a challenge to identify themselves, he answered in Italian, 
‘Telecommunications”. The ruse worked and they were able to escape across to the other 
side of the road shortly afterwards. John Angus eventually made it back to Mora del 
Ebro, where he crossed the bridge over the River Ebro only hours before it was blown up 
by the Republicans.94
On 2 April, the surviving remainder of the battalion took up positions one and a half 
kilometres south-west of Gandesa on the road to Tortosa. Still under the command of
92 Interview with George Drever, in MacDougall, p.281.
93 “For example, the first time we caught a rabbit. Now that’s your dinner, but what do you do with it? It’s 
kicking about and it’s got fur on. And how do you get it into a pot?” Interview with David Stirrat, in 
MacDougall, p.270.
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Dunbar, they took up a holding position on a steep-sided ridge, which was both easy to 
defend and difficult to outflank, and were reinforced with a group o f fifty Spanish 
soldiers and a small tank. They managed to hold off Rebel attacks all day then pulled 
back at night, covered by a dozen volunteers from No. 4 Company, under the command 
of Walter Gregory, who had served with the battalion since the first day of Jarama, and 
had been promoted temporarily to ‘teniente.’95 Dunbar’s group made a forced march of 
twenty-eight kilometres towards Tortosa and met Sam Wild, just out of hospital, on the 
way and were caught up by Walter Gregory’s group just as they waited to cross the River 
Ebro.96 They crossed the Ebro by boat at Cherta and blew up the bridge at Mora to 
prevent the Nationalists from crossing the river behind them.97
Many o f those who survived and managed to return to join the battalion were forced 
to swim across the River Ebro, a wide and fast moving river. David Stirrat, a volunteer 
from Glasgow and Donald Weston, from Sheffield, lost their American companion to the 
current on their first attempt and were forced to turn around. Their second attempt was 
successful, though they were shot at and almost killed by a Republican patrol before they 
could identify themselves.98 In all, it took three weeks from the disaster at Calaciete and a 
journey o f nearly forty miles behind enemy lines to return to the safety of what, by mid- 
April 1938, had become the southern Republican zone, separated from the northern zone 
in Catalonia, following the Rebels capture of Vinaroz on the Mediterranean on 3 April,
94 Angus, pp. 10-11.
95 Gregory, pp. 110-111.
96 Rust, p. 157 and Gregory, p.l 12.
97 Alexander, 181.
98 Interview with David Stirrat, in MacDougall, p.272.
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and another forty miles o f coastland shortly afterwards." But to the surprise o f everyone- 
not least the Rebels- the Republican forces were soon to launch their own assault through 
Aragon, and return across the Ebro in what was probably the most audacious move of the 
war.
For the XV International Brigade, the end o f Spring and the start of the summer of 
1938 was to be a another period of reorganisation and rebuilding o f morale. The 
commander of the Brigade, Copic, left Spain, and was replaced by a Spaniard, Major 
Valledor, a veteran of the Aturias uprising of October 1934.100 The British Battalion was 
now back under the command of Sam Wild, who had gained considerable respect during 
his time in Spain101 and the battalion’s numbers were boosted by a number of new 
arrivals102, and by the men of the Anti-Tank Battery, who had been unable to find 
replacement guns for those lost in the retreats.103 On 14 April, as part of the rebuilding, 
Harry Pollitt visited the battalion and the sick and injured in Republican hospitals.104 The 
battalion once more received important visitors: Pandit Nehru, the future Prime Minister
"  By 19 April Franco held forty miles of Mediterranean coastline. Thomas, Spanish Civil War, p.803.
100 Alexander, p.201 and Thomas, Spanish Civil War, p.851.
101 Other British commanders also received promotions: Malcolm Dunbar, originally commander of the 
British Anti-Tank Battery, was promoted to XV International Brigade Chief of Staff, and his erstwhile 
number two and replacement commander, Hugh (Humphrey) Slater, was promoted to Brigade Chief of 
Operations.
102 A large number of recruits joined the battalion in the spring of 1938. Interview with Garry McCartney, 
in MacDougall, p.249.
103 Though one section of the Anti-tank Battery remained, armed with an antiquated replacement gun. 
Thomas, To Tilt at Windmills, pp. 104-105 & Alexander, p.204.
104 Laurie Lee’s description of the meeting with Harry Pollitt describes how volunteers’ initial enthusiasm 
dissipated after Pollitt had finished his pep talk. Laurie Lee’s account of his experiences in Spain are not 
always entirely accurate, but it may be that this particular aspect has a grain of truth in it. Walter 
Greenhalgh, a volunteer from Manchester, describes how in March 1938, the battalion was getting bored 
and they were taken out of the line to be talked at by Harry Pollitt who gives them a rousing pep talk. But 
as Greenhalgh states, “The euphoria only lasted a very short time.” Interview with Walter Greenhalgh, 
IWMSA 11187/9/5. For the debate surrounding Lee’s role in Spain see Valerie Grove, Laurie Lee: The 
Well Loved Stranger (London: Viking, 1999) pp.512-521.
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o f India on the 17 May, and in mid-July, just before the Ebro offensive, a deputation of 
students, including Edward Heath, met with a group from the battalion. The rebuilding 
process was also helped considerably by the temporary opening o f Spain’s border with 
France between March and May 1938, which allowed new arms to reach the Republican 
army, and by the new recruits who brought its strength back up to six hundred and fifty 
men, of whom roughly a third were British.105 By the end of the month, according to an 
official report by the head of the International Brigade base, ‘Comrade Gomez’, 
calculated that there had been one thousand eight hundred and six ‘English’ volunteers, 
of whom four hundred and sixty had been sent home and one hundred and twenty four 
killed.106
The creation of the ‘Activist Movement,’ which tried to encourage volunteers to 
become ‘exemplary soldiers’, attempted to raise the volunteers’ morale, and increase the 
role of the Communist Party in the Republican Army, which was under pressure from 
Prieto, the Minister of Defence who had been attempting to limit the party’s influence.107 
Despite the efforts of representatives in the battalion such as John Peet, who worked in 
the Brigade postal service and George Green, the husband of Nan, the movement made 
little impact.108 Likewise, attempts to set up a formalised party structure within the 
battalion were also relatively unsuccessful. However, the battalion was kept busy training
105 Gregory, p. 116.
106 Report by Comrade Gomez, the head of the International Brigade Base at Albacete [real name Wilhelm 
Zeisser] 26 July 1938, Moscow 33987/3/1149, cited in Radosh, p.464.
107 Prieto’s struggles with the PCE were long-standing, who viewed him as a defeatist; La Pasionaria was a 
particular enemy of his. Thomas, Spanish Civil War, pp.776-777.
108 Bill Alexander states that, “it simply was not needed, for the spirit was already there.” Alexander, 
p.203. This was no doubt true for the committed activists in the battalion. For those more resistant to the 
Communist Party’s role in the battalion, the movement would probably have been just as ineffective, 
though for rather different reasons.
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on the procedures for crossing rivers and as most guessed, these were part of the 
preparations for the Republican forces to launch a spectacular offensive into Aragon by 
crossing the River Ebro.109 The plan aimed to divert a possible Rebel attack on Valencia 
by capturing the town of Gandesa and, if  all went to plan, reunite the two Republican 
zones.110 In a battalion meeting on 21 July 1938, the rumours of an impending 
Republican offensive were confirmed to all the members of the battalion.111
Led by Juan Modesto, the Republican forces moved up to the River Ebro during the 
nights of 23 and 24 July and, during the following night, began the river crossing at 
sixteen separate points along a fifty mile front. Just as the British press sympathetic to the 
Republic had hailed the capture of Teruel as a moment o f great significance, so too was 
the crossing of the Ebro, which the News Chronicle argued, had “enormous psychological 
significance” for the Republic.112 The Daily Worker carried an article by Peter Kerrigan 
on its front page, announcing triumphantly how the swift advance had captured 
considerable territory, weaponry and prisoners.113 The newspaper declared that the 
offensive was a huge morale boost to the Republicans, particularly after the retreats o f the 
previous spring and, in this instance, the paper’s hyperbole seems well-founded.114 As 
one volunteer recounted,
109 Part of these preparations included the British volunteer, Lewis Clive, an Olympic oarsman and strong 
swimmer, swimming across the Ebro at night to reconnoitre the Rebel positions. Clive was later killed 
attempting to capture Hill 481 at Gandesa. (See below).
110 Hughes & Garrido, p. 107.
111 George Wheeler, MS, p.36.
112 ‘Hitting back,’ News Chronicle, 28 July 1938, p.8.
113 ‘Republicans’ Surprise Drive Across Ebro’, Daily Worker, 27 July 1938, pp.1-3.
114 “The atmosphere of enthusiasm and determination, as revealed by their talk, has to be seen to be 
believed. They hilly realise all this battle means to Spain and to democracy throughout the world. Many of 
these men...were in the Aragon retreat.” ‘Republicans Sweep On’, Daily Worker, 26 July 1938, p.l.
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In the Spring our forces had been thrown back across the Ebro in the last big offensive by 
the fascists when they had driven a wedge to the Mediterranean on April 14th. The right 
wing press was then jubilant and had prophesied the imminent fall of Barcelona. Valencia 
was threatened and indeed the end seemed near for democracy in Spain.
Then three months later the world suddenly gasped. Our forces advanced on a 90 mile 
front to a depth of 18 miles. Over 5,000 prisoners were taken, large quantities of Italian 
equipment, and the fascists were well and truly on the run.115
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Map 11. The Republican Ebro Offensive, July 1938.116
The British Battalion followed the Canadian Mac-Paps across the river near Asco and 
Vinebre, to the north-east of Gandesa, in a number o f small boats and on a rope 
suspension bridge about a yard wide, whilst pontoon bridges upstream allowed tanks and 
other vehicles to cross.117 Within two hours o f the first troops crossing, Rebel aeroplanes
115 Wheeler, p.43. Another volunteer described how, “I remember well the recrossing o f  the Ebro because 
it was a very, very dramatic moment in time for everybody.” Interview with Hugh Sloan, in MacDougall, 
p.227.
116 Source o f  map: Alexander, p. 198.
117 Interview with Hugh Sloan, in MacDougall, p.228. Though the offensive was delayed when a vehicle 
became stuck on one o f the pontoon bridges. Interview with Peter Kerrigan, IWMSA 810/6/3 and Brome, 
p.256.
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were attacking the temporary bridges across the river, but, nevertheless, the offensive had 
caught the Rebels by surprise once again.118 Despite constant attention from Rebel 
aircraft, by the afternoon of 25 July the British Battalion was within two kilometres of 
Corbera, a small town on the road to Gandesa which, with the support of the British 
Battalion, the Spanish XIII Brigade successfully captured during the night, as Rebel 
forces pulled back to defend Gandesa.119
On the following day, the British Battalion continued their advance towards their 
major objective, and a major key to the Ebro offensive, the town of Gandesa.120 However, 
the Republicans were woefully short of motorised equipment121 and by now the element 
of surprise was no longer with them, so they were met by increasingly fierce resistance 
from Rebel forces, particularly aircraft and artillery fire, as Franco rushed up 
reinforcements.122 Nationalist reconnaissance the previous day had established how and 
where the Republicans were crossing the river and allowed the German and Italian units 
of the Nationalist air-force to begin bombing the advancing troops. The battle 
increasingly became a struggle between Republican engineers attempting to construct 
river crossings, and aircraft hampering their efforts. The Rebels also opened the lock
118 Despite attempts by the Rebels to collect military intelligence, all of the Republican offensives of 1937- 
1938 caught the Rebels somewhat unawares. Stanley Payne, The Franco Regime (Wisconsin Press, 1987) 
p. 138. However, as Hugh Thomas points out, the front in the Spanish Civil war stretched for over one 
thousand miles and, though Rebel reports had described the movement of Republican units, it was 
impossible for the Rebel command to investigate every rumour. Thomas, Spanish Civil War, p.840.
119 Alexander, p.206.
120 ‘Key Franco Town Surrounded on Three Sides’, Daily Worker, 29 July 1938, p.l.
121 Hughes & Garrido, pp.109-110.
122 Peter Kerrigan’s reports for the Daily Worker become less triumphant as July moves to August, 
stressing the determination of the republican’s advance despite increasing Rebel opposition. See, for 
example, Daily Worker 4 August 1938, p.l which admitted that, “the Government attacks during the last 
few days have been met by a new concentration of artillery and machine-gun fire, assisted almost 
continuously by aviation.” Coverage then shifted in tone, carrying a laudatory interview with General
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upstream at the reservoir at Barasona, which raised the level and increased the flow of the 
already powerful River Ebro, further hampering the crossing.123 As the British Battalion 
approached the town they were ordered to attack a hill a mile to the east o f the town. This 
was Hill 481- later known by the British as ‘the Pimple’- which overlooked Gandesa, and 
needed to be captured before the town could be attacked with any chance of success.
The British No. 1 Company began their attempts to capture Hill 481 on the following 
day, the 27 July. However, in a repeat of their experiences at Purburrel Hill the previous 
August, the battalion discovered the hill to have been expertly fortified and extremely 
robustly defended. One of No. 1 Company, a young Scottish volunteer called Steve 
Fullarton, later recalled how they were able to hear the defenders working on the 
defences during the night, further fortifying the machine-gun emplacements.124 The 
natural defences were as impregnable as those constructed by the Rebels; “it was 
practically a sheer rise in front o f us.”125 To add further to the battalion’s woes, the 
attacks were made during daylight, and had negligible support from tanks and aircraft 
and, critically, artillery.126 Fred Thomas from the Anti-Tank Battery remembered it as 
one of his toughest times in Spain
My blanket choked me, my packstrap cut into my shoulder, the night was stifling hot- in
short, I never felt less like a revolutionary in my life.127
Modesto, calls for more donations for Spain {Daily Worker, 8 August 1938 p.l & 9 August p.3) and 
demands that France should open the border with Spain. Daily Worker, 11 August 1938, p.3.
123 Chris Henry, The Ebro 1938: The Death Knell o f  the Republic (Oxford: Osprey, 1999) p.37.
124 Interview with Steve Fullarton, in MacDougall, p.298.
125 Ibid.
126 For a revealing description of the unequal levels of artillery and air support, see Hughes & Garrido, 
pp.l 10-111.
127 Description of the Ebro in July 1938. Thomas, To Tilt at Windmills, p.l 15.
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As Matthew Hughes and Enriqueta Garrido have pointed out, “The courage of the 
Army of the Ebro, fighting in stifling summer heat, could not overcome entrenched, 
properly supported and equally determined opposition.”128 ‘The Pimple’ proved too much 
for No. 1 Company and despite several costly attempts in which many volunteers, 
including the mathematician David Guest, and Lewis Clive,129 a rowing gold medallist in 
the 1932 Los Angeles Olympics, were killed, they were unable to capture it.130 The 
following day, a desperate charge by No. 3 Company saw them get within fifty feet of the 
crest o f the hill and attack the defences with grenades, yet still not capture the positions. 
Another attack that night, assisted by the Listers and the Spanish XIII Brigade was also 
unsuccessful.
On 30 July, No. 2 Company joined the attack on Hill 481, but with no more success. 
The company commander, Lieutenant John Angus, and three replacements, Walter 
Gregory, Bill Harrington and Joe Harkins were all wounded within hours of each other, 
Harkins fatally.131 The 3 August132 saw the British Battalion’s final desperate, and 
ultimately unsuccessful attempt on Hill 481, before the battalion was moved into reserve, 
and Republican forces gave up on their attempts to capture Gandesa and took up
128 Ibid, p.l 12.
129 ‘Rowing Blue Dies for Democracy in Spain’, Daily Worker, 8 August 1938, p .l .
130 Wheeler, pp.48-49. A monument to the Republican soldiers who were killed in the Sierra Pandols 
region was recently unearthed in Spain, having lain undiscovered throughout the Franco years. On the 
monument appears the names of four British volunteers killed in the Ebro offensive, Lewis Clive, David 
Guest, Harry Dobson, killed on Hill 481 and Morris Miller killed on Hill 666, together with one killed in 
the retreats through Aragon, the Battalion Commissar Walter Tapsell. As a recent essay recounts, the 
monument was constructed by Republican engineers including Percy Ludwick, a British civil engineer who 
served on the XV Brigade Staff from September 1937 to December 1938. See Percy Ludwick, 
‘Fortification Work in the XVth International Brigade’, Unpublished, (1998) p.10.
131 Gregory, p. 126.
132 The death of Harry Dobson, a member of the Brigade Staff and Communist Party representative within 
the battalion, demonstrates the unreliability of the date of death. A survivor of the torpedoing of the
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defensive positions. As George Wheeler observed, “The offensive so brilliantly planned 
and executed by Colonel Modesto and the Spaniards under Lister was virtually brought to 
a halt in our sector at Hill 481.”133 The battalion was withdrawn from the sector on the 6 
August.
With the Republicans now on the defensive, August saw the beginning of a new 
Rebel offensive in Aragon as, on 11 August, the Nationalists counter-attacked in the 
mountains to the south of the Sierra Pandols. The XV International Brigade was called 
upon to defend Hill 666, which had been occupied by the XI Republican Division. On 24 
August the British Battalion took over the exhausted Lincoln’s positions on the main 
height o f the Sierra Pandols,134 which the British barely managed to hold, after suffering 
a massive artillery bombardment and an attack by two Rebel battalions.135 Placed in a 
highly precarious position, with little defensive cover, and with the hard rock making the 
digging o f trenches impossible, the British could do little other than maintain as low a 
profile as possible, and attempt to avoid the attentions of the accurate Nationalist 
artillery. Their nights were little better, as the Nationalists kept up a constant stream of 
rifle-fire which the defenders had little choice but to believe could be the precursor to an 
attack.136
republican ship the SS. City of Barcelona, Dobson was either killed in July (Alexander, p.266) or on 1 
August (Rust, p. 180) or 3 August (Moscow 545/6/125 p. 10).
133 Wheeler, p.43.
134 The Lincolns had held the position consisting mainly of solid rock for ten days, sheltering behind stone 
parapets as the Rebels poured artillery and aircraft fire on them. Carroll, p. 199.
135 Alexander, p.210. Following the British defence of Hill 666, it took the Rebels until November 1938 to 
finally capture it. Henry, p.60.
136 Wheeler, p.61.
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Two weeks later on 8 September, the British were fighting on another strategic hill, 
this time attempting to recapture Hill 356 near Sandesco, in the nearby range o f Sierra 
Caballs. The British Battalion captured the hill despite what appeared to be 
overwhelming numbers of Nationalist soldiers and unrelenting artillery and aircraft 
bombardments, as Walter Gregory, now back with the battalion, remembered:
How we came to hate planes and cannon and how different would have been our 
sentiments if they had been ours and not those of the fascists; but they never were.137
September was to be the last month of action for the British volunteers fighting in the 
57 Battalion o f the XV International Brigade, and they were to be called for one final 
action. On 21 September, the day that the Spanish Premier Juan Negrin announced the 
Republic’s intention to repatriate all foreign volunteers,138 the XV Brigade were recalled 
to the front late at night to replace the XIII (Dombrowski) Brigade who had suffered 
heavy losses at Sierra de Lavall de la Torre.139 On 23 September the British Battalion- 
under the command of George Fletcher, following Sam Wild’s injury in the hand by a 
shell at Hill 666- now numbering only three hundred and thirty-seven men, of whom
137 Gregory, p.131. During the Rebel counter-attack, Rebel aircraft were dropping 10, 000 pounds of 
bombs on the republican lines every day. Hugh Thomas’s description of the Rebel’s air superiority gives 
some level of understanding of the desperate circumstances in which Gregory and his comrades found 
themselves, “All day and every day the nationalist aeroplanes, sometimes two hundred at the same time, 
circled over the republican lines, with hardly any interference from the inadequate anti-aircraft defences 
and badly managed fighters of their opponents. Many of their Moscas and Chatos were destroyed; many 
were damaged, and many pilots were either dead or wounded; by this time, most of the best Russian pilots 
had been withdrawn.” Thomas, Spanish Civil War, p.843.
138 As Bill Rust described to Harry Pollitt in a letter dated 26 May 1938, it had been decided previously 
that the foreign volunteers were now in such small numbers that they could be withdrawn. “According to 
our old froggie friend [Andre Marty] there is no longer an I.B. there are only foreign soldiers mixed with 
Spanish Brigades. Also, after a couple of victories, everyone will go.” IBA Box C, File 22/6. A report from 
Dimitrov to Marshall Voroshilov in Moscow confirms that the decision to withdraw the brigades originated 
with Premier Negrin, who believed they were “exhausted”, “their military efficiency had fallen o ff’ and 
“the influx of new volunteers is negligible.” Thus the withdrawal of the brigades should not be seen as a 
evidence for Stalin’s withdrawal of support for the Republic. See Moscow 33987/3/1149, cited in Radosh, 
p.469. A copy of the Spanish resolution for withdrawl of non-Spanish combatants from Spain put to the 
League of Nations in September 1938 resides in the PRO. See F0371/22696 W 12789.
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fewer than a third were British,140 moved up to the front for their last action on Spanish 
soil. After sustaining an immense five-hour Nationalist artillery barrage, under which the 
American Lincoln Battalion was forced to retire, they were, in Peter Kerrigan’s words, 
“subjected to intense enfilading fire” from the positions previously occupied by the 
Lincolns. No. 1 Company in particular bore the brunt o f the attack and remained in their 
positions until their trenches were overrun.141
The battalion was withdrawn in the evening. Two-hundred members o f the battalion 
had been killed, wounded or were missing over the last three days.142 At one a.m. the 
order finally arrived which withdrew the XV International Brigade from the front line. 
For some, it was a tragic and heartbreaking end to their role in Spain. Peter Kerrigan 
described his shock at this terrible outcome of their last action:
I could give dozens of individual acts of heroism but what is the use. The list of citations 
which I enclose, tells in brief official terms of the acts of deathless glory which were 
played out against a background of the cutting to pieces of our very bravest. I saw what 
No. 1 Coy. came through at Cordoba and I will never forget when I was told what our 
casualties were in those first 3 days at Jarama. But nothing can compare with the end of 
our Battalion.143
As Peter Carroll observed, raw courage and a belief in the essential ‘rightness’ of 
their cause, “could not overcome inexperience, poor coordination and superior military
139 Wheeler, p.81.
140 By 23 September, only 106 of the Battalion were British. Alexander, p.215.
141 Letter from Peter Kerrigan to Harry Pollitt, 27 September 1938, IBA Box C, File 25/5.
142 Peter Kerrigan listed the casualties between the 22 and 24 September as Dead 14, Wounded 24, Missing 
132, Deserters 31. Ibid. A number of British, including Frank West, George Wheeler and John Dunlop 
were captured, and later joined the comrades at the prison camp of San Pedro de Cardena, near Burgos. See 
the following chapter.
143 Letter from Peter Kerrigan to Harry Pollitt, 27 September 1938, IBA Box C, File 25/5.
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force.”144 But the depleted ranks of British volunteers were not to leave Spain 
immediately. Two events would formally mark the withdrawal of the International 
Brigaders from Spain. On 17 October all the foreign volunteers in the 35 Division were 
paraded and reviewed, and several of their number received promotions and 
commendations. Both Malcolm Dunbar, chief of operations for the XV International 
Brigade and Sam Wild, the battalion commander, were promoted to major, and John 
Power, the Irish political commissar who had tried- vainly- to persuade the Irish 
contingent to remain with the British Battalion in early 1937, was promoted to captain.145
The final appearance of the battalion was at a farewell parade in Barcelona at the end 
of October146, at which important Republican figures, including President Azana and the 
Prime Minister Negrin, expressed their thanks to the Internationals. The description of the 
parade, written the following day by Fred Thomas, not normally one for hyperbole or 
exaggeration, captures the full emotion of the occasion:
Yesterday was a day I shall never forget. The Parade was, I am sure, an emotional feast 
for us all. It was no simple march through the streets, but a glorious demonstration of the 
enthusiasm and affection of the people of Catalonia for the Internationals.
Trucks took us through crowded streets, with flags and bunting everywhere, the people 
cheering and throwing flowers, crowding every window and balcony. We dismounted 
finally at the Sarria Road, starting point of the procession.
There the Brigades of many different nationalities were drawn up nine abreast. Spanish 
troops lined the route as, led by military bands, we set off. Everywhere thousands packed 
the broad streets, time after time men and women broke through the cordon to hug and
144 Carroll, p. 162.
145 Alexander, p.239.
146 There has been some confusion over the exact date of the farewell parade in Barcelona. It is invariably 
listed as having taken place on 29 October (See, for example, Alexander, p.239 and Arthur Landis, 
Abraham Lincoln Brigade pp.592-593). In fact, as Vidal states, pp.311-312, the parade actually took place 
on 28 October, as coverage of the event in the British press on 29 October demonstrates. See, for example, 
‘A last Parade in Barcelona- Cheers and Flowers’, The Times, Saturday 29 October 1938, p.14.1 am very 
grateful to Fred Thomas of the British Anti-Tank Battery for bringing this error to my attention.
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kiss us, holding up small children and babies to be kissed in return, smothering us with 
affection as they cheered and cheered.
For an hour and a half we made our slow way through some of the principle streets in one 
long glut of emotional excess. I was not the only Brigader sometimes reduced to tears: 
we, who were leaving the fight, were yet receiving the heartfelt homage of the Spanish 
people.
In the street of the 14th April the March ended, and then came the speeches. From a 
platform full of important people from many countries as well as of the Republic, Dr. 
Negrin, Prime Minister, addressed us and the vast crowds. Then came President Azana 
followed by the chief of the Army of the Ebro. Finally we recognised the spare figure of 
the indomitable “La Pasionaria” who quickly had the crowd roaring their approval of her 
every word. But we British were not near enough to hear much, so I have to wait until to­
day to read her stirring speech: one sentence stands out- “Come back, as honoured sons 
of Spain.”147
As Fred Thomas states, the speech by Dolores Iburrari, the Communist deputy from the 
Asturias forever known as La Pasionaria, delivered to the more than 13 000 watching 
internationals, was the highlight o f an extremely emotional occasion. Describing the 
volunteers as ‘history’ and ‘legend’, she invited the volunteers to return to Spain, “when 
the olive tree of peace puts forth its leaves again.” It was to be a long wait.
For the volunteers it was to be departure that left them with mixed feelings. Though 
of course, as Bill Alexander states, they wanted to get home, it is also clear that many felt 
that, “they were leaving unfinished the task they had undertaken.”148 The war was by no 
means over, and the Republic’s precarious situation was getting progressively worse. The 
departure was, in any event, not immediate. Bureaucracy held up the repatriation, but 
following pressure from sympathetic MPs in Britain, and from a delegation of volunteers 
lobbying the British Consul in Barcelona, most of the British volunteers, three hundred
147 Thomas, To Tilt at Windmills, p. 164.
148 Alexander, p.240.
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and five in total, left Spain by train at the beginning o f December 1938.149 The group 
arrived back in Victoria Station on the evening o f the 7 December 1938 where, to their 
surprise and delight, they were met by a huge crowd to welcome them back home.150 In 
addition to families and friends were a number of senior members of the British Labour 
Movement, including Clement Attlee, the maverick Labour M.P. Stafford Cripps, the 
Communist M.P. Willie Gallagher and Will Lawther from the British Miners’ Federation.
Over the next few weeks several other groups of the British volunteers returned to 
Britain, including some of those who had been wounded fighting in Spain. But not all the 
British volunteers in Spain were able to return. In the Nationalist zone there were a 
number of volunteers held in prisoners o f war camps. For some of them, it would be 
several months before they would see home again; others, notably Frank Ryan, the Irish 
veteran captured at Calaceite, would never return.
149 This number includes all the British volunteers in Spain, including those with 15 Brigade staff and other 
units. Alexander, p.241.
150 As has been noted, it was hardly surprising that the British right-wing press chose not to report the 
welcome at Victoria for the 305 that arrived on 7 December 1938. “Clearly to report the return of British 
volunteers would have proved anathema to newspapers which had consistently condemned the 
International Brigades as the embodiment of that Bolshevik threat.” Shelmerdine, p.40.
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“Somebody spoke and I heard a voice say, “Don’t shoot.” They 
thought we were Russians with the uniforms at first. Somebody 
shouted, “Ingles?” If it hadn’t been for that.. .we would have been 
shot one at a time. They were going to shoot us. We were all lined 
up.”
Interview with James Maley, Imperial War Museum Sound 
Archive, 11947/3/1.
As I have described, large groups of British volunteers were taken prisoner on two 
occasions during the battalion’s involvement in the civil war: the first during the battle of 
Jarama in February 1937, and the second at Calaceite, during the retreats of March 1938. 
In addition, individual British volunteers were captured at various stages of the war: 
Lieutenant Walter Gregory and several others were unfortunate enough to be captured on 
the British Battalion’s very last day of action in Spain.1
The first group consisted of up to thirty volunteers from the Machine-Gun Company 
captured on the second day of Jarama, 13 February 1937.2 As Maurice Goldberg and 
James Maley, two members of the company, recounted later, the volunteers had good 
reason to believe they were about to be shot, for the belief was widespread that captured 
Internationals were shot on sight. Indeed, the British Government was aware as early as 
November 1936 that British volunteers captured by Franco were likely to be executed. A
1 Gregory, pp. 134-135. While most British prisoners were kept together, a handful were kept in other jails. 
John Firman Danson from Chatham (actually Canadian), and Archibald Bartlett (real name Archibald 
Yemm) from Pontypridd were both prisoners at Duesto prison in Bilbao. So too was Tom Picton, an ex­
boxer from Wales, who was shot whilst in prison. See IBA Box 28a File A/6 and Alexander, p. 187.
2 See chapter four.
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telegram from the British Embassy to Madrid, sent to London on 9 November 1936, 
stated that,
It is possible that we will have a rush of some fifty British combatants who would 
otherwise be murdered, for protection in the Embassy. If so I would take them in and if 
insurgents demand their surrender I would refuse pending your instructions.3
The British Government’s reluctant acquiescence to his request is evident from the reply 
two days later.
I presume you have carefully considered the possibility that the lives of the 190 persons 
now in the Embassy would be seriously endangered by admission of these candidates 
who by their own actions have put themselves in a different category from refugees 
whose plight is no fault of their own.. .If you are in touch with any of the combatants they 
should be advised to make their way to territory which is not likely to fall into insurgent 
hands, or better still to leave Spain.
In event of emergency, however, I give you authority to act as suggested in your telegram 
under reference on the assumption that such persons would be admitted only as a last 
resort and in face of grave risk that they would lose their lives if they are captured or 
surrender. They should also be required to give an undertaking to take no further part in 
hostilities.4
On 9 March 1937 Franco issued a proclamation declaring that any foreigners captured 
under arms would be shot.5 Despite official antipathy to the volunteers, the British 
Government nevertheless issued a ‘stiff note’ to Franco threatening, “the strongest 
possible reaction on the part of H.M. Government if  the clauses relating to the Geneva 
Convention were not rigorously adhered to.” However, the order was not suspended until 
early April 1938, following pressure on Franco from Mussolini, who was keen to use the 
Internationals in exchange for Italian soldiers captured by the Republicans. In general the 
Italians anyway took prisoners alive, even before April 1938, though amongst Spanish
3 Telegram from George Ogilvie-Forbes, Counsellor in Madrid. PRO PRO371/20584-W15462. Like many
others, Ogilvie-Forbes is expecting the capital to fall shortly to the Rebel forces.
4 Ibid.
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units the situation was somewhat different, as Peter Kemp recounts in his description of 
his time fighting with the Rebels:
Beyond were several half-ruined shepherds’ huts; against their walls about a dozen 
prisoners were slumped together, while some of our tank crews stood in front of them, 
loading rifles. As I approached there was a series of shots, and the prisoners slumped to 
the ground.
‘My God! ’ I said to Cancela, feeling slightly sick. ‘What do they think they’re doing, 
shooting those prisoners?’
Cancela looked at me. ‘They’re from the International Brigades,’ he said grimly.6
There is no doubt whatsoever that the Nationalists often shot prisoners, particularly if 
they were International Brigaders.7 Internationals certainly believed they might well be 
shot if captured, particularly if they were political commissars, officers, or machine- 
gunners8 and the prospect of being captured by Moors was especially feared.9 A 
confidential report on the British volunteers in the International Brigades in Spain, 
compiled by a member of the British consular staff at the end of the civil war was sent to 
the Foreign Office, which admitted that,
5 PRO F0371/21287 W6098. The proclamation is also cited in Geiser, p. 271 fit 10.
6 Peter Kemp, Mine Were o f  Trouble (London: Cassells, 1957) p. 162. Kemp later recounts how, on 14 
March 1938, his superior officer, Colonel Penaredora, ordered Kemp to execute a deserter from the 
International Brigades, an Irishman from Belfast. Penaredora insisted that Kemp execute the prisoner and 
sent two Legionnaries after Kemp to make sure that the order was obeyed. Kemp, pp.170-173. The date 
suggests that the executed brigader could have been either Ben Murray, a Communist party branch 
secretary bom in County Tyrone, or Joseph Murray (no relation) also from County Tyrone.
7 As Peter Carroll states, “With very few exceptions, fascist policy was to take no prisoners.” He cites Carl 
Geiser’s figure of 173 shot out of a total of 287 Americans captured. Carroll, pp. 155 & 175.
8 See for example, interview with George Drever, IWMSA 841/2/1 and interview with Tom Murray in 
MacDougall, p.318. Bill Rust later claimed that, “The fascists never allow a captured political commissar to 
remain alive.” Rust, p. 154. Carl Geiser, an American officer and political commissar also believed that, 
“All officers of the International Brigade were executed upon capture.” Geiser, p.67.
9 How much of this was based on a racial stereotyping- not unknown among the volunteers’ descriptions of 
the Moors- is difficult to establish. John Myers, who was a prisoner at San Pedro de Cardena, gave a 
colourful interview to the West London Observer on 24 February 1939 p.6, which described how the 
Moors’ “horribly ferocious treatment of prisoners was only too well known...in appearance they were a 
revolting spectacle, with their long ugly teeth “like Dracula,” saliva streaming from the comers of their 
mouths and their eyes ablaze with an insane lust.”
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I am informed confidentially that any International Brigadier taken in the Ebro offensive 
was asked one question, “When did you come to Spain?” If he replied after the 19th July 
1936 he was shot sin formacion de causa.10
But it was not just the Rebels who shot prisoners; the shooting of prisoners occurred 
on both sides during the Spanish Civil War, and it is beyond doubt that members of the 
International Brigades were themselves involved. Carl Geiser, who was a political 
commissar in the American battalion, and hardly a hostile witness, testifies that during 
1937 a number of Spanish Nationalist officers and NCOs were executed at Quinto in 
Aragon by American International Brigaders and Spanish Republican troops on the 
orders of General ‘Walter.’11
However, this was not to be the fate of the British Machine-Gun Company, who were 
extremely fortunate to be saved by the intervention of a Spanish officer.12 Nevertheless, 
several individuals were still shot outright. Phil Elins, of Leeds, was killed when reaching 
for tobacco from his pockets:
Another prisoner asked permission to smoke, which was granted. As he reached in his 
tunic-pocket for a cigarette, the guard who had given permission riddled his stomach with 
bullets from a sub-machine-gun. The hand shot out of the tunic-pocket, holding a 
cigarette.13
John Stevens, an engineer from Islington in London, was also killed by the same burst 
of machine-gun fire. The other British volunteers were understandably terrified and 
appalled; Edward Dickenson, the company second in command, protested vigorously
10 Report on International Brigades by M.V. Miller, Barcelona, 5 April 1939. PRO F0371/24124-7458.
11 For an account of the shooting of prisoners at Quinto, see Geiser, pp.30-31 and Carroll, p. 156.
12 As recounted to Giles Romilly. IBA Box 28. See also Geiser, p.15.
13 IBA Box 28.
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over the shooting, and was promptly picked out as a suspected leader and shot through 
the head with a pistol.14 The commander o f the Machine-Gun Company, Harold Fry, 
escaped, Dickenson having deliberately ripped off the officer’s insignia from his 
uniform.15
The remainder of the prisoners were protected by Civil Guards and marched to 
temporary holding areas for prisoners at nearby San Martin de la Vega where they were 
held for two days before being taken to a jail in Navalcamero, about twenty miles south 
of Madrid, where they were fingerprinted and their heads shaved. The prisoners were 
held for a week here, nine to a cell,16 before being interrogated individually by Alfonso 
Merry del Val, the son o f the former Spanish Ambassador in London, and photographed 
standing on the back of a truck by a Daily Mail reporter.17 The newspaper caption is 
typical of the Daily Mail's coverage of the war:
These are the first pictures-exclusive to “The Daily Mail”-of some of the misguided and 
hapless British prisoners who were captured by General Franco’s forces on the Jarama 
front. They were sent out to Spain by Communists with promises of work at £6 a week, 
but the first most of them know of their real fate what when they were given arms and 
drafted to the Red’s front line.18
14 Carl Geiser states that Dickenson was enraged at the shooting of Elias, and his contemptuous reaction 
towards the Nationalists led them to halt the column and shoot him Geiser, p. 15. “Stood against a tree 
Dickenson realized he was about to be executed. He smiled, raise his clenched fist, and called out “Salud" 
as they fired.” Whether Dickenson’s smile and calm acceptance of the situation is an exaggeration, is 
impossible to verify. Geiser admits that his version originated with Bill Alexander, so is at least third hand. 
The original version is probably the one in Moscow, “The men were ordered to march down the valley to a 
spot 400 metres off. The Spanish officer, mad with delight, ordered Ted Dickenson, second in command of 
the Machine-Gun Company, out of their ranks. Dickenson, knowing what was coming, displayed 
marvellous courage. He stepped smartly out of the ranks, marched towards the tree indicated by the fascist 
officer, turned about, and with the words “Salud Comrades” fell with fascist bullets in him.” Moscow 
545/3/467 p.13.
15 Interview with Tommy Bloomfield, in MacDougall, p.49.
16 Ibid.
17 Alexander, p. 184.
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Ironically, the taking of this photograph by the Daily Mail photographer proved to be 
fortunate for the prisoners, for it provided evidence to those in Britain that the captives 
were still alive, which the Rebels might otherwise have been able to deny.
The prisoners were then moved to an old factory in Talavera de la Reina where 
Spanish Republican prisoners were being held and were joined by two volunteers from 
Liverpool, Jack Flynn and Fred Jones, at the end of February.19 At Talavera the British 
prisoners were worked hard for three months repairing roads and burying the bodies of 
executed Republican prisoners, with little food and the most basic living and sanitary 
facilities. Several prisoners were still carrying the wounds they had sustained at Jarama; 
many of the others fell ill from stomach and lung diseases.20
On 18 May 1937, after three months at Talavera, the prisoners were moved on to 
Salamanca, where they were all tried by a military court for ‘aiding a military Rebellion.’ 
They were tried as a collective group and no interpreter was provided, so the prisoners 
agreed amongst themselves not to speak in court21 Five were sentenced to death: the 
commander Harold Fry, plus George Leeson, Maurice Goldberg, Jimmy Rutherford and 
Charles West.22 The remainder of the British were sentenced to twenty years 
imprisonment, with James Pugh and George Watters sentenced to serve their entire
18 ‘Britons Captured in Spain’, Daily Mail, 31 March 1937, p.20.
19 Nationalists claimed that the two were caught having deserted from the Republican lines. They were 
later released with the other British prisoners. IBA Box D-7, File A/7.
20 Many of the volunteers were badly wounded following their capture; Donald Renton had been wounded 
in the legs, Harold Fry had a broken arm and both Jimmy Rutherford and George Watters had been beaten 
virtually unconscious. Interview with Donald Renton, in MacDougall, p.26, Alexander, p. 184 and Geiser, 
pp.15-16.
21 Geiser, p. 16.
22 IBA Box 28, File A/18.
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sentence in solitary confinement.23 In fact, none o f the condemned British prisoners were 
actually executed at Salamanca, though as every night groups of Spaniards were taken 
out of the prison in a van- which became known as the ‘Agony Wagon’- and not brought 
back again, the five condemned British prisoners greeted the arrival o f the truck at five o’ 
clock each evening with particular foreboding.24
Following their show trial, the prisoners were moved to the Model Prison in 
Salamanca, where they remained until May 1937, when they were informed that Franco 
had pardoned them, and that they were to be exchanged for a similar number o f Italians 
captured by Republican forces. Twenty-three British prisoners were exchanged25 and 
marched across the frontier at Inin, through a crowd with their arms raised in the Fascist 
salute. A photograph was taken in which one of the volunteers also has his arm raised, 
but this was purely a compromise formed after an attempted propaganda exercise by the 
Nationalists; originally all were required to salute and when they refused were informed 
that the exchange would be cancelled.26
The volunteers reached England at the end o f May 1937. Of the twenty-three released 
prisoners, five were back in Spain fighting with the British Battalion within six weeks, 
including Harold Fry, Basil Minsk (a Jewish volunteer from London fighting under the 
name of Basil Abrahams, who later served with the XV International Brigade staff), Tom
23 Ibid.
24 IBA Box 28 and Alexander, p. 184.
25 See ‘Prisoners Released by Franco: a generous parting gesture’, The Times, 29 May 1937, p. 13.
26 IBA Box 33 File 16/6.
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Bloomfield, a Scot from Kirkcaldy in Fife, and Jimmy Rutherford, the Edinburgh 
delegate to the YCL annual conference in 1934.27
A small number of prisoners were not released and kept back, including George 
Leeson, Maurice Goldberg and Robert Silcock, a volunteer from Liverpool, and were 
moved in with Spanish prisoners. Leeson was released in September after a solidarity 
campaign in the UK, and Goldberg and Silcock were finally released in November 
1937.28 The reasons for holding back the volunteers are unclear; Bill Alexander suggests 
it was anti-Semitism,29 Carl Geiser that the volunteers were kept back to ensure that the 
released prisoners would not say anything unfavourable when they returned home.30 Both 
explanations are possible, though Geiser’s explanation seems more likely.
The second large group of British volunteers was captured at Calaceite during the 
retreat through Aragon on 31 March 1938, by an Italian column from the crack Italian 
(Blackshirt) Division, with a number of stragglers captured over the following days. The 
capture o f over one hundred British volunteers was a disaster for the British Battalion, 
which, like most of the Spanish Republican Army, was already reeling from the dramatic 
advances made by the Rebel forces.
Several prisoners were shot outright, just as some had been at Jarama in February 
1937, even though Nationalist aeroplanes had dropped leaflets on the retreating
27 ‘Jimmy Rutherford Died for Freedom’, Challenge, 20 February 1939, p.7.
28 IBA Box 28 Files A2 & A/56 & Alexander, p. 185.
29 Alexander, p. 185.
30 Geiser, p. 17.
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Republicans, encouraging them to desert and guaranteeing their safety.31 The group of 
British prisoners were marched to the main square in Calaceite by Civil Guards, where 
they were lined up against a wall in front of machine-guns. To the prisoners it seemed 
clear that they were all to be shot, as one said, “We thought, ‘this is it.”’32 However, they 
were spotted by an American journalist who was in the company of several Italian Army 
officers. The officers, aware of the Internationals value in an exchange for Italian 
prisoners held by the Republicans, prevented the Guardia Civil from shooting them.
The prisoners were gradually all brought to the Italian controlled prison at Alcaniz.33 
The official battalion report admits that, “Many prisoners were apprehensive and a large 
number demoralised” and that a number blamed the Communist Party and the battalion 
leadership for their present situation.34 As the inevitable interrogations began in earnest, it 
soon became clear that the Nationalist authorities were looking for officers and political 
commissars. Communist Party and YCL members wisely decided that all should deny 
party membership or officer rank, and hope that they would not be exposed by, “some of 
the weaker elements, who were openly declaring their preference for Fascism.”35
31 Alexander, p. 186.
32 Interview with Joseph Leo Byrne, IWMSA 12930/3/2 and interview with Morien Morgan who stated his 
belief that, “Up until this date all prisoners had been shot by the Francoists.” IWMSA 9856/4/2.
33 Anon., They Fought in Franco's Jails (London: CPGB, 1939) pp.3-4.
34 IBA Box C File 3/la. Carl Geiser reported that many of the American prisoners felt likewise. Geiser, 
p. 142. As Bill Alexander further acknowledges, morale was, not surprisingly, very low and states that 
many volunteers felt they had ‘dishonoured’ their cause by being captured and that others had been 
shattered by their experiences of war. Though he admits that “all were uncertain, having heard of the 
cruelty and terror experienced by the earlier group of prisoners,” he makes no mention of the “violent 
reactions to the party and Battalion leadership” mentioned in the official report. Alexander, p. 186.
35 IBA Box C File 3/la.
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After a number o f days at Alcaniz, the prisoners were taken to the military academy 
at Zaragoza, where most British prisoners had arrived by 2 or 3 of April. Here the 
discipline was even harder than at Alcaniz, where prisoners had been beaten and forced 
to sleep in appalling unsanitary conditions alongside the open lavatory. At Zaragoza 
prisoners were warned that guards had orders to shoot on sight any prisoners showing 
themselves at the windows. Prisoners were forced to salute in the fascist style, though the 
Irish Republican leader Frank Ryan, who made no secret o f his rank, refused to give the 
fascist salute throughout his long period of captivity and several devout Communists, 
such as Danny Gibbons (later a member of a Soviet spy ring following the invasion of 
Russia by Germany in June 194136) and Lionel Jacobs, initially spoke out against it.37 
The Rebel authorities’ rather clumsy and ineffectual attempt to impose the fascist salute 
on the prisoners at Zaragoza, is recounted by the American prisoner, Carl Geiser:
[The Nationalist Officer] formed us into straight ranks, making certain that each man 
would have enough room to swing his arm properly. Then he stepped in front of us, drew 
himself up to his full height, and barked, “Rompen filasT
The number of creative ways nearly two hundred Internationals found to express their 
opinion of Franco was impressive. After giving the military salute, arms went up in all 
directions, all out of synchronization and to all levels. Fingers drooped forward, even 
formed fists. Some were yelling “Fran-“ while others were yelling “-co.”
The astonished expression of the officer’s face told us we had scored. When he made the 
mistake of again shouting, “Rompen JilasF’ we attained new heights of creativity.
36 Nigel West and Oleg Tsarev, The Crown Jewels. The British Secrets at the Heart o f  the KGB Archives 
(London: 1998), pp. 154, cited in Halstead & McLoughlin, p.4. Other members of the British Battalion were 
also involved with Soviet espionage. Nigel West identifies Douglas ‘Dave’ Springhall as the centre of a 
GRU spy ring. He was arrested and convicted in 1943 for possession of classified papers. Wilf McCartney 
is also named as a reliable USSR agent. West further suggests that Charlotte Franken (Haldane) became a 
member of the CPGB’s underground in 1937 and that her huspand, JBS Haldane, may have been 
INTELLIGENSIA, the leader of the spy ring. Nigel West, Venona: the Greatest Secret o f  the Cold War 
(London: Harper Collins, 1999) pp.60-78.
37 IBA Box C File 3/la, They Fought in Franco‘s Jails, p.5 and Alexander, pp. 186-187.
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The officer realised it was useless to continue, and with a show of disgust dismissed us. 
We were jubilant. What had threatened dangerously to divide us had been converted into 
a morale-boosting victory. We were not asked to salute again.38
The prisoners scored a similar success later in their period of captivity. Ordered to 
chant the Francoist chant- jEspana Una! jEspana Grande! jEspana Libre! the prisoners 
were also to respond to each line with their own cry o f ‘ jFranco!’. Instead many amended 
the words from ‘Franco’ to ‘Fuck You’, or kept quiet for the first two chants then 
bellowed out */Libre/ ’39 When the prisoners were ordered by the prison guards to shout 
louder, the guards must have been astonished by the prisoners’ willingness to respond.40
On the second day in the military prison at Zaragoza, the prisoners were interviewed 
by Merry del Val, who had interviewed the British prisoners captured at Jarama the 
previous year.41 One o f the captured at Calaceite was Jimmy Rutherford, who had been 
captured at Jarama, and later returned to fight in Spain.42 Despite desperate attempts by 
other British volunteers to shield Rutherford- who had attempted to hide his identity by 
using the pseudonym ‘Jimmy Smalls’- Rutherford was recognised by Merry del Val as 
one o f the Jarama prisoners he had interviewed previously.43 Rutherford was taken away
38 Geiser, pp.95-96. Garry McCartney later described the display as resembling “ a hundred tic-tack men at 
a racecourse, all waving their arms about in different directions.” Interview with Garry McCartney in 
MacDougall, p.250.
39 Interview with Garry McCartney, in MacDougall, p.257.
40 Interview with George Wheeler, IWMSA 11442/8/7. On first sight this appears a fairly typical gloss on 
the prisoners response to the camp authorities, in keeping with the ‘official’ history and, indeed, the story 
features in Alexander’s work (p. 191). However, it should also be remembered that some rather iconoclastic 
British volunteers had been shouting ‘No bloody pan’ as an alternative to ‘No pasaran’ and referring to 
Political Commissars as ‘Comic Stars.’ (See conclusions, below).
41 Alexander, p. 187.
42 Several others captured at Jarama had also returned. See above.
43 According to James Maley, the prisoners captured at Jarama in February 1937 had all been finger 
printed, which would have made Rutherford’s discovery inevitable. However, no other volunteer makes 
any reference to their fingerprints having been taken, so this seems inconclusive. See interview with James 
Maley, IWMSA 11947/3/2.
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and shot on 24 May 1938 for being in contravention of the agreement all the freed British 
prisoners-of-war had signed, not to return to Spain following their repatriation to Britain. 
Following the execution, a letter was sent by the British Foreign Office to Jimmy 
Rutherford’s father confirming that this was the case.
Your son, Mr. James Rutherford, was taken prisoner on February 13th, 1937 at San Martin 
de la Vega, but was released on July 5th, having promised to take no further part in future 
Spanish hostilities. On May 24th last he was captured a second time at Calaceite, tried by 
court martial and executed.44
As the letter went on to explain, Rutherford was in contravention of international law, 
and the Foreign Office somewhat insensitively enclosed an extract from Oppenheim’s 
International Law to demonstrate this. A letter to Willie Gallagher, the Communist 
Member o f Parliament for Fife, on 9 February 1939, explained the Government’s position 
in more detail:
I am very sorry that the enquiries which we have made resulted in this bad news, but I am 
afraid that a formal protest or a claim for redress would serve no purpose seeing that Mr. 
James Rutherford was released on a promise that he would not serve again in the Spanish 
war and broke this promise...General Franco’s army have as a general practice made this 
offence a capital one and H.M.G. have no status for demanding special treatment for 
British subjects serving with the Spanish forces.45
Rutherford’s execution in April 1938 and Harold Fry’s death at Fuentes de Ebro the 
previous October persuaded the British Communist Party not to allow volunteers who 
had been prisoners to return to Spain, as George Leeson found when he later attempted to 
re-enlist with the British Battalion 46
44 Letter from the Foreign Office to J. Rutherford (father of James). PRO FO371/24122-W2027 and IBA 
Box 28 File 4/4. The dates here are incorrect: in fact Rutherford was repatriated in May 1937, and 
recaptured in March 1938 after having returned to Spain.
45 Letter from Foreign Office to Willie Gallagher, PRO F0371/24122-W1565.
46 Interview with George Leeson, IWMSA 803/4/3.
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Whilst the prisoners were imprisoned at Zaragoza they were visited by several 
international journalists, who had been invited in order to show to the world how the 
International Brigade had been smashed by the Nationalist Army. Clearly, the Rebel 
authorities recognised that there was far greater propaganda value in keeping the large 
number of British prisoners alive than in executing them.47 Amongst the visitors was The 
Times reporter Kim Philby,48 who gave the impression of, “a rather conservative 
Englishman with leanings towards fascism”49 and William Carney of the New York 
Times, who was extremely unsympathetic to the Internationals.50 The members of the 
press were also able to satisfy a more immediate desire; cigarettes. Morien Morgan, a 
Welsh volunteer from No. 2 Company captured in January 1938 had, apparently, 
“[developed] the cadging o f cigarettes into a fine art.” Morgan was interviewed by 
Philby, whom he asked to exchange some French francs into pesetas so that he could buy 
cigarettes. The reporter took pity on him and gave him a virtually full packet of 
cigarettes. Morgan successfully repeated the trick with the other reporters and later 
shared the proceeds with the other Welsh prisoners.51
47 According to the official record there were 102 British prisoners at Saragossa on April 3 1938. This 
number soon increased to 146.
48 The official report (IBA Box C File 3/la) lists Kim Philby as working for The Daily Telegraph. In fact 
Philby was assigned to the Nationalists and working for The Times to building up his Conservative 
credentials, whilst all the time secretly working for Moscow.
49 Interview with Dougal Eggar, IWMSA 9426/4/4.
50 Jimmy Moon, who was a prisoner at Saragossa and San Pedro, blames William Camey for recognising 
Jimmy Rutherford, thus virtually ensuring his execution. Interview with Jimmy Moon, IWMSA 15729/4/2. 
However, other volunteers recount that it was Merry de Val who recognised Rutherford (see, for example, 
interview with Dave Goodman, IWMSA 16621/5/4) and as he had interviewed individually all the British 
captured at Jarama it seems probable that whether or not Camey did pick Rutherford out, Merry del Val 
would still have recognised him anyway.
51 Interview with Morien Morgan, IWMSA 9856/4/3.
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On 6 April the prisoners were marched to Zaragoza railway station, where the 
humming o f ‘revolutionary marching tunes’ by some caused more conflict between the 
prisoners, as several complained that this would lead to further punishment. Four of the 
volunteers were particularly unhappy and, “offered to throw in their lot with the 
Fascists.”52 The British prisoners were then transferred to Burgos by train, a journey of 
two days, during which the prisoners were rarely fed, and given even less exercise. Late 
in the evening o f 8 April, the contingent arrived at the prison camp of San Pedro de 
Cardefia, eleven kilometres south-east of Burgos, built on the site of the first Benedictine 
monastery in Spain and the last resting place of El Cid, where they were kept separately 
from the large numbers o f Spanish prisoners-of-war, who were mainly awaiting transfer 
to labour battalions.53
The prisoners at San Pedro, who had been captured at Calaceite in March, were later 
joined by other British prisoners, including Frank West and George Wheeler,54 who had 
been captured at Sierra de la Val in the Sierra Pandols in Aragon in the autumn of 1938, 
after the Republican offensive across the Ebro had ground to a halt.55 At first West, 
Wheeler and the other prisoners were taken to an overcrowded bam, where they spent the 
night with no room for the prisoners to lie down. At daybreak the following morning, the 
prisoners were called up individually in alphabetical order and asked why they had come 
to Spain and, if  they were released, would they come back to fight again. The first to be
52 IBA Box C File 3/1".
53 They Fought in Franco’s Jails, p.7 and Alexander, p. 187.
54 Interview with Frank West, IWMSA 9315/8/6.
55 Walter Gregory and George Wheeler were also captured at this time. Alexander, p.191 The Machine- 
Gun group, including George Green the husband of Nan Green, were surrounded at the same time, and 
were never seen again. Gregory, p. 134.
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questioned answered, “Because I am an anti-fascist” to the first question and, “Yes” to 
the second. Following this brief interrogation he was taken out of the building and those 
inside heard a brief burst of machine-gun fire. The process continued with most prisoners 
giving similar answers. George Wheeler was one of the last to be questioned and led 
outside. To his astonishment and relief he was led out to join the rest o f his comrades 
who were alive and well, if  extremely shocked. Wheeler recognised that the process was 
a macabre exercise designed by the Rebels to humiliate and terrify the prisoners.56
The International prisoners at San Pedro were kept in dormitories seventy yards long 
by ten yards wide, with between three hundred and three hundred and fifty prisoners in 
each dormitory; one group on the ground floor, and the rest divided between the first and 
second floors.57 On the ground floor, the discomfort caused by insufficient blankets, 
ventilation and light was only exceeded by the sanitary arrangements, which were, if 
anything, worse than those experienced at Alcaniz. There was only one tap for six 
hundred men and, “the lavatories were open, of the crudest style, and were often 
blocked.”58 The facilities were outside in the main square and shared with the Spanish 
prisoners, and prisoners were required to wait in line, sometimes for hours, to use them. 
Lawrence Wheeler described how the standard of sanitation was so bad that there was,
No water so the faeces were piling up and sometime that was about two feet high.. .It was
the most disgusting thing under the sun.59
56 Interview with George Wheeler, IWMSA 11442/8/6.
57 IBA Box C File 3/la and They Fought in Franco’s Jails, p.8.
58 Cyril Kent, ‘I Was in a Franco Prison’, Challenge 5 January 1939 pp. 10-11 and Alexander, p. 188.
59 Interview with George Wheeler, IWMSA 11442/8/6.
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Joe Norman, one o f the British captured at Calaceite, has particular reason to remember 
the toilets at San Pedro with horror:
There was no newspaper, no toilet paper. And it was in a sunken room, the toilet. And, of 
course, they were tearing their clothing and all that sort of thing. And it got stopped up.
So they asked for volunteers to.. .It flooded to a depth of six feet, this place. And they 
asked for volunteers. The fascists wouldn’t clean it out. So the committee asked for 
volunteers. But we couldn’t ask anyone outside the committee because it was such a 
filthy job. So three of us volunteered. And we’d got to dive in this lot and we cleared it. It 
took about an hour. One was a Canadian. One was a Scot. Two of them died of typhus.60
For those on the first and second floors, the facilities were at least inside the building 
but, nevertheless, still woefully inadequate. With only three taps divided between the 
prisoners, it was impossible for them to stay clean and thus fleas, lice and diseases were 
endemic. Most prisoners were infested with lice for the entire time they remained at San 
Pedro:
People were so ridden with lice, that they got so accustomed to it, that they no longer had 
to think. If I was talking to anyone and I saw a louse on his shoulder I’d simply put out 
my hand take off the louse and just squash it straight away.61
Many prisoners suffered from sickness whilst they were in the prison camp; a large 
number o f the British prisoners were suffering from a form of dysentery brought on by a 
poor diet and insufficient and unhygienic food, and were not always able to restrain 
themselves whilst waiting in the long queues for the toilets, thus adding to their, and 
other prisoners’ misery.62 Treatment for diarrhoea was basic at best and, as always, there 
were problems caused by language problems with the few medical workers amongst the
60 Interview with Joe Norman, IWMSA 818/4/3.
61 Interview with Morien Morgan, IWMSA 9856/4/3.
62 Interview with Lawrence George Wheeler, IWMSA 11442/8/6.
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prisoners sometimes misunderstanding description of the symptoms.63 With the medical 
facilities being somewhat limited- there were five doctors for all the International 
Brigaders held at San Pedro- those suffering from wounds sustained before their arrival, 
or diseases contacted during their incarceration, suffered particularly badly, with their 
condition exacerbated by the general unsanitary conditions.
Several prisoners described having sores on the lower half of their bodies and brittle 
teeth, symptomatic o f scurvy. Harold Collins, a volunteer from North Kensington, was 
hospitalised with suspected malaria.64 Morris Levitas suffered from swollen knees, which 
made walking extremely difficult and painful.65 Joseph Byrne from Liverpool fell ill with 
enteric fever, for which he was, in the circumstances, lucky enough to be treated with 
aspirin and the occasional dose of half a cup of goat’s milk. Much to his own surprise, he 
survived. Two other prisoners suffering from similar symptoms did not.66
In fact, hospitalisation did not necessarily offer any great improvements on conditions 
in the camp. Bruce Allender who, as a first-aider, occasionally helped in the Burgos 
hospital, described how the hospital in Burgos was run by priests, who “treated people 
like pigs,” for they believed the Internationals to be “animals.” Allender was in no doubt
63 For example, Kearney Cassells, a volunteer from Liverpool was suffering from constipation but was 
treated for diarrhoea for several days before the mistake was recognised. Chris Hall, Disciplina 
Camaradas: Four North Eastern Volunteers in the Spanish Civil War (Pontefract: Gosling Press, 1994) 
p. 103. (He is listed here as Kearney ‘Castles’).
64 Interview with Harold Collins, IWMSA 9481/4/4.
65 Interview with Maurice Levitas IWMSA 16358/5/4.
66 Interview with Joseph Leo Byrne, IWMSA 12930/3/3.
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that their cruelty was deliberate, “They were letting people die off. That’s what it 
amounted to.”67
Behind many of the illnesses lay the poor diet. The prisoners were fed a thin soup, 
Ajo, comprised of warm water flavoured with olive oil, garlic and breadcrumbs, and one 
small bread roll per day, roughly the size of a man’s fist.68 At lunchtime and in the 
evening the prisoners were also fed a spoonful of white beans, which, very occasionally, 
contained a small piece of pork fat69 Not surprisingly, food was an issue that stretched 
the prisoner self-discipline and was the cause of occasional arguments, particularly on the 
very rare occasions when the meagre rations were augmented with sardines.70 These 
came in large frying pans, which prisoners would crowd around, attempting to scoop up 
the nutritious oil on their bread. Quarrels over the sardine pans are described by Frank 
West, who was one of the British volunteers captured at the Ebro in September 1938. 
West found that the strict discipline maintained in the International Brigades had 
temporarily broken down at San Pedro:
The meals were turned out in big flat flying pans that were put on the floor and the lads 
just told to come and get it. They fought one another, trod in the food and really messed 
things up. It was decided two things should happen. One was that all the International 
Brigaders should be formed into four companies. Each company should have a 
commander. And second they then organised the food so that it could be served to each 
company and each company took turns getting what was left over. That stopped the 
battles.71
67 Interview with Bruce Allender, IWMSA 11300/4/3.
68 Geiser, pp.102-103.
69 For a short time the white beans were replaced with red kidney beans. Popular at first, the red beans 
became less popular after being served twice daily for a week.
70 Though not all the prisoners agree on this point. One recounts that, “They would throw the bread on the 
floor, hoping to see us scrabbling for it. But the discipline with these people was very, very good. There 
was no scrabbling for the food, you know.” Interview with Morien Morgan, IWMSA 9856/4/4.
71 Dolly West, Frank West: A Biography, MS. Available on-line at: 
http://huitzilo.tezcat.com/~juanyen/intbrig/countries/england/vets/frankwest/westbio.html
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The arguments could became a real problem on the rare occasions that there was 
enough food for a few prisoners to have a second portion. Those served first would have 
enough time to eat their food before rejoining the queue at the rear. Thus prisoners 
competed to be first in the queue creating crowding around the cauldrons, which led to 
beatings from the guards. There were also occasional thefts of food, usually bread rolls 
prisoners had tucked away to consume later. One prisoner was discovered stealing, tried 
by a summary court headed by Frank Ryan and punished by the temporary daily 
confiscation of his own bread ration.72
Aware that indiscipline could encourage the prison authorities to mete out 
punishment to the prisoners, Communist Party members attempted to group together to 
form a ‘camp committee’ to restore discipline and raise the spirits of the demoralised 
prisoners. The Communist Party members quickly got to know each other, despite the 
dangers associated with overt political activity. By 4 April 1938, Danny Gibbons had 
convened a meeting o f party cadres, a committee had been organised- known by the other 
prisoners as “the secret six”73- and Jack Jones (a miner from Rhondda, not the labour 
trade unionist) was designated as Secretary.74 The committee was later expanded when it 
turned out that another group of communists had also formed a committee and the two 
groups were first amalgamated, and then reorganised following the transfer of the
72 Cronin pp.139-140 and Geiser, p.l 13.
73 Interview with Jimmy Moon, IWMSA 15729/4/2.
74 IBA Box C File 3/1*.
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prisoners to San Pedro.75 The group gradually increased in number, though progress was 
slow as the party members, “were apprehensive of possible informers and of what 
measure the Fascist authorities would take if  they became aware o f the party committee 
and Party Members.”76 By the summer of 1938 the committee at San Pedro comprised 
eight British party members, plus Bob Dickie, a Canadian. Bob Dickie, together with 
Jack Jones and Danny Gibbons, were selected to be the secretariat, who would be 
required to make any decisions too urgent to allow the meeting of the entire committee. 
This arrangement arose despite the opposition of American communists, who preferred 
forming members into groups of five who would discuss all matters before decisions 
were taken. The British committee decided that, “the most effective and safest method 
was to give the committee full powers, with implicit acceptance o f direction by all Party 
members” and cited the American model as “false democracy,” claiming that the 
American model opened them up to the risk of infiltration.77 The British committee was 
also critical o f the German group, who they claimed to be over-cautious, though they did 
recognise that they had “special difficulties,” for their position was more dangerous than 
that of any other nationality. The German prisoners were interrogated daily by Gestapo 
agents and were believed by other prisoners to have been infiltrated by ‘unreliable 
elements’ and ‘Trotskyists.’78
75 Various groups of volunteers, usually Communist Party members, made contact with each other. For 
example, Garry McCartney, a Scottish member of the CP and YCL, was in close contact with two other 
prisoners, Willie Collins and Donald Carson, who he knew from trade union activities in Scotland. 
Interview with Garry McCartney, in MacDougall, p.249.
76IBA Box C File 3/la.
77 Ibid.
78 Ibid.
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The party committee continued to operate clandestinely throughout their time at San 
Pedro, with their main objectives being to limit punishment inflicted on the prisoners by 
the guards and to settle grievances between prisoners without involving the camp 
authorities. Misdemeanours were assigned punishments- such as extra duties and 
cleaning lavatories79- by the committee, rather than reporting the miscreants to the camp 
authorities, thus saving everyone a beating. To a certain extent, this necessitated the 
committee having a realistic attitude towards cooperating with the camp authorities. As 
Joe Norman, a Communist and a member of the camp committee described,
The function of the committee, any problems- because we did get problems, surprisingly, 
you know, people fell out with each other and that sort of thing. You had to pacify them 
and explain that it’s not a thing to do. You don’t want to give the fascist guard a chance 
to come at you.80
The negotiation came despite protests from a number of the prisoners that this would 
only provoke the authorities into further acts of violence. Danny Gibbons, who was a CP 
official and the battalion secretary, was threatened with being thrown out of a window by 
some o f the prisoners who were alarmed by his agitation. Indeed, the party officials were 
informed categorically by the camp authorities that orders were not to be questioned but 
to be carried out, or, “serious consequences would result”, which the prisoners reasonably 
concluded, meant that those disobeying would be shot.81
Maintaining a disciplined military manner when being drilled or paraded could easily 
be justified for the prisoners were, after all, members o f the International Brigade, but
79 They Fought in Franco's Jails, p.l 1.
80 Interview with Joe Norman, IWMSA 818/4/3.
81 IBA Box C File 3/1“.
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kneeling for Catholic Mass, for example, was not accepted willingly by some prisoners. 
Two German prisoners who refused to kneel met a swift and brutal response from the 
authorities:
They were immediately beaten by an officer, while the other officers “crossed” 
themselves. The two Germans were further punished by being put in the calabouse 
[sic].82
Another point of contention was the saluting of the Nationalist flag, and the shouting of 
‘Franco’, which had to accompany giving the fascist salute.83 Not surprisingly there was 
a general unease at this, and many prisoners cooperated half-heartedly at best. This was 
often rewarded with a beating. The committee recognised that here they faced an 
awkward dilemma, and pragmatically sought a compromise. However, this approach 
created its own problems, and opened the committee up to criticisms that they were not 
firm enough in resisting the authorities’ demands and too easily succumbed to threats 
from the authorities.84
Criticisms of the committee eventually died down when it was realised that the 
British committee was not making decisions autonomously, but were consulting with 
committees from other national groups. Certainly the committee’s conciliatory approach 
to the authorities was not an unqualified success; despite their attempts, beatings with 
sticks, rubber piping and riding crops were a regular occurrence. Occasionally the
82 Ibid.
83 The report explains that, “sharp divisions arose on the manner of saluting and shouting. Everyone 
saluted, especially when in front of the officers, and no-one advocated otherwise, but the English speaking 
comrades were loath to shout ‘Franco.’” Ibid.
84 See ibid.. Two non-party prisoners were singled out in the report for opposing the Committee’s line, as 
was another prisoner, a party member. The three were George Ives, a member of the Labour Party from 
Shipley and William Collins from Glasgow. The CP member was Lionel Jacobs from Hackney in London.
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committee would warn an individual prisoner that his behaviour was “bringing trouble 
upon himself’ and that, therefore, he alone would have to take responsibility for any 
punishment meted out. One British prisoner, Robert Beggs from Glasgow, was beaten up 
on the parade ground and, despite the advice of the committee to the contrary, attempted 
to complain about the beating directly to the commandant. He was intercepted by the 
sergeants and put into the cells where he remained until the British prisoners were 
released from San Pedro.85 The effectiveness o f the committee’s approach was 
demonstrated when they wrote to the commandant about Beggs’ treatment and shortly 
afterwards the prisoners were informed that if  the prisoners followed general regulations 
there would be no more beatings. Eventually, the house committee’s policy o f negotiation 
was rewarded by official recognition from the commandant at San Pedro, in part because 
of their undeniable role in organising various activities, but also because they oversaw the 
distribution o f a fund which was formed by prisoners donating ten per-cent of monies 
received after the regime was relaxed slightly in August 1938, combined with a large 
donation of £100 from Clive Branson when he was repatriated in October 1938.86 The 
money was used to buy various items such as tobacco and chocolate for some o f the sick 
prisoners and writing materials for the lectures and classes.87
The prisoners soon developed strategies for coping with the harsh nature o f the 
regime and here the house committee set up by the Communist Party activists played a 
leading role. In addition to various language classes, there were a number of lectures 
organised on aspects o f political culture, including Marxist philosophy and a history of
85 Ibid.
86 IBA Box D-7 Files A/1 & A/6.
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the International Brigade. A course of lectures on English working-class history was 
started by one of the members of the committee, Lionel Jacobs, but was forced to be 
abandoned after pressure was applied by the camp authorities.88 Various games and 
tournaments were also organised and, for three months a handwritten newspaper, The San 
Pedro Jaily News, was published, until copies started falling into the hands of the guards, 
after which it was prudently discontinued.89 The committee even managed to organise a 
May Day celebration and a Christmas concert which consisted o f the rendition of a 
number o f old ballads. Whilst the guards applauded the singing enthusiastically, the 
prisoners’ performance of The Barber of Seville, a satire o f camp life, was less well 
received.90 Still, for the prisoners, there was a rather more surreptitious pleasure:
To the inner amusement of all prisoners, at each performance, some of the fleas in our
straw sacks left us and established new residence with our guests.91
However, playing chess, with pieces carved from at first, bread and later, soap was, as 
Walter Gregory explained, “the most popular way to isolate ourselves from the daily 
horror of life in the filth of San Pedro.”92 Towards the end of the British prisoners’ stay at 
San Pedro, reading became an increasingly popular way to pass time, particularly 
following the delivery o f a large shipment of paperback books to the camp following a 
request by Jimmy Moon to a friend of his who worked in a library in south-west
87 IBA Box C File 3/1 a and Geiser, p. 128.
88 IBA Box C File 3/1 a.
89 They Fought in Franco’s Jails, pp.12-13.
90 Geiser, pp. 188-189 and They Fought in Franco’s Jails, p. 11.
91 Geiser, p.191.
92 Gregory, p.149. See also Cyril Kent, ‘I Was in a Franco Prison’, Challenge, 5 January 1939, pp. 10-11.
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London.93 The request did not fall on deaf ears, for one of the directors of the library was 
Harold Laski, who was also on the editorial panel o f the Left Book Club.94
The committee also managed to raise issues with the British military attache in 
Burgos, Colonel C.C. Martin on his visits to the camp. The first o f these was on 11 June 
1938, when the prisoners’ refusal to perform the fascist salute in front o f Colonel Martin, 
despite the order being given twice, was met by renewed beatings.95 Concerned that 
many prisoners might have their own agendas to raise with Colonel Martin, “The 
Committee organised responsible comrades to do the talking.”96 However, some 
individuals did manage to make contact with Colonel Martin. George Wheeler, 
concerned that his parents believed him to have been killed, was desperate to get news of 
his whereabouts back to his parents, and brought the matter to Colonel Martin’s notice. 
Martin shook Wheeler’s hand and promised he would personally see to it. According to 
Wheeler, Martin never did.97
The camp committee raised various matters with Colonel Martin, such as the number 
of prisoners, the beatings, the role of the Gestapo in the camp, and the poor general 
conditions o f the medical facilities, food and quarters. However, there was very little 
improvement as a result of the visit, and a great deal of bad feeling when Colonel Martin 
stated that the British Government would be requesting a levy o f £4 per man from the one 
hundred prisoners who had been told they would shortly be transferred in preparation for
93 Geiser, p. 185.
94 Dewar, pp.121-122.
95 They Fought in Franco’s Jails, p. 13 and Alexander, p. 191.
96 IBA Box C File 3/1\
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an exchange with Italian prisoners held by the Republic.98 The British prisoners were 
transferred to the Italian-run camp at Palencia on 12 June 1938, the day after the visit 
from Colonel Martin. On the same day, Frank Ryan, the Irish Republican leader, also left 
San Pedro, though not to be repatriated. He was led away in handcuffs and sentenced to 
death at his trial on 15 June, accused by the Nationalists of commanding International 
Brigaders who had executed Nationalist prisoners captured during the Brunete 
offensive.99
The one hundred prisoners being repatriated were held until the Nationalist 
authorities received confirmation that the Italians had been released. Finally, on Saturday 
22 October 1938, confirmation was received and the British were transferred to 
Ondarreta prison at San Sebastian in northern Spain, where they were kept for a further 
two days.100 Many prisoners considered it to be worse than San Pedro, for the basement 
of the prison was full of Basques awaiting execution. On the following Monday, forty of 
the British International Brigaders were released and allowed to march over the French 
border to Irun and freedom, led by the London artist, Clive Branson.101 They arrived back 
in Britain at Victoria Station on the evening of 25 October 1938. The remaining British at 
Ondarreta were released and returned to Britain over the next few days.
97 Interview with George Wheeler, IWMSA 11442/8/7.
98 Geiser, p. 128.
99 Seven Americans wrote a letter to The Times denying the charges against Ryan. The Times, 1 June 1938, 
cited in Geiser, p. 133.
100 Geiser, p. 174.
101 IBA Box D-7 File A/1.
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For the prisoners remaining in San Pedro, the most urgent matter was to attempt to 
limit the use of beatings, which were endemic and used by the Rebel authorities to punish 
and humiliate the prisoners, on top of the hardships caused by deliberate neglect.102 The 
sergeants in charge o f the British contingent were particularly vicious; one, called 
Castenu, was nick-named ‘Sticky’ for his willingness to use a large heavy stick to beat 
the prisoners, at the slightest excuse. The others were little better: ‘Tanky’ who had been 
wounded in an Italian tank when fighting against the British Battalion on the 31 March 
1938103 usually referred to the prisoners as “rojos bastardos”;104 and ‘Froggy,’ named 
after his ‘bulbous blue eyes,’ appeared to dislike the British in particular.105 The British 
prisoners were advised that any unwillingness to obey regulations would result in the 
offenders being “shot like dogs;”106 many prisoners believed that the violence of the 
jailors was a deliberate attempt to provoke them.107
Most of the beatings resulted from a belief by the sergeants in control that the 
prisoners were undisciplined. The beatings increased substantially after the British refusal 
to salute in front of Lady Austen Chamberlain, a relative of Neville Chamberlain, who 
visited San Pedro on 8 September 1938. The camp authorities cynically issued clean 
uniforms and shoes to the prisoners. However, the impression they were attempting to
102 Almost without exception, accounts by British prisoners testify to the brutal treatment meted out by the 
guards at San Pedro de Cardena. Jimmy Moon, for example, describes how, “people were beaten every 
day.” Interview with Jimmy Moon IWMSA 15729/4/2.
103 Geiser, p. 129.
104 Interview with Jimmy Moon IWMSA 15729/4 13. George Wheeler described ‘Tanky’ as, “The most 
evil man that I ever knew...Tanky was the enemy, he hated us like mad.” IWMSA 11442/8/6.
105 Alexander, p. 188. By all accounts the feeling was mutual: George Wheeler described ‘Froggy’ as, “the 
most disgusting specimen of humanity you will ever see.” Interview with George Wheeler, IWMSA 
11442/8/6.
106 IBA Box C File 3/1“.
107 See, for example, interview with William Kelly, IWMSA 819/1/1.
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create for the visit was somewhat ruined by parading the prisoners in the rain for an hour 
before the visitors arrival. Lady Chamberlain was infuriated by the prisoners’ refusal to 
offer her the fascist salute, as was the Spanish sergeant, ‘Sticky.’108 The discipline 
increased considerably in September 1938, following the arrival of two new sergeants. 
The official report describes the regime implemented by the new guards as “a period of 
terror.” As the regime increased the level o f disciplinary measures, the party committee 
reacted by recommending that prisoners should be cautious and try to avoid provoking 
the guards. Before September the prisoners had been relatively left to their own devices, 
at least within the dormitories, but this ended dramatically. The level o f violence was 
stepped up, with prisoners regularly being taken out at night to receive beatings for 
alleged infringements o f discipline. The use o f informants was also extended, and 
information provided by them led to three prisoners accused of, “having killed and 
wounded fascist soldiers and being an officer and having sung revolutionary songs” 
receiving terrible beatings at precisely the time the British Government representative, 
Colonel Martin, was interviewing the British prisoners for the second time, on 10 
September 1938. One o f the prisoners was beaten into signing a confession and kept in 
solitary confinement for five days without light, food, water or any toilet facilities. He 
later attempted suicide and was still in isolation when the British contingent left San 
Pedro.
The daily beatings were usually doled out by ‘Sticky.’ Every day a handful o f men 
would be arbitrarily selected and given night-time beatings, which often ended in 
hospitalisation.
108 Alexander, p. 191.
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The men would be taken one by one into a small room where there were ten or a dozen 
Fascists. When the victim entered he immediately received a terrific blow in the face, and 
he was punched from one man to another right around the room. Then sticks and whips 
were used. If he fell to the floor he was kicked again to his feet, until finally he could rise 
no more. After that the hospital.109
Prisoners were regularly beaten with rifle butts and riding crops as they reached the 
foot of the dormitory stairs on their way to parade or meals, so many refused to descend 
the stairs, preferring to go without food rather than go through the ordeal. Bob Doyle, a 
veteran o f the IRA who was captured at Calaceite, remembered the brutality clearly:
If you showed discipline they would smash in with rifle butts and with sticks into the rear 
ranks to throw you into disorder to avoid the beatings. Coming down for your meals and 
saluting the flag in the morning they would line up at the door so that any attempt to 
come out in order, to allow one out at a time or two out of the door, they immediately 
disorganised the ranks. The same way if we made games of chess and sat around with 
improvised pieces they would raid them and take them away and that would be preceded 
by a beating of anyone within sight.110
Examples o f the brutality in the camp abound. Joe Norman, who was a member of the 
communist committee, was beaten up for mistakenly giving the clenched fist salute to 
two Gestapo interrogators.111 In fact many o f the prisoners believed, like Bob Doyle, that 
the beatings were part of a deliberate strategy to break the prisoners’ morale and political 
beliefs.
I would describe our treatment as brutal, demoralising and of course it was a deliberate 
strategy in every way to demoralise us and to make out that we were sub-human, that we 
could not be normal to have come and fought in the International Brigades.112
109 They Fought in Franco's Jails, p.8.
110 Interview with Bob Doyle, IWMSA 806/4/3.
111 Interview with Joe Norman, IWMSA 818/4/4,
112 Interview with Bob Doyle, IWMSA 806/4/3.
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The party committee came under considerable pressure to organise some form of 
resistance, such as refusing to leave the dormitories, or refusing to take food, but 
members were convinced that the prison authorities were attempting to provoke the 
prisoners into some form of reaction. The party committee refused to sanction any form 
of protest, arguing that there were many other nationals besides the English who would 
suffer as a result of a unilateral protest. They also argued that amongst the prisoners were 
volunteers who had attempted to desert from the battalion and others who consistently 
criticised the party and battalion leaders, who as “weak elements” could not be relied 
upon.113 Instead they decided to include in a letter home a description o f the recent events 
to the British representative, Colonel Martin, on his visit planned for the 20 November. 
The letter stated that, so far, the party committee had acted as a restraining influence on 
the other prisoners but could not continue to do so, unless the treatment improved. The 
letter was kept a secret amongst the members o f the committee but, in the event, the 
British representative never showed up. Had he done so, the effects could well have been 
dramatic, for the letter requested that a copy should be sent both to the camp authorities 
at Burgos and to the commandant. The party committee’s assessment o f the possible 
repercussions were that,
We could have taken control of the camp, whatever might have been the result after that,
but realised any such action would have had world effect.114
Instead a complaint was made to the American consul which led to a brief and 
unsatisfactory investigation by the Civil Guard.
113 IBA Box C File 3/1“.
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Not all the punishments were physical; psychological punishments were also inflicted 
on prisoners. Morien Morgan describes himself and four other prisoners being lined up 
against the wall as though they were to be executed.
I remember on one occasion about five or six of us were taken down to the courtyard, 
made to face the wall; they were going to shoot us. And there we were against the wall 
and they shoot. Deliberately missing us and having a very good laugh.115
Joe Norman was either the victim of this form of psychological torture, or very 
fortunate to survive his time at San Pedro. On two separate occasions he and other 
comrades were brought out at three o’clock in the morning and stood in front o f a firing 
squad for an hour, before being returned to the barracks. Norman believes that the only 
reason the executions did not go ahead was because Merry del Val intervened, frightened 
of creating a political furore.116
Some guards found other ways to humiliate the prisoners, such as throwing half­
smoked cigarettes to the prisoners to see the prisoners’ nicotine-fuelled scrabble or, when 
the prisoners got wise to the trick and refused to rise to the bait, offered them cigarettes to 
which cordite had been added.117 Attempts were also made to indoctrinate the prisoners 
with Nationalist propaganda. Following a visit by a priest several large shelves were put 
up in the camp and filled with books of Nationalist propaganda. To many of the 
prisoners, the handing out and reading of fascist literature by Catholic priests merely 
provided an object lesson in the Catholic Church’s role in Spain’s ruling class. When the
114 Ibid.
115 Interview with Morien Morgan, IWMSA 9856/4/4.
116 Interview with Joe Norman, IWMSA 818/4/4.
117 Interview with Jimmy Moon, IWMSA 15729/4/3.
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camp authorities discovered that the books were disappearing off the shelves, yet no 
prisoners appeared to be reading them, they tried a different tack.118 Prisoners were 
forced to listen to speeches and to attend mass, though as both were usually conducted in 
Spanish, their effectiveness was bound to be somewhat limited, even if  the prisoners had 
been susceptible.119
Aware that many of the prisoners were by no means proficient in Spanish, in July 
1938 the camp authorities attempted to persuade representatives from the various 
nationalities to read the propaganda aloud in their own languages. This gave the English 
contingent an opportunity for a rare victory over the authorities for, when asked, all 
volunteers at first denied they were English speakers, but instead that they spoke Welsh 
or ‘Scottish,’ ‘Irish’ or ‘Canadian’.120 Eventually, o f course, the ruse was discovered and 
the party committee recommended that all the volunteers should read in turn. This still 
offered opportunities for prisoners to gain a small measure of revenge. Morris Levitas, a 
volunteer from London, was instructed to read Nationalist propaganda to the other 
English-speaking volunteers. Different prisoners have different recollections of exactly 
how Levitas managed to make the text sound ridiculous, but there are many references to 
the puzzled and angry responses by the guards to the English prisoners’ laughter.121 It is 
clear that small victories such as these provided important boosts in morale for the
118 The blank paper at the back of the books was used for writing paper. The rest was probably used for 
rather more practical purposes.
119 Maurice Levitas claims the propaganda was totally ineffective, “We would not respond to any kind of 
political propaganda.” Interview with Maurice Levitas, IWMSA 16358/5/4.
120 IBA Box C File 3/1“ and, for example, interview with Lawrence Wheeler, IWMSA 11442/8/6.
121 George Wheeler describes how Levitas ignored the punctuation and inserted his own. Interview with 
George Wheeler, IWMSA 11442/8/6. However, Maurice Levitas states that he was required to read a 
fascist pamphlet responding to the Bishop of Teruel’s anti-fascist lecture and replaced the fascist responses 
to the Bishop’s questions with his own. Interview with Maurice Levitas, IWMSA 16358/5/4.
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prisoners, particularly when after a time the authorities realised the ineffectiveness of the 
exercise and the readings were discontinued.
At the same time as attempting to imbue the prisoners with Nationalists propaganda, 
the authorities were also determined to present their version of life in the camp and, 
particularly, to deny any stories of atrocities. Reports appeared in Britain in newspapers 
and journals sympathetic to their cause and this description o f the prison camp at San 
Pedro is typical of the style:
These prisoners lead an easy life at San Pedro de Cardena, for, unlike the Spanish 
prisoners, they are not called upon to work. Reveille sounds at half past seven. After 
breakfast all form up on the esplanade outside the Monastery, where the red and gold flag 
is hoisted in the middle of a small garden planted by these Communist prisoners 
themselves with designs in box of the emblems of Nationalist Spain. Then they are free, 
for the most part, to stroll about or chat or read. Two hours of drill a day provide the 
necessary exercise. Food is abundant and consists of vegetables and meat or fish. These 
two meals a day are probably better than the men ever had in Red Spain. At sundown 
they form up again to attend the ceremony of lowering the flag, saluting with outstretched 
arm as they sing the anthems of National Spain. Then, at nine-o-clock the bugle sounds 
‘Lights out.’122
Photographs were carried of healthy prisoners to support denials o f the ill treatment 
of prisoners.123 William Carney, writing for the New York Times, sent back glowing 
reports o f the treatment of prisoners by the Nationalists, which described how, 
“foreigners were treated exactly like Spanish prisoners.”124 His report was bitingly 
satirised in a cartoon called ‘As Mr Carney Saw Us.’ by James Moon, a laboratory 
technician from London, which appeared on the masthead of the prisoners’ clandestine
122 ‘A Life of Ease’, Spain, 55, (18 October 1938) pp.41-43.
123 The caption underneath the photograph reads, “Do these look as though they were “Beaten every day 
for six weeks?”” ‘Franco’s “Hell Prisons’” , Spain, 58, (8 November 1938) pp.106-107.
124 New York Times, 3 April 1938, cited in Geiser p.96.
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newspaper, The Jaily News,125 The cartoon shows the prisoners relaxing in the 
comfortable surroundings of San Pedro, spending their time reading, drinking and fishing 
in the nearby river, with the sick attended by an attractive young nurse. Reports in the 
Spanish Nationalist media were even more preposterous, describing how the prisoners 
declared themselves to be, “most contented.. .this is not a prison, it’s a rest home.”126
The attempts by the camp authorities to convince the outside world that San Pedro 
was run under a beneficial and enlightened regime did have some advantages for the 
prisoners. As early as April 1938 the authorities agreed to a visit by the Red Cross and 
the right o f prisoners to send a message home, though the message was restricted to the 
phrase, ‘Notificandoles que me encuentro b ien '121 To a certain extent the attempts to 
dupe visitors to the camp were successful; though it could also be that, like the inspectors 
overlooking the non-intervention agreement, those examining the camps turned a blind 
eye to any awkward matters. In a letter to Charlotte Haldane, the secretary of the 
Dependents’ Aid Committee, in January 1939, the Foreign Office insisted that, “Mr 
Jerram [the acting British agent at Burgos] states that he had been informed by Colonel 
Miracles that the prisoners were well fed”.128 Similarly, in a letter to the father of Jimmy 
Moon in early January 1939, the Foreign Office assured Mr Moon that conditions in San 
Pedro were satisfactory:
With regards to the question of the conditions in which the British prisoners are being 
kept, I am to state that when Colonel Martin, a member of the staff of the British Agency,
125 Jaily News, 11 August 1938, p. 1. The cartoon appears in Alexander, p. 190.
126 Diario de Burgos, 1 April 1938, cited in Geiser, p.l 18.
127 ‘Notifying you that I am well.’ Gradually the restrictions were lifted- by Mid-June, prisoners were free 
to write home and to request money, though it could takes months to receive a reply. Geiser, p. 131.
128 Letter from Foreign Office to Charlotte Haldane, 11 January 1939. PRO F0371/24122-W22.
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visited the camp at San Pedro de Cardena [sic] in November last he considered that the 
prisoners appeared to be well cared for. According to earlier reports, Colonel Martin had 
found the prisoners well nourished and in good health.129
Within San Pedro, attempts to demonstrate to the prisoners the error o f their ways and 
the misguided nature of their cause continued. Prisoners were given a pamphlet to read, 
allegedly written by a former member of the British Battalion, which was critical of the 
International Brigade.130 In response, the British leaders claimed that he had been a 
drunkard and sent back to England. As the American prisoner Carl Geiser remarked 
sardonically, “The British thought he had written it for pay. The paper was 
appreciated.”131
Attempts were made by the camp authorities both to assess the success of the 
Nationalist propaganda on the prisoners and to obtain information from them. A few of 
the British were questioned by the Gestapo at various times during their incarceration at 
San Pedro, though the Italian and German prisoners were questioned on a daily basis. 
Interrogators were keen to determine how the volunteers were recruited, how they arrived 
in Spain and whether or not they were communists.132 They also attempted to discover 
military information about the workings of the brigade: who were the officers, where 
were the volunteers when captured and were they carrying a gun. The response of the 
party committee to the questioning was to recommend a clear and straightforward 
response to the interrogations, that:
129 Letter to T. Moon, 10 January 1939. PRO FO371/24122-W207.
130 Anon. In Spain with the International Brigade: A personal narrative (London: Bums Oates and 
Washbome, 1938). The author was probably Alec Alexander, a labourer from Liverpool, who became 
disaffected with the International Brigade in Spain.
131 Geiser, p. 141.
264
Prisoners o f  war
We had come to Spain to fight for democracy, that we were armed when captured and to 
refuse any information concerning the Battalion and the officers.133
Some volunteers denied they had been carrying a gun; Bernard McKenna from 
Manchester claimed that he had been in the transmissions department and maintained he 
was, “an innocent bystander.”134 Rather more bizarre were the psychological tests that the 
prisoners were subjected to during interrogations. In addition to detailed measurements 
being taken o f the volunteers’ physical characteristics, the prisoners were required to 
complete a questionnaire containing two hundred-odd questions dealing with their 
personal lives: intimate personal questions about the volunteers’ families, politics and 
trade unions. They also asked rather more philosophical questions on the volunteers’ 
perceptions of the USSR, Francoist Spain and their own countries, and what they 
understood o f the meaning of political terminologies such as communism and democracy 
and other questions relating to their ‘cultural development.’ As the prisoners recognised, 
the authorities’ aims of these questions were to attempt to provide evidence for three 
features o f rightist ideology and/or propaganda: to justify the Nazi beliefs on race; to 
show the International volunteers were the dregs o f degenerate western democracies, and 
to attempt to discover the identity of the leading elements amongst the prisoners.135 Or as 
one prisoner put it rather succinctly:
To show to the world what a lot of morons we were. It was a lot of questions related to 
drink and sex.136
132 Many prisoners were also concerned that Jewish volunteers might be targeted. Thus pseudonyms were 
used by some. See IBA Box D-7 File A/6 and interview with Jimmy Moon, IWMSA 15729/4/2.
133 IBA Box C File 3 /la.
134 Hall, pp. 101-102.
135 IBA Box C File 3 /la.
136 Interview with George Wheeler, IWMSA 11442/8/7.
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The rather formulaic and unsophisticated nature of the questioning meant that the 
camp authorities were not likely to be successful in their attempts to glean information. In 
fact, the official report claimed instead that, “Many times the examiners were the ones 
being tested.”137 Certainly there was ample opportunity for the prisoners to agree 
common answers to the questions.
There were a number of prisoners who attempted to escape, despite the inherent risks 
involved. In total there were sixteen attempts by prisoners to escape from the camp, of 
which only two were known by the British committee to have been successful. One of the 
successful attempts was particularly audacious:
One International.. .decided he didn’t like the camp, and walked north up a dirt pathway, 
having picked up a nearby garbage container as if to dump it. The guards allowed him to 
pass. When he was out of sight, he kept going. The prison authorities had not yet made a 
list of all the Internationals, so they didn’t miss him. Several months later we received a 
card from him postmarked in France.138
The majority o f the escape attempts were by the Italian or German brigaders who were 
fully aware of the reception waiting for them in their homeland.
The Gestapo used to go round the camp telling the Spanish fascist that they would shoot 
the German I.B.ers when they got back to Germany if the Spanish Fascists didn’t. There 
was a German lad who spoke Spanish like the natives, who decided to escape. There was 
a discussion among the German lads and a bunch of them decided they were going to 
have a go. But this lad was recaptured. They stood him outside the entrance where we 
had to come for our meals. He was so battered it was incredible to see. They put him 
down to a real punishment cell. We had everything arranged so the lads got milk and so 
on down to him. It took a fortnight to get the pieces of shirt out of his flesh -  they’d 
carved him up with the whip so much.139
137 IBA Box C File 3/1“.
138 Geiser, p. 103.
139 Shaer, op cit.
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To discourage escape attempts, the authorities ensured that the escapees were not the 
only ones to be punished. By the end of the summer of 1938 the authorities had made the 
prisoners responsible for their own discipline, following the formation of the Communist 
committees. Each of the two floors in the camp was guarded by three prisoners, so when 
there were escapes, the guards would be punished first. In some cases escapes were made 
with the full knowledge of the camp committee: two monitors were supplied with 
financial assistance as well as information by the party committee, as were the last six 
German prisoners to escape on the night of the 14-15 November 1938.140 The six 
Germans escaped by sawing through the iron bars covering the windows and had ripped 
up mattresses to use as ropes. Disposing of the straw inside the mattresses presented a 
problem, which was surmounted by floating the straw out of the camp in small 
handfuls.141 Not unreasonably, the guards concluded other prisoners must have been 
involved in assisting the prisoners to escape, and “two days o f terror” followed at San 
Pedro. On parade the prisoners were threatened by a captain, in temporary charge of the 
camp whilst the commandant was on leave, who informed them that his wish was to see 
all the prisoners shot. During the next few days very few prisoners escaped being beaten, 
with the six prisoners on watch during the night of the escape receiving particularly 
vicious beatings. One of the six was British, David Kennedy from Greenock in 
Scotland,142 who was so badly beaten that he was hospitalised for two weeks; if  possible, 
the Germans were treated even more harshly. Two German prisoners who had been
140 IBA Box C File 3/la. Carl Geiser states that the escape was on the previous night of the 13 November.
141 Interview with Morien Morgan, IWMSA 9856/4/3.
142 The official report (IBA Box C File 3/la) refers to him as English, but he was actually a Scot. See IBA 
Box D-7 File A/1.
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sleeping near the site of the escape were terribly beaten and thrown into calaboose, ‘the 
black hole.’ Complaints that they were in need of urgent medical attention were ignored 
by ‘Sticky’; they were only released a week later when the Major in charge o f the camp 
realised that prisoners dying from beatings would only make his position worse. All six 
German escapees were recaptured and were thrown back into ‘the black hole’ in San 
Pedro, following harsh beatings. The Gestapo agents in the camp were brutal in their 
interrogations of prisoners who had been caught attempting to escape. In many cases they 
questioned the returning captives on the situation outside the camp, clearly under the 
belief that prisoners were making contact with Republican supporters on the outside.143
The remaining seventy-five British prisoners remained at San Pedro until another 
exchange was arranged. On 23 January 1939 the British, together with around thirty 
Canadian and a small number of Swiss prisoners, left San Pedro.144 They were exchanged 
at the rate o f one International to ten Italian soldiers; a policy which later led to the 
volunteers’ claim that one British volunteer was equal to ten Italian Nationalist soldiers. 
The prisoners were then transferred to Ondarreta jail in San Sebastian before they finally 
returned home in early February 1939.145 On 16 February 1939, the British Consul at 
Valencia, Goodden, arranged for another thirty-four British, and eleven Swiss, to be 
exchanged for forty-five Italians.146 As there were insufficient Italian prisoners, ten 
British prisoners remained in San Sebastian jail for a further three months, until finally 
being released in April 1939.
143 IBA Box C File 3/1“.
144 ‘Franco Will Never Conquer the Spanish’, Challenge, 20 February 1939 p.6. (Penned by David 
Goodman).
145 ‘General Franco Frees 67 Britons’, Daily Telegraph, 6 February 1939 p.7.
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As with the other British volunteers repatriated from Spain, the Foreign Office stated 
that, “Undertakings to refund the cost of repatriation should be obtained from British 
prisoners.”147 Bill Alexander states that there are no records of any o f these requests 
being paid,148 though at least one ex-prisoner later admitted having paid the levy.149 
Many veterans believe that the British Government did very little to help the prisoners 
and the treatment during the prisoners’ repatriation by British Government 
representatives, such as demands for payment, made many feel extremely bitter. Bruce 
Allender describes how the released prisoners were met by one solitary British 
representative in Hendaye, who made it clear how the prisoners were viewed by many, if 
not most, o f those working in the Foreign Office
They stripped us of our clothing.. .this is the British Embassy, the sods. They were really 
nasty, you know, the British. Altogether. When I say altogether I only mean one. I only 
saw one. Who was a toffee nosed little bastard.. .He treated us like dirt.150
Likewise, George Wheeler complained that following their release, all the food and drink 
on the train through France had been provided by the Canadian Government.
The Canadian Government provided everything. I’m sorry to say that the British 
Government didn’t contribute a thing.. .That was the British Government for you. They 
didn’t care tuppence.151
46 Geiser, p. 198.
47 PRO F0371/24122-W784.
48 Alexander, p.241.
49 Interview with Morien Morgan, IWMSA 9856/4/4 and with George Drever, in MacDougall, p.288.
50 Interview with Bruce Allender, IWMSA 11300/4/3.
51 Interview with Lawrence George Wheeler, IWMSA 11442/8/7-8.
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Two prisoners were still not released even in April 1939; Tom Jones, a Welsh miner 
from Wrexham and the Irishman Frank Ryan, who had been sentenced to death. Both 
were connected to Nationalist movements in their respective countries and it has been 
suggested that the Nazi regime hoped to make use of them in some manner.152 The death 
sentences on both were commuted to thirty years imprisonment. A powerful campaign to 
secure the release of the two was launched in Ireland and Britain which gained support 
from people in Canada and America and huge amounts of mail and food parcels were 
sent to the two. At one stage appeals were made in parliament for Ryan’s release and 
‘Release Frank Ryan or else’ was painted in huge letters alongside the River Thames.153 
A telegram sent from the British representative in Burgos to the Foreign Office in 
London in February 1939 shows that representatives of the British Government were 
trying get Frank Ryan included in the group to be repatriated- despite his IRA past- but 
were not meeting with any success.154 Eventually Jones was released on the 20 March 
1940; Ryan, however, was not and, instead, was taken to Germany in July. Ryan 
eventually died in Dresden jail in June 1944.155
152 Alexander, p. 193.
153 Geiser, p. 133.
154 A telegram of 10 February 1939, from Burgos to London stated that there believed to be twelve British 
prisoners still at Burgos and another two at Bilbao. The telegram remarked that, “I cannot at present get 
Frank Ryan included in the exchange but I am making further efforts.” PRO F0371/24123-W2491.
155 For the full story of Ryan’s incarceration, see Cronin, op cit.
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“The international movement can and must be regarded as the 
highest manifestation of progressive humanity’s international 
solidarity with the heroic people of Spain.”
Report from Colonel K. Sverchevsky, [‘General Walter’] to Com. 
Voroshilov, People’s commissar of the Defence of the USSR, 
Marshall of the Soviet Union, 20 November 1938, Moscow 
33987/3/1149 cited in Ronald Radosh, Mary M. Habeck, & 
Grigory Sevostianov, (eds.). Spain Betrayed. The Soviet Union in 
the Spanish Civil War (London: Yale University Press, 2001) 
p.471.
“The Brigades were, from beginning to end, a Comintern army. 
The Brigades would never have existed but for the Soviet- 
Comintem decision to call them into being.”
R. Dan Richardson, Comintern Army (University of Kentucky 
Press, 1982) p. 177.
For many years after the end of the war in Spain, the history of the British volunteers 
in Spain remained in the safe hands of members of the battalion, or their ardent 
supporters. Thus, Frank Ryan, Bill Rust and Bill Alexander, the authors respectively of 
The Book o f the XVth Brigade (1939), Britons in Spain (1939) and British Volunteers for 
Liberty (1982), were described accurately by one later observer as, “keepers of the story 
by which they wanted the battalion to be remembered.”1 In these works, the legend of the 
International Brigades was a heroic tale of international working-class solidarity, a lesson 
in ‘strength and unity,’ to use Bill Alexander’s phrase. Over the years, as the full horror 
of what the ‘new civilisation’ o f Soviet Russia actually meant gradually dawned, the 
heroic struggle of the Spanish Republic against the barbarous invasion by Italy and 
Germany, and the help from democratic supporters around the world for the International
1 Hopkins, p.xi.
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Brigades became, for many, the one thing to be looked back on with pride; ‘the last great 
cause.’
However, many have felt that this view is simplistic in the extreme. As early as 1937, 
George Orwell had been arguing that the notion of ‘good versus evil,’ or ‘democracy 
versus fascism’ was extremely problematic. Despite the limited scope of Homage to 
Catalonia, the accusations levelled at the role of the Communist Party in Spain- 
especially the brutal suppression of the POUM- have made their mark, and the argument 
over ‘war or revolution’ is still repeated endlessly in classrooms, seminars and, more 
recently, in internet discussion lists.2 And despite the efforts of Bill Alexander and his 
cohorts to hold the line established in 1936, the image of the International Brigades has 
come under a prolonged and sustained attack from both left and right. Alexander’s 
attempt to face down these attacks with the publication of British Volunteers fo r  Liberty 
was, at the same time, both a success and a failure. It was successful in that the book 
benefited greatly from the intimate personal knowledge o f Bill Alexander and other 
volunteers, which enabled him to rectify many of the weaknesses and omissions in the 
earlier works to make British Volunteers for Liberty the standard work on the British 
Battalion. But it was also a failure, for the work was too heavily steeped in the world of 
the 1930s and either skirted around, or played down issues- such as the executions of
2 The dispute essentially rested on two opposing beliefs; the first, put forward by the Communists, was that 
the first priority was to win the war, thus the revolution should be put on hold. The alternative view, 
expounded by the Anarchists and the POUM, was that this was a revolutionary war, that war and revolution 
were thus inseparable. Whilst the former argument is seductive (as George Orwell himself recognised), the 
problem was that it provided an ideological smokescreen for the suppression of those supporting the 
alternative perspective. See George Orwell, Homage to Catalonia (London: Seeker & Warburg, 1938) 
pp.58-64 for his original analysis.
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deserters- that challenged the heroic legend of the International Brigades in the Spanish 
Civil War.
The first major study to begin the attempt to revise attitudes towards the brigades was 
R. Dan Richardson’s Comintern Army, published in 1982. The book, in Richardson’s 
words, challenged,
The appealing idea that the men of those first international contingents, and the thousands 
who were to follow them into the whirlwind of the civil war in Spain, represented the 
response of world democracy to the threat of fascism.3
Richardson argued that the significance of the brigades went beyond the military, that, 
“they were a significant political, ideological and propaganda instrument which could be- 
and was- used by the Comintern for its own purposes, not only inside Spain but on the 
larger world stage.”4 For Richardson,
The origins of the International Brigades are to be found in the working out of a Soviet- 
Comintem policy of worldwide scope and not, as some would have it, the spontaneous 
response of world democracy to the threat of fascism in Spain. To put it differently, 
without the Soviet-Comintem decision to intervene directly in the Spanish war and, as 
part of that intervention, create a volunteer force for use in Spain, the International 
Brigades would never have come into existence.5
However, this is really little more than counter-factual speculation. The international 
response to the Spanish war began before the Comintern started to organise recruitment 
and was first and foremost a reaction to German and Italian involvement, rather than a
3 Richardson, p. 1.
4 Ibid, p.2.
5 Richardson, pp.14-15. This paragraph is quoted in Hopkins (p.153) and appears to form the basis of much 
of his interpretation of the role of the Communist Party in the International Brigades and Spain, though he 
does go on to admit that both Jason Gumey and Fred Copeman claim that the Communist Party simply
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Soviet creation to further their strategic and political interests. By the time Comintern 
involvement was making itself felt, many foreigners, such as the English artist Felicia 
Browne, had already died fighting the Rebels. The sophisticated level of organisation of 
the Communist Party enabled the International Brigades to become a disciplined fighting 
force, but the will to fight against the uprising was not something the Comintern created, 
though they could, and indeed did, put the willingness to effective use.
Richardson draws a distinction between the early volunteers who fought with the 
militia units affiliated to particular political groups such as the Anarchists or POUM, and 
the large number of -overwhelmingly communist- volunteers who fought in the 
communist run International Brigades themselves:
The fact that some of the foreign militiamen were ultimately incorporated into the 
Brigades demonstrates rather that the Brigades were a new, different, and essentially 
unconnected development.”6
As I have shown, there was a higher proportion of middle class volunteers amongst 
the early volunteers (that is, those arriving before December 1936), but there is little 
evidence to suggest that there were substantial political differences between the first few 
and the later recruits, only that the organisational structure provided by the Communist 
Party allowed those who might not otherwise have been able to travel to Spain easily 
with the means to do so. As chapter three demonstrated, whilst the John Comfords and 
Ralph Foxes had passports and the wherewithal, they were not typical; working-class
took advantage of a popular sympathy for the Spanish Republic: “Ultimately, Moscow would take 
possession of this idealism and shape it for its own purposes.” Hopkins, p. 156.
6 Richardson, p.23.
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non-party members and members alike were already leaving for Spain. And as Helen 
Graham argues,
The way the Comintern stepped in to coordinate the mobilisation of volunteer fighters for 
the Republic provides a perfect example of Soviet caution.. .the International Brigades 
were far from being a ‘Comintern Army’, (i.e. an instrument for the political domination 
of the Republic). They were shock troops, part of Stalin’s emergency planning. The 
Comintern provided die vital organisational mechanism that made it possible 
systematically to channel to Spain the military expertise of the international left in order 
to stave off imminent Republican defeat in the autumn of 1936. But the political and 
social motives that took the Brigaders to Spain were as complex as those of the first 
volunteers who had gone to Spain without organisational back-up. Seen in their full 
historical context, the International Brigades were no more Stalin’s ‘invention’ than was 
the dynamic of European Popular Front itself.7
Since the opening of the Comintern Archive in Moscow, the process of revision has 
accelerated. Works emanating from the United States such as Herbert Romerstein’s 
Heroic Victims (1994), The Secret World o f American Communism (1995) by Harvey 
Klehr, J.E. Haynes and F.I. Firsov and, more recently, Spain Betrayed (2001), edited by 
Ronald Radosh, Mary M. Habeck and Grigory Sevostianov, make extensive use of the 
Moscow material to demonstrate communist domination, and more significantly, 
Comintern control, of the brigades.
Communists did indeed dominate the British Battalion for, as chapter one has 
stressed, the British volunteers were overwhelmingly communist. However, this 
description, though factually accurate, is too simplistic, for it suggests that the members 
of the Communist Party were a homogeneous block, a ‘phalanx o f disciplined Comintern 
warriors.’ In fact, the reasons for joining the party were as diverse as the reasons that led
7 Review of Antonio Elorza & Marta Bizcarrondo, Queridos camaradas. La Internacional Comunista y  
Espana 1919-1939 (Barcelona: Planeta, 1999) by Helen Graham, in The Volunteer, 23:5, (Winter 2001) 
pp. 17-19.
275
Conclusions: Volunteers for Liberty or Comintern Army?
to volunteering for Spain, though most of the volunteers shared a belief that mainstream 
conventional politics was not serving the interests o f working-class people. The high 
levels of unemployment of the Great Depression- with over two million still unemployed 
in Britain in 19358- means testing, and the rise of Mosley’s British Union of Fascists, 
provided ample evidence for those looking for it. At the same time, the hostile response 
of the official labour movement to both the National Unemployed Workers’ Movement 
and the hunger marches- not forgetting Ramsay MacDonald’s willingness, following the 
great split of 1931, to sit with the Conservatives in a National Government- led people to 
look for alternative political cultures.9 Some joined the Independent Labour Party (ILP), 
though the ILP was, by 1936, a party in decline, “a regional (primarily Scottish) political 
force.”10 Others turned to the Communist Party, and though the party never made any real 
inroads into parliamentary politics, it became a noisier and rather more serious force of 
resistance once the disastrous policy of ‘class against class’ had been replaced by 
‘popular frontism.’11 For those in Britain who believed that direct action was needed to 
fight injustice, inequality and the spread of fascism, it is not hard to see why, in the 
1930s, the Communist Party would have been a great attraction. As George Leeson, an
8 B.R. Mitchell, & P Deane, Abstract o f British Historical Statistics (Cambridge University Press, 1971) 
p.66, cited in Stevenson & Cook, p.311.
9 The leaders of the trade union movement where exceedingly reluctant to become embroiled into industrial 
action on behalf of the Spanish Republic, partly because of the legacy of the General Strike, but also due to 
the fear and loathing of Communism by those like Walter Citrine, the leader of the TUC and Ernest Bevin, 
leader of the powerful T&GWU. Citrine advised all Trade Councils not to provide assistance to the hunger 
marchers. The Labour Party were not in position to challenge the National Government in parliament, who 
had a majority over the Liberals and Labour of 249 seats. See Buchanan, The British Labour Movement, 
p.63 and Stevenson & Cook, p. 187.
10 As R.E Dowse argues, by disaffiliating from the Labour Party in July 1932, “the I.L.P. had, in effect, cut 
itself completely from the organised working-class.” R.E. Dowse, Left in the Centre: The Independent 
Labour Party, 1893-1940 (London: Longmans, 1966) p. 189.
11 Tom Buchanan points out that, “On Spain, as on most political issues in the later 1930s, the Communist 
Party was undoubtedly the most energetic force on the British left.” Buchanan, Britain and the Spanish 
Civil War, p.74.
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Irish bom Londoner explained, his reasons for joining the party and volunteering for 
Spain were inseparable,
The reason why I joined the Communist Party is partly the reason why I went to 
Spain...My basic feelings and beliefs made me an anti-fascist, opposed to Hitler and were 
my reasons for joining the Communist Party and going to Spain...I looked around and 
thought the Labour Party doesn’t seem to be doing very much, they are pretty tame 
anyway and I thought the only people who seem to be doing anything that leads to what I 
believe in- Socialism- were the Communists, even of they were a small group.12
The accusation of Comintern control of the brigades is based upon the indisputable 
fact that the senior military commanders were Comintern appointments, even though the 
shortage of middle-ranking officers in the Republican army is well-established, as is the 
lack of military experience amongst many of the international volunteers.13 Furthermore, 
of those Spanish officers who did stay with the Republic, there was no real means of 
knowing if  their loyalty could be guaranteed.
Likewise, it is argued that the system of political commissars was instigated by the 
Comintern to maintain political discipline or, in fact, to suppress heterodoxy. This 
criticism of the role o f the Comintern in the International Brigades- that it fostered a lack 
of toleration for any form of political nonconformity- is the major theme of the recent 
study of the British volunteers by James Hopkins which, whilst considerably more 
measured than the works of Richardson and Radosh, nevertheless maintains that there 
was a clear schism between the leadership and the rank and file. Hopkins appears to agree
12 Interview with George Leeson, IWMSA 803/4/1.
13 For example, Radosh cites a letter from Marty to Moscow requesting experienced military commanders 
as evidence of the Comintern’s determination to control the brigades, even though the document states that, 
of the recruits, “one third have insufficient military training [and] the command staff is extremely small and 
insufficiently qualified.” Moscow 33987/3/832, cited in Radosh, pp. 103-105.
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with Romerstein that many of the volunteers were ‘heroic victims,’ facing totalitarianism 
not just from the Rebels, but also from the Comintern who held the brigades in an iron 
grip. The Communist leadership, at battalion level and higher, comes into particular 
criticism, though he is less critical of the lower echelons o f the British Battalion, 
believing that they had little access to impartial information on which to base their 
thoughts, as all reading matter was controlled by the party; the Daily Worker, “the 
newspaper of working-class militants consistently misled or lied to them.”14 Hopkins 
argues that the leadership of the Communist Party, both at national and international 
level, cynically used the International Brigades to further the aims of the Communist 
Party, which, he argues, were inextricably intertwined with the foreign policy of the 
USSR. Thus the accusation that appeared in the contemporary press that the volunteers 
were ‘dupes’ returns. Hopkins’ summary is explicit in its criticism:
If the men on the battlefield sought to live their political ideals on the battlefields of 
Spain, they were betrayed by the party that made it possible for them to be there.15
However, the level o f Comintern control over the British volunteers in the 
International Brigades may have been exaggerated, just as the extent o f Comintern
14 Hopkins, p.213. However, later in his book, Hopkins conversely argues that, “it is hard to believe that at 
some level the volunteers did not know what was taking place.” Hopkins, p.279. If members of the 
battalion were denied the means to discover information for themselves, this latter claim seems a little 
unfair.
15 Hopkins, p.317. However, as Fred Thomas who fought with the Anti-Tank Battery has pointed out, 
Hopkins sometimes places too much reliance on volunteers’ testimonies, which are often rather subjective 
and impressionistic (Letter from Fred Thomas to Richard Baxell, 27 September 1999). For example, 
Hopkins readiness to accept Fred Copeman’s claim that he created an anti-tank battery composed of ‘good 
looking students’ to keep the middle and working-class Communists separated in a kind of apartheid, is 
disputed by all the ex-members of the British Anti-Tank Battery that I have talked to, who recollect that it 
was the battery’s commander, Malcolm Dunbar, rather than Fred Copeman, who chose the members. There 
seems little doubt that many of Copeman’s assertions should be treated with caution. They also include 
claims that Tom Wintringham shot himself at Jarama, that Bob Merriman and Walter Tapsell were 
executed by the Communist Party to keep them quiet, and that homosexuality was rife in the British 
Battalion. Interview with Fred Copeman, IWMSA 794/13/2-8. See also chapter 4.
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control of the British Communist Party has been shown to be likewise.16 Just as the 
CPGB was given a certain amount of ‘slack in the line,’ so the British Battalion was 
allowed a certain degree of autonomy. And just as, “by the later 1930s, Pollitt was 
becoming increasingly irked by the Comintern,”17 many senior members of the British 
Battalion were feeling likewise about the members of XV Brigade Staff.18 Furthermore, 
as I will show, the British Battalion maintained a much more compassionate attitude 
towards deserters than some of the other battalions, despite pressure from above.
Likewise, though most volunteers accepted the ‘Moscow line’ during their time in 
Spain, this does not mean that they were all blind adherents or ‘true believers,’ but rather 
fellow travellers who used the Communist Party’s resources to get them to Spain.19 Not 
all the commanders of the battalion were communists or, at least, not when they
16 See Andrew Thorpe, ‘Comintern ‘Control’ of the Communist Party of Great Britain, 1920-43’, English 
Historical Review (June, 1998) pp.637-662 and Andrew Thorpe, ‘The Communist International and the 
British Communist Party’, in Tim Rees, & Andrew Thorpe, (eds.). International Communism and the 
Communist International, 1919-1943 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999) pp.67-86.
17 Thorpe, ‘The Communist International,’ p.80.
18 In a confidential report written in December 1937, Bill Rust stated that, “[Fred] Copeman refers, almost 
without exception, to the Brigade in a disparaging fashion.” Rust also claimed that these sentiments were 
widespread amongst senior figures in the British Battalion: “[Copeman] has also been successful in 
infecting C[omra]de [Bill] Alexander his adjutant with the same attitude and S[am] Wild has a long 
established anti-brigade tradition. Also [Ted] Edwards- battalion sec[retar]y is just a weakling who swims 
with the tide- in this case against the brigade.” According to the report, only Walter Tapsell, the battalion 
commissar, spoke up for the brigade staff and was thus “treated by Copeman and Wild with contempt.” In a 
clear demonstration of the importance of keeping these critical reports in perspective, Rust still 
acknowledged that, assuming Copeman could be brought back into line, he possessed many “sterling 
qualities as a battalion commander.” PS AR 6, AHN Salamanca, pp. 1-4.
19 Many of these would later leave the Communist Party. Whilst some volunteers maintained their support 
for the USSR for a number of years after the end of the Spanish years, others did not. Some like Fred 
Thomas and John Angus left when the Soviet Union’s policies no longer coincided with theirs; others, like 
Leslie Preger, left the party even earlier; he left when he returned home from Spain: “I just drifted away, 
especially because of their attitude towards the P.O.U.M.ists and anarchists. The Daily Worker had 
accounts of the P.O.U.M.ists playing football with Franco’s troops. I thought there are some things I can’t 
accept and when the trials started and every leading theoretician of the Russian Party suddenly turned out to 
be a Western spy I just couldn’t accept all those things.” Interview with Leslie Preger, in Corkhill & 
Rawnsley, p.33. Likewise, Bernard Knox left the party over the show trials of the old Bolsheviks in 1937 
and Russia’s brutal annexation of the Balkan states and the war in Finland. He was appalled and disgusted
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volunteered.20 Sam Wild only joined the party in Spain as, so he claims, did Fred 
Copeman, despite his history as an activist. They were hardly unrepresentative; of the 
five hundred odd members of the Communist Party who list a date o f joining, over forty 
per-cent of them joined in 1936 or later.21
The volunteers were not ‘dupes,’ they went to Spain to fight fascism and most still 
believe, with some justification, that they did just that. In this sense the relationship 
between the Communist Party and the volunteers is more symbiotic than parasitic, for the 
party greatly facilitated the process of volunteering for, and travelling to, the war in 
Spain. And whilst they were in Spain the volunteers acknowledged what many 
commentators seem to ignore; that the Republic was involved in a life or death struggle 
and that, as George Orwell himself recognised, ‘war is bloody.’ The myth of the ‘last 
great cause’ has prevented many supporters of the Republic from accepting that the 
censorship, the imprisonment o f insubordinates, and the occasionally callous treatment of 
deserters that occurred within the Republican zone, are not necessarily symptoms of the 
‘Stalinization’ o f Republican Spain, but could also be seen as the desperate reaction of 
the Republican army in a bitter struggle for its very survival.
when he heard of the recall of General Kleber and his subsequent execution. Bernard Knox, Premature 
Anti-Fascist (New York University, 1998) p.l 1.
20 Miles Tomalin later claimed that “Promotion in our brigades, and presumably throughout the Republican 
Army, was based solely on service record.” However, this claim should be seen in the light of his statement 
which followed: “The best soldiers were generally the men with the deepest social convictions.” Miles 
Tomalin, ‘Memories of the Spanish War’, New Statesman (31 October 1975) p.541.
21 Source: Moscow 545/6/95 and IWMSA interview material.
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But for critics o f Soviet intervention in Spain, the suppression in the Republican zone 
is seen not as a reaction to the war, but as an extension of Stalin’s purges in the Soviet 
Union. As R. Dan Richardson argues,
The mentality of political suspicion, hatred, terror and murder that was then running its 
grotesque and bloody course in the Soviet Union and that cast its spell throughout the 
Comintern spilled over into Spain and the International Brigades.22
Likewise, James Hopkins claims that, “Stalin had every intention of achieving 
effective dictatorship in Spain but behind an anti-fascist fa9ade.”23 This belief is 
particularly explicit in the works by Romerstein and Radosh, who have a mutual distrust 
of the Communist Party’s, the Comintern’s and Stalin’s role, which they seem to consider 
one and the same. These commentators argue that Stalin supported the Republic, not so 
much because he wished to prevent Spain becoming another fascist state, but in order to 
establish a ‘peoples’ democracy,’ along the line of the later eastern European states.
Despite ample evidence of the extent of Soviet influence in Spain, this seems 
unlikely; not out o f any altruistic motives o f ‘solidarity’ by Stalin, but because the 
USSR’s security lay in the hope fostering detente with the western democracies, which 
Stalin was fully aware would be dashed by any sign of sponsorship o f a social revolution 
by the USSR or the Comintern. Indeed, on this point, that the Communist Party in Spain 
acted as a counter-revolutionary force, there is a rare consensus. Like Chamberlain, Stalin 
viewed the Spanish war from the context of increasing German strength and how he 
might use Spain to limit Hitler’s expansionism. First, by keeping Germany involved in
22 Richardson, p. 159.
23 Hopkins, p.l 51.
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the war as long as possible and, later, when it became clear that the Republic would lose, 
looking for alternative solutions. Ironically, as Alan Bullock has argued, there are 
parallels in the attitudes o f Stalin and Hitler towards the Spanish war,
Both Hitler and Stalin valued the diversionary effect of the war, Hitler in allowing 
Germany to continue rearmament, and Stalin in keeping the other European powers 
divided and so allowing him to carry out the purges [within the USSR] without anxiety 
about external threats.24
There is also a parallel between Stalin’s aims within Spain and Europe: whilst 
fostering ‘social revolution’ might be considered a long-term (almost theoretical) 
aspiration, for Stalin the threat of a resurgent Germany was a much more immediate 
concern. Thus the revolution in Spain was a lower priority than the survival o f the 
Republic, just as a revolution in Europe was a lower priority than the survival o f the 
USSR.
Much of the evidence for the Communist Party’s political intolerance in the brigades 
comes from the large number o f files in Moscow containing appraisals of the volunteers, 
drawn up by their military and political leaders. However, as Cary Nelson has pointed 
out, the- often highly derogatory- comments were written for party officials back home, 
and remarks such as ‘lumpen element’ should be seen in context.25 The British volunteers 
had at best, limited military experience, and were thrown into a brutal war where the 
likelihood of death or serious injury was undeniable. Viewed in this light, it is perhaps 
not surprising that a number o f individuals failed to measure up to the party’s strict 
criteria, and reacted to the stresses of war by drinking excessively or deserting. The list of
24 Alan Bullock, Hitler and Stalin (London: Fontana, 1993) p.582.
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terrifying battles that the volunteers were involved in, from the defence of Madrid in 
1936-37 to the Ebro offensive in the summer of 1938, should provide some 
understanding of the incredible strain they were put under. In many of these battles the 
battalion fought against the elite of the Nationalist forces; that many volunteers were 
disgruntled, demoralised and a number of volunteers deserted should thus hardly be taken 
as a fundamental disenchantment with their cause and their leaders. As one of the British 
volunteers, John Longstaff later observed,
They’d gone through some very traumatic and severe experiences in the front line. 
They’d gone without sleep. They had seen their pals being killed or badly wounded. 
There’s a limit to any man’s endurance. And it wasn’t surprising to me, [that] by the end 
of some of the campaigns some people needed medical treatment. I suppose one would 
call them shell-shocked.26
As another volunteer admitted,
I should think that if they were honest, almost every member of the British Battalion 
wanted to go home at some time or other, because it was a war of unusual hardships, of 
unusually high casualties 27
The strain was often compounded by contact with relatives at home, for though the 
post office in Albacete often censored letters containing requests to return home, it is 
clear that some volunteers were aware of the worries o f their families in Britain. John 
Tunnah, who fought with the battalion during the first half of 1937, recounts how,
My sisters just wanted to come to bring me back. And I had to tell them in a letter that 
while you could volunteer in you couldn’t volunteer out.28
25 See Cary Nelson’s review of Hopkins, in The Volunteer, 22:1, (Winter 2000) pp.5-15.
26 Interview with John Longstaff, IWMSA 9299/13/10. Other British volunteers suffered from shell-shock 
during their time in Spain. It seems a rather enlightened attitude to the condition was adopted in the 
battalion, with volunteers being moved into positions in the rear, such as the cookhouse. See interview with 
Frank Graham, IWMSA 11877/6/6.
27 Interview with John Peet, in Corkhill & Rawnsley, p.l 11.
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The volunteers fought in the extremely harsh climates of Brunete and of Teruel, on a diet 
that plainly disagreed with many,29 against overwhelming military odds. That they 
actually managed to operate at all, let alone as ‘Republican shock-troops,’ is more a 
testament both to their individual bravery and their collective discipline. As Cary Nelson 
observes of the reports,
Often enough these were hasty comments written in battlefield conditions. The language 
is often hyperbolic, the judgements frequently unsound.30
The remarks were often more on their political potential rather then their actual 
performance in Spain, thus even some of the negative statements were tempered, such as 
the report on Jack Waring-Reid, who was described as, “Weak. Came under the influence 
of bad elements and deserted,” yet the report concludes, “may well possibly still do some 
good work.”31 As a covering letter to the Central Committee o f the Communist Party, 
dated 20 December 1938, explains,
The standard set has been a high one. One must bear in mind the fact that the comrades 
have been tested here in exceptionally severe circumstances during many months of 
fighting, and this has made a very big demand on their political, moral, and physical 
resources.32
28 Interview with John Tunnah, IWMSA 840/9/1.
29 Illness was a major problem for the British volunteers, as, indeed, it was for the republican Army as a 
whole. “Sickness and disease were far more dangerous enemies than Nationalists. For every battle injury, 
there were four, five, or six who had to be discharged or hospitalized because of illness.” Michael Seidman, 
‘Quiet fronts in the Spanish Civil War’, Historian (Summer, 1999) p.830. Olive oil, beans, poor quality 
meat and wine were not a good mixture. Tom Murray recounts how the brigaders used to help themselves 
to fruit, particularly grapes. As a result, as Fred Thomas describes, “Most of us, including me, are having 
tummy trouble.” Fred Thomas, To Tilt at Windmills, p.26. See also Sommerfield, p.31, Romilly p.33 and 
interview with Tom Murray, in MacDougall, pp.315-316.
30 Nelson, p.5.
31 Moscow 545/6/96 p.45.
32 Moscow 545/6/96 p. 1.
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As Vincent Brome acknowledged,
There are individual accounts of different sections of the International Brigade which 
represent them as overun by criminals and drunkards, but these were in a minority. A 
high proportion were ordinary working men who might or might not have personal 
problems which they solved by joining the Brigades, but many of the early recruits 
fiercely believed in the ideal of fighting Fascism, and were ready, in the long run, to obey 
orders.33
It is certainly true that several volunteers have confirmed that, as James Hopkins 
suggested, the subject of drunkenness was an issue within the battalion,34
During the training period of the battalion at Madrigueras we had some problems arising 
from drink. A strict order had been issued that during training no drink would be served 
to any of the internationals. Notwithstanding this there were lads turning up very, very 
much under the influence. We discovered by pure accident that the way round the 
problem of getting drink even when there was a complete prohibition was to order what 
they called cafe frlo, cold coffee, a mixture of rum and coffee.35
In a letter written August 1937 to Will Paynter, Walter Tapsell referred to his satisfaction 
that during a recent period of rest there had been no desertions and, “Only one case of 
drunkenness. (Compare this with the previous position when we were at 
Mondejar![sic])”36 But though the Moscow characterisation list mentions several 
‘drunkards’, it also states that some of them were otherwise good soldiers, suggesting that 
to some extent heavy drinking was tolerated, or at least understood.37 After all Sam Wild, 
probably the best o f the British commanders, was known to be a very heavy drinker. As
33 Brome, pp. 68-69.
34 Hopkins, p. 184.
35 Interview with Donald Renton, in MacDougall, p.24.
36 IBA Box C File 16/2. In June 1937 Bill Meredith reported to Fred Copeman that five members of his 
Number 2 Company were drunk and that, “Fighting has been going on in the trench and some drastic 
action should be taken as an example to the rest of the Battalion.” Copeman sentenced the offenders to ten 
days in a labour battalion and docked them five days pay. Moscow 545/3/451 p.49.
37 For example, George Adamson is listed as, “Brave at front. Drunkard in rear” and Frank Caims, “Good, 
but tendency to drink.” Moscow 545/6/96 p.5-7. A report compiled in February 1938 listed forty deserters,
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Jan Kurzke, a German volunteer who fought alongside the British in Madrid in 1936 
recognised,
Sometimes comrades became the worse for drink. To deny that would be denying human 
nature.. .Somehow or other one could not be too hard on the few comrades who drank a 
glass too much at times. One never knew what the next day would bring.38
For a number of the volunteers, of course, the pressures of the war could not be 
relieved by the occasional drinking spree. The issue o f desertions is one of the major 
facets of the perceived disaffection with the leadership and the conditions in Spain, as R. 
Dan Richardson noted:
From at least as early in the war as March 1937, men were deserting or attempting to 
desert in large enough numbers to make it a major issue in the brigades.39
According to the list of undesirables held in Moscow there were over two hundred and 
fifty deserters from the British Battalion,40 a lower estimate than Bill Alexander’s of two 
hundred and ninety-eight41 It has always been acknowledged that it was a problem for 
the British Battalion: as Walter Greenhalgh, who served from December 1936 right 
through to October 1938 admitted, “There were lots of desertions.”42 This point is clearly 
made in a report from the Brigade base at Albacete, which stated that:
though it admitted that there had been perhaps three times as many. The majority were returned to the front. 
Moscow 545/3/45 lp.91.
38 Hearst, p.84.
39 Richardson, p. 165.
40 Moscow 545/6/99 pp. 14-19 is a list of thieves, drunkards, deserters and other undesirables in the English 
speaking battalions.
41 Alexander, p.81. As Peter Carroll’s study of the American volunteers points out, it is extremely difficult 
to accurately gauge the numbers of deserters. Most of the volunteers entered illegally, surrendering their 
passports (if they had one) and were, for obvious reasons, at pains to conceal their tracks. Nevertheless, 
Carroll estimates the number of American deserters to number around one hundred, about four per-cent. 
Carroll, pp.147-148.
42 Interview with Walter Greenhalgh, IWMSA 111 87/9/7.
286
Conclusions: Volunteers for Liberty or Comintern Army?
The English battalion has fallen victim to a wave of collective desertions, which has 
begun to effect [sic] the American battalions. The officers are not excluded from this 
process of demoralization.43
Fred Copeman, one of the battalion commanders admitted threatening with grenades 
a number of deserters who were hiding out in wine vats at Jarama in order to encourage 
them to return to the line 44 There were also a number of desertions after Brunete when, 
as George Aitken, the battalion commissar described, morale was very low:
They were lying almost dead to the world with fatigue, with the heat, the thirst and the 
lack of food.. .they were half dead with exhaustion45
John Angus, later commissar at Camp Lucas the re-education camp for deserters, agrees:
After the terrible battering the battalion received at Brunete a number of the survivors, 
perhaps as many as 60 or 70, though my memory is now hazy, expressed shall we say, a 
reluctance to return to the front. Many of them claimed, I think honestly, that they had 
been told when they joined up in England that they were signing-on for only a limited 
period of some months and would then be able to return home. This would probably have 
been the most happy solution but it was prevented, at least it was alleged by the new 
Minister of War, Prieto, issuing a decree which made it impossible 46
R. Dan Richardson claimed- repeating accusations printed in newspapers such as the 
Daily Mail and Morning Post- that,
Numerous men also claimed that they had been lured to Spain with the promise of high- 
paying jobs. Once in Spanish territory the Brigade authorities took their passports and 
informed them that they were in the army. When the men complained, the answer given
43 Report from Albacete, [end of] July 1937. Moscow 35082/1/90, cited in Radosh, p.246.
44 Interview with Fred Copeman, IWMSA 794/13/2.
45 Interview with George Aitken, IWMSA 10358/3/2.
46 Angus, p.7. Will Paynter, the Welsh organiser for the Communist Party, and base commissar at 
Albacete, also remarks on the low moral after Brunete: “The ferocity of the battles, the absence of effective 
supporting arms, after the first attack- they had been deployed to meet a fascist counter-attack on another 
section of the front [at Brunete] and the state of disorganization, all created problems of morale which led 
to some of the men leaving the battle front.” Will Paynter, My Generation (London: George Allen & 
Unwin, 1972) p.70.
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was that since they had no passports they were strictly subject to the Spanish authorities
and that if they attempted to ‘desert’ they would be shot.47
However, as I have shown, there is scant evidence for Richardson’s accusation. Nor is it 
likely that the Communist Party refused to allow the British volunteers to return home 
because they were impossible to replace and that it was feared some would, “make public 
some of the unsavoury aspects of Communist operations in Spain.”48
The reality is that, in the main, the desertions from the British Battalion did not so 
much represent a dissatisfaction with the political organisation of the battalion, but were a 
reaction simply to the high casualties sustained in the first half of 1937, and the lack of 
leave and repatriation. In a sense, the repatriation problem was irreconcilable, for there 
was a clear contradiction between the volunteers as ‘volunteers’ and as members of the 
Republican army. The problem was undoubtedly exacerbated by some British party 
figures offering guarantees of limited periods o f service in Spain, though it seems 
unlikely that this was a deliberate attempt to trick potential recruits; what seems more 
likely is that Robson, and others, simply made promises that they were not in a position 
to keep.49
47 Richardson, p. 167.
48 Ibid, p. 169.
49 As many volunteers have recounted, by the summer of 1937 the warning that ‘you couldn’t volunteer 
out’ was included in Robbie’s caution to potential recruits. See, for example, interviews with John Tunnah, 
IWMSA 840/9/1 and John Longstaff, IWMSA 99219/13/4.
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It is widely recognised that most of the men deserted because of the battalion’s 
refusal to allow leave in England.50 With many volunteers believing that they were 
volunteering for a limited period of time51 and that, as volunteers, at the end of this period 
they would be allowed to return home, this was a predictable source of conflict once the 
International Brigades had been incorporated into the Republican Army and the 
volunteers were told they must stay in Spain until the end o f the war.52
The question of returning comes up ever more frequently and more insistently. The 
question is raised not only by some bad or demoralized elements, whom consulates sent 
home; the question comes up in general and is raised by a broad contingent of the 
volunteers, and in almost every brigade.53
The leaders o f the battalion were well aware of the importance o f the issue. For 
example, in the period after Brunete there was a move to repatriate a number of 
volunteers who had been in Spain for some time. Unfortunately, the repatriations were 
badly organised and Will Paynter, the commissar at Albacete, complained that,
The whole policy which I suggested on repatriation has been distorted.. .A list of those 
for repatriation was read and the comrades were sent down to me whether they wanted to 
come or not. In short about one half of the effective fighting strength of the Battalion was 
sent down to me for repatriation and at a time when it was held up!! However, the thing 
is done now and we will have to make the best of it. On the whole I think it will be best 
that these men return.54
50 IBA Box C 14/5 cited in Hopkins, p.255. Bill Alexander also acknowledged that, “ One of the biggest 
problems facing the British concerned leave and repatriation.” Alexander p.79.
51 James Hopkins claims that, ‘This impression was fostered both in England and confirmed at Albacete by 
prominent members of the brigade leadership.” Hopkins, p.292. Togliatti admitted in a report at the end of 
August 1937 that many of the American, English and Italian volunteers had been promised they would be 
in Spain for no more than six months. Report by Togliatti 29 August 1937. Moscow 33987/3/961, cited in 
Radosh, p.253.
52 As General Walter realistically observed, “Leave in the army always attracts a great deal of interest, and 
the problem flares up with a special keenness during a war.” Report by General Walter, Moscow 
35082/1/95, cited in ibid, p.458.
53 Report by Togliatti, 29 August 1937, Moscow 33987/3/961, cited in ibid p.253.
54 Letter from Will Paynter, 4 September 1937, IBA Box C, File 17/1.
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As George Aitken makes clear,
A decision had been reached with the agreement of the Party that all of the men of the 
original No 1 Company, who had been in Spain from 8 to 9 months, should be given the 
opportunity of going home. Similarly, the original battalion people had also to be allowed 
to return home gradually after 8 months service and according to length of service.55
According to John Angus, the problem was exacerbated by the belief that the higher 
ranks were treated differently from the lower:
However, what made the situation infinitely worse, and added to the general atmosphere 
of cynicism and demoralisation, was that the entire British leadership from the battalion 
right down to company or even lower level, had, in fact, been allowed to go home either 
on leave or permanently.56
While this may have been the perception o f some o f the volunteers, it is not an 
accurate observation. Between July and September 1937 there were six battalion political 
commissars57 and five battalion commanders58 and whilst this rapid turnover must have 
been extremely disconcerting for the volunteers, the perception that the senior figures of 
the battalion were being allowed to return home whilst the lower ranks remained in the 
line is not an accurate one. Whilst Walter Tapsell and Fred Copeman returned home 
briefly in September 1937 (with Bert Williams, George Aitken and Jock Cunningham 
who remained in the UK) this was hardly for rest and recuperation; on the contrary, they 
were all hauled over the coals by Harry Pollitt for the internal divisions which had been 
causing great unrest at both battalion and brigade level since Brunete. And Angus clearly
55 Letter from George Aitken, undated, IBA Box C, File 17/7.
56 Angus, p.7. Angus claimed that, “The British chaps included none, or really very few, really bad 
elements. They were just ordinary chaps who thought they had been conned and whose morale had been 
reduced by seeing a number of commissars, one after the other, stay with them for a few weeks and then 
return to England.” Angus, p.8.
57 Bert Williams, George Coyle, Jack Roberts, Ernest Torrance, Jim Bourne and Eric Whalley. Moscow 
545/6/89 p.37.
58 Fred Copeman, Joe Hinks, Peter Daley, Paddy O’Daire and Harold Fry. Moscow 545/6/89 p.37.
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did not think that the battalion was full o f men who resented the party’s influence in the 
Brigades and who deserted in response; as the political commissar at Camp Lucas, the 
‘re-education’ camp for deserters, Angus was in a good position to understand their 
gripes, but as he states, their complaints didn’t prevent them agreeing to return with him 
to the battalion during the retreats of spring 1938.59
They were not the only deserters to return to the battalion, even though, as Joe 
Norman explained, “it was like any other army, if  you deserted and got caught you were 
punished.”60 George Coyle deserted after Jarama and was sentenced to serve in a labour 
battalion, but returned to the battalion and later became a political commissar.61 As Peter 
Carroll explains,
Brigade policy, with a few exceptions, permitted the return of deserters. Typical 
punishment was assignment to a labour battalion, which required work on fortifications 
and trenches. Then, after interviews, men who had completed their sentences were 
attached to appropriate units.62
Some volunteers just slipped off for a weekend, particularly during the long period in the 
line at Jarama during the spring of 1937, and in these circumstances the usual punishment 
would be to dig latrines.63
59 John Angus was placed in charge of the camp to try and restore morale. He appears to have been popular 
with the British in the camp, and he was also viewed highly by the battalion military and political 
leadership. Alexander p.81.
60 Interview with Joe Norman, IWMSA 818/4/2.
61 Hopkins, p.268.
62 Carroll, pp.177-178. Another example of this is recounted by Jack Jones, who came across ‘Taffy’ 
Foulkes, a deserter from the British Battalion in Barcelona. When Jones accompanied Foulkes back to the 
battalion, Sam Wild, “simply told him not to be a bloody fool again.” Jack Jones, Union Man (London: 
Collins, 1986) p.69 also cited in Hopkins, p.268.
63 Or in the case of ranking soldiers they might be demoted. See Steve Nelson, The Volunteers: a personal 
narrative o f the fight against fascism in Spain (New York: Masses & Mainstream, 1953) p. 106.
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During the month of March, discipline amongst the Battalion [of the 15 th brigade] was 
weak. Many comrades went to the nearby towns (Chinchon, Aranjuez, Morata). Many 
also left the lines without permission and went on foot to Madrid.64
Three volunteers were punished for overstaying leave during the end of 1937, for which 
the punishment was loss of pay for those days. This was hardly a harsh punishment, for 
there was little to spend the money on anyway.65
Some volunteers even returned to the battalion after deserting to Britain.66 For 
example, the record o f Pat Murphy, a volunteer from South-east London, states:
Deserted to England March. Returned to Spain 2.6.37. Was with battalion at Brunete and 
Aragon. Fair soldier in line. Recently deserted to Valencia, but caught and brought back. 
Now at Intendencia as bricklayer.67
Murphy returned to Spain, and as the Moscow report shows, he deserted once more, was 
returned and worked as a bricklayer. According to another file held in London, he
64 Moscow 545/3/467 p.46. See also interview with John ‘Bosco’ Jones, IWMSA 9392/6/5. Jones admits 
that within his section there was an arrangement that one or two volunteers would “What we did arrange in 
Jarama, which was perhaps only 30 miles from Madrid, as it was stalemate that two at a time could go to 
the main road and Spaniards most of the couldn’t read or write you could hand them almost any document. 
“I want a camion to take me to Madrid. And so we were taking unofficial twenty-four hours. So long as 
they got back next morning, okay. This went on through my section quite well.”” Jones’ ruse was 
discovered, however, and he was sentenced to ten nights digging trenches in ‘no mans’ land.
65 Report signed by Lieutenant Edwards, 9 December 1937. Boon was stopped three days pay and 
Cranfield and Steventon two. Moscow 545/3/495 p.22 & p.29.
66 To identify volunteers and prevent them returning to Spain, deserters repatriated via the British 
consulates had their passports stamped, “Valid for a single direct journey to the United Kingdom.” As a 
note explained, “The object of this procedure is to warn His Majesty’s authorities concerned that the 
persons in question have served with the Spanish forces.” From the tone of the correspondence, (the 
deserters were described as ‘thugs’ and ‘misguided stiffs’) it is quite clear that the consular officials 
harbour a hostile and patronising attitude to the deserting volunteers. PRO F0889/2/97-125.
The view that the Spanish war was a ‘distraction’ from more important matters was widely prevalent 
amongst members of the British Government and ruling establishment. Randolph Churchill famously 
remarked that, “A few excitable Catholics and ardent Socialists [in Britain] think that this war matters, but 
for the general public it’s just a lot of bloody dagoes killing each other.” Arnold Lunn, Spanish Rehearsal 
(London: Hutchinson & Co., 1937) p.43, cited in Buchanan, ‘A Far Away Country’ p.23.
67 Moscow 545/6/99 p.9.
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absconded once again on 4 September 1938.68 Despite his frequent desertions, Murphy 
does not appear to have been unduly punished. Murphy is not unique; Albert Rabone 
from Gosport in Hampshire also returned to Spain after deserting in May 1937.69 Charles 
JefFord from Dagenham was kicked out of Spain on 4 September 1937 with a reputation 
as, “A bad grumbler and agitator”70 but returned to Spain on 15 November 1937. He 
again got himself into trouble, and was, “Arrested for organising desertion. Now in jail 
Albacete.”71 He too survived his run-in with the authorities. Albert Charlesworth left of 
his own accord via Barcelona, but returned to Spain six weeks later over the Pyrenees in 
time to join the fighting at Teruel.72
This apparently liberal attitude to deserters flies in the face o f the claims that British 
volunteers were shot for desertion. Several volunteers, such as the member of the British 
Anti-Tank Battery, Hugh Sloan (known in Spain as Hugh Smith), have denied that any 
British volunteers were executed for desertion^ and Fred Copeman has stated that Harry 
Pollitt was firmly opposed to the shooting of deserters.^ Copeman strongly resisted 
communist demands for the use of the death penalty and deliberately put discipline in the 
hands of Bill Alexander and Sam Wild whom he believed didn’t support it either.75
68 IBA Box 21a File A.
69 IBA Box D-7 File A/1.
70 IBA Box 39 File A/31.
71 Moscow 545/3/99 p.5.
72 Interview with Albert Charlesworth, IWMSA 798/4/2-3.
73 “There is utterly no reason to believe that any commander, including Jock Cunningham and Fred 
Copeman, used his pistol against any member of the Brigade.” Interview with Hugh Sloan, in MacDougall,
p.211.
74 “We had an absolute rigid rule when I was commander that none of our men would ever get shot. The 
worst punishment you could have in our battalion was to be sent home in disgrace if you deserted. And we 
only had three real deserters...all the others [would] be away for a fortnight.” Interview with Fred 
Copeman, IWMSA 794/13/4.
75 Brome, p.233.
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Despite the opposition, at least two British volunteers were executed and another two 
were, if  not actually executed, put in positions that virtually guaranteed their deaths. 
However, it was not the deserting alone that led to their deaths; in all of the cases it was 
because the desertions were exacerbated by actions which caused, or had the potential to 
cause, extensive casualties amongst their comrades. The clearest example o f this occurred 
in January 1938, when two British volunteers were captured attempting to desert to the 
Rebels lines and were found to be carrying plans of the layout o f the British positions at 
Teruel, including the machine-gun positions.76 There is no doubt that this information 
would have enabled the Rebel forces to inflict a heavy defeat on the British Battalion. 
After their arrest and the report to brigade HQ of the attempted desertion and betrayal, 
General Walter, the XV International Brigade commander, came to the battalion to say 
that they had been found guilty o f desertion to the enemy. In a battalion meeting that 
followed, the verdict was unanimous that they should be executed77 and, according to 
John Dunlop, several members of the battalion were selected for the execution party.78 
The outcome of the discovery of this act o f treachery was probably inevitable, though 
Bill Alexander is somewhat circumspect about what actually happened. Alexander 
remarks on the bitterness felt by the volunteers and states that,
They were taken to the rear, court-martialled and sentenced to death. It has been said that
the sentence was commuted to service in a labour battalion and they were killed later in
76 James Hopkins overstates the number of executions by referring to the execution of two volunteers for 
desertion and later to the execution of Patrick Glacken in January 1938. What is not made clear is that, in 
fact, Glacken was one of the two deserters. See Hopkins, pp.267-268.
77 “The death sentences imposed on the two deserters from the British Battalion received the complete 
approval of a Battalion meeting yesterday.” Our Fight, 10 January 1938, p.l.
78 Dunlop states that all the members of the execution squad were Communist Party members, and of the 
rank of sergeant Interview with John Dunlop, IWMSA 11355/13/7.
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an artillery barrage while digging fortifications. It has also been said that the sentence 
was carried out.79
Despite Alexander’s equivocation, the implication is pretty clear, and as Bill 
Alexander was battalion commander at this time, it seems rather unlikely that he would 
not know whether (or not), the sentence had been carried out. Bob Cooney, who was then 
working in the Brigade commissariat, states that one o f the deserters, a baker from 
Glasgow, was executed,80 though according to a file held in the IBA, he was killed by 
shellfire “on the Ebro front.”81 His file in Moscow states simply that he was “killed Jan 
20.”82 Cooney states very clearly why the offence was taken so seriously,
Kemp was shot by firing squad, but not for desertion. He was shot because in order to 
carry out his desertion he was prepared to betray the lives of his comrades by giving 
information to the fascists. It was the one single incident of its kind.83
It was believed that Kemp, the elder of the two was the real instigator of the plan and the 
other deserter, Patrick Glacken, also from Scotland, was not shot and was probably, as 
Bob Cooney and John Dunlop claim, killed by shellfire.84
One was an older man who was what we described as a bad type and apparently he’d 
influenced this younger fellow and he persuaded him to go along with him. And they 
deserted towards the enemy. Fortunately they were caught by a republican patrol and they 
were brought back.. .In fact only one of the deserters was executed. That was the older 
man, because the younger chap was really quite young and we thought it was unfair that 
he should be punished because he had been so strongly influenced by the other man. He 
was sent to a labour battalion and I heard he was killed later on.85
79 Alexander, p.82.
80 Interview with Bob Cooney, in Corkhill & Rawnsley, pp. 120-122.
81 IBA Box 21a File A.
82 Moscow 545/3/99.
83 Interview with Bob Cooney, in Corkhill & Rawnsley, p. 121.
84 Ibid, pp.121-122.
85 Interview with John Dunlop, IWMSA 11355/13/7-8.
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Though sending a volunteer into a situation in which he was virtually certain to be killed 
now seems akin to murder, it is unlikely that the volunteers would have seen it that way. 
After all, as the casualty rates show, they regularly faced odds that were not much better.
The other British volunteer executed in Spain was Maurice Ryan,86 an Irishman who 
volunteered, claiming that he wanted to kill his brother who was serving with the 
Nationalists under General O’Duffy.87 Ryan had served with the Irish Free State Army, 
was believed to have at one time had fascist leanings, and whilst in Spain had been jailed 
for disruption.88 There were various accusations of sabotage levelled at Ryan89 who 
appears to have opened fire on his comrades with a machine-gun but, according to John 
Dunlop, it seems that Ryan’s activities may have owed as much to drink as espionage. 
Dunlop describes how during an attack on Hill 481 near Gandesa in the Ebro offensive of 
1938,
I was just at the edge of a small hill. Right above my head, just inches above my head, 
there was a long burst of machine-gun fire but it was coming in the wrong direction. It 
wasn’t coming from in front of me, it was coming from behind me and it was just hitting 
the top of this ridge, just above my head. I looked back and I could see this gun, one of 
our own machine-guns, actually firing. It appeared to be firing on us, so that more or less 
ended our attack.90
86 Hugh Sloan refers to meeting a ‘Paddy’ Ryan in July 1938 in Ian MacDougall’s collection of interviews 
with Scottish volunteers. MacDougall erroneously identifies him as Frank Ryan, who had been captured at 
Calaciete at the end of March 1938, rather than as Maurice Ryan. Interview with Hugh Sloan, in 
MacDougall p.229, and fn  152, p.349.
87 Dunlop described Ryan as, “a decidedly kenspeckle character.” Interview with John Dunlop, IWMSA 
11355/13/7/10 also cited in Stradling, Irish and the Spanish Civil War p. 190.
88 Moscow 545/6/99.
89 See for example, Tom Murray’s accusation that Ryan refused to obey orders and threatened him with a 
hand grenade. Interview with Tom Murray, in MacDougall, p.324, also cited in Hopkins, pp.266-167.
90 Interview with John Dunlop, IWMSA 11355/13/10.
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Dunlop reported this to Sam Wild who discovered that Dunlop had been fired upon by 
Ryan.
He was flaying drunk. I don’t know how many of our blokes had been hit and wounded 
by this gun, but he was overpowered and arrested.
Divisional HQ gave orders for him to be executed by members of the British Battalion.
I was told later that Sam Wild, the commander of the battalion and George Fletcher the 
second in command took Ryan for a walk and told him to go ahead of them and then they 
shot him in the back of the head. I also heard that George Fletcher was in tears over 
that.91
Tom Murray, the political commissar of the Machine-Gun Company refused to identify 
who carried out the execution, but admits that, “There was a decision taken to get rid of 
him.. .At any rate he was got rid of, just shot in the back of the head.”92
There is another accusation of an execution that needs to be addressed; the case of 
Bert Overton, commander of No. 3 Company at Jarama, who deserted his post on the 
second day.93 Fred Copeman claims that,
Towards the end of the war Sam Wild agreed to shoot two British. Of all the people one 
of them was Overton.94
However, despite this claim by Copeman, there is no real evidence to suggest that he was 
executed. More likely is that following his court-martial Overton, like Glacken, was
91 Ibid.
92 Interview with Tom Murray, in MacDougall, p.324.
93 See chapter four.
94 Interview with Fred Copeman, IWMSA 794/13/3.
297
Conclusions: Volunteers for Liberty or Comintern Army?
placed deliberately in an extremely hazardous situation where he was killed carrying 
ammunition, “to a forward position.”
There are a number of other rumours of executions. James Hopkins cites the case of 
William Meeke, a labourer from County Antrim, as a deserter who was “shot whilst 
attempting to escape.”95 Certainly Meeke was imprisoned in Spain, for his Moscow file 
states that he, “Served in the British Battalion. Was imprisoned 2 May 1938 near 
Figueras with an American. Escaped the following day but was recaptured”.96 However, 
information that he was shot, drawn from the Moscow files, is contradicted by a file in 
the PRO, which states that, in fact, Meeke was repatriated around the end o f 1938, or the 
beginning o f 1939.97
Likewise, an anonymous volunteer claimed that one of the English contingent was 
executed for possession of fascist literature in January 1937.98 There is no other evidence 
to support this, and coming from a disaffected ex-member of the International Brigade 
who, by his own admission, spent a portion of his time in Spain imprisoned for 
drunkenness, can probably be seen as anti-communist propaganda. However, the case of 
one Scottish volunteer, James Donald, is slightly more mysterious. Donald appears in the 
official Roll of Honour as having died at Belchite in March 1938 during the retreats. 
Donald had deserted in March 1937 from Jarama, and was captured before deserting 
again. He was put in jail in Valencia, along with Bob Smillie, the ILP volunteer who died
95 Hopkins, p.268. Meeke can only have been wounded, rather than killed.
96 Moscow 545/6/171 p.37.
97 The file shows that Meeke was allocated a repatriation number when he entered a camp in France after 
the war. Thus he cannot have been executed in Spain. PRO F0371/2696/133-241.
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in prison." At the alleged time of his death at Belchite, Donald was actually in Valencia 
jail and what actually happened is uncertain; there is no listing for his return to Britain, so 
it is not impossible that he was shot after deserting again. Likewise, Michael Browne, a 
volunteer with two years experience in the Colonial Police, and known in Spain as 
‘Poona’ Browne, is alleged to have been executed by his company commander ‘Taffy’ 
Evans, after deserting.100 Again, there is no other evidence for this, though there is no 
record of him returning to Britain. The last rumour concerns a volunteer from Devon, 
J.A.C. Browning, o f whom there is virtually no information101 yet, according to 
documents held in the PRO, his father travelled to Spain to try to discover his 
whereabouts, having received a photograph of him in Republican army uniform, before 
he disappeared without trace.102
Thus the belief that the battalion was ruled with rigid and merciless discipline which 
involved the execution of deserters is an exaggeration. As Peter Carroll argues,
Even if all the other charges of assassination proved true, the number of Americans killed 
outside combat would total less than ten. The rarity of these killings undermines the 
notion, made popular by George Orwell’s Homage to Catalonia, that the International 
Brigades enforced discipline by terror.103
98 In Spain with the International Brigade, p.8.
"  See Buchanan, ‘Death of Bob Smillie’, pp.435-464.
100 Interview with Tony Gilbert, IWMSA 9157/10.
1011 have found no mention of Browning in any of the files held in the IB A or Moscow.
102 PRO F0371/6060-10683/6/41.
103 Carroll, p. 188.
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Despite the numbers of ‘unreliables,’ the real level of disaffection in the battalion was 
probably not as high as Hopkins suggests.104 In a letter written to Harry Pollitt and R.W. 
Robson on 21 December 1936, the battalion commissar, Walter Tapsell, names a number 
of ‘bad eggs’ in the battalion, before stating categorically that, “o f course, [the] great 
majority are magnificent.”105 Likewise, General Walter, Commander o f the 35 Division, 
in a report to Marshall Voroshilov (therefore for internal, rather than external viewing), 
stated that:
One can and must confirm that with the exception of a small group of rogues, 
adventurers, and scoundrels, a hugely overwhelming majority of the internationalists in 
Spain were fulfilling their duty as revolutionaries and were conscious of the need for an 
armed defence of freedom and of their national and class interests.106
Cary Nelson’s remarks on the importance of putting the complaints in context should 
be bom in mind, as should be the traditional culture of ‘grumbling’ associated with the 
British Army.107 There is no doubt that some volunteers clearly resented the hierarchical 
structure of the brigades, and a small number, such as the Glasgow tailor Alec 
Marcovitch,108 were singled out for their dissenting political views.109 However, the 
complaints, and the critical reports should be viewed alongside the use of the familiar
104 Harvey Klehr, J.E Haynes & F.I. Firsov’s, The Secret World o f American Communism (London: Yale 
UP, 1995) also exaggerates the level of disaffection. There are only about one hundred in the Klehr list and 
many of those are hardly serious disciplinary issues, especially considering that this was around August 
1938 in the wake of what Bill Alexander describes with some justification as the “disastrous” retreats of the 
spring of 1938.
105IBA Box C File 8/2, p.2.
106 Report from ‘ General Walter’ to Com. Voroshilov, People’s Commissar of the Defence of the USSR, 
Marshall of the Soviet Union. Moscow 33987/3/1149 cited in Radosh, p.471.
107 As Bill Rust admits, many of the volunteers were, “exercising the inalienable British right to grumble.” 
Rust, p.31.
108 See Hopkins, pp.258-264.
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form of ‘tu’ by British volunteers to their commanders, that General Walter referred to in 
exasperation,110 the use of the term ‘comic star’ for political commissars,111 and the 
shouts o f ‘no bloody pan’ instead o f No Pasaran,112 which are all symptomatic of the 
British volunteers’ reluctance to swallow what many wrote off simply as ‘party 
bullshit.’113 As John Peet, who served with the British Machine-Gun Company in Spain 
(and later defected from his post as Reuters correspondent to East Germany in 1950) 
explains, “This was just the curious British habit o f taking the piss, in a friendly way, out 
of hallowed symbols and slogans, patriotic or political.”114 No doubt some inexperienced 
or excessively officious political commissars over-reacted to the grumbling, perhaps by 
including a criticism in the volunteer’s file, but those who did not and turned a blind eye, 
like Bob Cooney or Walter Tapsell, were generally popular with their men.115
109 Marcovitch had a long history of arguments with Peter Kerrigan in Glasgow and was clearly singled 
out. However, very few other British brigaders were actually imprisoned for political non-conformity, so- 
called ‘deviationism,’ though persistent deserters might be imprisoned. This was, after all, an army.
110 General Walter, the commander of the 35 Division, ruefully acknowledged that, “Being an “antifascist 
revolutionary” allows you to argue and debate with the commander, as a rule, using the familiar “tu” with 
your hands in your pockets and a cigarette in your mouth.” Radosh, p.446.
111 As Thomas Evans described, political commissars were often referred to as ‘Comic stars.’ Interview 
with Thomas Glyndwr Evans, in Hynes, p.58.
112 John Booth one of the contingent of volunteers from Manchester, described that, “When they had us 
chanting ‘No Pasaran’, the lads would be there, grim-faced, with the old clenched fist firmly up, not a smile 
among them, all shouting ‘No Bastard Pan.’ Interview with John Booth, in ibid, p.58.
113 Some of the volunteers were highly critical of the party propaganda, believing it to be self-defeating. 
For example, James Albrighton is very critical of the official communiques that were distributed to the 
volunteers, claiming that they deliberately underestimated casualty numbers. “Whoever is responsible for 
issuing these communique’s (sic) and wall newspapers must think that we are fools or children...To many 
of the comrades it is an insult to their intelligence to make such statements.” James Albrighton’s diary, 
Tuesday 5 January 1937.
114 John Peet, The Long Engagement: Memoirs o f a Cold War Legend (London: Fourth Estate, 1989) p.77.
115 Peet goes on to describe how several German Commissars and Russian advisors assumed the battalion 
to be in a state of near-mutiny, “and would make urgent representations to our political commissars. The 
political commissars (‘comic stars’ was the usual brigade term) often did not fully grasp what the 
complaints were about- they often led the singing themselves.” Ibid, p.77.
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Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the retreats of the spring o f 1938 and the 
subsequent failure of the Ebro offensive of the summer did have a very detrimental effect 
on the morale of the battalion.116 By this time it was readily apparent that the Republic 
was heading for defeat and many volunteers clearly wished to return home, and some 
were prepared to go to great lengths to ensure that this happened. One Scottish recruit at 
Tarazona was alleged to have, “Deliberately contracted venereal disease in order to 
escape front service,”117 and some volunteers were repatriated with what were clearly 
self-inflicted injuries,118 despite the seriousness with which these offences were 
viewed.119
Ironically, suggestions have been made that the target o f much of the unhappiness in 
the battalion (and in other International units in Spain) was not the Communist Party, but 
their Spanish comrades in the Republican Army. General Walter, the commander of the 
35 Division of which the British Battalion was part, saw this as one of the International 
Brigades’ greatest failings:
All of our difficulties, weaknesses, and failures were excused by the fact that there were 
Spanish present in our brigades. ‘The Spanish are cowards,” “they always flee,” “they
116 As Alexander states, “It was a difficult time for the army and for the Republic...There was some 
defeatism, some desertion and there were some who drifted from the front.” Alexander, pp.197-198.
117 Moscow 545/6/93 p.3. As James Jump recounts, the republican army had a puritanical attitude to 
venereal diseases, “To get VD for example, you were told it was the equivalent of a self-inflicted wound, 
you were not only harming yourself but the army.” Interview with James Jump, IWMSA 9524/6/4. Whilst 
in hospital for hepatitis, Jump’s medical records were mixed up with those of another patient suffering from 
a venereal disease. His description of the coldness with which he was treated by all the hospital staff is a 
good demonstration of how badly the condition was viewed, both politically and morally.
118 Thomas B. Hughes from London is listed as “Repat. S.I. Wnd. N.G.” and Thomas McColl from 
Scotland as “Mataro (S.I. Wound).” Moscow 545/6/97 p.9 & p.l 1.
119 This was also true of the republican Army as a whole. As Michael Seidman states, “Madrid Hospital 14 
(Calle de la Puebla) reported so many self-mutilations in the left hand or arm that health care personnel 
assumed that any injuries in these body parts were self-inflicted. On a quiet sector near Lerida in September 
1937, commissars recommended public shaming and severe punishment, including death sentences, for 
automutilados.” Seidman, p.830.
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never want to fight,” and so on and so forth, became the internationalists’ favourite and 
most frequent leitmotiv.120
A number of the British volunteers, like David Cooper, expressed the feeling that the 
regular Spanish forces were not as committed as the International and communist 
Brigades:
It was only the International Brigade soldiers who did the fighting. We could never see a 
Spanish unit anywhere, at any rate where the big action took place.121
One Scottish volunteer, Hugh Sloan, refers to having to use strong-arm tactics to keep 
some young Spanish soldiers from running:
Some of the younger boys in Spanish units had broken and an emergency arose. They had 
just been drafted in and had no experience of any battles before. Obviously their 
inexperience caused some concern. Anyway, we had to shoo them back into position. I 
don’t think I should say very much about that.. .In shooing the Spanish boys back Bill 
[Cranston] and the American [volunteer] had lifted hand-grenades to try and encourage 
the youngsters to go back. And when they went back the American comrade discovered 
that he had pulled the pin on his hand-grenade.122
According to John Angus, this disillusion even extended to Bob Merriman, the 
commander of the Lincolns, who remarked bitterly to him that, “The only people who do 
not run away are the English and the Germans.”123 Hamish Fraser, who served as a 
commissar and brigade staff officer, went further still and claimed that the Republic’s 
problems were deep seated, and even claimed that, “The Achilles heel of the Republic
120 Report by General Walter, 14 January 1938, Moscow 35082/1/95, cited in Radosh, p.450.
121 Hooper, p.32.
122 Interview with Hugh Sloan, in MacDougall, p.208. George Wheeler, a corporal in the British Battalion, 
also recalls having to prompt a Spanish comrade forward at bayonet point. However, he was honest enough 
to admit to his own fears, “‘Adelante’ I yelled at him in righteous indignation, conveniently forgetting that 
a little earlier I had been almost ready to flee.” Wheeler, MS, p.79.
123 Angus, p.9.
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was the indifference of the ordinary Spaniard.”124 As a later convert to Catholicism, 
Fraser might be expected to argue that the Republic lacked support from the majority of 
the Spanish people; nevertheless, the belief that the International Brigades were used as 
shock-troops and were more dedicated than some of the Spanish forces, seems to have 
been widely held.125 Indeed, as documents cited by Radosh show, the belief had some 
foundation for, at least until after the battle of Brunete, the International Brigades were 
some of the best Republican units.126 Walter Tapsell, in a letter defending himself against 
accusations by George Aitken that he was “whipping up discontent against the Spanish 
troops,” argued that:
In plain fact, and it is hard to state this, on every occasion we were with Spanish troops in 
this engagement they let us down. Their behaviour on every occasion either resulted in 
serious casualties, or the immediate loss of positions won by us at heavy cost. This is a 
fact.127
Tapsell raged against ‘pious prattle’ that, he believed, was not facing up to this 
fundamentally important issue, and avoiding any criticism of the Spanish forces.128 
However, Peter Kerrigan, in a report to Harry Pollitt after the horrendous level of 
casualties inflicted on the British volunteers on the last two days o f active service 
between 22 and 24 September 1938, admitted that:
Many of the Spanish reinforcements we had received deserted over to the enemy or ran 
away, and this applied to the new Spaniards with the Mac-Paps and other battalions.129
124 Hamish Fraser, The Truth About Spain (Oxford: Catholic Social Guild, 1949) p. 5.
125 See Moscow 35082/1/90, reproduced in Radosh, pp.241-242.
126 See report of 29 August 1937, which describes how, during the fighting round Madrid in 1936 and the 
first half of 1937, the International Brigades, “represented a force that was significantly superior to the 
Spanish units from every point of view.” Moscow 33987/3/961 cited in Radosh, p.255.
127DBA Box C, File 16/1.
128 See chapter 5, in which the arguments following Brunete that raged between Tapsell, Aitken and others 
are discussed. One of the central issues was the performance of Spanish members of the battalion.
129 Letter from Peter Kerrigan to Harry Pollitt, 27 September 1938, IBA Box C, File 25/5.
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However, he went on to state categorically that, “Our own Spanish comrades fought like 
lions without exception.” There is, of course, a distinction to be made between the battle- 
hardened and highly politicised Spanish volunteers in the International Brigades, and the 
conscripted Spaniards who, towards the end of the civil war, were necessarily becoming 
younger and younger.130 In general, there seems to have been a healthy respect for the 
Spanish Communist Regiments o f Lister, El Campesino and Modesto.131 On first sight it 
might appear strange that the Internationals were critical o f the very people they had 
come to help. However, to the Internationals, the war was not a civil war between 
Spaniards, it was an anti-fascist war. Thus to the Internationals, this was just as much 
their fight and the fact that it was being fought in Spain was almost immaterial. Spain 
was just the latest front on the European battlefield.132
And it seems that the antipathy could go both ways.133 A confidential report drawn up 
at the end of July 1937 (probably by Vital Gayman, the base commander at Albacete) 
testified how,
The International Brigades are considered to be a foreign body, a band of intruders-1 will 
not say by the Spanish people as a whole, but by the vast majority of political leaders, 
soldiers, civil servants and political parties in Republican Spain.. .It is the prevailing
130 In September 1938 the Spanish reinforcements in the British Battalion were, “very young, almost 
untrained, and a number were prisoners from Franco’s army who had accepted the option of joining the 
Republican forces.” Alexander, p.211.
131 Togliatti reported critically of the disparaging attitude of the International towards the Spanish units, yet 
concluded that in many ways the Lister Brigade was at least as professional as any of the International 
Brigades. Report dated 29 August 1937, Moscow 33987/3/961, reproduced in Radosh, p.255.
132 There was, of course, genuine sympathy for the Spanish republicans. It is important to remember, for 
example, that all Communist Party members gave a third of their wages to Socorro Rojo (Red Aid).
133 In a letter of 23 June 1937, General Stem remarks upon, “the attitude of Spaniards toward them and of 
them towards the Spaniards...the chauvinism of the nationalities [in the International brigades].” Moscow 
33987/3/1056, cited in Radosh, p.240.
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opinion among high officers in the Spanish army, more or less irrespective of political 
affiliation, that the International Brigades are nothing but a foreign legion, an army of 
mercenaries fighting for money.134
Gayman’s feelings are not unique; this was clearly an important issue for the 
Republican army.135 One British volunteer, James Jump, recounts how an officer in a 
Spanish brigade had rather different ideas o f rank and discipline from the British 
volunteers used to serving in the rather less rigid International Brigades:
[The Spanish Republican Army officer] was immaculately dressed in a spick and span 
uniform. He wore white gloves all the time. He carried a swagger stick and the Spaniards 
in the army were standing to attention and saluting him and saying, “Si, si mi capitan” 
and things like that and when he saw us... We must have given him as big a shock as he 
gave us, because we used the familiar tu form of address to him which made him wince. 
We called him comrade, which nearly gave him an apoplectic fit. He remonstrated with 
us for not calling him sir and saluting him and we said in the International Brigades we 
never saluted our officers and they were our comrades and we called them by their names 
or we called them comrade and if he didn’t like it, well, you know, too bad on him.136
The Comintern advisor, General Stem, believed that this antipathy between national 
groups was mainly caused by the high casualty rate in the International Brigades, which 
had dramatically reduced the proportion of foreigners. Most British volunteers in Spain 
were wounded at least once, and the mortality rate exceeded twenty per-cent.
It is not conceivable that a brigade that consists of no less than 80 percent Spaniards 
should be led only by international officers, who as a rule do not command the Spanish 
language and consequently cannot bring about the proper contact with the soldiers. 
Imagine yourself in the position of the Spanish soldiers, and you will easily understand 
that the Spanish soldiers must have the impression that their national pride has been 
hurt.137
134 Moscow 35082/1/90 in ibid, p.241.
135 For example, Vincent Brome claims that some Spanish soldiers thought little of the foreigners and that 
they asked when they would be leaving Spain. Brome, p.253.
136 Interview with James Jump, IWMSA 9524/6/5.
137 Moscow 35082/1/90 cited in Radosh, p.260.
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However, it is important to put these complaints into perspective. In general, as Bill 
Alexander testifies, high numbers of Spaniards volunteered to fight in the International 
Brigades, despite the high casualty rate. And in any case, as the report by General Walter 
points out, complaints were not only directed at Spanish comrades; there was also a level 
of intolerance between the national groups within the International Brigades:
The nationality question is the weakest spot in the international units and is the main 
hindrance impeding the growth of our potential.
Very little is said about relations between the nationalities within the international units, 
or more truthfully, it is completely hushed up, but it is just this which gives rise to almost 
all our weaknesses.. .the francophobia was most transparently obvious.. .anti-Semitism 
flourished.. .At the very same time as the volunteers were unifying, this petty, disgusting, 
foul squabble about the superiority of one nationality over another was going on. 
Everyone was superior to the French, but even they were superior to the Spanish.138
There were also difficulties caused by the infamous problem of languages within the 
International Brigades; not without good reason was one study o f the International 
Brigades entitled ‘Legions of Babel.’139 However, like the other nationalities, the British 
volunteers did include a small number who were fluent in other European languages.140 
Several senior figures either already spoke Spanish or learnt it in Spain, such as Paddy 
O’Daire, the battalion commander at Quinto in 1937, and Tony McLean who worked as a 
research clerk and military censor at Tarazona. Bill Alexander spoke French, as did a 
number o f others, including Alex Cummings, the battalion adjutant at Brunete who was 
killed on the Ebro in September 1938, and Alan Gilchrist, the political commissar in the 
Anti-Tank Battery. There was also a number who spoke several languages: the Cypriot, 
Hercules Avgherinos, spoke English, French, Spanish, German and Greek and served as
138 Report by General Walter, 14 January 1938, Moscow 35082/1/95, cited in ibid, pp.448-449.
139 V.B. Johnson, Legions o f  Babel: The International Brigades in the Spanish Civil War (London: 
Pennsylvania University Press, 1967).
140 Moscow 545/6/89 pp. 12-13.
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battalion interpreter.141 Peter Harrison, who worked as an administrator at the hospital at 
Huete under Dr. Alex Tudor-Hart, spoke French, German Spanish and Siamese. 
However, the outstanding linguist amongst the British volunteers was Jim Ruskin; his file 
in Moscow lists his languages as English, French, Spanish, German and Russian, all of 
which were ‘excellent.’142 Though one commentator remarked that the International 
Brigades showed that a multinational force could be effective, as, “one man in each 
company had a rudimentary knowledge of several languages,”143 a large number of the 
British Battalion understood little, if any, Spanish. The Irish volunteer Joe Monks 
claimed that this was because there was, “a superstition that anybody that started to study 
Spanish grammar got killed,” but he went on to admit that this was, in fact, “just an 
excuse for not doing it.”144
Criticisms of other nationalities within the XV International Brigade do appear to 
have been relatively widespread. The arguments between the Irish volunteers and the 
British that preceded the split in January 1937 have already been commented upon,145 
likewise the rivalry between the American and British volunteers is well documented. 
The British felt the American influence in the XV Brigade was too powerful, and the 
Americans harboured resentments against particular British individuals.146 Whilst the
141 Ibid and Alexander p .l51.
142 Ruskin, whose real name was Doumont Zubchaninov, was of ‘White Russian’ descent. He had worked 
as a communications technician in Spain, France and Argentina, and actually spoke eight languages. He 
was at first used as the brigade interpreter, before being placed in charge of brigade transmissions. 
Alexander, p.l 18.
143 Brome, p. 272.
144 Interview with Joe Monks, IWMSA 11303/4/3.
145 See chapter three.
146 See for example the refusal by the Americans to accept George Wattis as their battalion commander. As 
James Hopkins states, “There was always considerable tension between the Americans and the British.” 
Hopkins, pp.273-274 &fn  69, pp.419-420.
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claim by an anonymous volunteer that, “I found that national pride was one o f the chief 
features in the life o f the International Brigade” was probably an exaggeration, clearly it 
did play a role.147 Walter Gregory, whilst admitting that it might have been his ‘personal 
bias,’ nevertheless believed that during the retreats through Aragon in the spring of 1938 
the British Battalion, “managed to retain a greater sense o f purpose and exhibited more 
resilience than was evidenced by other battalions in the XV Brigade.”148Likewise, Fred 
Copeman claimed that the Thaelmann and Dimitrov battalions ran and ‘left them in the 
lurch,’ “It never ended in the war, we always found ourselves stuck up in front of 
everybody else.”149
The high casualty rate created problems in addition to the disagreements between the 
national groups. For the battalion, the most serious was the negative effect it had on 
recruitment.150 The original number of enthusiastic volunteers who had arrived in 
December 1936 and January 1937 had been decimated at Jarama, and by the spring of 
1937 many potential volunteers became understandably less enthusiastic to become 
‘cannon-fodder.’151 As R. Dan Richardson states:
147 In Spain with the International Brigades, p. 6.
148 Gregory, p.l 12.
149 Interview with Fred Copeman, IWMSA 794/13/2. Many of the British agreed with Copeman, “We were 
the shock battalion of the shock brigades.” Interview with Tommy Bloomfield, in MacDougall, p.52. 
However, others have argued that in fact the Dimitrov battalion was one of the best battalions in any of the 
brigades: “Their long record of service, casualties, bravery and single-minded devotion were remarkable.” 
Brome, p. 231.
150 As Tom Murray, one of the Political Commissars in the British Battalion, later stated, “Casualty rates in 
the Spanish war were terrible.” Interview with Tom Murray, in MacDougall, p.327. Several senior figures 
including Fred Copeman, one of the battalion commanders and Billy Griffiths, the party representative 
within the battalion in Spain, have remarked upon the high casualty rates and their slowing down of 
recruitment.
151 Francis, Miners Against Fascism, p. 158.
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That steady reservoir of political emigres and Communist militants which had supplied 
the bulk of the early Internationals had been, by the Spring of 1937, substantially 
exhausted... and the generally growing awareness that joining the Brigades was less a 
romantic adventure than a good way to die young played a part in reducing the numbers 
of men who might otherwise have been tempted to join.152
W hilst recruitment never reached the levels o f  the w inter o f  1936-37, when forty a 
month were arriving, rather than the forty a week following Brunete,153 it is clear that, as 
Figure 17 shows, following the Battle o f  Brunete in July 1937, the numbers entering 
Spain from Britain began to increase once again, before tailing o ff in the spring o f 
1938.154
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Figure 17. Date of arrival of the British volunteers
152 Richardson, p.88. See also Vincent Brome who argues that by the end o f 1937 recruitment was 
becoming a problem for returning brigaders did not always present a pretty picture and the chance o f  death 
was clearly high. Brome, p.228.
153 Francis, Miners Against Fascism, p. 172. Between April and September 1937, 6,464 volunteers arrived 
at Albacete, compared to 18,000 between October 1936 and March 1937. P Pages, ‘Marty, Vidal, Kleber at 
le Komintem. Ce que nous apprennent les Archives de Moscow’, (CIBI) pp. 14-15, cited in Andy Durgan, 
‘Freedom Fighters or Comintern Army?’, International Socialism Journal, 84, (Autumn 1999) p.6.
154 Source for arrival data: Moscow 545/6/89-91 & IBA Box D-7 File A/1.
310
Conclusions: Volunteers for Liberty or Comintern Army?
The crisis in numbers forced the British party to suggest to some party members that 
they might consider volunteering for Spain,155 and to reconsider allowing important 
cadres to volunteer. Bob Cooney, a commissar with the battalion in 1938, who had 
originally been persuaded not to volunteer, describes how he was allowed to go to Spain 
arrived in October 1937, “after a crisis in the battalion, a loss o f manpower and terrific 
losses in leadership.”156 Billy Griffiths, a member of the Rhondda Communist Party 
committee, and one o f James Hopkins’ ‘true believers,’ was also asked to volunteer, and 
rather resented being taken away from this party work in Britain.
I resented being asked to go to Spain. Why me? Could I be spared? Alas, for my conceit 
everyone agreed that I should go. I was not indispensable.157
Tom Murray, a Labour Councillor (and at the same time an underground Communist 
Party member) was also asked to volunteer in 1938, following the retreats of the spring:
A local official of the Communist Party asked me if I was prepared to go, and I said, “If 
it’s the view of the Party that I should go, then I’ll go.”158
Murray believed that this official had made a mistake and indeed, when he arrived in 
Spain, Peter Kerrigan, the Daily Worker correspondent and erstwhile base commissar at 
Albacete, admitted as much, and tried to persuade him to return.159
155 Walter Gregory, for example, a party member and organiser from Nottingham, was asked by Clarence 
Mason, the paid CP organiser for the Nottingham area, “Would you like to go to Spain?” Interview with 
Thomas Walter Gregory, IWMSA 8851/9/1 and Gregory, p. 19.
156 Interview with Bob Cooney, in Corkhill & Rawnsley, p.l 18.
157 Billy Griffiths, unpublished MS, p.l.
158 Interview with Tom Murray, in MacDougall, p.308.
159 Ibid, p.310-311.
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According to Robson, who was responsible for recruitment, this policy of 
encouraging party figures to volunteer was abandoned in 1938, as the party became 
increasingly concerned about the number of senior party cadres killed in Spain. 
Thereafter, figures were no longer encouraged to volunteer.160 As George Aitken stated 
concerning the repatriation o f the battalion commissar George Coyle, “He was a valuable 
party cadre and that we should try to protect such comrades as much as possible since we 
had already lost so many of our very best Party comrades.”161 However, K.W. Watkins’ 
claim that, “A policy was pursued by which the really key men were never committed to 
dangerous participation in the struggle”162 is not accurate. Many senior party figures did 
serve in Spain, usually as political commissars, but the loss of Ralph Fox encouraged the 
party to try to keep senior figures as base commissars at Albacete, rather than on front­
line service. Nevertheless, Will Paynter, Tom Murray, Bob Cooney and Walter Tapsell 
all served at the front during 1938. Indeed, Will Paynter, who was a senior member of the 
South Wales Miners’ Federation as well as nominated for the central committee of the 
Communist Party, was actually asked to go to Spain.163
As recruits dribbled in during the summer of 1937 following the heavy losses at 
Brunete, there were, once again, complaints about their quality. In a letter to Harry Pollitt 
in September 1937, Will Paynter complained that,
160 Francis, Miners Against Fascism, p. 164.
161 Letter from George Aitken to the party bureau, undated (but probably September 1937), IBA Box C, 
File 17/7. It is also true that, as a letter from Peter Kerrigan, the brigade commissar at Albacete to Harry 
Pollitt testifies, the creation of the commissariat at Albacete was partly an attempt by Andre Marty to 
preserve the lives of valuable Communist cadres, following the deaths of Ralph Fox and Hans Beimler (a 
Communist ex-deputy of the Reichstag) in the battles for Madrid in December 1936. Letter from Peter 
Kerrigan to Harry Pollitt, 4 January 1937, CP/IND/POLL/2/5-6, NMLH Manchester.
162 Watkins, p. 176.
163 Francis, Miners Against Fascism, p. 169.
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Not only do we need and demand new forces but they must be better quality than the 
recent batches have been. I have reported to you the types that are finding their way out 
here. I may inform you that apprehension about this is not just confined to us. Some other 
people are expressing concern.164
Of course, at first, it had been military experience, rather than political resolve, which 
had been the main criterion for recruits, though the latter might be considered a necessary 
replacement for a lack of the former.165 And, as correspondence from Spain sent back to 
London clearly shows, this was not an infrequent occurrence, hardly surprising when 
recruitment for the International Brigades became increasingly difficult. Many of the 
more middle-class volunteers had been in the Officer Training Corps (OTC) at school 
and some, like Sam Russell, chose to join whilst at university.166 Many volunteers had 
served in the Territorial Army, though again not for the ‘conventional’ reasons. As Phil 
Gillan, who fought in the battles for Madrid in late 1936 pointed out, “Not out of 
patriotism, no way; it was the only way we could get a holiday.”167
Thus the proportion of British volunteers with previous military experience is rather 
higher than one might have imagined, though it is worth noting that where volunteers had 
served in the forces, their experience was not necessarily relevant. Whilst ex-navy men 
such as Fred Copeman and Sam Wild could draw on their experiences, others could not.
164 Letter from Will Paynter to Harry Pollitt, IBA Box C, File 17/1.
165 Ralph Fox, the battalion commissar of No. 1 Company who was killed at Lopera in late December 
1936, had argued that military experience was essential and that only a small number of “good, loyal and 
tried comrades” should be taken on. He was somewhat scathing in his remarks, stating that there should be 
no more “odds and sods from Bloomsbury, of whom we have had a few.” IBA Box C File 8/2.
166 Russell argued the Leninist line that, “a working-class which doesn’t learn the use of arms deserves to 
be slaves.” Interview with Sam Russell, IWMSA 9484/6/1.
167 Interview with Phil Gillan, Ian MacDougall p. 13. As Bill Alexander put it, “those who had previously 
served in the regular forces had enlisted because the food and pay provided an escape from unemployment 
and hardship.” Alexander, p. 133.
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For example, George Brown asked Walter Greenhalgh, a fellow Mancunian he knew 
from the Young Communist League to join up because Brown knew he had been in the 
Territorial Army. Unfortunately, though Greenhalgh did indeed possess experience of the 
Territorial Army, his time had been spent as a drummer. Thus the level o f military 
experience o f the volunteers appears greater than perhaps it actually was, as does the 
level o f disaffection, desertions and discipline within the British Battalion o f the XV 
International Brigade.
Figure 18. Proportion of British volunteers with some previous military experience.168
Clearly, the files held in the archive in Moscow have demonstrated that the official 
histories of the British Battalion were somewhat limited in approach. Nevertheless, many 
of the surviving British volunteers do not feel that the picture of the conflict presented in 
recent works bears much resemblance to their experiences o f the Spanish war. They
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believe strongly that the volunteers were not Moscow’s dupes; the volunteers went to 
Spain to fight fascism and, by their definition o f fascism, they did just that. Most 
volunteers still look back with pride both on their own involvement in particular, and the 
involvement o f international support in general, for the Republicans in the war, despite 
trenchant criticisms of the Communist Party’s role in Spain. Like the Spanish Republic 
itself, the volunteers who fought in Spain had little official support, and thus were 
eternally grateful for what help they did receive from the Communist Party and the Soviet 
Union. And the volunteers’ analysis was, after all, proved correct. These ‘premature anti­
fascists’ were fighting an illegal military rising launched against a legally elected 
Government; the rising was supported by the might o f the European fascist powers of 
Italy and Germany and the war was the precursor for the wider European conflict that the 
western democracies had sacrificed the Spanish Republic to avoid. In September 1939 
the governments o f Europe could hardly say they had not been warned.
168 Drawn from a sample of 582 volunteers who were asked whether, or not, they had military experience 
before their time in Spain. Moscow 545/6/91.
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Appendix
The first major research task in the elaboration of this thesis required me to design 
and create a huge computerised database of the nearly 2 400 British volunteers in Spain. 
This database is the bedrock on which the thesis rests. It gathers together all details that I 
was able to unearth of the volunteers’ addresses, ages, party affiliation, trade union 
membership and occupational profiles (which formed the basis of the first chapter). In 
addition, each volunteer’s role within the International Brigades, including their date of 
arrival, rank, service history and either the date of leaving Spain or, in many cases, the 
date and place of death, is also listed.
This database was compiled principally from documents held in the International 
Brigade Archive in London, the Public Record Office in Kew and the International 
Brigade Collection in Moscow, though it also includes information from the interviews 
held in the Imperial War Museum, the memoirs of volunteers, and all the other primary 
and secondary sources consulted during the research for this thesis.
London University regulations stipulate a maximum limit of 100 000 words so, 
unfortunately, it has not been possible to include a printed annotated list of the British 
volunteers within this thesis. However, a ‘read-only’ version o f the database, in Microsoft 
Access 2000 format, is enclosed within the thesis on a CD ROM (see rear cover). A copy 
has also been deposited with the International Brigade Archive in London.
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